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Abstract 
Suborbital flights will soon take flight as a viable commercial operation. Operators such as Virgin 
Galactic, along with their designer Scaled Composites, will be responsible for safety of the flight 
crew, Spaceflight Participants and indeed the uninvolved public beneath their flight trajectories.  
Within the United States, the Federal Aviation Authority’s Office of Commercial Transportation 
(FAA-AST) has provided Launch License Regulations and Guidelines for prospective design 
organisations and operators alike. The aim of this thesis is to analyse suborbital spaceflight 
approaches to safety management and to determine whether effective safety management is being or 
could be applied to influence vehicle design and subsequent operation. 
The thesis provides a review of current safety-related information on suborbital spaceflight, existing 
space safety information and also existing aviation safety information. The findings of the review 
concern two main areas; firstly that a gap exists within suborbital safety management criteria, and 
secondly that a gap exists in existing aviation-based safety guidelines.  
In the first case, the research concluded that FAA-AST safety management criteria did not present 
sufficiently explicit and rationalised guidelines for this new industry. Indeed, the thesis argues that the 
scope of the FAA-AST regulations (covering both orbital and suborbital aspects) is too broad, and 
that regulations and guidelines should be split into distinct orbital and suborbital sections so as to 
provide more effective directives.  
In Europe, no such regulations or guidelines exist as there has until now been no requirement (a 
‘customer’) for the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to implement such a framework. This 
thesis sought to address this gap by using a safety tool (Goal Structuring Notation) to construct a goal-
based regulatory approach, which was included in a draft EASA suborbital Policy.  
Secondly, the main significant finding of this research is that a gap (literally) exists between current 
aviation-based design organisation safety guidelines and operator safety risk management guidelines. 
This absence of communication means operators are not managing their safety risks as effectively as 
they could. The thesis argues that the suborbital domain should take heed, as most vehicles are based 
on aircraft designs and therefore suborbital operators will, no doubt, apply ‘best practice’ either from 
the aviation or commercial space domains. Neither is appropriate or effective.  
As a result of the main finding a contiguous safety model has been developed which employs a ‘key 
(platform) hazard’ to join the design organisation analysis to the operator safety risk management, 
therefore completing an explicit sequence from the initiating causal event to the accident. The model 
is demonstrated using case studies from space disasters (Space Shuttle) and also from aviation 
accidents (Air France flight AF447); the model details the explicit accident sequence and shows 
missing or failed controls leading up to the accident.  
The research enabled models to be constructed and also proposed additional and explicit guidelines 
for the suborbital industry such as medical and training standards and separate safety criteria for 
vertical launch vehicles; these are included as recommendations and need to be ratified by recognised 
bodies such as the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety’s Suborbital Space 
Safety Technical Committee for inclusion in their Space Safety Standards Manual. In the latter case 
these recommendations are already agenda items for the Technical Committee to address.       
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CHAPTER ONE – Introduction & Research Strategy  
 INTRODUCTION 1.
This Thesis is purposely focused on the Personal Spaceflight Industry and therefore concentrates on 
the nascent suborbital domain. It is recognised that fee-paying individuals have been to the 
International Space Station by means of a Soyuz rocket and are deemed fully fledged astronauts; these 
people have been assigned a scientific project to enable them to be eligible. They have also been 
trained under the government-based requirements and have launched under government-based 
existing regulations and guidelines and so this part of the ‘personal spaceflight’ is not included as part 
of the research. 
In October 2006 it may have appeared late in terms of trying to influence policy and guidelines with 
Virgin Galactic planning flights in 2007/2008; however no suborbital flights have taken place over the 
period of the research and a realistic start to suborbital operations is more likely to be in 2012/2013. 
Additionally no design or operating activities have taken place in Europe and the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) was not tasked with producing regulations for suborbital aircraft operations. 
Thus the opportunity still existed for the activities of the research to influence decision-makers in their 
regulations and guidelines and possibly to influence operators. 
  RESEARCH AIMS 1.1.
 TO ANALYSE THE SUBORBITAL SPACEFLIGHT APPROACHES TO SAFETY 1.1.1
MANAGEMENT 
Personal Spaceflight is an emerging field and the initial approach to ensure safety has been driven 
from the FAA through the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 (CSLAA) and with 
the Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA-AST) as 
adjudicators. The Advisory Circulars (AC), Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFRs) detail the activities required for: 
 Safety Engineering  Safety Management  Basic Training  Flight Crew  Participants – with waivers to say that they understand the risks and that the 
vehicle is not certified 
Is this sufficient? Are participant waivers appropriate? Within Europe and under EASA remit, the 
FAA guidelines and regulation are probably not appropriate. 
This thesis examines the delta between the FAA approach to Safety Management, including 
Spaceflight Training & Medical requirements and a possible European approach. The research aims to 
examine the Safety Management ‘best practices’ in the aviation and space domains in order to 
determine if a suitable ‘Safety Model’ exists for the emerging industry 
  TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPING SAFETY MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY FOR 1.1.2
SUBORBITAL SPACEFLIGHT 
Based on the analysis of the identified approaches to suborbital spaceflight there is an opportunity to 
assist in developing appropriate methodology in the safety activity and training fields.  
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Another aim of the research is to use the analysis and determine the gaps that exist and to identify new 
and integrated methods in approaching safety. 
  TO ASSIST IN THE SETTING OF SAFETY & TRAINING STANDARDS FOR SUBORBITAL 1.1.3
SPACEFLIGHT 
As the commercial spaceflight is immature and the FAA guidelines are extremely flexible, there is an 
opportunity to assist in setting the regulatory standards for safety in Europe, including medical and 
training standards. An aim of the thesis is to influence safety standards and training/medical standards 
in the emerging field.  
  TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE TECHNOLOGICAL RESOLUTIONS FOR SPACEFLIGHT  1.1.4
OPERATORS BASED ON CURRENT & EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
When analysing the leading operator’s spacecraft designs, it is clear that in some areas there are 
weaknesses in their methodology and safety has not been an influential factor – rather it has been a 
solution-based methodology as opposed to a full acquisition cycle with safety input along the way.   
Therefore, this part of the research aims to identify emerging technologies and examines whether 
retrospective application is possible using safety analysis techniques. 
  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  1.2.
  GAP ANALYSIS 1.2.1
A gap analysis is the first objective in order to determine the shortfalls in the suborbital spaceflight 
approach in comparison to the aviation and governmental space programmes. The gap analysis will be 
applied to the following areas: 
 Safety Management Systems  Safety Criteria  Hazard Management  Risk Management  Training  Medical  Emerging Technologies 
 SPACEFLIGHT SAFETY ACTIVITIES 1.2.2
One of the objectives is to undertake safety activities should a gap be identified during the analysis; 
the following are anticipated ‘gaps’ from the initial research, networking and conferences attended: 
 European Suborbital Aircraft Safety Criteria  Safety Management System for Spaceports  Safety Assessment of Operator – although it was hoped that ‘Rocketplane’ or 
Virgin Galactic would have provided an opportunity for analysis this did not 
materialise. Instead the company Zero2Infinity were content for a safety analysis 
to be conducted regarding their ‘near space’ BLOON project.  A contiguous safety model 
  SPACEFLIGHT MEDICAL & TRAINING ACTIVITIES 1.2.3
Another objective is to review and then analyse the extremely limited medical and training guidelines 
suggested by the FAA. The objectives of this part of the research is related to the actual medical 
criterion and training that is derived from synthesised safety analysis i.e. training that is required as 
mitigation to specific Hazards. 
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   IDENTIFICATION & REVIEW OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS FOR 1.2.4
SPECIFIC  USE  BY INDUSTRY 
The final objective is to identify emerging technologies and to review these for their suitability for the 
commercial spaceflight industry; one method used is a safety technique – Cost Benefit Analysis. This 
is used as part of the ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP) process. It is anticipated that this 
may be qualitative rather than quantitative due to the immaturity of the industry however this part of 
the research will examine (by synthesised safety analysis) the additional technology-based risk 
reduction measures as part of an ALARP Evaluation process.  
  RESEARCH FRAMEWORK OUTPUTS 1.3.
Research framework agreements have been sought with relevant organisations in order to undertake 
the research activities. The purpose of the agreements is to be able to provide safety influence in 
achieving stated objectives; an example with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is to 
provide safety rules and guidelines for the European Suborbital Aircraft (SoA) Industry. The 
framework agreements were finalised during the academic year 2010-2011. The research was then 
able to continue with the author being involved in the Preliminary Regulatory Impact Assessment; 
however the European Commission (EC) has not yet approved the task for EASA and therefore the 
task is only part complete. Nonetheless the research thus far has enabled a partial summary of the SoA 
Policy to be produced and also has enabled the author to continue with a more in-depth analysis which 
is presented as ‘supplemental considerations’ to the Policy; the aim here is that EASA can elect to 
include parts of the supplemental research as part of their guidelines whereas the Policy will be kept at 
a high level.  
The following areas were hoped to be covered and the thesis goals had to remain flexible over the 
period of the research due to prospective opportunities not materialising: 
 EUROPEAN SAFETY CRITERIA – EASA task started and currently on hold; 
research continued and has provided ‘supplemental considerations’ for EASA as 
well as a SoA Policy goal-based safety argument structure  SPACEFLIGHT TRAINING PROGRAMME– not materialised and this is 
instead covered in Chapter 3  SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM – SPACEPORT– not materialised and a 
synthesis has been conducted in Chapter 4  SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR OPERATOR – the author provided 
safety guidance for Virgin Galactic (SMS framework) however the contract 
required a Non-Disclosure Agreement and therefore the work could not be 
included in the thesis   EMERGING TECHNOLOGY REVIEW – ‘zero2infinity’ – Non Disclosure 
Agreement in place to research the safety criteria and emerging technologies for 
the ‘Near-Space’ Balloon experience (BLOON). This has been completed in 
Chapter 4.    
  METHOD OF RESEARCH 1.4.
  RESEARCH FRAMEWORK METHODOLOGY 1.4.1
The research methodology employed is captured in Figure 2 below using a Goal Structuring Notation 
(GSN) approach. GSN is a graphical representation of an argument and is the preferred methodology 
for articulating a safety case; this application of the technique is discussed further in Chapter 2.2. The 
GSN is used here to represent the research undertaken and is used to argue the completeness and 
effectiveness of the thesis; as such it was used as a ‘living’ document throughout the life of the 
research and updates have occurred as a result of changing situations; an example was that 
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‘Rocketplane’ were the designated Spacecraft Operator for analysis under formal Non-Disclosure 
Agreement, however due to financial issues they are no longer developing a commercial spacecraft1. 
Also Virgin Galactic work could not be reproduced due to Non-Disclosure Agreements. This has led 
to another Operator being sought for analysis and Zero2Infinity were content for their BLOON 
project to be analysed within a research framework during the later stages of the thesis. Additionally 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) research framework took longer than expected and 
eventually started in January 2011; this was subsequently placed ‘on hold’ in May whilst the 
European Commission made their decision on the Preliminary Regulatory Impact Assessment.  
GSN Symbols: 
The following GSN graphical notation is used both in the research methodology ‘Thesis Case’ and 
also for a proposed ‘future-state’ EASA goal-based regulatory safety case in Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 1: Goal Structuring Notation graphical ‘nodes’ 
The ‘Thesis Case’ Top Goal has amplifying statements (Context) such as definitions, the aims and 
objectives of the research. The Top Goal is supported by an argument (Top Strategy) detailing the 
sub-goals; Review (Goal 1), Gap Analysis (G2), proposed safety models and guidelines for a ‘future-
state’ (G3) and an effective validation process (G4). The argument is then supported by evidence that 
the research has been completed and validated (solutions E.1.1 etc.). 
                                                     
1
 Rocketplane have since resurfaced in April 2011 and are linked with possible opportunities in Holland with the 
‘Spacelinq’ project. 
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Figure 2: Research Methodology and Results using Goal Structuring Notation – unable to complete task E3.1 due EASA resourcing  
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1.4.1.1 ‘THESIS CASE’ FRAMEWORK  Top Goal: The research of ‘Examining the Influence of Safety Management in the 
Personal Spaceflight Industry’ meets the stated aims, objectives and deliverables 
in order to satisfy the criteria for the award of PhD. 
The Context of which the ‘Top Goal’ is argued is as follows: 
 Context 1 [C_Top_1]: Definition of Safety Management; A Safety Management 
System is a safety organizational function concerned with implementing and 
managing safety policies and procedures necessary to undertake formal safety 
risk management (see Section 2.2).  C_Top_2: Definition of Personal Spaceflight; for the purpose of this Thesis, 
Personal Spaceflight is considered as travel to space by fee-paying personnel 
[space is further defined as 100km, see Section 1.7].  C_Top_3: Aims of the Research (See Section 1.1)  C_Top_4: Objectives of the Research (See Section 1.2)  C_Top_5: Proposed models and guidelines of the Research; these are those 
documents (results of particular research) produced as part of a research 
framework with an organising body, such as the SoA Policy and guidelines for 
EASA and also the safety analysis for Zero-2-Infinity. Also the SATURN 
SAFETY MODEL and resultant hazard log will be a product of the research and it 
is intended that this will be peer reviewed.   C_Top_6: Bibliography & References (see bibliography & references as 
appropriate)  C_Top_7: Recommendation from the Research in terms of Safety & Training & 
‘other’ aspects considered (see Section 6.3)  
 
The Top Goal is supported by a logical research strategy (Top Strategy) which demonstrates that the 
research meets the top goal. This Top Strategy is supported by four strands of the argument; an 
effective review (Goal G1), a Gap Analysis (G2), innovative proposed models, guidelines and 
methodologies (G3) and validation of the research (G4): 
 (G1): The review of spaceflight-related literature and industry standards ensures 
thorough understanding of personal spaceflight issues; G1 is supported by 
Evidence of sufficient literature review (E1.1) and Evidence of Personal 
Spaceflight Industry review (E1.2).  (G2): The Gap Analysis is comprehensive in order to meet the aims and 
objectives; G2 is supported by Evidence (E2.1) Authors Papers and Evidence 
(E2.2) Authors Gap Analysis.  (G3): The proposed models, guidelines and methodologies are innovative and 
appropriate for the identified disciplines; G3 is supported by Evidence (E3.1) 
EASA Policy2 (E3.2) Spaceflight Medical & Training Analysis, (E3.3) Operator 
Analysis (E3.4) Spaceport Analysis, (E3.5) Synthesis of Emerging Technologies 
and (E3.6) New Safety Model.   (G4): The validation process is effective in ensuring the Thesis has met the Top 
Goal; G4 is supported by Evidence (E4.1) Authors Findings, Evidence (E4.2) 
Authors Discussions and also Validation by Industry Evidence and G4.1 is 
supported by Evidence (E4.1.1) EASA validation, (E4.1.2) Operator validation 
and (E4.1.4) External Supervisor validation. 
                                                     
2
 The EASA evidence (E3.1) is shown 40% complete because the task for the next phase has not been 
authorised for EASA by the EC. The 40% claim is due to the initial Pre-RIA being complete and the author’s 
efforts in the EASA Policy Safety Case and Supplemental Considerations as detailed in Chapter 3. 
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The evidence that the goals have been met is justified at section 5.6. 
 REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND RELEVANT SAFETY TECHNIQUES 1.5.
The review phase of the research concentrates on the spaceflight domain but also examines the safety 
techniques from the aviation domain. 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 1.5.1
Personal Spaceflight is an emerging field with the FAA-AST leading the way; hence the literature 
review strategy is twofold: 
 Review of FAA-AST Rules and Guidelines for the Industry. This involves 
reviewing initial FAA-AST documents and then reviewing updates to them as 
they are issued; an example of this is the AC No.437.55-1 [18] which has 
superseded the previous 2005 version (AC No.431.35-2A). The reviews are 
captured in Chapter 2.1.  Review of Books, Journals and articles on spaceflight; this includes information 
on government-led space programmes, such as National Aerospace & Space 
Agency (NASA), European Space Agency (ESA) documents and other relevant 
space standards. These reviews are also captured in Chapter 2.1.  
  EMERGING PERSONAL SPACEFLIGHT INDUSTRY REVIEW 1.5.2
Although the Personal Spaceflight Industry is yet to begin commercial operations, there has been 
increased interest during the last few years and the progress of companies such as Virgin Galactic has 
been slow but notable. This part of the review covers relevant papers from space-related conferences 
and also covers relevant articles from the emerging Industry (Chapter 2.1.2). 
  GAP ANALYSIS 1.5.3
A GAP Analysis is defined in the ‘Business Directory’ as: 
‘Technique for determining the steps to be taken in moving from a current 
state to a desired future-state’ 
In terms of the gap analysis undertaken in Chapter 2.3.2 the purpose is to analyse the current state in 
regards to the applicable Safety Management activities relating to the FAA’s Rules and Guidelines 
and other applicable standards. The rationale is that the first Personal Spaceflight launches will be 
undertaken in America and the FAA-AST are the only governing body to have published criteria for 
designers and operators to follow. The outcome of the gap analysis can be viewed as one step in 
moving from the current state and Chapter 3 examines a possible policy and guidelines for EASA 
consideration in moving forward to a desired future-state. 
 REVIEW OF SAFETY ‘TOOLS’ 1.5.4
It is necessary to review the different approaches to Safety Management and System Safety in order to 
determine which aspects are applicable and considered ‘best practice’ such that they can be taken 
forward to the emerging Personal Spaceflight Industry. The reviews are captured in Chapter 2.2. 
  REVIEW OF SPACEFLIGHT MEDICAL STANDARDS 1.5.5
Understanding the principles of Safety Management and in particular Risk Management will enable a 
clear understanding of what hazards are present and what mitigation strategies are required. Having a 
robust medical strategy will form important mitigation to minimise the likelihood of harm to the 
spaceflight participants. Chapter 2.3.4 examines the FAA regulations (current state). 
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  REVIEW OF TRAINING APPROACHES 1.5.6
A component of a Safety Management System (SMS) is ‘Training’ and a review of the different 
approaches of how to establish training for the Personal Spaceflight Industry is necessary because of 
the complex and demanding environment that spaceflight passengers or ‘participants’ (SFPs) will be 
subjected to. The reviews are captured in Chapter 2.3.6; these include a comparison of governmental 
(NASA), military and civilian training approaches as well as the FAA regulations (current state).  
  SAFETY INFLUENCE  1.5.7
The main purpose of the research is to examine whether safety management can influence the 
emerging Personal Spaceflight Industry. The methodology for determining Safety Influence hinges on 
the results of the gap analysis in Chapter 2.3.2 and then examines whether the policies, guidelines and 
models presented by the ‘gaps’ can be effectively applied to the areas discussed in Chapter 3 and 
hence influencing a move from the current state to a future-state. This is achieved through research 
frameworks with organisations as detailed in 3.2 and 4.4; where research frameworks are not 
available then the ‘guidelines’ will be validated accordingly.  
  SYNTHESIS 1.5.8
Chapter 4 presents a synthesis of emerging and current technologies that may have a direct impact on 
the safety of the vehicle and people on board. This chapter also examines the benefit of utilising one 
of the identified technologies against the cost of implementing the technology (for instance as a 
control measure); one of the safety techniques involved is ‘Cost Benefit Analysis’ which is reviewed 
in Chapter 2.2 in the first instance. 
 RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS & PRE-REQUISITES 1.6.
 ASSUMPTIONS: 1.6.1
It is assumed that the models and guidelines from this research are treated in accordance with standard 
Intellectual Proprietary rules. 
   PRE-REQUISITES: 1.6.2
It is a pre-requisite that the personnel contacted for information about their ‘spaceflight-related’ 
company or for validation of this research are Suitably Qualified Experienced Personnel (SQEP). 
 THESIS ROADMAP FOR THE READER 1.7.
 The thesis starts with an introduction to space tourism because there are already orbital fee paying 
‘astronauts’ who fly on the existing governmental program on board a Russian Soyuz spacecraft. This 
thesis however concentrates on the nascent suborbital domain and the introduction therefore describes 
the origins of the X-Prize in 2004 to commercial development in 2011.  
Having set the scene for the suborbital ‘space’ industry Chapter 2 then reviews the relevant 
information available. As the suborbital industry is yet to take off it was important to reflect on the 
current orbital spaceflight accidents to gauge the safety of the space industry. Next a review of 
existing safety tools and techniques was carried out to determine how this was achieved and whether 
this could be improved for the suborbital domain. Here it was also considered necessary to review the 
aviation-based safety guidelines because most suborbital vehicles have aircraft-like designs. Finally 
within Chapter 2 a review of existing commercial spaceflight legislation and guidelines was carried 
out along with other emerging and related guidelines.  
Chapter 3 details possible ways in which Safety Management can influence the emerging industry by 
addressing the key gaps identified in Chapter 2. In the first instance the recommendations from this 
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thesis have been transferred to the Suborbital Safety Technical Committee of the International 
Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (the author is the Chair of this Technical 
Committee). Secondly a framework was established with the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) to assist in providing a Suborbital Aircraft (SoA) Policy; here the research and gap analysis 
provided the initial roadmap for the Policy and provided ‘supplemental guidelines for consideration’. 
However the European Commission have stopped the work on SoA Policy due to other higher 
priorities within EASA and hence this meant the task was not concluded; this is detailed as further 
work. Additionally in Chapter 3 an exemplar safety model was developed because of the gap 
identified within the aviation domain; the model is relevant to the suborbital and aviation domains and 
case studies have been used to show how a contiguous safety management approach could prevent 
accidents. Chapter 3 also provides analysis of Spaceport Safety and guidelines for reducing operator 
risks with medical, training and protective equipment strategies.  
Chapter 4 provides a synthesis of emerging technologies relevant to the suborbital domain including 
spacesuits, emergency systems and rocket propulsion systems. Additionally a framework was agreed 
with a space tourism company (Zero2Infinity) to analyse their ‘near space’ balloon project using the 
safety model and supplemental guidelines for consideration from Chapter 3.  
Chapter 5 details the findings and significance of the research and provides validation of the thesis by 
EASA and Zero2Infinity.  
Chapter 6 details the conclusions and recommendations. Additional supporting information is 
contained within the Appendices including a Functional Hazard Analysis, Case Studies of Space 
Shuttle disasters and the Air France AF447 accident and the EASA SoA Policy Goal Structuring 
Notation (not finished).
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 BACKGROUND – SPACE TOURISM 1.8.
 A NEW ERA IN SPACE TRAVEL 1.8.1
Travelling into Space for tourism may seem to some as fanciful and futuristic however this is already 
a reality courtesy of Space Adventures. There have been seven fee-paying Space Tourists thus far and 
more will follow; indeed Space Adventures are planning ‘trips’ around the Moon and back to Earth as 
one of their services. The first ‘tourist’ Denis Tito launched into Space in 2001 and Charles Simonyi 
liked his first experience in 2007 so much that he went to Space for a second time in 2009 (thus 
making it eight space tourist trips3). 
Of course to achieve this, the Space Tourists must actually become scientific-based members of the 
crew embarking to spend 10 days on the International Space Station (ISS). First of all they must 
undergo full astronaut medical tests and training for six months and they are then classified as 
astronauts and are no longer considered ‘Space Tourists’. Nonetheless they have paid circa 
$20Million for the experience and are thus still fee-paying members of the public. 
Suborbital flight could be considered as the gateway to orbital flights in that commercialising space to 
the mass market requires a cheaper and quicker process than the existing orbital space tourism market. 
A suborbital flight is one that reaches an altitude higher than 100 km (62 miles, or 328,000 ft.) above 
sea level; this altitude, known as the Kármán line, was chosen by the Fédération Aéronautique 
Internationale4. Once the suborbital market is mature (and by implication, safe) and the costs reduced 
then Design Organisations (DO) and Operators will be able to derive the necessary orbital-capable 
machine based on the ‘low cost’ model for their suborbital machines. 
  THE X-PRIZE AND OTHER KEY INITIATIVES 1.8.2
Two dates will remain key moments in the new and exciting field of Space Tourism – 29th September 
and 4th October 2004, when Space Ship One (SS1) achieved heights of 103km and a record breaking 
112km respectively. The flight was a 2-stage launch profile: the first stage was up to 50,000ft with the 
SS1 attached to a ’Mother-Ship’ (the White Knight) to save on fuel; the second stage was the release 
of SS1 at 50,000ft, followed by rocket ignition taking SS1 to the pre-requisite ‘space height’ of 
100km at three times the speed of sound. The spacecraft spent five minutes in the space environment 
under its own momentum and then returned through the atmosphere under gravity using a unique 
wing feathering system before returning to normal configuration and gliding back to the departure 
runway. 
The flight of SS1 evolved from the $10M Ansari X-Prize competition [1] instigated by Peter 
Diamandis. The aim was to design and build a craft capable of achieving a manned 100km ‘space’ 
flight twice within a week. The objective of the prize was to demonstrate that the craft were actually 
‘reusable’ i.e. a Re-Launch Vehicle (RLV).  For this achievement to be taken forward, the Ansari X-
Prize winners must evolve from a competition into a viable commercial operation.  Scaled 
Composite’s SS1 design was the baseline vehicle for Virgin Galactic’s requirements to take space 
tourists into suborbital flight. Now seven years later Scaled Composites have designed and built Space 
Ship 2 and White Knight 2 and are presently in the test phase. However along the way there have 
been set-backs; in 2007 during a simple test of their new hybrid rocket propulsion system (nitrous 
oxide injector test) there was a catastrophic accident killing three scientists and injuring several 
                                                     
3
 http://www.spaceadventures.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=orbital.Clients 
4
 See Wikipedia information on the FAI and general information on spaceflight;  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federation_Aronautique_Internationale 
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others. This sad event should have been avoided and one could question whether a Safety 
Management System was in place. Scaled Composites have since moved on with the design and are 
looking forward to commercial operations with Virgin Galactic in the coming years. 
The current X-Prize competition (Google Lunar X Prize) has a $50M prize for the team who can 
design and build a craft as a ‘Lunar Lander’ with vertical take-off and landing capabilities. 
Other initiatives include Bigelow Aerospace [2] and his ‘Space Hotels’; this incredible initiative’s 
design, build and test phase is already mirroring the spacecraft’s path with the idea that Operators and 
their designers will want to have a spacecraft that is capable of ‘docking’ with a space hotel. Bigelow 
has made impressive progress and has already launched his first two prototypes ‘Genesis I’ and 
‘Genesis II’ into orbit; tests are being conducted as to the strength and rigidity of the structures 
currently orbiting the Earth. 
  THE SPACE MARKET 1.8.3
The Space market can really be split into two fields; orbital and suborbital. In the orbital field, Space 
Exploration Technologies (Space-X) are the leaders having won a lucrative contract from NASA to 
provide a commercial crew transportation system to the ISS. They have developed the Falcon-9 
launch system for their Dragon spacecraft and on 8th December 2010 they became the first 
commercial company in history to re-enter a spacecraft from orbit; this was their first successful 
orbital test launch – the company experienced test launch accidents with their Falcon-9 rocket during 
earlier test phases (see Chapter 2). 
In terms of the suborbital field, Virgin Galactic (air-launched system) is demonstrably the early 
leaders5 with XCOR progressing well with a different vehicle approach (rocket-powered aircraft 
taking off horizontally by its own means). Other companies employing a vertical capsule system such 
as Armadillo Aerospace and Blue Origin are also progressing well. There are quite a few other 
companies in various stages of early design stages and these will emerge to fruition over the next 
decade. 
In regards to the suborbital market projections, the updated Futron/Zogby report [3] suggests that up 
to 13,000 people per year could be undertaking suborbital flights by 2021. In a more recent 
contrasting study by the European Space Research and Technology Centre [4] the number is 
estimated at 15,000 people per year; the report suggests that the industry could move towards a 
classical aeronautical business model as soon as there would be a sufficient number of spacecraft 
manufacturers to cater for demand. The report further suggests that the ‘luxury travel market’ 
represents a unique chance for space tourism to get off the ground and reach the critical mass that will 
enable a significant ticket price decrease. 
  COMMERCIALISING SPACE 1.8.4
A commercial operation of this type can only be considered viable if it is also safe. Herein lays the 
challenge for the nascent space tourism industry. Safety is paramount, as in conventional commercial 
aviation; however, the risks in suborbital flights will be far greater due to the spaceflight 
environmental aspects. Commercial space tourism sits in the grey area between NASA and the 
regulated FAA-AST. This uncharted area therefore requires new regulations and standards. To give 
the industry impetus, it clearly requires a 2-way dialogue between the regulator and the operator of the 
                                                     
5
 Virgin Galactic/Scaled Composites are currently (2011) in the ‘Test and Evaluation’ phase; their latest 
successful airdrop was conducted on 4 May 2011 
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Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV)/Suborbital Aircraft (SoA). This will ensure safety and also the 
required flexibility (in the form of disclaimers and insurances). Having an impractical and an 
unyielding approach would be too restrictive for the general public if they are to become space 
participants 
The FAA has appointed the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA-AST) [5] as the 
governing body and the CLSAA (2004) as legislation for the fledgling commercial spaceflight 
industry. Other commercial avenues are being examined by NASA in providing contracts to 
commercial companies such as ‘Space-X’ to provide an orbital spacecraft to re-supply the 
International Space Station (ISS). This contracting approach has also been extended to include Boeing 
and Armadillo Aerospace. 
  SAFETY, SAFETY, SAFETY 1.8.5
Commercial (Personal) Spaceflight is still in its infancy and regarding Safety Management policies, 
the FAA-AST is concentrating more on the designer’s experiment permits and safety activities rather 
than the policies and procedures of operators; however they use the term ‘operator’ for Scaled 
Composites (for example) as the design company who will be designing, building and testing the 
spaceship as part of an experimental license i.e. they are not discussing Virgin Galactic as the 
operator.  
Furthermore the FAA-AST Advisory Circular (AC) regarding Hazard Analysis is not as robust as it 
could be and this element is analysed during the research as part of the gap analysis in Chapter 2.3. In 
terms of a prospective spaceflight operator’s safety management, the FAA-AST has a 3-pronged 
strategy towards safety assurance for RLV mission and vehicle operation’s licensing. The strategy is 
depicted in various FAA-AST documents, including their guide to RLV Reliability Analysis [6] 
whereby the three strands are: 
 Using a logical, disciplined system safety process to identify hazards and to 
mitigate or eliminate risk,  Establishing limitations of acceptable public risk as determined through a 
calculation of the individual and collective risk, including the expected number of 
casualties (Ec)   Imposing mandatory and derived operating requirements 
This 3-pronged strategy is also discussed as part of the gap analysis in Chapter 2.3. 
Why do we need to consider operators at such an early stage? The answer is involvement; even 
though an operator may not be planning to ‘fly’ for a number of years until the spacecraft has been 
designed, built and tested, the operator should have a Safety Management System in order to build a 
safety culture; indeed within Europe this should be mandated as part of an Air Operator Certificate 
(AOC) – the FAA-AST has not mandated this as yet though its aviation safety counterpart (FAA-
AVS) is introducing this. Additionally as the reliability of these new spacecraft will be relatively low 
and essentially un-proven the operator procedural mitigation will play a large factor in providing 
safety assurance to the regulators; hence it is important to establish these operator procedures in 
conjunction with the operator.  
Having a top-down and bottom-up safety effort right from the concept stage would provide tangible 
evidence in support of the safety effort which could avert an accident/mishap. Dianne Vaughan [7] 
discovered a lack of safety culture as part of the contributory aspects of the Challenger disaster at 
NASA: 
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‘flying with ‘’acceptable risks’’ was normative in NASA culture. The five-step 
decision sequence I found that characterized work group decision-making 
about the SRB (Solid Rocket Boosters) joints was nothing less than the 
working group conforming to NASA’s procedures for hazard analysis….in 
fact the listing and description of the ‘’acceptable risks’’ on the Space Shuttle 
prior to the first launch in April 1981 filled six volumes.’     
In essence, safety is a key component to the success of the evolving industry and the safety effort 
needs to be robust and practicable in all industry fields during the formative years. A safety culture 
takes time to evolve and the process should be started at the beginning of a project and be a ‘just and 
learning’ culture. Safety Culture is discussed in Section 2.2.9. 
  EMERGING SPACE SAFETY GOVERNING BODIES AND ASSOCIATIONS 1.8.6
As a new domain emerges there is a requirement to govern the field in terms of legality and safety. 
The suborbital domain provides challenging issues such as the cross-over from ‘air law’ to ‘space 
law’ and sovereignty of that ‘space’ segment. These issues need to be addressed at various levels such 
as the United Nations and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as a top priority due 
to the imminent start of operations from Virgin Galactic and XCOR. 
There are various Associations and Federations that can provide a body of experts from within a 
particular field and debate and influence the way forward on challenging aspects. In terms of space 
safety the following are considered leading bodies (the relevant sub-committees are listed): 
 International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) 
o Suborbital Space Safety Technical Committee (SSS TC) – this is a newly 
formed TC proposed and implemented by the author and discussed more in 
Chapter 3.  International Space Safety Federation (ISSF) 
o Commercial Human Space Safety Committee 
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   DEFINITIONS 1.9.
The following definitions apply to this Thesis: 
Term Meaning Source 
1st Party Personnel Individuals directly involved in operating the re-usable launch and 
re-entry vehicle/suborbital aircraft i.e. the flight crew/pilots 
Author derived 
See 3.3.1 
2nd Party Personnel 
individuals directly involved in supporting the spacecraft/suborbital 
aircraft (i.e. maintainers) and individuals participating in the flight 
who are not members of the flight crew i.e. passengers (spaceflight 
participants) 
Author derived 
3rd Party Personnel 
the uninvolved public and other uninvolved personnel within the 
vicinity of the spacecraft/suborbital aircraft i.e. near the vehicle on 
the ground such as within the boundaries of the Spaceport 
Author derived 
Acceptably Safe 
The Risk to a suborbital aircraft has been demonstrated to have 
been reduced so far as is reasonably practicable and that relevant 
prescriptive safety targets and safety requirements have been met 
for all phases of the suborbital flight 
Author derived 
See 2.2.6 
Accident 
An unplanned event or series of events that results in death, injury, 
occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or 
damage to the environment. 
AC120-92 
Crew 
Any employee of a licensee or transferee, or of a contractor or 
subcontractor of a licensee or transferee, who performs activities in 
the course of that employment directly relating to the launch, re-
entry, or other operation of or in a launch vehicle or re-entry 
vehicle that carries human beings. 
FAA-AST 
Failure Condition 
A condition having an effect on either the airplane or its occupants, 
or both, either direct or consequential which is caused or 
contributed to by one or more failures or errors considering flight 
phase and relevant adverse operational or environmental conditions 
or external events 
AC23.1309 
Flight crew 
Any employee of a licensee or transferee, or of a contractor or 
subcontractor of a licensee or transferee, who is on board a launch 
or re-entry vehicle and performs activities in the course of that 
employment directly relating to the launch, re-entry, or other 
operation of the launch vehicle or re-entry vehicle 
FAA-AST 
Flight Safety System 
Destructive or non-destructive system designed to limit or restrict 
the hazards to public health and safety and the safety of property 
presented by a launch vehicle or re-entry vehicle while in flight by 
initiating and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle flight 
FAA-AST 
Flight Termination 
System 
Explosive or other disabling or thrust-terminating equipment 
installed in a launch vehicle, plus any associated 
ground equipment, for terminating the flight of a malfunctioning 
vehicle or stage 
ISO-14620 
‘g’ (in relation to G-
Force) 
The ratio of actual acceleration to that of the earth’s gravity ‘g’ of 
9.8m/s² Wikipedia 
Hazard 
A physical situation, condition, or state of a system, often 
following from some initiating event, that unless mitigated may 
lead to an accident 
Based on UK 
Defence Standard 
00-56 
Human Factors 
The systematic application of relevant information about human 
capabilities, limitations, characteristics, behaviours and motivation 
to the design of systems. 
UK Defence 
Standard 00-56 
Human Rating 
A human-rated system is one that accommodates human needs, 
effectively utilizes human capabilities, controls hazards and 
manages safety risk associated with human spaceflight, and 
provides to the maximum extent practical, the capability to safely 
recover the crew from hazardous situations 
NASA 
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Independent Safety 
Auditor (ISA) 
An individual or team, from an independent organisation, that 
undertakes audits and other assessment activities to provide 
assurance that safety activities comply with planned arrangements, 
are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve objectives; 
and whether related outputs are correct, valid and fit for purpose 
UK Defence 
Standard 00-56 
Mishap Unsuccessful mission due to an accident or incident FAA-AST 
RLV 
A Re-Launch Vehicle (RLV) is a spacecraft designed to enter 
space, then re-enter and land such that the vehicle can be launched 
again 
FAA-AST 
RLV Pilot   A designated member of the RLV flight crew who has the ability to 
exercise flight control authority over a launch or re-entry vehicle FAA-AST 
Safe 
Risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is 
ALARP and broadly acceptable, or tolerable, and relevant 
prescriptive safety requirements have been met, for a system in a 
given application in a given operating environment 
UK Defence 
Standard 00-56 
Safety Case 
A structured argument supported by a body of evidence that 
provides a compelling, comprehensive and valid case that a system 
is safe for a given application in a given environment 
UK Defence 
Standard 00-56 
Safety Management 
The systematic management of the risks associated with operations, 
related ground operations and aircraft engineering or maintenance 
activities to achieve high levels of safety performance 
UK CAA 
Safety Management 
System 
A safety organizational function concerned with implementing and 
managing safety policies and procedures necessary to undertake 
formal safety risk management 
Author derived See 
2.2 
‘Safing’ An action or sequence of actions necessary to place systems, Sub-systems or component parts into predetermined safe conditions 
ISSB – Space 
Safety Standards 
Space Space shall be defined as the environment above the Earth, beginning at 62 miles (100km). 
Fédération 
Aéronautique 
Internationale 
Space flight participant 
(SFP) 
An individual, who is not crew, carried within a launch vehicle or 
re-entry vehicle FAA-AST 
Suborbital rocket 
A vehicle, rocket-propelled in whole or in part, intended for flight 
on a suborbital trajectory, and the thrust of which is greater than its 
lift for the majority of the rocket-powered portion of its ascent 
FAA-AST 
Suborbital trajectory 
The intentional flight path of a launch vehicle, re-entry vehicle, or 
any portion thereof, whose vacuum instantaneous impact point 
does not leave the surface of the Earth  
FAA-AST 
Tolerable 
A level of risk between broadly acceptable and unacceptable that 
may be tolerated by society when it has been demonstrated to be 
ALARP 
Based on UK 
Defence Standard 
00-56 
 
Table 1: Definitions applicable to the Dissertation 
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CHAPTER TWO - Academic & Industry Review  
  INTRODUCTION 2.
Chapter Two includes a review of academic and industry literature in the suborbital field and due to 
the immaturity of the Personal Spaceflight Industry this also includes reviewing relevant NASA 
spaceflight aspects such as lessons identified from accidents. To balance the Industry perspective, 
reviews of academic papers and conference presentations give an insight into various aspects on how 
the industry is tackling novel issues regarding Personal Spaceflight; this includes the initial European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) standpoint on managing suborbital aircraft within a European 
regulatory framework. Finally, a review of aerospace safety management system tools and techniques 
is undertaken in order to assess their applicability to the new field.    
 ACADEMIC REVIEW 2.1.
Suborbital space tourism has yet to take-off and already there are concerns6 over the newcomers to the 
space industry. These concerns come from the safety experts within an established governmental-
based space industry; the question is ‘why’? To understand these concerns we must first examine all 
of the evidence presented by the emerging suborbital players ranging from the FAA-AST rules and 
guidelines, to academic papers and in particular to review those areas where we can identify ‘Lessons 
Learned’ from accidents so that we can try and avoid accidents in the suborbital domain; indeed many 
believe that more than one disaster in the early developmental and commercial phase could see the 
end of suborbital space tourism before it has the chance to mature. Let us not forget that orbital space 
tourism has thus far proven to be successful (and safe); this may be due to using the current launch 
systems (the Soyuz rocket) and with the fee-paying astronaut undergoing standard astronaut training 
(mitigation) and having rigid supervision (more mitigation).  
 Human Spaceflight & Aerospace Accidents 2.1.1
Spaceflight accidents tend to draw the attention of the media because most accidents and incidents 
involving rockets tend to be spectacular in the outcome (or consequences). When this involves human 
spaceflight, the interest level is world-wide and any disaster has severe consequences. In 50 years of 
spaceflight there have only been 4 ‘disasters’ (see Table 2 below) during the ‘flight’ phase of the 
spaceflight; however there have been many more accidents and incidents resulting in deaths or 
injuries to astronauts and support personnel. Of these accidents, the most documented are the Space 
Shuttle disasters. Within these disasters ‘active and ‘latent’ failures play a major part in the 
contributions to the accidents (as per most accidents) and this was clearly evident, and detailed, in the 
Space Shuttle ‘Challenger’ Board of Inquiry findings and also by Diane Vaughan.  
2.1.1.1 Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 
Diane Vaughan [7] cited poor managerial decision-making in the Space Shuttle ‘Challenger’ disaster 
in 1986. The Space Shuttle launched on Tuesday 28th January 1986 at 1138 Eastern Time with 
temperatures at 36 °F (2.2 °C)7; this was 15 degrees Fahrenheit lower than any previous Space Shuttle 
Launch.  The design temperature limitations for the Solid Rocket Booster’s O-ring seals were 53 °F 
(12 °C). National Administration Space Agency (NASA) management decided to launch against the 
                                                     
6
 Comment by the President of the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety during the 
Space Tourism Safety Panel discussion, 20 May 2010, Huntsville, Alabama, USA 
7
 http://www.spaceline.org/challenger.html 
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advice of the engineers and so must be seen as a major contributor to the accident. The ‘Rogers 
Commission’ cited the following regarding the root cause and also the contributory aspects of the 
accident: 
‘The loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger was caused by a failure in the joint 
between the two lower segments of the right Solid Rocket Motor. The specific 
failure was the destruction of the seals that are intended to prevent hot gases 
from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor’ 
‘The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made that 
decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the O-
rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written recommendation of 
the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 degrees 
Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the 
management reversed its position. They did not have a clear understanding of 
Rockwell's concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If 
the decision-makers had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they 
would have decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986’. 
Here it is clear that a technical issue was compounded by an organisational (managerial) safety culture 
issue and this aspect is discussed more in 2.2.8 (human-machine integration), 2.2.9 (safety culture) 
and further analysed as part of a case study in Chapter 3.4.7. 
2.1.1.2 Space Shuttle Columbia Accident 
Nearly 20 years later, NASA was still making fundamental safety errors in their managerial decision-
making. The Space Shuttle ‘Columbia’ was lost on 1 February 2003 as a result of a breach in the 
thermal protection system on the leading edge of the left wing; the origins of the causal factor actually 
happened during launch when a piece of insulating foam broke off and damaged the wing. The 
‘Columbia’ Accident Investigation Board’s report [8] also cited the poor safety culture at NASA: 
“The organisational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle’s 
history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to 
gain approval for the Shuttle program, subsequent years of resource 
constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterisations of 
the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed 
national vision. Cultural traits and organisational practices detrimental to 
safety and reliability were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past 
success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to 
understand why systems were not performing in accordance with 
requirements/specifications); organisational barriers which prevented 
effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional 
differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across the program” 
More specifically the Board found 14 other instances where the Thermal Protection System had 
suffered damage either from launch or from space debris and hence: 
 ‘Space Shuttle Program personnel knew that the monitoring of tile damage 
was inadequate and that clear trends could be more readily identified if 
monitoring was improved, but no such improvements were made.’  
Chapter Two   Review 
 
 
Page 18 of 300 
 
It appears that little had improved in terms of proactive safety management and that the cultural issues 
identified from ‘Challenger’ were still prevalent. 
2.1.1.3 UK MoD Nimrod XV230 Accident 
In the UK, Charles Haddon-Cave QC was tasked with reviewing the Royal Air Force Nimrod aircraft 
Board of Inquiry results and his report [9] reflected on the similarities between the organisational 
failures of NASA to that of the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Suppliers. The report concludes 
the accident was ‘avoidable’ and that ‘there has been a yawning gap between the appearance and 
reality of safety’ and that there were ‘manifold shortcomings in the UK military -airworthiness and in-
service support regimes’. 
As depicted in Haddon-Cave’s report, there were many ‘Active & Latent Failures’ in the Nimrod 
accident sequence:  
 
Figure 3: Haddon-Cave Report on the Nimrod Accident - ‘Bow-Tie’ and Swiss-Cheese analogy 
As with the Space Shuttle disasters the Nimrod Accident resulted from technical issues and 
organisational failings. Common issues arose over time (for both Shuttle and Nimrod) as ‘latent’ 
failures including: 
 Normalisation of risk (Nimrod Project Team/Designers and NASA)    Incorrect safety assessment and classification of hazards (and their associated 
accident risk) – (Nimrod and arguably NASA)  Design changes not formally re-assessed for safety risks (Nimrod air refuelling 
equipment  Budgetary and Timeline constraints (Nimrod and NASA)  Flying aircraft in different context (environment) to which it was designed 
(Nimrod)  
On the day of the accidents ‘active’ failures played a contributory part and these included: 
 Poor management decision to launch (Challenger) – temperatures outside of 
limits 
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 Poor management decision to re-enter (Columbia) – could have saved crew by 
rescue mission to the ISS instead  Poor awareness of aircraft limitations and ‘push-on’ military mentality – relating 
to Nimrod and pressure in the air refuelling system (and normal fuel system) with 
aging aircraft flying at height in high temperatures being refuelled at high 
pressure 
The accident sequence or chain for the Space Shuttles or Nimrod could have been broken at any point 
in the latent or active failures detailed above and this is the role of a proactive Safety Management 
System whereby everyone is aware of safety and anyone can break the ‘chain’ (discussed further in 
2.2.9). 
2.1.1.4 Space-Related Accident Trends & Comparisons 
It is important to try and understand why accidents have occurred within specific fields and as with 
the Nimrod accident, a comparison of other similar industries can also be helpful.  
A comparison of accidents was provided in Van Pelten’s Space Tourism book [10] where he cites the 
two Space Shuttle Disasters (Challenger 1986 & Columbia 2003) and also 2 Russian Accidents (1967 
& 1971).  The book is aimed at the general public and therefore provides interesting facts regarding 
the history of spaceflight and then takes the reader (as a spaceflight participant) on a journey to their 
spaceflight, covering a theoretical medical and training journey. The following summary table of 
manned spacecraft Accidents is based on the accidents noted in Van Pelton’s book, the NASA library 
[11] and the Roscosmos website [12]: 
Date Spacecraft Accident Flight Phase Details/Comments 
Apr 23 1967 SOYUZ 1 Uncontrolled Crash Descent and Land 
Parachute fails to open resulting in 
death of  the cosmonaut (1 on 
board) 
June 06 1971 SOYUZ 11 Structural failure Re-entry/Descent 
Pressure leak in the cabin resulted 
in the death of 3 cosmonauts 
Jan 28 1986 SPACE SHUTTLE Challenger Explosion Launch 
Launch temperature too low and 
O-rings failed resulting in 7 
astronaut deaths  
Feb 01 2003 SPACE SHUTTLE Columbia 
Structural 
failure Re-entry 
Damage to wing leading edge from 
detached foam insulation during 
launch results in wing 
disintegrating on re-entry with 
consequence of deaths of all 7 
astronauts   
Table 2: Summary of Manned Spacecraft Accidents 
There has already been one accident in the emerging Space Tourism field; this was during a ground 
test of Scaled Composites’ hybrid rocket engine; the test was a nitrous oxide injector test and the 
System exploded killing three of their engine sub-contractor’s scientists. The company provided a 
statement [13] detailing their plans for continuous improvement including: 
 Conducting increased compatibility testing between N2O and any materials that 
contact it in the tank and eliminate incompatible materials in the flow path;  Revising cleaning procedures to further minimize the risk of contaminants in the 
system;  Replacing the composite liner in the N2O tank with a metal tank liner;  Diluting N2O vapour in the tank with Nitrogen or another inert gas to decrease 
its volatility and/or act as a pressurant; 
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 Designing additional safety systems for the N2O tank to minimize the danger due 
to tank overpressure; for example, a burst disk feature; and  Increasing the amount of testing during the development program to demonstrate 
that these design changes, and any improvements to system components, prevent 
the sequence of events that led to the accident. 
These intended actions appear good means of mitigation against the hazard of explosion including a 
mix of design modification and safety features and also procedural controls. The question that remains 
is why was this not done in the first instance i.e. within a formal Safety Management System with 
integrated design systems safety analysis because surely these mitigation measures would have been 
identified in a formal hazard identification and analysis process such as a Functional Hazard 
Analysis?  
This accident at Scaled Composites is the only major occurrence that has happened; there has also 
been a minor incident with White Knight 2 (the carrier aircraft) during a landing run where the left 
hand landing gear failed. So already during the development stage there has been one fatal accident 
(with 3 fatalities) and 1 minor reportable incident. When reviewing this against Figure 4 and Figure 5 
we can see that there are probably many more incidents that have occurred; the question is ‘how are 
they managing the risks?’ 
Indeed when examining accident data it is also useful and relevant to examine the ‘near misses’ 
(serious incidents) during spaceflights and also to examine those accidents and serious incidents that 
occur during spaceflight training and during the design and development (in particular, testing as 
detailed above in the Scaled Composites’ accident): 
 Date Spacecraft Or 
Equipment 
Accident Or 
Serious 
Incident 
Flight Phase Or  
Training  
Or Testing 
Details/Comments 
Oct 24 
1960 
Soviet R-16 missile 
(included as technology 
relevant to development 
of SOYUZ rockets) 
Explosion Launch pad test flight Second stage motors ignited prematurely killing over 100 people 
Mar 23 
1961 Oxygen Chamber Fire 
Low pressure 
chamber testing Cosmonaut received burns and later died 
Apr 14 
1964 DELTA Rocket Explosion Assembly Phase 
Static electricity spark ignited the rocket 
killing 3 technicians and injuring 9 others 
Jan 27 
1967 APOLLO 1 Fire  Launch Test 
Fire during Launch Pad Test resulting in all 3 
astronauts suffocating to death 
Nov 15 
1967 X-15 Loss of Control Training - Descent 
Loss of situational awareness resulting in 
yawing and spin and irrecoverable LOC 
resulting in the aircraft breaking up at high 
Mach numbers whilst inverted and not in 
control – pilot death 
May 06 
1968 
Lunar Landing Research 
Vehicle (LLRV) 
Crash (Loss of 
control or thrust 
) 
Training – Lunar 
Landing Pilot Neil Armstrong ejected safely 
Dec 08 
1968 
Lunar Landing Research 
Vehicle (LLRV) 
Crash (Loss of 
control or thrust 
) 
Training – Lunar 
Landing Pilot ejected safely 
1969 
January 
18 
SOYUZ 5 
Loss of Control 
- separation 
failure 
Re-entry 
The Soyuz had a harrowing re-entry and 
landing when the capsule's service module 
initially refused to separate, causing the 
spacecraft to begin re-entry faced the wrong 
way. The service module broke away before 
the capsule would have been destroyed, and 
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 Date Spacecraft Or 
Equipment 
Accident Or 
Serious 
Incident 
Flight Phase Or  
Training  
Or Testing 
Details/Comments 
so it made a rough but survivable landing far 
off course in the Ural Mountains 
Apr 23 
1970 APOLLO 13 Explosion Orbit 
Electrical arc/spark in oxygen system of 
command module – no deaths as they 
managed to survive and return to Earth 
Jan 29 
1971 
Lunar Landing Research 
Vehicle (LLRV) 
Crash (Loss of 
control or thrust 
) 
Training – Lunar 
Landing Pilot ejected safely 
1975 SOYUZ 18 Loss of Control  Ascent 
Non-nominal event resulting in crew 
experiencing 21g and they used the abort 
system (emergency escape rockets firing the 
cabin away from the launcher) – no deaths  
Oct 16 
1976 SOYUZ 23 
Landing capsule 
sank in water Landing 
The SOYUZ capsule broke through the 
surface of a frozen lake and was dragged 
underwater by its parachute. The crew was 
saved after a very difficult rescue operation.  
Mar 19 
1981 
SPACE SHUTTLE 
Columbia Anoxia Preparation for STS-1 
Anoxia due to nitrogen atmosphere in the aft 
engine compartment: 2 killed and 3 revived 
1983 SOYUZ T-10 Explosion Launch Pad 
Uncontrolled Rocket fire and the crew 
aborted using the flight safety abort system 
propelling them away from danger – they 
were subject to 16g  
July 29 
1985 
SPACE SHUTTLE 
Challenger (STS 51-F) Fire  Ascent 
Five minutes and 45 seconds into ascent, one 
of three shuttle main engines aboard 
Challenger shut down prematurely due to a 
spurious high temperature reading. At about 
the same time, a second main engine almost 
shut down from a similar problem, but this 
was observed and inhibited by a fast acting 
flight controller. The failure resulted in an 
Abort to Orbit (ATO) trajectory, whereby the 
shuttle achieves a lower than planned orbital 
altitude. Had the second engine failed within 
about 20 seconds of the first, a Transatlantic 
Landing (TAL) abort might have been 
necessary. (No bailout option existed until 
after mission STS-51-L (Challenger disaster), 
but even today a bailout—a "contingency 
abort", would never be considered when an 
"intact abort" option exists, and after five 
minutes of normal flight it would always 
exist unless a serious flight control failure 
prevailed 
July 23 
1999 
SPACE SHUTTLE 
Columbia (STS-93) 
Main engine 
electrical short 
and hydrogen 
leak 
Launch-Ascent 
Five seconds after lift-off, an electrical short 
knocked out controllers for two shuttle main 
engines. The engines automatically switched 
to their backup controllers. Had a further 
short shut down two engines, Columbia 
would have ditched in the ocean, although 
the crew could have possibly bailed out. 
Concurrently a pin came loose inside one 
engine and ruptured a cooling line, allowing 
a hydrogen fuel leak. This caused premature 
fuel exhaustion, but the vehicle safely 
achieved a slightly lower orbit. Had the 
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 Date Spacecraft Or 
Equipment 
Accident Or 
Serious 
Incident 
Flight Phase Or  
Training  
Or Testing 
Details/Comments 
failure propagated further, a risky 
transatlantic or RTLS abort would have been 
required.  
Aug 22 
2003 VLS-1-301 Rocket Explosion Launch Pad 
One of four first stage motors ignited 
accidentally – killing 21 people 
July 26 
2007 
SPACESHIP 2 Hybrid 
Rocket Explosion Engine Test bed 
the test was a nitrous oxide injector test 
killing 3 people 
April 19 
2008 SOYUZ TMA-11 Loss of Control Re-entry 
Suffered a re-entry mishap similar to that 
suffered by Soyuz 5 in 1969. The service 
module failed to completely separate from 
the re-entry vehicle and caused it to face the 
wrong way during the early portion of aero-
braking. As with Soyuz 5, the service module 
eventually separated and the re-entry vehicle 
completed a rough but survivable landing. 
Table 3: Summary of Manned Spaceflight-Related Accident and Serious Incidents (non-flight) 
There have been circa 281 missions to date [14] and therefore the average fatal accident rate is 1 in 70 
per mission. 
In terms of people, the risk of death for astronauts is about 4 per cent (18 out of 430 astronauts that 
have flown on operational flights). From the first launch of Yuri Gagarin to the present day there have 
been circa 133 fatalities; it is not known how many people have been involved and how many 
‘activities’ were undertaken and so it is difficult to be accurate with the statistics. 
A comparison with aviation and risky activities such as parachuting averages a risk of death of 1 in 
100,000 jumps for parachutists and 1 in 2 Million flights for aviation passengers. So NASA’s safety 
performance of 1 in 70 is concerning and is clearly a target to vastly improve on for the nascent 
suborbital domain. 
The statistical trends and comparisons can certainly be useful in determining safety criteria (see 
2.3.1.1) and this should arguably be derived by the regulators for use in policies and guidelines.  
Table 3 details the reported accidents and serious incidents within the space domain and when we 
consider the ‘iceberg model’ and apply the Heinrich ratio in Figure 4 a picture starts to emerge of the 
underlying safety risks that may or may not be being managed effectively.  
 
Figure 4: Standard Iceberg Model - Heinrich Ratio 
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The updated Heinrich ratio examines the relationship between accidents and incidents and adds an 
additional layer. For the purpose of space or aviation this extra layer is more appropriate as it 
considers fatal accidents, accidents and reportable incidents (as well as the unreported incidents). 
Figure 5 represents the added layer and we can then get a better perspective on the safety risks 
involved. In terms of a safety culture one cannot merely gauge this on the number of accidents that 
have occurred i.e. an airline may have not had any fatal accidents but may be experiencing 100 Air 
Safety Reports per month and ten per cent of these may be significant (safety significant events). On 
top of that there may be hundreds of near misses in regards to ground incidents as well as incidents in 
the air. Thus it can be seen that aviation and space flights carry a high safety risk and this needs to be 
a) recognised and b) managed.  
 
Figure 5: Updated Heinrich Ratio showing accidents (safety significant events) 
The statistics are important to gain an understanding regarding the industry risks yet need to be 
viewed in ‘like terms’ for the emerging Personal Spaceflight field. The Shuttle for instance is a 
vertical take-off/horizontal land vehicle, whereas the APPOLLO and SOYUZ are Vertical take-
off/Vertical Land vehicles.  Within aviation, the aeroplanes are horizontal take-off/horizontal 
(powered) landing. There will be different combinations for suborbital operations in the near future 
and one of the leaders (Virgin Galactic) has a totally different profile of horizontal (airborne) take-
off/vertical descent and horizontal (non-powered) approach and landing. In his extremely biased and 
journalistic book (published by Virgin Books Limited), Kenny Kemp [15] talks to key players from 
Virgin Galactic (VG) who categorically believe that their innovative System is ‘safe’: 
 Will Whitehorn (VG President) – ‘Safety is and will continue to be Virgin 
Galactic’s North Star’  Burt Rutan (Scaled Composites) – ‘We believe a proper goal for safety is a 
record that was achieved during the first five years of commercial scheduled 
airline service, which while exposing the passengers to high risks by today’s 
standards, was more than a hundred times safe as government manned space 
flight’  George Whitesides (then VG Chief Technical Officer, now Chief Executive 
Officer) – ‘So now you have a hybrid [rocket motor]  which is extremely safe at 
low cost and with an efficiency that is in between solids and liquids. So it is ideal 
technology for us’.   
The Virgin Galactic air-launch system may have many inherent safety features in its design and only 
time will tell of its success during test flights and during the early phases of commercial operations. 
Chapter Two   Review 
 
 
Page 24 of 300 
 
However the development program has come at a high cost; as detailed in Table 3 above, there was an 
accident during Scaled Composites’ testing of their hybrid rocket system where 3 scientists were 
killed and others severely injured in an explosion.  
The XCOR ‘Lynx’ RLV is a horizontal take-off/horizontal land (powered ability) craft and the 
airframe is designed and built more conventionally, therefore one could argue that the XCOR vehicle 
is the safest proposal thus far; except that its profile dictates use of a rocket engine for take-off and 
therefore is susceptible to high risks on the ground. The rocket design is unique in that it has the 
ability to terminate the thrust phase (to conduct an abort scenario) but then also has the capability to 
re-ignite8 (to either continue with the flight or to assist in controlling the vehicle or indeed to fly to 
another nearby landing location). This therefore could be seen as an advantage in that the rocket 
engine is initiated on the ground and their procedures could dictate that the brakes are not released 
until satisfactory pressures and temperatures are verified. 
The risks faced by the newcomers to the space industry will be similar in nature to those faced by 
NASA and it will be interesting to see if the ‘lessons identified’ from the Space Shuttle disasters will 
indeed influence the management in the suborbital domain.   
The role of Management will play a large part in the success or failure of a suborbital mission. 
Management can directly influence many aspects including: 
 Launch ‘Go/No-Go’ decisions – ‘Active’ failure as in the Challenger disaster  Sign-off for System’s Exceptions and Limitations – ‘Active’ failure on the day, 
but also ‘Latent’ failure in the case of NASA because this was the ‘norm’ over a 
long period of time as cited by Diane Vaughan (….in fact the listing and 
description of the ‘’acceptable risks’’ on the Space Shuttle prior to the first 
launch in April 1981 filled six volumes)  Operating Profile decisions  Design Acceptance decisions  Influence on design 
 Spaceflight Conferences 2.1.2
Spaceflight-related conferences have recently provided organisations and individuals an opportunity 
to discuss Personal Spaceflight as well as the Governmentally-led safety topics concerning the 
International Space Station (ISS) activities and the Space Shuttle replacement program.  
The author has attended and presented papers at the International Astronautical Conference (IAC) and 
also the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS). Although the 
majority of the proceedings’ concern governmental programs there is growing interest in the emerging 
commercial spaceflight field; indeed the IAASS expressed ‘concern’ over the ‘newcomers’ to Space.  
The IAASS Independent Space Safety Board (ISSB) has produced a ‘Space Safety Standard – 
Commercial Manned Spacecraft’ [16] to provide guidance to the new community. Its purpose is to 
‘establish safety requirements applicable to the IAASS Certification of Commercial Human Rated 
Systems (CHS)’; this covers both orbital and suborbital spaceflight. Interestingly, the scope covers 
flight personnel (crew and spaceflight participants), ground personnel, the vehicle and any other 
interfacing system from the CHS-related hazards. It furthermore excludes the Expendable Launchers 
and all issues relating to public safety. This is in discord with the governmental-driven programmes 
                                                     
8
 http://www.xcor.com 
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and safety analysis and also in the FAA-AST commercial spaceflight guidelines; both of these 
approaches focus heavily on protecting the public and use the ‘Expected Casualty [Ec]’ methodology 
(see Section 2.3 below). The ISSB Manual also appears to be in discord with the ‘Safety Risk’ criteria 
stating that: 
 for orbital flights the probability of a catastrophic event for the flight personnel 
during the entire mission shall not exceed 1x10-3  for suborbital flights the probability of a catastrophic event for the flight 
personnel during the entire mission shall not exceed 1x10-4 
There is no explanation as to how these values were derived and therefore one could interpret these 
values in different ways i.e. it could mean the Total Safety Risk (sum of all accidents over the whole 
duration of the mission) or it could mean the value for catastrophic failure conditions. 
The rest of the ISSB Manual identifies Technical Requirements (Chapter 2), Vehicle Safety Design 
Requirement (Chapter 3) and Certification Requirements (Chapter 4). 
Another relevant conference is the International Academy of Aeronautics (IAA) and their first 
conference was in 2008 at Arcachon, France; the main theme was that the industry needed proper 
regulation and main operators presented their hypothetical spacecraft and trajectories. The 2nd IAA 
conference on ‘private commercial spaceflight’ provided updates to the original themes and the 
sessions were split into legal/regulatory and designer/operator business models. A common issue was 
identified in both sessions in that the FAA-AST ‘launch licensing’ methodology was in contradiction 
to the proposed European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) certification methodology (for winged 
aircraft – see 2.3.8). The designers were split in that the US-based companies such as XCOR and 
Rocketplane wanted to fly in Europe but remaining under the FAA-AST remit whereas European-
based companies such as EADS-Astrium and Reaction Engines wanted to be certified by EASA. The 
rationale from the US-based companies was that the EASA certification approach is more protracted, 
more costly (by an order of magnitude) and would be difficult to achieve the safety objectives for 
failure conditions i.e. to provide evidence of meeting in the order of 1 x 10-7 per flying hour for 
example. Reaction Engines are actually designing an orbital spacecraft (Skylon) but they want EASA 
certification. They at least have attempted to derive probabilities for catastrophic failure conditions by 
using an ‘abort’ rate and linking this to a platform loss rate. The approach appears sound and will be 
discussed in 2.2.6. One problem with Reaction Engines wanting to be certified by EASA is that the 
agency are only proposing to certify winged vehicles (which Skylon is) up to the edge of space i.e. 
within the ‘air domain’; EASA state they are not competent to certify a vehicle in the ‘space domain’. 
It shall be also noted that currently, the FAA-AST responsibility is limited to the launch and re-entry 
phases of the flight, and not to the phase in-between, i.e. the orbital flight phase. Herein lays the 
problem for Reaction Engines in that the majority of their flight will be in the space domain; of course 
they have to fly through the air domain for the climb and when they enter the re-entry phase. The 
author contends that a dual-approach will have to be taken in that EASA could certify the air domain 
aspects and another ‘suitable’ authority will have to approve and manage the space domain aspects; 
this later space domain issue has not been addressed sufficiently by the Industry at this time. This is 
further discussed in the ‘space law’ versus ‘air law’ debate in 2.3.9.   
2.1.2.1 Papers 
The author has submitted spaceflight-related papers to conferences during the period of the Thesis and 
these have been focussed on the perceived gaps in the emerging space tourism industry. The 
following papers were authored during the period and are included in Appendices 8 through 12: 
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 Oct 2006, SMS for the Private Space Industry; submitted to the IAC in Valencia  May 2007, Certification of microgravity flights in the UK; presented to the UK 
CAA as an internal paper for QinetiQ  Oct 2008, Centrifuge as key mitigation in the private spaceflight industry; 
submitted to the 3rd IAASS in Rome  May 2010, Safety Criteria for the Personal Spaceflight Industry; submitted to the 
4th IAASS in Huntsville  Oct 2011, Safety Model for the Commercial Spaceflight Industry; being 
submitted to the 5th IAASS in Paris 
The relevance of the papers is that a thorough review of the industry and academic literature was 
undertaken for each paper in addition to and complementary to this Thesis. 
 Spaceflight Conclusion of Academic Review 2.1.3
It is clear that academia and industry bodies are both concerned and excited at the prospect of the 
emerging Space Tourism industry. There is trepidation in that accidents may occur as per those that 
have occurred either on launch or during re-entry. There are fundamental safety culture issues that 
have been raised in terms of Normalisation of Risk. These Lesson Learnt (or rather Lessons 
Identified) must be captured, digested and instilled in the new industry. This aspect will certainly be 
one of the objectives of a new Technical Committee of the International Association for the 
Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) – which the author has instigated and will Chair (see Chapter 
3). 
The various papers presented at space safety conferences reflect a changing attitude towards safety in 
that no more is safety an afterthought to NASA-based projects and this is being instilled amongst their 
European and other Nation brethren (as opposed to engineer the solution with a bit of Human 
Machine Integration and finally can we get safety ‘sign-off’). 
The popular books that are on the market tend to be fanciful and have been released too early 
(possibly in anticipation of a 2007 launch from Virgin Galactic); here we are approaching five years 
later and more to the wise on what is required in terms of passenger training (2.3.6) and medical 
requirements (2.3.4).  
There are plenty of theoretical ideas on safety and design but it boils down to what the safety 
requirements are and what the safety targets are; these aspects are still being considered by designers 
and regulators alike and is the main topic of this Thesis. 
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 REVIEW OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT ‘TOOLS’ 2.2.
 Safety Management Systems  2.2.1
It is first important to clarify what is meant by a ‘System’. According to the Oxford Advanced 
Learners Dictionary [19] a system means: 
 “an organised set of ideas or theories or a particular way of doing; a group 
of things, pieces of equipment, etc., that are connected or work together, or; 
the rules or people that control a country or an organisation” 
From the above definition of ‘system’ we can discern that there is a common thread – organised 
approach, connected and controlling. So when we apply this to ‘Safety Management System’ we are 
concerned with the safety approach an organization takes to control an activity or function. 
Safety Management is a proactive safety-based activity with the purpose of accident and incident 
prevention by means of prospective analysis. Flight Safety on the other hand could be considered as 
reactive events from or during an incident; a pilot of an RLV can be considered managing the Flight 
Safety during an Incident (and actions prior to or preventing the incident) and Flight Safety Officers 
on the ground would then record the Incident for further investigation and trend analysis by means of 
retrospective analysis. Arguably both types of activity should be employed in a complimentary 
organisational ‘system’ within the Personal Spaceflight Industry in order to capture the ‘Lessons 
Learnt’; not only from the Aviation Industry, but other Industries such as the Rail and Petro-Chemical 
Industries. All of these Industries have complex and critical aspects to their modus of operand and all 
have suffered Catastrophic Accidents where safety issues were cited as major contributory factors. 
Indeed in 1988 the UK suffered 2 such accidents; the Piper Alpha Oil Rig disaster and the Clapham 
Junction Railway accident. Following these events and as a result of the findings from the subsequent 
investigations from the Lord Cullen report [20] and a general need to improve railway safety 
regulations [23], safety cases were introduced as requirements for these industries as part of an 
effective SMS. 
More specifically related the Challenger disaster may have been averted had a more robust SMS been 
in place; Diane Vaughan [7] cited a ‘poor safety culture’ referring to NASA’s safety policies 
(allowing ‘six volumes’ of ‘acceptable risks’ on the Space Shuttle) and NASA’s processes (the 
Management decision to launch against engineering advice).   
From the mid-90’s onwards the proactive SMS models were introduced and the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation’s document [24] (ICAO 9859 – Safety Management Manual) presents a mix of 
the reactive and proactive methods. The ICAO is the overarching SMS guidance document and the 
following definitions of SMS are from varying governing bodies and prominent safety standard 
documents.  
The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) updated their SMS Publication to an SMS ‘Guidance to 
Organisations’ [25] document that aligns with ICAO Manual and the CAA defines an SMS as:  
“An SMS is an organised approach to managing safety, including the 
necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and 
procedures. The complexity of the SMS should match the organisation’s 
requirements for managing safety. At the core of the SMS is a formal Risk 
Management process that identifies hazard and assesses and mitigates risk.” 
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The CAA document is aimed at Air Operator Certificate (AOC) holders and Aerospace Maintenance 
Organisations. 
The FAA definition from the SMS Advisory Circular [26]:  
“The formal, top-down business-like approach to managing safety risk. It 
includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the management of 
safety (including safety risk management, safety policy, safety assurance, and 
safety promotion).” 
The Euro Control ‘SKYbrary’ [27] definition:  
“Safety management is an organizational function, which ensures that all 
safety risks have been identified, assessed and satisfactorily mitigated.” 
Defence-Standard 00-56 [28] definition:  
“The organizational structure, processes, procedures and methodologies that 
enable the direction and control of activities necessary to meet safety 
requirements and safety policy objectives” 
The relevance to this Thesis is to ascertain a ‘best practice’ SMS definition in order to clarify what an 
SMS is. Taking the relevant phrases from each definition helps narrow the process: 
 Organised approach  Formal top-down business-like approach  Organizational function  Safety organization structures, safety policies and systematic safety procedures  Formal Safety Risk Management  Meeting Safety Requirements 
From the above list we derive the Thesis definition: 
A Safety Management System is a safety organizational function concerned with implementing and 
managing safety policies and procedures necessary to undertake formal safety risk management 
 Safety Management Plan 2.2.2
Now that SMS definitions have been presented, the underpinning organizational document that details 
the SMS is the Safety Management Plan (SMP).  
The documents reviewed to assess the SMS definitions have been reviewed to assess the suggested 
SMP contents. The ICAO 9859 Manual [24] suggests that an SMS Manual (SMSM) and an SMS 
Implementation Plan is required; the former being an instrument for communicating the SMS 
approach to the whole organization and the Implementation Plan (SMSIP) defines the organization’s 
approach to managing safety. The SMSM suggests the following contents: 
 scope of the safety management system;  safety policy and objectives;  safety accountabilities;  key safety personnel;  documentation control procedures;  coordination of emergency response planning;  hazard identification and risk management schemes; 
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 safety assurance;  safety performance monitoring;  safety auditing;  management of change;  safety promotion; and  Contracted activities. 
The SMSIP suggests the following contents: 
 safety policy and objectives;  system description;  gap analysis;  SMS components;  safety roles and responsibilities;  hazard reporting policy;  means of employee involvement;  safety performance measurement;  safety communication;  safety training; and  management review of safety performance 
The Def-Stan 00-56 [28] document focuses on providing guidance on establishing a means of 
complying with the Requirements for the management of Safety; hence although many of the ICAO 
contents are included, Def-Stan 00-56 additionally suggests: 
 Initial definition of all key Safety Requirements  Tolerability Criteria  Safety Programme Plan  Compliance Matrix 
Both the EASA [27] and FAA [29] documents defer to the higher ICAO (1) SMSM in that they 
follow the four-tiered SMS component/framework approach: 
 Safety policy and objectives   Safety Risk Management 
o Hazard Identification 
o Risk Assessment and Mitigation  Safety Assurance 
o Safety performance monitoring and measurement 
o The management of change 
o Continuous Improvement of the SMS  Safety Promotion 
The relevance to this Thesis is to ascertain a ‘best-practice’ SMP suggested content list. From the 
above review it is clear that the ICAO, EASA and FAA methodology omit a vital element that has 
been covered by the Def-Stan 00-56 approach: Safety Requirements, including Tolerability Criteria.  
The SMP should describe the following as a minimum9:  
 Safety Policy & Objectives  Safety Organisation, Roles & Accountabilities/Responsibilities 
                                                     
9
 The SMP List is compiled by the author as ‘best practice’ combining relevant aspects from the following 
documents: References 24, 25, 26, 27 & 28. 
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 A description of the Safety Management System to be operated  Note: in this instance, an RLV Operator’s SMS will include a description of the 
SMS approach by the organization towards formal safety risk management  A description of the RLV Equipment   Scope of the SMS including details of interface SMSs or Safety Cases  Safety Programme Plan   Initial definition of all key Safety Requirements  Tolerability Criteria  Hazard and Risk Management Approach  Occurrence Management   Emergency Response Plan  Safety Audit Plan  Safety Promotion  Change Management Plan (including Configuration Control)  Compliance Matrix  Contractor Requirements 
  The Safety Case 2.2.3
The Safety Case has been adopted within the UK as a result of catastrophic accidents mentioned in 
2.1.1.3. Within Def-Stan 00-56 [28] a safety case is defined as: 
“A structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a 
compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given 
application in a given operating environment” 
Safety Cases may be produced at the System, Super-System or Sub-System level. Where lower-level 
Safety Cases require integration to the prime System or Super-System Safety Case then the prime 
organisation should be responsible for ensuring that an Integration Safety Case or Safety Case Report 
may be required to ensure there are no weaknesses to the argument; invariably through experience, 
the author has found many weaknesses at the boundary between Safety Cases. 
There are several ways to construct a Safety Case in terms of structure and expression and this 
depends on the scale and depth of the Safety Case.  
A safety argument may be made textually if a simple system is being argued as ‘safe’ i.e. the 
argument is familiar and uses standard evidence from the domain such as a Certificate of Design (see 
Figure 6 below). However at the other end of the scale a ‘System’ may be in the Space Tourism 
domain whereby the technology and environment are unfamiliar and there are no known standards; in 
this instance a Safety Case is recommended and possibly using both textual and Claims-Arguments-
Evidence (CAE) diagrams or Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to demonstrate that the ‘System’ is 
safe. 
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Solution 
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Minimal argument and standard evidence 
from the domain i.e. certificates of design 
 
 
Focused argument on reasons for novel solution, 
plus the appropriate evidence 
U
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Minimal argument and standard evidence 
from another domain i.e. use of 
FAA/NASA standards 
 
 
 
Extensive argument and evidence, with 
substantial independent scrutiny and application 
of novel standards and technology i.e. Space 
Tourism Operations 
 
Figure 6: Complexity of ‘System’ and Requirements for structured argument and evidence 
2.2.3.1 Safety Case Boundaries 
The scope of the safety case is an important starting point and must be explicit in detailing the 
boundaries. Once the scope has been defined then further assumptions can be made as to the use of 
the System; these will be numerous in the beginning of a project but as the development progresses 
these should be replaced by evidence.  
 Design Organisation Safety Case (platform level); this is the ‘As Designed’ safety 
case covering the design, certification, manufacture and test of the platform. 
Feeding into the Platform Safety Case (As Designed) are lower-level sub-system 
safety cases i.e. for the Avionics system, Engine System, Hydraulic System and 
so on: 
o Sub-System Safety Case (system 1) 
o Sub-System Safety Case (system ‘n’)  Integration Safety Case; this is an essential aspect to consider because in the case 
of engines (as a sub-system) they will have their own DO safety case which needs 
to be analysed for its integration on a particular aircraft and operated and 
supported in certain environments. Aspects to consider include; 
o Maintenance activities  
o Operating environment such as Air Traffic and Spaceport safety 
o Support Equipment i.e. Specialist Ground Support Equipment such as 
propellant loaders  Operator Safety Case; this is the ‘As Flown’ safety case incorporating operational 
aspects such as; 
o operating environment 
o operator procedures 
o operator limitations 
o operator training 
o operator safety risk management 
Figure 7 below depicts the integration of safety cases at different levels; in this instance it is for a 
Suborbital Aircraft with Carrier Aircraft. The sub-systems below the SoA level should have their own 
safety cases and one of the most important facets of the ‘Total Safety Case’ below is the integration 
argument. The Rocket Propulsion System (RPS) may be procured as a bespoke system and therefore 
may have reliability data and service history to form the backbone of its safety case but is the RPS 
safe within the context of the SoA. Likewise the Carrier Aircraft will have its own safety case and 
certification but a modification will be required to integrate the SoA with the Carrier (either top-
Chapter Two   Review 
 
 
Page 32 of 300 
 
loaded or bottom-loaded) and it is this system that will require an additional integration safety case 
argument. 
 
Figure 7: Integrated Safety Case Approach 
2.2.3.2 The Safety Case Report 
The Safety Case Report (SCR) is a document that presents a safety argument of the Safety Case as a 
‘snapshot’ in time; therefore it is a document that should be updated throughout the development of 
the spacecraft, throughout its life and also at disposal of the spacecraft (or de-commissioning of 
spacecraft or sub-systems as part of the fleet). UK Def-Stan 00-56, Issue 4 suggest that a SCR should 
report on the following project aspects: 
 Executive Summary  System Description  Progress against the (Safety) Programme  Hazard Analysis (including mitigation)  Emergency/Contingency Arrangements  Operational Information  Audit Reports  Conclusions/Recommendations 
The SCR is a vital document in tracking the progress and also in tracking discrepancies and 
observations as the project advances. It is also a formal and auditable record of safety activities 
undertaken since the last SCR. It provides the Accountable manager with a summary of the progress 
and importantly whether the safety risks are acceptable and being managed. 
In terms of the design lifecycle there are important milestones (such as Preliminary and Critical 
Design Review, etc.) and so the safety case can be summarised at those milestones in the form of the 
SCR. Figure 32 details the design ‘Vee’ lifecycle and the SCR submissions can be seen as the 
program develops.  
 Hazard Management  2.2.4
The Hazard Management System (HMS) is vital to the success of the safety effort and the Hazard Log 
is the core of the HMS as it is the final suppository of safety information and should provide a means 
of tracking hazards and assist in providing a means of assessing the overall risk of the spacecraft so as 
Equipment Safety Case - Rocket
Equipment Safety Case - Airframe
Equipment Safety Case – Avionics, etc
Sub-System 1: Safety 
Case
Sub-System 2: Safety 
Case
Sub-Systeŵ ͚Ŷ͛: Safety 
Case
Platform Safety Case (SoA/Carrier)
Carrier  
Safety case
Suborbital Aircraft      
Safety case
Total Safety Case
(includes Operational Safety)
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to measure whether the safety target has been met. It is important to define the basics such as defining 
what a hazard is and to understand its sequential position within the accident sequence: 
Hazard definitions: 
 FAA AC [18]; Equipment, system, operation or condition with an existing or 
potential condition that may result in loss or harm  UK Def-Stan 00-56 [28]; A physical situation or state of a system, often following 
from some initiating event, that may lead to an accident  ICAO SMS Manual [24]; A condition or an object with the potential to cause 
injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material or 
reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function 
Cause definitions: 
 FAA AC [18]; the Advisory Circular has ‘FAULT’ as an initiating event and 
define it as ‘an anomalous change in state of an item that may warrant some type 
of corrective action to decrease risk.’  UK Def-Stan 00-56 [28]; the origin, sequence or combination of circumstances 
leading to an event  ICAO SMS Manual [24]; does not contain a definition of a Cause or ‘Fault’ but 
note that each hazard will have a unique set of ‘CAUSAL FACTORS’. 
Accident definitions: 
 FAA-AST AC [18] does not define accident. They have ‘MISHAP’ defined as; ‘a 
launch or re-entry accident, launch or re-entry incident. Launch site accident, 
failure to complete a launch or re-entry as planned, or an unplanned event or 
series of events resulting in a fatality, serious injury, or greater than $25,000 
worth of damage to the payload, launch or re-entry vehicle, launch or re-entry 
support facility, or governmental property located on  the launch or re-entry 
site.’ 
The FAA-AST AC [18] paragraph 5b says to classify the RISK of the hazard by its severity and 
likelihood – hence their concept is to recognise that the hazard has a probability but it also contains a 
severity element i.e. to the event’s outcome or consequence. The issue here is that there is no explicit 
link to a particular accident and therefore how do you manage the ‘category B’ defences (recovery 
barriers in the Haddon-Cave model in Figure 3)? 
Failure Condition definition: 
However for aircraft certification purposes we have failure conditions and these are linked to a 
severity classification (and not a specific accident). The failure condition is defined [87] as: 
A condition having an effect on either the airplane or its occupants, or both, 
either direct or consequential which is caused or contributed to by one or 
more failures or errors considering flight phase and relevant adverse 
operational or environmental conditions or external events 
In this instance failure conditions have been derived from Functional Hazard Analysis (see 2.2.4 
below) and therefore have known consequences; thus designers know that a ‘misleading airspeed 
display’ failure condition could lead to a catastrophic event and therefore must met the relevant safety 
objective (1x10-9 per flying hour).  
Chapter Two   Review 
 
 
Page 34 of 300 
 
It is notable that there appears to be little difference between a ‘hazard’ and a ‘failure condition’ from 
the above descriptions and this could lead to problems. This is discussed further below in ‘accident 
sequence’ section 2.2.5. 
2.2.4.1 Hazard Identification & Analysis  
The Hazard Identification & Analysis (HIA) process should start at the beginning of a program and 
continue throughout the life of the program up to ‘Disposal’. Figure 8 below shows different phases 
of a program and typical safety activities undertaken at each stage. 
 
Figure 8: Design Cycle detailing typical stages and associated safety activities 
The design cycle shown above compliments the standard ‘V-Model’ design phases for Validation and 
Verification as detailed in section 2.2.16. 
Design Organisations (DO) follow best practices and must meet certification requirements for their 
aircraft i.e. Joint Airworthiness Regulations (JAR) 25.1309 and accompanying guidelines Advisory 
Circular (AC) 25.1309-1A for large aeroplanes. DOs also follow guidelines to ensure a consistent and 
recognised approach has been taken when presenting their analysis to the regulators. Typical 
guidelines include Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761[75] and ARP 4754 [39]. The 
standard safety analysis techniques include: 
Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) 
A Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) is conducted at the beginning of the 
aircraft/system development cycle. It should identify and classify the failure 
condition(s) associated with the aircraft functions and combinations of 
aircraft functions. These failure condition classifications establish the safety 
objectives. 
The FHA is vital step in the safety process and in particular to a new project such as a suborbital 
Aircraft (SoA) for spaceflight it is fundamental in ensuring that failure conditions are identified and 
safety objectives set. This aspect is covered in more detail in 3.2 as part of the EASA Suborbital 
Aircraft Policy task; this provides an FHA based on Part 23.1309 and adapted for spacecraft 
(Suborbital Aircraft). 
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Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) 
The PSSA is a systematic examination of the proposed system architecture(s) 
to determine how failures can cause the functional hazards identified by the 
FHA. The objective of the PSSA is to establish the safety requirements of the 
system and to determine that the proposed architecture can reasonably be 
expected to meet the safety objectives identified by the FHA. 
The PSSA (for functional failures) can be in the form of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) which can be 
based on the functions derived from the FHA. The initial FTA can be at the aircraft level and this can 
be useful in determining budgets (derived safety requirements) on lower-level systems. Then these 
lower-level systems can have their own FTAs in order to demonstrate that they have met their failure 
condition’s safety objective.  
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
The FTA should be updated throughout the program as more information 
such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) becomes available. 
System Safety Assessment (SSA) 
The SSA is the same as a System Hazard Analysis (SHA) and the prime purpose of the SSA (SHA) is 
to determine whether the safety requirements and targets have been met: 
The System Safety Assessment (SSA) is a systematic, comprehensive 
evaluation of the implemented system to show that safety objectives from the 
FHA and derived safety requirements from the PSSA are met. 
An SSA can be undertaken at the aircraft level and also at the system level (Sub-System Safety 
Assessment).  
The difference between a PSSA and an SSA is that a PSSA is a method to 
evaluate proposed architectures and derive system/item safety requirements; 
whereas the SSA is a verification that the implemented design meets both the 
qualitative and quantitative safety requirements as defined in the FHA and 
PSSA. 
Zonal Safety Assessment (ZSA) 
A ZSA is a technique that is performed to identify common causes of failure. In essence it is: “an 
analysis of the component-external failure modes and their effects on the relevant system itself and 
adjacent systems.” 
The ZSA is an important technique that should be conducted early in the program in the first instance 
(by use of installation drawings, photographs, etc.) and then undertaken ‘on-aircraft’ to verify the 
initial findings and to identify issues as a result of the physical inspection; from the author’s 
experience, actual installations often differ slightly to that of the drawings and chaffing or interference 
hazards can be more prevalent and easily identified when the aircraft is built. Should ‘Rigs’ or Mock-
ups be available during the development then these can also be used for the ZSA and other safety 
analysis techniques. 
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2.2.4.2 Other Hazard Identification and Analyses methods 
Other methods of Hazard Identification and Analysis include software and complex hardware aspects 
and also analysing inherent hazards. Firstly in terms of inherent analysis the Occupational Health 
Hazard Analysis (OHHA) and the Operating & Support Hazard Analysis (O&SHA) are recognised 
techniques. These are defined Defence Standard 00-56 [28] as: 
Occupational Health Hazard Analysis OHHA 
OHHA is carried out to identify health hazards and to recommend measures to be included in the 
system, such as the provision of ventilation, barriers, protective clothing etc., to reduce the associated 
risk to a tolerable level. 
Additionally the UK MoD recognised the activity and produced guidelines in their Acquisition 
Operating Framework database [40].  
Additionally the UK MoD recognised the activity and produced guidelines in their Acquisition 
Operating Framework database [40]. Additionally Def-Stan 00-56 Issue 2 [32] provided guidelines on 
what the analysis should consider such as: 
 The presence or production of toxic, inflammable or explosive materials, e.g. 
carcinogens or suspected carcinogens, systemic poisons, asphyxiants or 
respiratory irritants  The generation of noise, vibration, physical shock, electric shock, heat or cold 
stress, ionizing or non-ionizing radiation  Exposure to the health hazards from other systems  The requirements of the Montreal Protocol, and current UK legislation 
The output of an OHHA activity generally provides causes to known hazards such as ‘exposure to 
lethal voltages’ or ‘exposure to hazardous materials (absorption)’ but the analysis can also identify 
new hazards.  
An OHHA is normally conducted by means of a checklist/audit approach with the results recorded in 
either a standalone document or within the SHA. 
OSHA 
Operating and Support Hazard Analysis is carried out to evaluate hazardous tasks that may be 
undertaken by operation and support staff. In addition, it should identify the nature and duration of 
actions that occur under hazardous conditions during various stages of in-service usage such as 
testing, installation, modification, maintenance, support, transportation, servicing, storage, operation 
and training. 
As with the OHHA the output of an OSHA activity generally provides causes to known hazards but 
can also identify new hazards. It is important to get the procedures (operating and maintenance) as 
soon as possible during the development phase so that a ‘desk-top’ analysis can be carried out. Then if 
Rigs or Mock-ups are available this can be more effectively conducted using the procedures on the 
actual equipment. The activity must be carried out on the final build stage as procedural steps may not 
be able to be performed as detailed and it is at this stage that the first amendments can be made so that 
hazards are not introduced (or human factors [short-cuts] introduced). 
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Additionally the FAA recognises the activity and has developed a procedure for undertaking an 
OSHA [41]. The procedure states ‘the O&SHA identifies and evaluates hazards resulting from the 
implementation of operations or tasks performed by persons.’ 
 The UK Def-Stan 00-56 Issue 2 [32] also provides guidelines for conducting an OSHA and suggests 
the activity should cover: 
The state of the system including;  The interfaces with the system  The specified range of environmental conditions  Other associated equipment  The effect of concurrent tasks and the order and complexity of tasks  Ergonomic issues  Training issues  The potential for human error  Commitment to safety by line management  Other common cause failures; e.g. human induced error and maintenance 
procedures. 
Of note the ergonomics, the potential for human error and common cause failures were prevalent 
within the author’s own experience of conducting OSHAs.  
Software Safety 
Software safety is a specialist subject and within a development program is often worthy of a separate 
Software Safety Working Group (SSWG) whom report to and sit on the Safety Working Group. 
Software in itself cannot do anything without a system and so software in itself is not hazardous. It is 
the requirement to use software within Complex Programmable Equipment (CPE).  
Software Development 
Software development within an aircraft/spacecraft program is one of the most challenging and 
difficult aspects to manage and hence a lot of effort must be expended at the beginning to fully 
understand the requirements otherwise the results could be both costly and catastrophic. The 
following presents a high level review of software safety aspects. 
The standards for software certification and safety are contained in DO-178B [42] and additionally of 
relevance in the NASA Software Safety Guidebook [43].  
The software safety effort within a program starts with a safety program: 
 Software Program Plan: a software program plan is the most important document 
to get right at the beginning of a program that involves software. The plan     Software Requirements 
o System Requirements – these are platform system requirements at the 
beginning of the program. From these Safety Requirements and Software 
Requirements are derived  Software Requirements – as with system requirements software 
requirements are developed from the function of the hardware and its 
associated function of the embedded software. The software may be 
performing a command function or indeed it could provide a control 
function; these need to be specified and then depending on the 
function and possible outcomes (in terms of hazards) the 
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requirements can then be refined as to whether the software is a 
safety critical item or not  
o Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) ‘v’ Design Assurance Levels’ (DAL) – these are 
different levels of assurance required of the software function. The 
SILs/DALs are produced in different standards as detailed below. Figure 9 
details a comparison of the different standards: 
 
Figure 9: Safety Integrity Levels – Comparison of standards 
 Software Safety Standards – the following standards apply to 
software  DO-178B [42]  IEC 61508 [45]  Def-Stan 00-56, Issue 2 [32] [now withdrawn]  Safety Critical Requirements – Safety Critical Software includes 
hazardous software (which can directly contribute to a hazard) 
[NASA guidebook - 43]; these also include software in as a control 
function  Non-safety critical requirements 
o Fault Tolerance requirements  Detailed in the main safety validation matrix – whereby software 
fault tolerance is the ability of the system to withstand an unwanted 
event [43] – this is concerned with detecting and recovering from 
small defects before they can become larger failures  Checked at the verification stage 
o Failure Tolerance requirements  Detailed in the main safety validation matrix – whereby software 
failure tolerance concerns maintaining the system in a safe state 
despite a failure with the system [43]  Checked at the verification stage  Software Compliance – Evidence 
o Analysis evidence 
o Demonstration evidence 
o Quantitative evidence – in terms of the software standard DO-178B (and the 
withdrawn Def-Stan 00-55) the following quantitative values were provided 
for designers to prove the assurance of the software: 
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CPE 
Assurance 
Level 
Failure Condition 
Classification 
Design Assurance 
Level 
Target Probability 
(per event for low 
usage system) 
Target Probability 
(per flying hour) 
High Catastrophic DAL A 10-5 10-9 
Medium Hazardous DAL B 10-4 10-7 
Low Major DAL C 10-3 10-5 
Very Low Minor DAL D 10-2 10-3 
Not Safety 
Related 
Negligible DAL E N/A N/A 
Table 4: Software Quantitative Targets 
o Qualitative evidence 
o Review evidence 
o Process evidence 
o Counter-evidence 
Software Safety 
The software and complex hardware safety aspects form an important part of the analysis on top of 
the CPE certification (product and process assurance) efforts as the safety analysis should link the 
initial Functional Failure Path Analysis (FFPA) such as from FHAs down to the software FMEAs. 
Then after analysis during and after tests the functional flow paths from the S-FMEAs to the system 
level hazards (bottom-up approach) should be mapped. By doing this activity the safety requirements 
and hazard allocation (including risk budget) can be verified; any new hazards identified from the 
bottom-up analysis can then be included as a derived safety requirement and flowed back-up the 
analysis to determine whether the top targets can still be met. The following safety analysis should be 
undertaken: 
 Safety analysis 
o Software Fault Tree Analysis 
o Software FMECA (S-FMEAs) 
o Code Analysis and review 
o COTS and SOUP 
o Safety evidence and arguments 
Complex Hardware 
Complex Hardware forms part of the CPE and the standards are contained in DO-254 [44]. The 
complex hardware devices can include Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), Complex 
Programmable Logic Devices (CPLD) and Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs). The 
general planning, V&V activities, configuration control, product & process assurance  and safety 
analysis are also relevant but the electronic hardware philosophy is generally a top-down approach as 
this more effectively addresses safety design errors.   
  Accident Sequence 2.2.5
Once the safety definitions have been established (cause, hazard, accident, consequence) it is 
important to establish accident sequences as part of the analysis. Prior to discussing the accident 
sequence methods it is worth detailing the sequence in order to establish whether the current 
methodologies and definitions are sufficiently covered and more importantly sufficiently connected. 
The following figures represent basic accident sequences using the definitions from above: 
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Figure 10: Standard Accident Sequence 
 
Figure 11: Failure Condition Sequence 
 
Figure 12: Modified Failure Condition Sequence to include explicit lower-level system hazard 
As can be seen the figures are trying to tell the same story but are actually different. The point here is 
that hazard or accident or failure condition sequences can mean different things to different people 
and this is one of the reasons that the designer-oriented analysis is different from an operator-oriented 
analysis. This disconnect is discussed further in 3.4 whereby a more contiguous safety model is 
proposed incorporating the modified sequence and linking this to explicit aircraft-level hazardous 
states and then on to explicit accidents. 
2.2.5.1 Tools & Techniques 
The accident sequence can best be presented in Fault Trees and Event Trees: 
Fault Tree Analysis 
The following figure presents a typical and simple structure of a Fault Tree that shows how a base-
event (cause) can lead through an intermediate event (hazard) and on to a top event (accident).  
 
 
Figure 13: Basic Fault Tree Structure 
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FTA is a deductive technique i.e. ‘what causes this to happen’; it is a top-down analysis to determine 
the causes or base events. So we could start with the Accident ‘Loss of Control’ and say ‘what causes 
this to happen’ and we would then list those events. Next we would take those individual events and 
ask once again ‘what causes this to happen’ and so on until we get to the base events; these could be 
power supply failure, sensor failure, software failure and hardware failure. The FTA can ‘burrow’ a 
long way down to find a root cause and the boundaries of the analysis needs to be determined up 
front. 
Event Tree Analysis 
Figure 14 below presents a basic Event Tree showing an initiating event (this typically would be at the 
hazard level) and shows ‘developments’ (typically these would be controls) and leading on to final 
outcomes (accidents) and also consequences. 
The ETA operates by forward logic from the question ‘what happens if?’ Here we follow logical 
sequences and we are determining the success or the failure of each event after the initiating event.  
Although there are guidelines on how to use the separate tools as part of the overall safety effort, these 
are generally geared towards the Design Organisations. The DOs are responsible up to the failure 
condition in order to demonstrate compliance to a safety objective i.e. they can use FTAs 
 
Figure 14: Basic Event Tree Structure 
Another reason to understand the accident sequence is to be able to try and ‘break the chain’ to 
prevent the accident.  
A slightly different approach used to identify the accident sequence is the ‘Loss Model’ technique. 
The Loss Model is another top-down deductive technique that uses qualitative analysis to demonstrate 
that the accident’s hazards and causes have been captured in a hierarchical manner. The Loss Model 
can be produced in readily available tools such as Microsoft Visio® as the model can be constructed 
in a simple fashion. The main point (as with all modelling of hazard and accident sequences) is to 
involve the right stakeholders i.e. subject matter experts; it is of little value to just have the safety 
engineer construct a Loss Model as he cannot know and understand the design and operation of every 
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system. Figure 15 depicts a simplistic Loss Model approach allowing the analyst to model a short path 
to the cause and even to include the cause control with the evidence detailed at the bottom.  
 
Figure 15: Simplistic Loss Model 
Inherent Accident Sequences 
Inherent hazard-to-accident sequences can be useful in addressing the non-technical aspects, such as 
‘slips and trips’, exposure to lethal voltages and so on but the analysis also needs to address the 
operating and supporting of the equipment in order to ensure all hazards have been captured. As 
described above in Section 2.2.4 the OSHA activity is one method that addresses operating and 
support procedures from an Inherent sequence perspective. The OSHA model should provide a 
sequence of activities to analyse; it is up to the analyst how far back and how far forward he goes 
(from the actual flight) when analysing the procedures i.e. the analyst must define the scope of the 
OSHA model.  In the generic ‘Swiss-Cheese’ model below the main defensive barriers are: 
 Organisational Factors (manpower/resources/training)  Procedures & Management   Preconditions, Attitudes and Supervision  Unsafe Act – this relates to the active decisions (i.e. managerial decisions  to 
release an aircraft)/actions (i.e. pilot actions) 
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Figure 16: Accident Sequence Adapted from Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model 
As can be seen in the accident sequence above, ‘failed communication’ can be both a Latent issue and 
an Active condition on the day of the accident.  Leverson [36] detailed these within her STAMP 
model as discussed in 2.2.6.4; there she suggests that the Socio-Political aspects play a factor in the 
total system i.e. regulators through to company executives through to the operators. 
Operators need to understand the Inherent accident sequences just as much as the functional accident 
sequences as day to day the operators deal with Safety Significant Events and Inherent Accidents (as 
opposed to catastrophic accidents).    
2.2.5.2 Accident Lists  
Within DO and Operator safety analysis ‘Accidents’ are not explicitly considered within sequences. 
Instead DOs tend to analyse up to the Failure Conditions (which are associated with a severity i.e. 
catastrophic) and stop there. Operators tend to undertake reactive ‘Risk Profiling’ based on the Flight 
Operations Quality Assurance approach i.e. managing ‘events’ such as runway incursions or near fast 
landings. 
In contrast, the military safety effort does focus on managing the Accident Risks but fails to manage 
the ‘hazardous’ incidents i.e. their severity classifications do not consider reduced safety margins 
(near mid-air collision, or near CFIT, etc.). 
The ICAO SMS Manual [24] details recognised ‘accidents’ from the history of aviation occurrences. 
The Accident List is as follows: 
 Controlled Flight Into Terrain – CFIT  Mid-Air Collision (MAC) 
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 Loss of Control – In flight (LOC-I)  Loss of Control – Ground (LOC-G)  Explosion (Fuel Related)  Fire/Smoke (Non-Impact)  Fire/Smoke (post impact)  Loss of Thrust (system/component failure or malfunction – power-plant)   Structural Failure   System/Component failure or malfunction – non-power-plant 
ICAO standards also define ‘Serious Incidents’ which could also be used within a safety model (see 
Section 3.4): 
 A near collision requiring an avoidance manoeuvre, or when an avoiding 
manoeuvre would have been appropriate to avoid a collision or an unsafe 
situation (near MAC)  Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) only marginally avoided  An aborted take-off on a closed or engaged runway, or a take-off from a runway 
with marginal separation from obstacle(s)  A landing or attempted landing on a closed or engaged runway  Gross failure to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial climb  All fires and smoke in the passenger compartment or in cargo compartments, or 
engine fires, even though such fires are extinguished with extinguishing agents  Any events which required the emergency use of oxygen by the flight crew  Aircraft structural failure or engine disintegration which is not classified as an 
accident  Multiple malfunctions of one or more aircraft systems that seriously affect the 
operation of the aircraft  Any case of flight crew incapacitation in flight  Any fuel state which would require the declaration of an emergency by the pilot  Take-off or landing incidents, such as undershooting, overrunning or running off 
the side of runways  System failures, weather phenomena, operation outside the approved flight 
envelope or other occurrences which could have caused difficulties controlling 
the aircraft  Failure of more than one system in a redundancy system which is mandatory for 
flight guidance and navigation 
These ICAO-based taxonomies are useful to use within the accident sequence and they can explicitly 
link to corresponding failure conditions and other contributory factors. This is explored more in 
Chapter 3.4. 
Inherent, people-based Accidents are more difficult to assign in terms of the aircraft/spacecraft 
analysis as this is not well documented. In order to manage the Total System Risk (discussed more in 
3.4.11) DOs should analyse the operating and support aspects during the development of the aircraft 
but they should do this with the Operator. It is only by undertaking a joint analysis will both ‘sides’ 
understand and be able to manage the inherent hazards (and accident risks) associated with the 
platform. An example would be a ‘slip & trip’ hazard that is caused by a large centre-console design 
in a small cockpit that leads to a Musculoskeletal Accident with the consequence of severe cut or 
bruise. Another example is ‘exposure to lethal voltages’ hazard that is caused by poor bonding/earth 
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termination leading to an Electrocution Accident with the consequence of death10.  So it is also 
important to establish proper sequences with Accidents such that hazards can be linked to them and 
‘accident controls’ implemented. Clearly the DO can address the root causes (such as the poor 
bonding or improve the centre-console design) but the Operator can then implement operating 
procedural controls, warning signs or limitations. 
Even within the Health & Safety documentations and references there is confusion in that they talk 
about accidents but then go on to say that: 
‘For slip and trip risks to be adequately controlled you need to undertake a 
risk assessment’11 and:  
‘Many slip, trip and fall accidents occur on the ground in the UK where 
existing UK Health and Safety legislation applies - Hazards associated with 
slips, trips and falls in the aircraft cabin and flight deck environments include 
…. Stairwells, open aircraft exits, etc.’12  
As can be seen the first example talks about the risk of a slip or trip and the second example talks 
about the slip or trip being an accident with the hazard being stairwells, open aircraft doors and so on; 
here it is considered that the hazards are actually causes and that the slip and trip is not an accident. It 
is also understood that ‘one man’s hazard is another man’s cause and this confusion is believed to be 
rooted in the fact that Accident Lists are not generated or used within the safety domain – even though 
ICAO have accident lists.    
  Risk Management 2.2.6
(Safety) Risk Management is the core safety activity that underpins the robustness of a safety case. It 
is important to define Risk (and Risk Management) because it is the author’s considered opinion that 
there is confusion between DOs and Operators as to the difference between a hazard assessment and a 
risk assessment: 
Risk Definitions 
 Def-Stan 00-56 [28]; Combination of the likelihood of harm and the severity of 
that harm  FAA-AST AC [18]; Measure that takes into consideration the likelihood if 
occurrence and the consequence of a hazard to people or property  ANSI [84]; a measure of the expected loss from a given hazard or group of 
hazards. Risk is a combined expression of loss severity and probability (or 
likelihood). When expressed quantitatively, risk is the simple numerical product 
of severity of loss and the probability that loss will occur at that severity level. 
Risk Management Definitions: 
 Def-Stan 00-56 [28]; The systematic application of management policies, 
                                                     
10
 The terms ‘musculoskeletal’ and ‘electrocution’ are detailed here as the ‘accident’ within a sequence. It is 
difficult to name this event (the accident) with inherent events as it is easy to confuse the event as a hazard or 
even the consequence, so care must be exercised when trying to establish inherent-based sequences. The 
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work10 details various disorders such as Musculoskeletal Disorder 
which covers aspects (hazards) including Noise, Vibration and Manual Handling. 
11
 http://www.hse.gov.uk/slips/employersriskas.htm 
12
 http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/cap757.pdf 
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procedures and practices to the tasks of Hazard Identification, Hazard Analysis, 
Risk Estimation, Risk and ALARP Evaluation, Risk Reduction and Risk 
Acceptance.  FAA-AST AC [18]; ‘Risk Mitigation’ is a process of reducing the likelihood of 
occurrence, severity of occurrence, or both the likelihood and severity of a 
hazard to people or property.  ANSI - none 
By undertaking Risk Management an Operator can determine whether a Total System can be deemed 
‘Acceptably Safe’. Here it is meant that the operator has taken an aircraft (or suborbital aircraft) that 
has met its design airworthiness criteria (failure condition safety objectives) and applied their operator 
procedures and limitations and have assessed the individual accident risks and then assessed the 
cumulative risks to the aircraft and derived this to be acceptably safe. 
‘Safe’ is described in the UK Defence Standards [28] as: 
“Risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is ALARP 
and broadly acceptable, or tolerable, and relevant prescriptive safety 
requirements have been met, for a system in a given application in a given 
operating environment.” 
Therefore the term ‘acceptably safe’ as applied to a suborbital aircraft is derived as: 
 The Risk to a suborbital aircraft has been demonstrated to have been reduced so 
far as is reasonably practicable and that relevant prescriptive safety targets and 
safety requirements have been met for all phases of the suborbital flight 
To demonstrate a safe System, Design Organisations (and Operators alike) will identify Safety 
Requirements that must be met. Safety Requirements are defined in the UK Defence Standards [28] 
as: 
“Specified criteria of a system that is necessary in order to reduce the risk of 
an accident or incident to an acceptable level. Also a requirement that helps 
or achieve a Safety Objective” 
As part of the Safety Requirements it is also important to have robust safety criteria to which a DO 
must meet. 
2.2.6.1 Safety Criteria & Targets 
Civilian Airworthiness Codes of Requirements 
The Aircraft Loss Target stated in Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR)/Certification Specification 
(CS) 25.1309 [87] is based on the world-wide accident rate which is about one per million flight 
hours, i.e. a probability of 1E-6 per hour of flight. The accident rate was first analysed in the UK for 
the British Civil Aviation Requirements (BCAR). It was deduced that the baseline rate was due 
operational and airframe related causes. Furthermore about 10% of accidents were attributed to failure 
conditions involving critical aircraft systems, i.e. 1E-1; therefore the overall target should be no 
greater than 1E-7. Arbitrarily it was deduced that there were approximately 100 system catastrophic 
failure conditions assumed to exist on civil aircraft, i.e. 1E+2. Therefore to prevent a deterioration of 
the current fatal accident rate, DOs must show that the probability of occurrence of each catastrophic 
failure condition was at least 1E-6 x 1E-1 / 1E+2 = 1E-9 per flying hour. This then became the basis 
for inclusion in the relevant Certification Specification’s codes of requirements for designing aircraft. 
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AC 25.1309-1A [51] details the acceptable means of compliance for § 25.1309(b) and of particular 
relevance is the ‘probability versus consequence’ graph. The probability classifications based on the 
above rationale are as follows: 
 Probable failure conditions >  1E-5  Improbable failure conditions < 1E-5 but >  1E-9  Extremely Improbable failure conditions < 1E-9 
The AC states that each failure condition should have a probability that is inversely related to its 
severity. It is recognised that should the Designer present an aircraft with 100 catastrophic failure 
conditions that meet the safety objective of 1E-, then they will meet the overall Loss Target (for 
catastrophic failure conditions) of 1E-7. §25.1309 then stipulated further safety objectives:  Major 
failure conditions are to be <1E-5 and >1E-9 and Minor failure conditions >1E-5; therefore one would 
assume that with a further 100 ‘Major’ failure conditions met by the DO at 1E-5 then they will meet 
that overall target of 1E-03.  
The range of the Major failure conditions is clearly too great, hence the FAA tasked the Aviation 
Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) with providing better guidance for DOs to follow. Their 
report [46] includes an updated AC 25.1309 and quite rightly splits the ‘Major’ failure condition 
criterion to the following classifications (severity/ probability): 
 No Safety effect/no probability requirement  Minor/Probable failure conditions <  1E-3  Major/Remote failure conditions < 1E-5   Hazardous/Extremely Remote failure conditions < 1E-7  Catastrophic/ Extremely Improbable failure conditions < 1E-9 
One question to ask with the chosen category ranges is why there are two orders of magnitude 
between the severity classifications (base 100) as opposed to a logarithmic scale using base 10 (and 
also why there were four orders of magnitude beforehand)? In answering this we must first look at the 
probability definitions: 
 Extremely Improbable Failure Condition:  a failure condition that is so unlikely 
that it is not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all airplanes 
of one type.  
 
Note: This probability includes a fail-safe design requirement that single failures 
must not result in catastrophic failure conditions, regardless of their probability. 
  Catastrophic Failure Condition:  a failure condition that would result in multiple 
fatalities, usually with the loss of the airplane. 
 
The multiple fatalities for catastrophic could refer to 100 people (as a rough order in a large passenger 
aircraft) and therefore the severity ranges per probability range reduce by two orders of magnitude i.e. 
by 100. Following this argument would mean that Hazardous events result in 1 death or 100 severe 
injuries and Major events result in 100 slight injuries. This rationale concerns looking at the harm 
(consequence) from the severity of the failure condition and therefore considers the risk of the 
accident; this is different from the risk of the failure condition. Furthermore this rationale does not 
consider that the original AC25.1309-1A [51] suggested four orders of magnitude between failure 
conditions. 
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In the UK Military Risk Matrices base 10 is used in a logarithmic scale but there is no explanation as 
to why; the military have small fast jets and helicopters with less than 10 people on board but also 
have large transport aircraft – if this were the case then there should be two Risk Matrices. 
It is therefore more credible that the probability ranges stem from the origins of the catastrophic 
failure condition (1x10-9 per flying hour for Part 25 aircraft and commuter category aircraft in Part 
23) and that the reducing severities and associated probabilities were derived from engineering 
judgment. This is further backed up by the use of phrases such as ‘because the improbable range is 
broad, the applicant should obtain early concurrence of the cognisant certificating office on an 
acceptable probability for each major failure condition’ [51]. Furthermore the original AC states that 
due to the fact that failure rate data is not precise that there is a degree of uncertainty (as indicated by 
the wide line on Figure 17 below) and that the descriptive probability expressions stated ‘on the order 
of’. 
This revised probability scheme has been incorporated in CS 25 [48]. The consequence versus 
probability graph is still a single safety objective/overall target line; the axis has changed i.e. 
probability on the vertical axis, and they have explicitly added the words ‘unacceptable’ above the 
safety objective line and ‘acceptable’ below. By keeping with the single line philosophy, this means 
that there is still an implicit ‘overall target’ for each type of failure condition (catastrophic/ 
hazardous/major/minor) as depicted in Figure 17 below. 
 
Figure 17: AC 25.1309 severity and probability criterion 
Recognising that smaller aircraft will have different characteristics than large aircraft a certification 
specification (CS) and AC were introduced. CS 23 [47] covers Normal, Utility, Aerobatic and 
Commuter Category airplanes. It details the applicability and provides a breakdown of categories of 
aircraft stating that an aircraft can be certified under more than one category so long as it meets all of 
the relevant and identified requirements. AC 23.1309 [87] follows the same rationale as §25.1309 
with the aim as: 
‘to improve the safety of the airplane fleet by fostering the incorporation of 
both new technologies that address pilot error and weather related accidents 
and those technologies that can be certificated affordably under 14 CFR Part 
23’ 
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Although the AC covers all of the categories stated above, it concentrates on the General Aviation 
(GA) aspects in rationalising the decision regarding the setting of safety objectives. The historical 
accident rate is predominantly associated with flying in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). 
The evidence indicates that the probability of a fatal accident in restricted visibility due to operational 
and airframe-related causes is 1 in 10,000 (1E-4) for single-engine aeroplanes under 6000lbs. 
Additionally (as per §25.1309) evidence shows that 10% of accidents are due to system failure 
conditions therefore the probability of a fatal accident from all causes is 1E-5 per flight hour. As 
opposed to large aircraft with many complex systems, Part 23 Class I aircraft are ‘arbitrarily’ derived 
to have 10 potential failure conditions that could be catastrophic thus the safety objective is 1E-6 per 
flying hour. The AC continues to state that larger aircraft (than Class I) have a lower failure rate and 
therefore have lower probability values for catastrophic failure conditions: 
 Class II =  1E-7  Class III =  1E-8  Class IV =  1E-9 
Although there is no ‘severity versus likelihood’ chart as per §25.1309, the chart would be exactly the 
same as in Figure 17 above. 
Airworthiness for Protection  
The codes of requirements are detailed for the assurance of the airworthiness of the aircraft in 
accordance with ICAO Annex 8 [49], where the foreword states: 
“The objective of international airworthiness Standards is to define...... the 
minimum level of airworthiness...for the recognition...of certificates of 
airworthiness... thereby achieving, among other things, protection of other 
aircraft, third parties and property” 
This overarching statement considers the aircraft, 3rd parties and property. Implicit in the aircraft part 
of the statement is clearly the crew (1st parties) and passengers (2nd parties); though CS’s and other 
requirements have more explicit requirements concerning safety of passengers and crew. 
Military Safety Targets 
UK Military 
The UK Military have adopted a top-down ‘Safety Target’ approach for all of their aircraft [50]. The 
Safety Target is detailed as: 
‘the cumulative probability of the loss of an aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative 
probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) which 
could result in the death of any air crew or passengers, should both be assessed to be of the order of 
one in a million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10-6 per flying hour) when operated 
within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration’  
This then is not prescriptive in its use of safety objectives for failure conditions (or hazards) and does 
not detail the number of ‘arbitrary’ safety critical failure conditions i.e. it does not state that there are 
100 catastrophic failure conditions; nor does it detail the 10% attributed to operational and airframe 
related causes. It is recognised within the military that this safety target was mainly introduced to 
provide a goal for aircraft already ‘In-Service’. For newly contracted aircraft, this safety target was 
the only contracted requirement and therefore Designers were left to their own conclusions in the 
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derivation of safety objectives for failure conditions i.e. were they contracted to 1E-8 or 1E-9 per 
flying hour for catastrophic failures? 
It is also recognised within the military that the safety target includes a mixture of design controls, 
operating procedural controls and limitations (these latter aspects covered within an aircraft’s Release 
to Service).  
Also it is clear from within the safety target statement that the military explicitly considers the crew 
and passengers in their criteria, but not 3rd parties or property; these are implicit requirements and 3rd 
parties in particular are covered within the severity classifications (property is not). 
The risk matrix and criterion used by the standard UK military Project Team is as follows: 
 
Table 5: UK Military Aviation Standard Risk Matrix 
As can be seen above the Project Team’s tend to use this for Accidents and Hazards with some filling 
in the table using Hazard Risk Indices (HRI) similar to that in Table 6 below. However the military 
guidelines do not explain the derivation of the numbers and how Project Teams were supposed to use 
them, other than one could differentiate between a high ‘C’ and a low ‘C’ Risk in the critical, 
marginal and negligible columns (likewise for the other A and D class cells) i.e. the ‘risk’ is a C10 so 
you know where this sits in the matrix. However this approach seems to be a mix of accident risk 
criterion (using Risk Class A, B, C and D) as well as a HRI scheme (1-24); though the cell values start 
at 1 (for catastrophic/frequent) and apart from identification purposes there is no rationale and no 
correlation to number of hazards per severity classification per the explicitly defined US system 
below.  
In summary there is much confusion with the way the UK Project Teams use their Risk Matrix (as 
well as the accompanying probability and severity classifications) and the newly installed UK 
Military Aviation Authority intend to revamp the criterion and are looking towards civilian best 
practices to be applied to new military aircraft developments. 
US Military 
The US military tend to follow the MIL-STD-882 [53] guidelines and also the Joint Service 
Specification Guide (JSSG) for Air Vehicles [52]. The later was produced to support ‘performance-
based aviation acquisition’. The JSSG provides useful insight into the derivation of Hazard Risk 
Indices (HRI) and the following table shows one form of using HRIs during the development stage 
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when setting requirements. The HRIs are derived from multiplying the values associated with the 
frequency and consequence i.e. Frequent (6) x Catastrophic (5) = 30 and so: 
 
Table 6: JSSG exemplar Hazard Risk Indices Table for aircraft procurement 
The extremely useful concept of numbering the matrix this way is that it links in to the origins of the 
failure conditions in that it appreciates where the 1x10-9 per flying hour  stems from (which includes an 
arbitrary 100 hazards). In the above table it is assumed that there are 100 hazards and that the 
cumulative value for catastrophic failures is 1000, then for development if there are 33 hazards that 
are catastrophic/frequent that the ‘target’ will not be met. Additionally the guide suggests that the risk 
matrix can be ‘calibrated’ by having a ‘forbidden zone’ and following the same regime as before this 
value is entered as 1001 and in the example below the forbidden zones are the high frequency, high 
consequence area: 
 
Table 7: JSSG exemplar Hazard Risk Indices Table including ‘forbidden zone’ 
In the above example an aircraft designer could have the following number of catastrophic ‘hazards’; 
30 (occasional), 20 (unlikely) and 10 (remote) – the guide suggests that hazards equal to or less than 
those in the ‘blue zone’ are not counted in the cumulative calculation and so the remaining 40 hazards 
must be within the Improbable cell. 
This methodology is explicit in its rationale and this is encouraging because in reviewing other 
documents it is not clear sometimes how they have derived their criteria or risk matrices (whether 
hazard based or accident based). 
Abort Rate Methodology 
Another method of deriving a platform Loss Rate was discussed by Reaction Engines at the 2nd IAA 
conference [54]. The rationale for the choice of an abort rate was that the ‘space-plane’ industry 
cannot afford the flight test criteria afforded by aerospace design and manufacture whereby the 
development costs would be recuperated by mass sales. Although a lot of evidence would be gathered 
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by design analysis and computer modelling and wind-tunnel testing of sub-scale models the actual 
flight tests (for Reaction Engines) was stated to be 300 between two prototype vehicles with a further 
76 flights in reserve. Their space vehicle ‘SKYLON’ is designed for orbital operations though the 
methodology is considered here as an alternative to the normal certification criteria which is based on 
well-proven systems. Their methodology was as follows: 
 Assumes link between Abort Rate and Loss Rate   Assumes 2 abort events would lead to Loss  Assumes 50% crew survivability in aborts 
 
Therefore probability of fatalities is half the probability of airframe loss = 
  Pfatal = Ploss/2  [Equation 1] 
Therefore Probability of loss is dependent over time [P (t)] whereby Pabort = ʃ P (t) and for two aborts 
this means that after the first abort the probability function for the second abort is half therefore; 
  Ploss = ∫ P(t) *∫ P(t) /2 = Pabort 2/2 therefore, 
Ploss = Pabort2/2   [Equation 2]    
Thus combined with Equation 1, the result is the estimated probability of fatality =  
Pfatal = (Pabort 2/2) / 2 = Pabort 2 / 4 [Equation 3] 
With a 1/100 abort rate (after 300 flights) this implies a vehicle loss rate of 1 in 20,000 which equates 
to a loss of life probability of 1 in 40,000 and therefore they claim that their initial estimates suggest 
they are more than one hundred times ‘safer’ than the Space Shuttle.  
They then suggest that a rolling certification program could be achievable to prove 1 in 10,000 (1.0 x 
10-4 pfh) by showing an abort rate of 1 in 225 (300 flights with no aborts or 500-1000 flights to 
establish a probability function). Then moving to ‘approach 2’ whereby they prove 1 in 1,000,000 (1.0 
x 10-6 pfh) by showing an abort rate of 1 in 700 (1000 flights with no abort or 3000 to 4000 flights to 
establish a probability function). 
This methodology of linking an abort rate to the loss rate is an interesting approach and needs to be 
further analysed as to the suitability for aircraft-based vehicles; it is considered this may be an 
appropriate method for vertical take-off/vertical landing vehicles in the suborbital domain; this 
suggestion is captured as a recommendation in 6.4. 
Conclusions on Safety Criteria & Targets 
Parts 23.1309 and 25.1309 baseline criteria are based on historical accident rates for the type (size) of 
aircraft. The levels of safety objectives for the failure conditions are then derived accordingly from 
codes of requirements and these are solely for the Design Organisation to demonstrate their 
compliance to as part of the certification process. These baseline criteria (and subsequent derivation of 
safety objectives) use sound methodology and for the suborbital field the same methodology could be 
employed (for aircraft-based vehicles); however it is clear that the baseline criterion must first be 
established, ensuring that the rationale is explicit and relevant. It was evident from the review that 
some criteria was not rationalised and this causes confusion (in particular in the UK military 
airworthiness and safety domain). 
In terms of a ‘Safety Target’ approach, this does not fit into the existing civilian methodology, but 
there may be merit in adopting a combined approach because for suborbital vehicles (and in particular 
Chapter Two   Review 
 
 
Page 53 of 300 
 
for the rocket engine) the civilian safety objectives (such as 1E-8 pfh) may be extremely difficult to 
achieve without some credit taken from operating procedures or limitations. Additionally, it may be 
more prudent to explicitly detail the consequences to 1st, 2nd and 3rd parties (and property) within the 
classifications. This aspect is further discussed in Chapter 3. 
The alternative method of calculating an abort rate and linking it to a loss rate is an interesting 
approach and one that may suit suborbital vertical take-off and landing vehicles in particular. 
Final Views on Risk Assessment and Risk Matrices  
This section has shown that there are various methods in assessing hazards (failure conditions) and 
accidents and sometimes these get mixed up. The author contends that there should be a clear 
distinction between functional analysis for certification of aircraft (and in EASA terms a certified 
aircraft implies that the flight crew and passengers are safe and so are those that are overflown by the 
aircraft) and inherent people-based analysis whereby risks to individuals or groups of people (pilots, 
maintainers, passengers and the public etc.) can be analysed and risk reduction carried out (to ALARP 
for instance as in the UK); for functional aircraft analysis the metric is ‘flying hours’ and for people-
based analysis the metric is ‘risk per person (per group) per year’. Additionally the author contends 
that it is acceptable to analyse individual risks to determine whether further risk reduction is required 
but that these individual risks (r) must then be aggregated to provide a cumulative risk i.e. Total Risk 
(R); this could be per severity or indeed for all risks. Therefore when compiling Risk Matrices the 
metric should be clear as to whether they represent a hazard or accident and whether they represent 
flying hours or risk to people. When summing the risks or analysing them individually care must be 
taken so as to apply the correct disproportion factor at the correct level (in the UK ALARP calculation 
in particular); otherwise the risk may be falsely presented leading to incorrect decisions being made as 
to whether to apply a risk reduction measure. Finally the Risk Matrices are sometimes not logarithmic 
or indeed not plotted per convention i.e. a Cartesian plot whereby severity is conventionally plotted 
increasing left to right on the x-axis and likelihood increasing vertically on the y-axis.  
2.2.6.2 Risk Estimation 
Risk Estimation determines (quantitatively or qualitatively) the risk consequences of individual 
Accidents; this takes into account the relevant hazard-to-accident sequences and in particular those 
hazards that are the main contributors to the Accident. 
Preliminary Risk Estimation (PRE) takes the Risk Estimation and attempts to classify the Risk of each 
Accident in terms of the ‘confidence’ level of the Risk presented. Once the PRE process has been 
completed the Risks can then be prioritised in order (highest to lowest) so that the most serious risks 
are looked at first when undertaking the Risk & ALARP Evaluation process. As well as estimating the 
Risk, the PRE process is one method of determining whether a project is viable in terms of meeting 
safety objectives/targets whether at the failure condition (system) level or the accident risk (platform) 
level.  
2.2.6.3 Risk & ALARP Evaluation 
The As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle stems from the UK Health & Safety 
Executive (HSE) definitions. The UK Defence Standards and others have taken the definitions and 
used them within their own standards: 
 UK HSE definition [55]: 
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At the core of ALARP is the concept of ‘reasonably practicable’ which 
involves weighing the risk against the trouble, time and money to control it. 
Thus ALARP describes the level to which it is expected that workplace risks 
are controlled to. 
 UK DEF-STAN 00-56 [28]: 
A risk is ALARP when it has been demonstrated that the cost of any further 
Risk Reduction, where the loss of (defence) capability as well as financial or 
other resource cost, is grossly disproportionate to the benefit obtained from 
the Risk Reduction.  
 ANSI [84]:  
That level of risk which can be further lowered only by an increment in 
resource expenditure that cannot be justified by the resulting decrement in 
risk. Often identified or verified by formal or subjective application of cost-
benefit analysis or multi-attribute utility theory. 
In terms of the above definitions there is a different emphasis from the HSE description of ALARP to 
that of the UK Defence Standards and also the American National Standards. In the latter the intent is 
that the Risk is applied towards military equipment (primarily in the air domain which concerns 
functional and inherent hazards [and their probabilities in flying hours] associated with a particular 
accident risk [factor of severity and the probability]). In the UK HSE domain the intent is to identify 
risks in the workplace and classify them in terms of tolerability towards the societal perspective; to do 
this the risk is deemed in terms of the risk to the population (of workforce or group) per 100,000 
people per year i.e. the risk is measured in terms of risk per person per year (pppy). 
The following ‘ALARP Triangle’ represents the degrees of risk in terms of acceptable deaths per 
person per year (per societal group) and is adapted from the HSE’s Reducing Risk Protecting People 
(R2P2) [56] guidelines: 
 
Figure 18: HSE – based ALARP Triangle depicting Tolerability of Risk 
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It is considered that the UK military have adapted the basis of the ALARP principle and applied this 
to the airworthiness (certification and safety risks) aspects. The Project Teams base their analysis on 
the flying hour rates and do not consider risk of death ‘pppy’. Chapter 3.4.9 provides a more explicit 
method to address the issue of flying hour ‘versus’ risk of death pppy. 
In demonstrating ALARP the UK HSE suggest that duty holders can do this by arguing risks are 
reduced to ALARP by following the order of precedence below: 
 Good Practice; here a duty holder can argue that he has followed good practice 
in implementing various levels of controls  Qualitatively; here a duty holder may argue engineering judgment and common 
sense in the approach  Quantitatively; in this instance more formal methods may be required to argue 
that the risk has been reduced to ALARP. This may include quantitative 
assessment backed up by a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) to demonstrate that the 
benefit gained from introducing a control measure is commensurate to the costs 
involved in the design, development and through-life management of the control. 
As can be seen in the UK Def-Stan 00-56 definition further above that the CBA effort provides a clear 
indication whether the cost of a control measure is grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained in 
which case the duty holder can argue against the implementation of said control; likewise if the cost is 
less than the calculated ‘ALARP Budget’ then the duty holder should implement the control. An 
example of this is provided in 4.2. 
2.2.6.4 Risk Reduction 
To demonstrate that risks are ALARP one has to state and justify the existing controls are actually 
implemented and are effective. The next stage is to identify additional potential controls to reduce the 
risk. Then the potential controls can be subject to an optimisation analysis to determine which of the 
controls should be implemented. This can then be documented as part of the safety justification that 
determines the risk is ALARP and is ready for the next phase of risk acceptance (2.2.6.5). 
Risk Reduction is the key component within an accident sequence because it is the one variable that 
we can have more of an influence on than for example the direct root cause. Many factors can have an 
influencing effect on the accident sequence including; the management, the media (environment), 
man (the human factor) and the machine and these can clearly be articulated in the 5-M model (2.2.8). 
Leverson [36] describes the many factors within a Socio-Technical based model called STAMP 
(Systems-Theoretic Accident Model) which suggests that accidents occur when external disturbances, 
component failures, or dysfunctional interactions among systems are not adequately handled by the 
controls system, that is, they result from an inadequate control or enforcement of safety-related 
constraints on the development, design and operation of the system. Within the paper her model 
focuses on the hierarchy of control based on adaptive feedback mechanisms and this is applied to the 
‘whole system’ meaning the total Socio-Technical aspects including legislation, regulations, 
certification, and design systems safety through to the operator safety. The model then refines the 
failure of controls (constraints) to three high-level control flaw classifications: 
 Inadequate Enforcement of Constraints (Control Actions)  Inadequate Execution of Control Action  Inadequate or missing feedback 
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In the systems theory part of the model Leverson with regards to the hierarchy of control based on 
adaptive feedback mechanisms she cites a paper (Ashby, 1956) that states that to affect control over a 
system requires four conditions:  
 The controller must have a goal or goals (e.g., to maintain the set point)  The controller must be able to affect the state of the system  The controller must be (or contain) a model of the system, and  The controller must be able to ascertain the state of the system 
The above control laws pertain to both humans and the automated system and can act independently 
or may act together i.e. in terms of modelling this within a Fault Tree the former would be either the 
human OR the automated system providing a control or in the latter case the human AND the 
automated system provides the control. Figure 19 below depicts the human and automated control 
systems and when explicitly shown like this provides a clear picture of why the human control may 
fail, in that due to the human factor aspects the human’s model of either the controlled process or the 
automated model may become flawed. 
 
Figure 19: A typical control loop and process model (from Leverson’s STAMP model) 
Some of these human factor aspects are discussed in the 5-M model (2.2.8) but to continue the 
analyses of these flaws (or variability in performance) we turn to another approach based on the 
Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) by Hollnagel. A paper on Resilience Engineering and 
Safety Management Systems in Aviation by Dijkstra [37] depicts the model (FRAM, Hollnagel 2004) 
and suggests the use of the model requires performance indicators.  
The FRAM essentially re-classifies failures and ‘errors’ to variability in performance and 
encompasses an alternative approach to capture the dynamic nature of how events occur; to use 
resonance rather than failure.  
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Figure 20: Functional Resonance Accident Model 
In the model the variability in performance reflects the performance of the system where the human 
and machine form part of that system. This model is an interesting concept whereby the ‘quality 
margins’ of the resonance can be pre-set values and for the automated system this is already the case 
whereby a warning or alarm is provided, however for the human these quality margins also need to be 
set; these margins of human error are discussed in 2.2.8 and refined into guidelines at 3.4.6.  
2.2.6.5 Risk Acceptance 
Risk Acceptance is the final stage in the RM process. Once all of the previous RM activities have 
been completed, the Risk Acceptance process should address how the sufficiency and adequacy of the 
supporting evidence will demonstrate that the Risk is Acceptable. The HSE classify the risks as: 
 Unacceptable  Tolerable  Broadly Acceptable 
Within the UK MoD an additional layer of tolerability is introduced. Risks are either: 
 Unacceptable  Intolerable  Tolerable  Broadly Acceptable 
The FAA-AST AS [18] has introduced a simplified risk acceptability matrix whereby they have two 
categories: 
 Category 1 – High (1-6, 8 – in terms of Hazard Risk Index [HRI])  Category 2 – Low (7, 9-20) 
The ANSI [84]; mishap risk categories are: 
 High (1-5)  Serious (6-9)  Medium (10-17)  Low (18-20) 
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The tolerability criteria detailed above are similar in their methods by having a ‘medium’ or 
‘tolerable’ area whereby accountable decision makers can accept (or not) the risks presented to them 
(except the FAA-AST guidelines for commercial spaceflight – where the risk is simply acceptable or 
not). 
  The Hazard Log 2.2.7
The Hazard Log is the cornerstone of a safety case and if structured correctly can provide a useful and 
auditable source of evidence. The ICAO SMS Manual [24] states that a hazard log should: 
 Record hazards  Have hazards with unique assigned numbers  Describe each hazard  Detail the consequences  Assess the likelihood and severity of the Safety Risks  Detail safety risk controls (mitigation measures)  Be updated for new hazards and safety risk controls 
The hazard log is an extremely powerful tool if used correctly and during the author’s visits to the 
safety offices of two airlines it was evident that the hazard log was an aspiration rather than a tool 
being used to determine the airline’s Safety Risk. Instead the preferred method was to use Risk 
Profiles based on the Flight Operations and Quality Assurance (FOQA) model. This takes individual 
occurrences and records them so that one can display the rate of occurrences in a Risk Profile. Once 
this is achieved it is easy to see what the airline’s issues are i.e. runway incursion, high speed/angle 
approaches due poor Air Traffic ‘let-downs’ and also inherent issues such as ‘Despatcher falling from 
aircraft steps’. These however are based on the frequency of the occurrence only and the Safety 
Manager may spend time on undertaking Risk Assessment for these issues whereas their highest Risk 
may actually be on a lower event in the Risk Profile; hence they need to include severity in their Risk 
Profile charts i.e. displaying a Risk Profile based on the sum of the frequency and severity of the 
occurrences. In one instance the airline Safety Manager was aware of this and his aspiration was to 
improve the system to take into account of the severity as well as the frequency; the case in point 
concerned the Despatcher falling from the aircraft steps – only one or two occurrences but the severity 
was high as the individuals received severe injuries. 
It is considered that a hazard log should be supplemented by the standard FOQA system rather than 
the Risk Profiles replacing the hazard log. 
2.2.7.1 Types of Hazard Log 
There are a few companies providing bespoke hazard logs or tools for conducting and recording risk 
assessments. Although these are standard hazard log tools they may require tailoring to suit a specific 
project. Moreover, when undertaking hazard and risk management one should always be cognisant of 
what the outcome is to be i.e. what are you going to do with the identified and analysed hazard? Does 
it require linking to an accident? Is it a simplex accident sequence or must the relationships be able to 
cope with many-to-one and many-to-many linking and therefore be able to cope with different levels 
within the sequence? Is the tool able to represent both the Design Organisation information and also 
integrate this with the Operator Safety Risk Management?  
Herein lays the issue with generic tools – they may be too simplistic or indeed not up to the task and 
hence do not get used. A hazard log should be based on user requirements. In this instance there is 
currently no detailed guidance for hazard logs except that of the minimum requirements detailed by 
the ICAO standards mentioned above. It is considered that due to the lack of an integrated safety 
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model the Design Organisations and Operators are left to their own devices and hence depending on 
the level of competence (or level of time and resource available) then the levels of hazard tracking 
vary enormously; this should be more consistent and more widely applicable – safety should not have 
standards within standards and organisations should learn lessons from one another in order to show 
continuous improvement.    
Section 3.4 discusses a Hazard Log based on the Exemplar Safety Model. 
  Human Factors Integration 2.2.8
Human Factors are cited within accident board investigations as being contributory factors within an 
accident sequence.  
Human Factors Integration (HFI) involves a multi-disciplinary team of experts that examine the 
requirements and issues concerning HFI during the early stages of aircraft/spacecraft development. It 
can also be termed Human Machine Integration (HMI) or Human Machine Ergonomics (HME)  
Interfaces between humans and complex electronic elements should be analysed carefully such that 
human errors are minimised. Another factor to consider is that the ‘machine’ does not overload the 
human with information; particularly in fault scenarios i.e. multiple error messages as was the case on 
Air France Flight 447 (see 3.4.7 for the case study). 
2.2.8.1 HFI Models 
Useful models exist to examine these integration factors including the ‘SHELL’ model and the 5-M 
model. 
SHELL Model 
The current SHELL model is based on Professor Edwards’ model13 which looked at the Software + 
Hardware + Environment + Live-ware (humans) aspects. It was not until 1975 that Captain Frank 
Hawkins added a second ‘L’ to the model to capture the interaction of the L-L i.e. humans with 
humans and in particular the management. Figure 21 below depicts the model. 
 
Figure 21: SHELL Model adapted by Hawkins 
5-M Model 
Figure 22 below depicts the 5-M model14 based on T P Wright and adapted by E A Jerome (1976) that 
best describes the interaction of management, man, machine and media in order to either have a 
successful mission or a mishap. The following section describes known and emerging issues within 
                                                     
13
 http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/ICAO_SHELL_Model 
14
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5_M_factors 
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the aviation domain (the suborbital space domain issues are also described in this section for 
comparison).  
 
 
Figure 22: 5-M Human Factors Integration Considerations  
Man  
The Human Factor is the most variable element in the model and statistically is the greatest 
contributor to aircraft accidents (currently estimated at 90%15). 
 Aviation/Current Space Issues; 
o Aviation;  The aviation industry has always suffered from ‘cross-cockpit 
gradient’ issues and this has led to accidents in some cases. 
Additionally where pilots are cited as being a major contributor in an 
accident, the root cause has sometimes not been uncovered; such as 
fatigue, lack of training, poor procedures. The Air France AF447 
disaster is a prime example of this and this is covered in more detail 
in the case study at 3.4.7 
o Space;  Orbital spaceflight involves a large multi-disciplinary team and 
operator procedures are a key mitigating factor in preventing 
accidents. The accident review (summarised in Table 2) reveals that 
the mishaps were due to technical causes (machine) and management 
as opposed to direct human factor errors (man). That said there will 
be a lot of unreported incidents involving man on the Space Shuttle, 
Soyuz or indeed aboard the ISS and these are either unreported or 
reported within the closed system of NASA.  Suborbital Issues 
o Flight Crew  Selection; Must be biased towards high-speed, high-g, high-stress 
previous experience (FAA state ‘of similar experience’).  Performance; Must have simulator training/test flights to improve 
performance and maintain standards.   Personal Factors; Crew Resource Management Training (CRM) to 
optimise synergy. 
                                                     
15
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_reliability 
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 Flight Crew Fatigue; within the aviation domain there is growing 
concern regarding pilot fatigue as a contributor to human error in 
accidents and incidents. Within the suborbital domain although the 
flights are not long i.e. no more than one hour, fatigue must be 
considered in Operator’s analysis. The rationale is that the flights 
may be more exacting on the pilots with the g-forces playing a major 
factor; it is anticipated that the pilots will experience up to +3g(z) 
during the pull-up phase and up to +6g(x) during the descent16. This 
may not be relevant during the test phase or early operational flights 
as the number of flights will invariably be low, however if flights are 
conducted more than once per day then fatigue will quickly become 
an issue. 
 
The UK CAP 719 [57] agrees with this cautionary point and state that 
‘acute fatigue is induced by long duty periods or by a string of 
particularly demanding tasks performed in the short term.’ 
o Spaceflight Participants (SFP); this is not a joy ride and hence the suborbital 
flight will be exacting for the SFPs. Indeed some may not be able to 
withstand excessive g-forces and hence there is a need to consider the 
following:  Medical Screening; there must be an explicit list of ‘go/no-go’ 
conditions for SFPs  Training; centrifuge training is a key aspect and is not mandatory in 
the FAA-AST guidelines  Personal Factors. With comprehensive training and briefing, the 
passenger’s psycho-physiological condition can be bolstered and 
SFPs should pose less of a risk to themselves and also such that they 
do not become a hazard to the control of the vehicle 
Machine  
The design of the aircraft/spacecraft is complex yet must meet certain certification requirements (or 
guidelines in terms of the FAA-AST for Suborbital design analysis within the United States) 
 Aviation/Current Space Issues; 
o Aviation:  Only 10% of aviation accidents are cited as having design issues as 
the contributor i.e. towards a CFIT or LOC. Machines are becoming 
more complex and apart from composite design advancements, 
Complex Programmable Equipment (CPE) are perhaps  providing 
more problems than the ones they were supposed to solve. In 
particular to the design and HFI issues, the Air France Flight 447 
disaster cites misleading CPE as a contributor; this is examined in 
more depth as part of a case study in Section 3.4.7. 
o Space:  The Space Shuttle and Soyuz are complex systems requiring an 
extensive Rocket Propulsion System (RPS) in order to overcome the 
Earth’s gravitational pull. Herein lays some of the problems with the 
machine and in particular to the Shuttle Challenger. Additionally the 
structural integrity of the machine must withstand immense forces 
during launch/ascent and re-entry in particular.  Suborbital Issues 
                                                     
16
 Typical g-forces and flight time from the Virgin Galactic model; http://www.virgingalactic.com 
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o There are different design solutions currently in development and even test 
flights (Virgin Galactic). The vehicle designs vary in their launch and re-
entry/approach methods including horizontal launch and take-off (XCOR), 
air-launch and glide to land (Virgin Galactic) and vertical take-off and land 
(Blue Origin). All of these are non-standard (aviation) designs using novel 
technologies and it is envisaged that these will present a high Safety Risk (at 
least one or two orders of magnitude ‘less safe’ than civil aviation standards). 
The novel design issues with Suborbital flight include:  Environment Control and Life Support System ECLSS  Rocket Propulsion System (RPS)  Propellant  Reaction Control System (RCS)  Composite Materials  
Media 
The environment can influence the aircraft/spacecraft  
 Aviation/Current Space Issues; 
o Aviation:  Icing conditions (both on the ground and in flight – AF 447)  Wind-shear  Lightning 
o Space Issues  Space Debris  Solar Flares/general radiation  Re-entry temperatures  Suborbital Issues 
o Extreme Altitude; high differential pressures, high temperature gradients 
o High ‘g’ forces 
o Radiation – negligible effect though worth considering 
o Space Debris – negligible effect though worth considering 
o Excessive Noise 
o Excessive Vibration 
Management 
The Management element has a large influencing effect on all of the elements and in particular to the 
man and the machine. 
 Aviation/Current Space Issues; 
o Aviation;  The Air France flight AF447 disaster is a clear example of 
management being a major contributor to the accident (meaning Air 
France management not Airbus management – who did submit a 
Service Bulletin to change the pitot tubes); this is examined in more 
depth as part of a case study in Section 3.4.7. 
o Space;  NASA Management has been cited as major contributors to both 
Challenger and Columbia Space Shuttle disasters.  Suborbital Issues  
o Regulation - Conforming to or exceeding regulations 
o Procedure - Control of crew procedures and ground control checklists, SOPs 
and Emergency procedures 
o Limitations – Suborbital flights need to have defined ‘corridors’ and be able 
to integrate with Air Traffic Management 
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o Flight Readiness Review (FRR) – the FRR will be a key management feature 
in the emerging Suborbital operations field. Safety Management of the Flight 
Crew, SFPs and the ‘public’ must be considered a top priority and this should 
be demonstrated by having the Safety Manager as a key stakeholder and with 
the authority to stop a flight. Additional stakeholders would include the 
Operation Officer (responsible for both operations and support 
[engineering/maintenance] and the Chief Medical Officer – all reporting to 
the Chief Executive; for this activity it is essential that a RACI chart is 
implemented whereby people know whether they are Responsible, 
Accountable, Consulted or Informed when a Go-No-Go decision is required 
(as well as the rest of their standard duties according to the RACI chart). 
Mission 
The mission element is the central focus of the model in that it summarises the operation. The mission 
is where the interaction of all the other elements combines to conclude in a mission success or a 
mishap. The mission is where the complexities of the operation are well defined, clearly understood 
and are attainable [29]: 
 Aviation/Current Space Issues; 
o In aviation operations are routine and the flight planning aspect ensures that 
the mission is well defined. Possible issues here include other domains 
affecting the  mission (media and man in particular) including last minute 
changes to the route or diversions due to external factors such as a runway 
blocked.  
o In orbital spaceflight the mission is a critical factor because of the exacting 
environment. The mission can be broken into the different phases because 
each phase has its own mission challenges in terms of interaction with the 
other elements and the main interactions are detailed below;  Launch; machine and management  Ascent; machine and media  Spaceflight; machine, man and media   Docking; machine, man and media  Re-entry, machine, media   Approach & Landing; machine, man and media  Suborbital Issues; 
o As expected the suborbital mission is less demanding than the orbital mission 
but is more demanding than aviation operations and hence sits in the ‘middle’ 
sector in terms of challenges. As opposed to orbital vehicles the suborbital 
vehicles are different in design i.e. air-launched, aircraft-based ground take-
off and land or vertical launch rockets. All of these have the same basic 
mission phases;  Launch (vertical, air drop, air rocket initiation [after normal take-off] 
or ground take-off); machine, man and media  Ascent; machine, man and media  Short Suborbital Space segment; machine, man and media  Approach & Landing; machine, man and media 
As can be seen the suborbital mission phases include ‘man’ within all phases 
as opposed to a lot of automation (machine) in the orbital phases.  
HFI – Poor Examples  
Examples of poor HFI include: 
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 Kegworth Air Crash; in this disaster the pilots shut down the wrong engine 
o Poor cockpit interface of multi-function displays 
o Inadequate warning system – engine fire detection (visual and audio) 
o Illogical spatial labelling – No’s 1 & 2 engine (above and below and not left 
to right)  Air France Flight 447 Crash; in this disaster the pilots failed to apply the correct 
actions when confronted with multiple failure warnings/cautions that were 
displayed on the Multi-Function Displays (the information is derived from the Air 
Data computer). This is examined in more detail in Section 3.4.7. 
2.2.8.2 Human Error 
The 5-M model above details the difficult issues that designers are faced with and it is clear that the 
human-in-the-loop is the most unpredictable part of the total system and the most difficult to model in 
terms of design and system safety analysis. Human error tends to be a failing in performance due to 
various influencing factors. These are best described from Reason’s [58] analogy of Rasmussen’s 
theory based on ‘Skills-Rules-Knowledge’ (SRK) performance levels in relation to errors: 
 Skills-Based level; this is where we carry out a routine task in an automated way  Rule-Based level; this is where there has been a situational change within the 
routine task and we need to change from a fully automated state to undertake a 
rule-based task based on procedures for example. In Figure 23 this is depicted in 
the ‘mixed’ state as we are ‘trained for problems’; in some instances we will have 
to fully and consciously follow a procedure whereas other procedures may 
require practice so that the procedure is an automatic action such as in certain 
well-practised aircraft emergency procedures i.e. a double-engine failure on  take-
off (in a four-engine aircraft for example)   Knowledge-Based level; this is where the situational change in a routine task is 
perhaps non-nominal and does not fit the ‘rule-based’ level such as an emergency 
with additional external factors. In this instance we have to rely on our knowledge 
to determine the actions to take. 
These SRK performance levels take cognisance of both the human psychological state and situational 
variables from which Reason derived his SRK ‘activity space’ as depicted in Figure 23: 
 
Figure 23: Reason’s Skill-Rule-Knowledge based performance levels (based on Rasmussen) within the 
‘activity space’ 
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Relating the SRK model to errors Reason then splits these into skill-based errors (slips and lapses) 
and mistakes (rule-based and knowledge-based mistakes).  Additionally Reason suggests a third type 
of error and that is ‘violations’ whereby a deviation from a procedure occurs; here Reason suggests 
this can be deliberate or erroneous (though not for sabotage reasons). Reason also states that the SRK 
levels are not mutually exclusive and may coexist at the same time.  
In another paper on Risk of Human Error by Chappelow [31] the analysis is refined and focuses on 
actual military accident and flying data combined with expert opinions in trying to quantify human 
performance aspects and in particular human error. Figure 24 below represents analysis of a mid-air 
collision accident in the form of an influence diagram generated by the experts.  
TalentUnderarousal Training CommandfailureWeather
Co-operative
mid-air
collision
Attention
failure
Rule
violation
Inappropriate
application of
procedure
Inappropriate
procedure
Distraction Personality Pressure Briefing
 
Figure 24: Chappelow’s Influence Diagram on Human Performance and Errors 
In relation to the SRK methodology we can see that the categories do coexist as Reason suggests. The 
following provides a consolidated and explicit list of Chappelow’s detailed analysis with Reason’s 
model (based on Rasmussen): 
 Skills-Based error 
o Attention failure 
 Under-arousal  Distraction 
o Inappropriate application of procedure 
 Training (lack of or inexperience)  Rule Based Error 
o Rule violation (deliberate or erroneous and not sabotage) 
 Personality  Pressure  
o Inappropriate application of procedure 
 Training (simple cognitive error) 
o Inappropriate procedure 
 Briefing (incorrect or lack of) 
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 Knowledge Based error 
o Inappropriate application of procedure 
 Personality  Talent  Training (cannot train for all eventualities in all environments)  Pressure 
Human Error Probability 
The above SRK can assist in further analysing the human error aspects in terms of applying 
probability values to human error in order to assist in modelling the total system (the author’s view is 
that this is aimed at the operator’s safety risk management in terms of procedures and training – as 
opposed to designers using HMI analysis separately to design out human interface issues therefore the 
designer’s aim is still to meet the safety objective by safe design practices i.e. not taking credit for 
human error probability within the analysis). 
A Human Interface Error Probability paper [30] provided common human error probability data from 
Kirwan as depicted in Table 8 below: 
Description Error Probability 
General rate for errors involving high stress levels 0.3 
Operator fails to act correctly in the first 30 minutes of an emergency situation 0.1 
Operator fails to act correctly after the first few hours in a high stress situation 0.03 
Error in a routine operation where care is required 0.01 
Error in simple routine operation 0.001 
Selection of the wrong switch (dissimilar in shape) 0.001 
Human-performance limit: single operator 0.0001 
Human-performance limit: team of operators performing a well-designed task 0.00001 
General Human-Error Probability Data in Various Operating Conditions 
Table 8: Human Error Probability Data from B Kirwan 
Another source of human error probability data is from Def-Stan 00-56 [32] and is more focused on 
defence systems and specifically applied in aircraft-based human errors. Here the term ‘omission’ 
error relates to skipping a part of a task and ‘commission’ errors relate to incorrectly performing a 
task: 
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Table 9: Human Error Probability values applied for aircrew in military analysis 
In comparison the two approaches are similar and we can therefore apply the probabilities for the 
SRK methodology as follows: 
 Skill-Based errors  
o Error in simple routine operation = 0.001 (1x10-3) 
o General error of commission = 3 x 10-3  Rule-Based errors 
o Errors of omission when the actions are embedded in a well-rehearsed 
procedure = 3 x 10-3 
o Error in a routine operation where care is required = 0.01 (1x10-2)  Knowledge-Based errors 
o Operator fails to act correctly in the first 30 minutes of an emergency 
situation = 0.1(1x10-1) 
o General omission error where there is no warning alarm or display = 1x10-2 
o General rate for errors involving high stress levels = 0.3 (3x10-1) 
o General decision errors rate for high stress levels = 0.3 (3x10-1) 
These performance levels can coexist and herein lays the issue in terms of accurately modelling the 
probability values. For simplicity the following guide (based on the above comparisons) could be 
applied to aircraft/spacecraft operational safety risk management and this is discussed further in 
3.4.6.3: 
 Control measures for high Stress emergency situations = 2 x 10-1  Control measures for well-rehearsed procedures to prevent a hazardous situation 
= 5 x 10-2  Control measures for simple routine operations = 3 x 10-3 
Training is a difficult factor to quantify and the following is considered reasonable to take credit for 
within a safety analysis:  
 Training for normal (green) procedures = 0 i.e. no additional credit  Training for abnormal (amber) procedures = 5 x 10-2  Emergency Training (red) = 2 x 10-1 per flying hour based on the high stress 
situations 
Implementing a Limitation is also a difficult factor to quantify because if a Limitation is in place and 
is followed to the letter then the hazardous situation (or accident) should not arise. However as with 
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all human-based actions there are situations that flight crew may go against the limitation; this could 
be as a Rule-Based Error or an unforced situation arises whereby the pilot uses his judgment during an 
emergency drill for instance i.e. a Knowledge-Based Error: 
 Limitation  = 1 x 10-2 per flying hour based on the general omission error where 
care is required or general error of supervision 
All of the above derived values are proposed for the safety model, however it is important that the 
relevant stakeholders (in particular flight crew, the safety manager and systems analyst) are consulted 
and agree upon the relevant values that can be credited within the accident sequence and therefore 
Risk Estimation. 
 Safety Culture 2.2.9
The above section on Human Factors discussed the 5-M model whereby the management have a large 
influencing factor on the safety of the mission (and its success or not). Additionally the section also 
discussed human errors (the man part of the model) and some of the reasons for variability in human 
performance. These issues can only be counteracted by the implementation of a top-down, bottom-up 
safety culture. 
 The ICAO SMS Manual [24] discusses safety culture in terms of the ‘just culture’ defined in 
Professor James Reason’s book on Organizational Accidents [58]: 
“The attempts to protect safety information and the reporter from punishment 
were developed using the term culture, for example, “non-punishing culture”, 
“non-blame/blame-free culture” and lately “safety culture” or “just culture”. 
The word culture does have specific meanings and the context in which it is 
used in this case can lead to misperception and misunderstanding. 
Nevertheless, safety and just culture have become broadly accepted, although 
not universally defined, terms to describe the context in which safety practices 
are fostered within an organization.” 
The UK CAA discusses safety culture in terms of commitment from the safety policy: 
“In preparing a safety policy, Senior Management should consult with key 
staff members in charge of safety-critical areas. Consultation will ensure that 
the safety policy and stated objectives are relevant to all staff and that there is 
a sense of shared responsibility for the safety culture in the organisation. A 
positive safety culture is one where all staff must be responsible for, and 
consider the impact of, safety on everything they do.” 
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Figure 25: Professor James Reason’s Safety Culture Model 
In terms of safe operations there is no denying that whether in the commercial side of aviation or in 
the military everyone is trying hard in terms of ‘flight safety’ and evidence of this will no doubt be in 
the forefront of their statistics (aircraft loss rate). Flight Safety tends to be more of a reactive 
disposition and this is shown quite aptly in Professor James Reason’s diagram in Figure 25 above. As 
can be seen from the ‘reactive’ culture, an organisation has some way to go towards becoming a 
‘generative’ culture. In today’s climate of scant resources due to cut-backs in most departments it is 
difficult to try and introduce new measures to improve an organisation’s safety culture. Indeed and in 
particular to the military, entrenched cultures are sometimes difficult to shake-off. Nonetheless every 
Safety Manager must attempt demonstrate ‘Continuous Improvement’ as demanded of overarching 
safety governance such as the ICAO SMS or from the equivalent governance within the military. 
Breaking the chain within an accident sequence is more likely to happen with a proactive or 
generative safety culture. Figure 26 shows how maintenance (the man in the 5-M model) could break 
the chain with pre-flight inspections or undertaking a task effectively as part of a maintenance 
schedule. In the Challenger disaster it was the management that could have broken the chain by not 
launching at such a cold temperature and in the Air France AF447 disaster the management could 
have introduced limitations and the pilots could have broken the accident chain by avoiding the icing 
conditions or taking the correct actions (procedure) in the hazardous situation. 
 
Figure 26: Breaking the chain in an accident sequence 
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 In terms of the emerging suborbital space industry the fore-runners such as Virgin Galactic, XCOR 
and Armadillo Aerospace these companies should be proactively encouraging and implementing a 
safety culture; this is discussed in 2.3.13. 
 Commercial Operations  2.2.10
This section provides an overview of the safety management activities concerning the commercial 
operators. The review focuses on the requirements and guidelines presented to operators in order to 
manage the safety effort for their airline. 
 EU-OPS 2.2.11
EU-OPS 1.037 [59] stipulates that Operators must have a ‘Flight Safety’ programme to be able to 
obtain an Air Operator Certificate. The document also covers those requirements such as safety and 
emergency equipment and safety training. In terms of ‘OPS 1.037’, an operator must establish:  
Accident prevention and flight safety programme: 
(a) An operator shall establish and maintain an accident prevention and flight safety 
programme, which may be integrated with the quality system, including: 
1. Programs to achieve and maintain risk awareness by all persons involved in 
operations; and 
2. An occurrence reporting scheme to enable the collation and assessment of 
relevant incident and accident reports in order to identify adverse trends or 
to address deficiencies in the interests of flight safety. The scheme shall 
protect the identity of the reporter and include the possibility that reports 
may be submitted anonymously; and 
3. Evaluation of relevant information relating to accidents and incidents and the 
promulgation of related information, but not the attribution of blame; and 
4. A flight data monitoring program for those aeroplanes in excess of 27 000 kg. 
Flight data monitoring (FDM) is the pro-active use of digital flight data from 
routine operations to improve aviation safety. The flight data monitoring 
programme shall be non-punitive and contain adequate safeguards to protect 
the source(s) of the data; and 
5. The appointment of a person accountable for managing the programme. 
The flight safety program will typically include a Risk Assessment scheme based on the ICAO SMS 
and also employ ‘Risk Profiles’ as detailed in 2.2.7.  
 ARP 5150 2.2.12
ARP 5150 [75] concerns the safety assessment of transport airplanes in commercial service and has 
useful guidelines, tools and methodologies for airline safety managers to follow. The document’s 
stated intent is that operators should: 
 Maintain the airworthiness (certification) of the airplane – in service events are 
assessed based on the effects of the level of safety intended in the certification 
process  Maintain the safety of the airplane – in service events are assessed against the 
internal safety objectives of (the) your company  Improve the safety of the airplane – in service events are assessed to identify 
opportunities to decrease their number, or to surpass the safety objectives of (the) 
your company  
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These statements are important and indicative of the theoretical approach to managing operator safety 
risks; indeed steps ‘b’ and ‘c’ are clearly achievable depending on what ‘internal safety objectives’ are 
set by the operator’s safety manager i.e. no more than 2 deaths per year or no more than 10 Safety 
Significant Events per month and so on. The term ‘safety objective’ should not have been used here 
and it clearly demonstrates the lack of joined up approach that exists in the aerospace business today. 
Instead, the term ‘safety goal’ would have been preferable and therefore it would not be confused with 
the term associated with a failure condition i.e. a catastrophic failure condition’s safety objective (for 
Part 25 aircraft) is 1x10-9 per flying hour. The second and third goals (maintaining and improving the 
safety of the airplane) are effective and quite achievable. 
However the interesting statement is that of the first statement above – to maintain the airworthiness 
of the aircraft (based on the effects of the level of safety intended in the certification process). This 
stated intent is most important yet appears to stop there; both in the document and at the airlines17. 
There is no contiguous assessment of the level of safety achieved at certification to that of the Risk 
Profile scheme or individual Risk Assessments undertaken by the operator (indeed the two visited did 
not have hazard logs but preferred the Risk Profile scheme as part of the FOQA). Hence it is the 
author’s view that airlines are still undertaking ‘Flight Safety’ activities (more reactive approach) 
rather than employing a fully integrated Safety Management System (proactive approach). 
 FAA SMS for Operators 2.2.13
The FAA has provided AC120-92 [33] which is an introduction to SMS for operators. The guide is 
designed to ‘allow integration of safety efforts into the operator’s business model and to integrate 
other systems such as quality, occupational safety, and environmental control systems that operators 
might already have in place or might be considering’. The guide is well presented and follows 
ICAO’s ‘Four Pillars of Safety Management’ (2.2.2) with the overall safety risk management and 
safety assurance process depicted in Figure 27 below. Their approach is sound and they adopt a 
‘systems of systems’ approach whereby they recognise that a ‘system’ can be equipment, people and 
facilities. Therefore they are adopting a systems safety approach by analysing the risks involved at the 
‘system’ level whereby they recommend that the most effective method of risk reduction is by 
brainstorming with company pilots, mechanics or dispatchers for instance.  
The guide has reasonable safety criteria with severity and likelihood classifications that have been 
adapted from the ICAO SM Manual and a standard safety risk matrix; the safety risk matrix is 
simplistic with an acceptable, acceptable with mitigation and unacceptable risk region.  
                                                     
17
 Based on the author’s view of visiting two major airlines 
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Figure 27 : FAA Operator’s SMS Methodology 
 Aviation Risk Management Solution 2.2.14
The Aviation Risk Management Solution (ARMS) methodology [34] is a reasonable attempt at 
providing a system for operators to assess their risks by introducing an Operational Risk Assessment 
(ORA) process. The ARMS methodology and Excel spread-sheet (tool) is aimed at airlines and other 
air operators and is based on a two-tiered approach including a preliminary Event Risk Classification 
scheme followed by a more specific Safety Issues Risks Assessment (SIRA).  
The rationale stated in the methodology is that ‘pre-ARMS’ standard methodology is not anchored to 
any recognised industry reference’ (in terms of Operator Risk Management Matrices with severity 
and probability); this is correct and hence this thesis has also recognised this but has focused on a new 
safety model that provides a contiguous safety approach i.e. the operator analysis is anchored to the 
design analysis and the metrics (per flying hour) are constant (see Chapter 3.4). Additionally the 
method contained within the SIRA provides a weighting for the failed ‘barriers’ (which is a good 
approach) however it is based on an estimated failure rate per sector as an example i.e. there is no 
relation or reference to human error rates. There are two problems with this approach: the first is the 
use of sectors as this does not correlate to flight hours; the second is that the estimations may not be 
conservative enough (as they do not relate to human error analysis) and therefore the resultant ‘risk’ 
may be biased towards a lower value hence hiding the real risk. Within the Event Risk Classification 
matrix the metrics have been derived from accident data and appear irrelevant and based on aircraft 
loss values. Nonetheless the usefulness of the matrix is that it is a starting point that identifies high 
and medium risks that require further analysis i.e. in the form of a SIRA. 
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Figure 28: ARMS’ Event Risk Classification matrix 
Issues with the ARMS methodology include: 
 No human factors reference in terms of ‘barriers’ failing – they estimate the 
probability for a barrier failing ‘per sector’ i.e. 1 in 100 and 1 in 10,000 and so 
on; these are for ‘avoidance barriers’ (before the undesirable operational state) 
and ‘recovery barriers’.     Based per sector i.e. ‘estimated frequency of triggering event’ is per flight sectors 
i.e. every 100,000 (1x10-5). The issue here is that the estimations can be 
optimistic or pessimistic depending on the safety analyst. Additionally the tool 
allows for a single sector analysis to determine whether the route may be 
acceptable; this would seem like a good idea however this results in an 
unacceptable risk due to the frequency of ‘1’ being inserted in the tool. Their 
answer to this is that ‘with the excuse that exposure to those elements within the 
global operation is very limited’  The system can be tailored to the ‘customer’ and it is stated that the same ERC 
can be used for different applications such as; 
o Risk per airport 
o Risk per flight phase  
o Risk per time of year 
This is also commendable but is it practical to attempt to cover the risks of ‘x’ 
per ‘y’ for different metrics within the same risk classification system? 
Arguably the risk at airports would be risk of death per person per year (per 
group or event i.e. despatchers, maintainers, flight servicing, air traffic 
controllers, etc.) whereas the risk for aircraft concerns the sectors (as detailed 
above)  Also tries to address safety issues on a global risk map meaning that they are 
attempting to have a common approach across airlines and other operators; this is 
commendable but not practical 
The ARMS methodology intent is useful and has chosen the metric as ‘per sector’ because there is 
indeed no anchor to any prevailing metric in use today (design organisation or otherwise). However 
this relies a lot on estimation and may not be updated sufficiently to maintain a robust model. The use 
of an ‘undesirable operating state’ is also useful and is based on the ‘BOW-TIE’ approach with 
avoidance barriers and recovery barriers as depicted in the SIRA framework model at Figure 29 
below. Here the methodology attempts to provide a weighting for risk reduction (controls) and once 
Chapter Two   Review 
 
 
Page 74 of 300 
 
again this is based on ‘conservative estimation’; without reference to human error probabilities these 
estimation can easily be manipulated to achieve a positive outcome.  
 
Figure 29: ARMS’ Safety Issues Risk Assessment Framework 
 GAIN Operator’s Flight Safety Handbook 2.2.15
The Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN) Working Group have developed an Operator’s 
Flight Safety Handbook [35] in order to serve as a guide for the creation and operation of a flight 
safety function within an operator’s organisation. The handbook covers the following topics: 
 Organisation and Administration  Safety Program Activities  Human Factors  Accident/Incident Investigation & Reports  Emergency Response & Crisis Management  Risk Management  Organisational Extension  Cabin Safety 
The Appendices provide additional methods, tools and processes and in particular Appendix E ‘Risk 
Management Process’ provides a useful insight into the Hazard Identification process; not only from 
the operator’s perspective but discusses system complexities, system risks and system-based 
accidents. The section (E3.6.6) then provides a number of examples showing an accident sequence 
along with their initiating hazards, contributory hazards and primary hazards and appropriate 
controls. The point of the examples is to illustrate the accident sequences and to show the ‘different’ 
sorts of hazards previously mentioned. Figure 30 below shows one of the examples. Arguably the 
sequence is too simplistic but the points are well made; indeed the term ‘primary hazard’ is interesting 
and is not far from the author’s introduction of a ‘Key (Platform) Hazard (see Chapter 3.4.4).The 
guidebook’s Appendix E also contains an example Risk Analysis Matrix with the simple severity of 0-
5 and the following consequences: 
 People  On time departures  Assets  Environment  Reputation 
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Figure 30: GAIN’s Operator’s Flight Safety Handbook Accident Sequence 
 Validation & Verification 2.2.16
This section reviews current validation & verification (V&V) methods and their relevance in the 
safety lifecycle. 
2.2.16.1 Safety Validation  
ARP 4754 [39] defines validation as: 
Validation of requirements and specific assumptions is the process of 
ensuring that the specified requirements are sufficiently correct and complete 
so that the product will meet applicable airworthiness requirements. 
Validation is a key part of the design process in that the aim is to provide assurance that the product is 
viable to move on to the next phase of the development program; hence it is an iterative process 
during the early stages as shown in the system safety process diagram in Figure 31 and also on the left 
of the V-diagram in Figure 32.  
The hierarchical requirements are defined at aircraft level, system and sub-system levels. In terms of 
safety the top level aircraft FHA is used in the first instance to establish Safety Requirements. 
Additionally safety requirements can be established from the aircraft level User Requirements and 
Regulatory Requirements including safety targets and objectives. Additionally it is important to 
establish assumptions at the beginning of a program and these should be validated to ensure that they 
are explicitly stated, disseminated and justified by supporting data.  
Requirements are flowed down to system and sub-system level and therefore they cross boundaries 
(of function and responsibility). In terms of safety requirements it is important that these boundaries 
are clear and that they are explicitly detailed within a Validation Requirements Matrix; for instance a 
system may be apportioned a ‘risk budget’ of the overall safety target and then a sub-system may be 
apportioned a further portion of the ‘risk budget’ as a failure condition’s safety objective. This is the 
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same for descriptive safety-related requirements. The validation at the initial aircraft FHA level is 
essentially validation of the safety requirements as depicted in the blue circle in Figure 31 below. 
Additionally as the design develops further requirements are derived which may not have been related 
to a higher-level requirement; these are then termed derived requirements and in terms of safety 
analysis are therefore called derived safety requirements. These may also be ‘flowed-down’ to sub-
systems. 
 
Figure 31: System Safety Process detailing Validation (blue circle) and Verification (red circle) 
In terms of the requirements being correct and complete, ARP 4754 provides useful guidelines to 
address safety validation aspects: 
 Do requirements trace to identified sources 
o Intended functions – aircraft level, system level 
o All functions, hazards and failure condition classifications identified in FHA 
o All failure conditions incorporated in PSSA 
o Derived requirements – design decision assumptions 
o Applicable regulatory standards and guidelines 
o Anticipated operating environment 
o Established flight operations/ maintenance procedures  Are Assumptions correct 
o FHA failure condition classification assumptions confirmed  Do requirements correctly reflect the safety analysis 
o Appropriate safety analyses completed correctly 
o All system hazards identified and classified correctly 
o Impact of unsafe design or design errors 
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o Reliability, availability and fault tolerance requirements 
A validation plan is required to map out the validation process which consists of (from ARP 4754): 
 The methods to be used   The data to be gathered or generated  What should be recorded (such as: summaries, reviews, or investigations)  The means for timely access to requirements validation information  How the status of validation will be maintained, or managed, when changes are 
made to requirements  Roles and responsibilities associated with the validation  A schedule of key validation activities 
This validation part of the safety process is clearly vital and therefore the safety manager should 
ensure that this is effort is included in the safety program and is sufficiently resourced. If this is not 
completed correctly or even undertaken by safety personnel then the verification aspects will be 
extremely difficult to justify and the robustness of the ‘as designed’ safety case will be affected.  
 
Figure 32: Design ‘V’ model detailing Validation & Verification activities with associated safety analysis 
2.2.16.2 Safety Verification  
ARP 4754 [39] defines verification as: 
The evaluation of an implementation of requirements to determine that they 
have been met  
Verification ensures that the validated requirements have been satisfied and that the safety analysis 
remains valid. In terms of the system safety process this is later in the program as depicted by the red 
circle in Figure 31 above. ARP 4754 suggests that there are four basic methods of verification: 
 Inspection and Review  Analysis  Test  Service Experience 
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As with the validation process it is essential to have a plan for the verification activities; in particular 
detailing the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders and detailing the level of independence 
required. The evidence gained from the various verification methods will enable a Verification Matrix 
to be completed which will form the basis of a verification summary for the design (System or Sub-
system). 
The Systems Hazard Analysis (SHA) is one method used for verification (ARP 4761 uses the terms 
System Safety Analysis (SSA) [39]) as depicted in the right side of the ‘Vee’ of Figure 32 above. 
ARP 4761 details the purpose of an SSA as: 
(a) Verification that the design requirements established in the System Level FHA are met  Validation that the classification established for the aircraft level effects are 
justified  Verification that the safety requirements called out in, or derived from aircraft 
design requirements and objectives are met  Verification that the design requirements identified in the CCA process are met  Linkage of the System level SSA to the aircraft level FHA. 
2.2.16.3 Other Industry & Academia Views on V&V  
In a paper on design verification and analysis for the CIRP Annals, it is suggested “that current 
validation and verification-based approaches mainly focus on product conformance to specifications, 
product functionality and process capability and that the current process can be subject to failures.” 
The paper provides concepts of validation and verification in the product lifecycle by including 
analysis and review of literature and state-of-the-art in:  
(i) preliminary design,  
(ii) digital product and process development; 
(iii) physical product and process realisation;  
(iv) System and network design; and  
(v) complex product verification and validation. 
  
The paper touches on the future trend in requirements for early design verification and suggests that 
there will be “challenges in methods to deal with verification using low design data-intensity, to 
enhance the scope of functional verification with the development of integrated functional mock-up 
and techniques for the integrated product and process verification.” 
With emerging and complex technology it will indeed be challenging and some of these aspects are 
reviewed more closely in the suborbital space safety section 2.3 and 2.3.14 concerning V&V. 
 Safety Independence  2.2.17
This section of ‘safety tools review’ has purposely been left to the last because once the ‘safety case’ 
is complete (for a particular milestone in the development program) and prior to its submission it 
should have the endorsement of an Independent Safety Auditor (ISA) as part of providing safety 
‘assurance’ of the aircraft/spacecraft. 
The author has been involved with many programs with and without an ISA and in some cases there 
has been confusion as to which organisation is doing what in terms of independent assurance of the 
‘product’. Within the UK MoD the author has come across the following terminology: 
 Independent Safety Auditor – this is the correct role for the term ‘ISA’ and 
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involves an independent check to determine whether the System is compliant to 
safety requirements and targets/objectives. Indeed this role of the ISA is the only 
one considered in Def-Stan 00-56 [28]; 
An individual or team, from an independent organisation, that undertakes 
audits and other assessment activities to provide assurance that safety 
activities comply with planned arrangements, are implemented effectively and 
are suitable to achieve objectives; and whether related outputs are correct, 
valid and fit for purpose. 
 Independent Safety Advisor – this is the role of a safety specialist (or team of 
specialists) whom support the Project Team in its safety activities.  Independent Safety Assessor – this is the role of specialist technical personnel 
who are Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in particular systems i.e. hydraulic 
specialists and who are capable of providing an independent assessment of a 
particular system as to its safe use.  
Haddon-Cave [9] also believed this and cites ‘there is an inconsistent approach to this separation of 
assurance and ‘ensurance’ and that this is further muddied by an unclear separation between advice 
and assurance in some areas’ and that ‘These differences are manifested in different degrees of 
independence and also various interpretations of the “A” as meaning advisors, assessors, assurers, 
auditors and also in different degrees of mandating of an ISA. 
Indeed as a result of Haddon Cave’s report the third group ‘Assessor’ have since become known as 
Independent Technical Evaluation (ITE) i.e. this is the role QinetiQ played in the Nimrod safety effort 
and indeed continue to do so on many MoD aircraft because of their expertise – in particular their 
facilities at Boscombe Down. 
The role of an ISA (auditor) to provide Assurance is extremely important and an ISA should be 
engaged at the beginning of a project and then used at the various important meetings and in 
reviewing important safety documents. The rationale of having an ISA at the beginning of the project 
(rather than at the end just to check for compliance) is that a project should explicitly know its safety 
requirements and targets/objectives and these should be agreed at the beginning. A Functional Block 
Diagram and high-level Functional Hazard Analysis should be undertaken in the first instance to 
apportion safety objectives and to determine whether a project should actually progress. It is here at 
the beginning where an ISA can prove his worth in assuring that the project is actually viable (in 
terms of achieving the safety target and objectives). 
 Conclusions of Safety Tools Review 2.2.18
The ‘Safety Tools’ review provided a view that there are similar safety management methodologies 
employed in different organisations and also at different levels i.e. at the top, the ICAO SMS provides 
the top-level guidance and then within regulatory bodies (the FAA, EASA) further guidance is 
available. It is concluded that the majority of safety management tools and methodologies are similar, 
however particular definitions are different and where this was the case the author provided an 
exemplar definition to carry forward to Chapter 3. Examples of this included: 
 Accident ‘v’ Mishap  Safety Management System  Cause ‘v’ Causal Factor  Sectors ‘v’ Flying Hours  Hazards ‘v’ Failure Conditions 
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The review highlighted good ‘best practice’ advice for Systems Design Analysts and provided clear 
safety objectives for the aircraft’s failure conditions. Additionally the standard system safety 
engineering is considered best practice and there are suitable recommended guidelines such as ARP 
4761 and ARP 4754. These, along with the higher-authority guidelines, provide the roadmap to 
effective safety engineering and safety management approaches; these start with the Safety 
Management Plan (and designer-based System Safety Program Plan) which contain the safety 
requirements and plans for hazard management starting with the Functional Block Diagram and FHA 
through to the verification stages including the System Hazard Analysis. However it must be noted 
that Design Organisations are interested in obtaining airworthiness certification for their aircraft and 
their liability seems to stop there (in terms of managing any operating risks); apart from distributing 
Service Bulletins for corrective action there is no intent to bridge the gap into the operator domain. 
The system design effort follows the standard ‘V’ lifecycle whereby Validation and Verification 
(V&V) forms an important part of the process. The safety V&V effort follows the design lifecycle and 
reports on the status of meeting safety requirements and targets at each milestone; this is essential in 
determining whether the design is acceptably safe in moving to the next stage. 
Today’s aircraft designs employ software and complex hardware and these must be managed both in 
terms of compliance (of product assurance and process assurance) and also that the functional flow 
paths have been traced up to the sub-system and system level hazards. In a project that the author was 
involved in it was evident that the CPE certification personnel were only concentrating on the process 
and product assurance and left the safety aspects to the safety team (who believed that it was the CPE 
experts responsibility to deal with and merely required a summary from them); hence the author 
identified this serious gap in the safety effort - which was then at the test evaluation phase.   
The review also highlighted that Operator-based Safety Management guidance was available however 
based on the author’s limited visits to airline operators it appears this is not being put to good use; 
instead airline’s Safety Managers tend to follow the FOQA approach and undertake Risk Assessments 
on an Incident-by-incident basis and use a Risk Profiling scheme. It was noted that ARP 5150 
provided a number of safety management techniques that airlines could follow however these were 
still bespoke and operator-focused. Also the ARMS technique provided a reasonable attempt to 
provide guidance for operator safety risk management but once again this methodology is used in 
isolation and based on sectors as opposed to flight hours and uses bespoke metrics. To obtain an Air 
Operator Certificate (AOC) the airline must show that they have followed the safety management 
guidelines and as part of the AOC operators must implement a Safety Management System per ICAO 
guidelines. 
It is concluded that the extant guidelines do not provide a methodology or approach that considers 
through-life safety management i.e. a contiguous safety model; rather there is separate guidance for 
system safety engineering (for DOs) and separate guidance for Operator Safety Risk Management. 
These shortcomings will be addressed in Chapter 3 by attempting to bridge the identified gap by a 
new safety model and this will be validated by the use of case studies.   
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 PERSONAL SPACEFLIGHT INDUSTRY REVIEW 2.3.
This section of the review concerns examining the foundations of the emerging Industry and 
undertaking an analysis to determine whether the ‘Rules’ and ‘Guidance’ are robust. As the Industry 
is in the developmental stage and gearing up for the Test & Evaluation phase, it was determined that a 
Gap Analysis would be beneficial (see 1.5.3); this Chapter establishes the ‘current position’ and 
Chapter 3 proposes methodologies towards a ‘future state’. The rationale is that rather than just being 
told what is considered not robust or indeed incorrect, the Operators and European Regulators could 
be shown a more robust strategy to be able to take forward and adapt to their own requirements.     
 FAA Legislation, Regulations & Guidelines 2.3.1
Currently the FAA is leading the way in providing governance to allow Personal Spaceflight to take 
wings. The AST have provided the following Rules and Guidance for the prospective spacecraft 
designers and operators and the following sections will review the relevant safety aspects: 
 Legislation (Commercial Space Launch Activities)  Regulation 
o General 
o Procedures (on regulation, licensing and Investigation Requirements) 
o Licensing   Parts 414 – Safety Approval  Parts 417 – Launch Safety  Parts 431 – Launch & Re-Entry of  Re-Launch Vehicles (RLV)  Parts 460 – Human Spaceflight Requirements  Advisory Circulars 
o Hazard Analysis for Re-Launch Vehicles (RLV)  
o License application procedures 
o Insurance conditions 
o Expected Casualty Calculations for Commercial Space Launch & Re-entry 
Missions 
o Reusable Launch & RLV system safety process  Guidelines 
o Financial Responsibility Requirements 
o Failure Probability Analysis 
o Environmental guidelines 
o Safety Approval Guidelines 
o RLV Guidelines  Software Safety  Safety Critical Structure Analysis  Safety Critical Hardware Analysis  RLV Safety process  Safety Validation and Verification Analysis  RLV Operations & Maintenance   Medical Screening guide  Operations with Flight Crew Guide  Operations with Spaceflight Participants guide  Supplemental guidance for applications 
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FAA Legislation 
The FAA-AST Legislation is under the United States Code (USC) Title 49, Subtitle IX, Chapter 70118 
and details the launch licensing requirements at the top level. 
FAA Regulations 
The FAA-AST Regulations for commercial spaceflight are contained within the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) Title 14 Chapter III [21]. The scope covers the procedures and requirements for 
commercial space transportation activities.  
 FAA Safety Regulatory Review & Gap Analysis 2.3.2
This section provides a review of the FAA-AST safety-related documents governing the early phase 
of Test & Evaluation and also Operations. The review is based on whether the FAA-AST guidelines 
are effective in that they have a rationalised approach and whether the approach would be suitable for 
European operations; where this is not the case it is identified as a gap. These gaps would then form 
the basis from which to research the area in conjunction with the ‘safety tools and techniques’ section 
(1.5.4) in order to derive a proposed suitable method for European operations and possibly for other 
bodies to consider (such as the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety in 
Chapter 3.1). 
Review of FAA-AST Hazard Analysis Guidelines 
The main documents driving safety activities are the FAA AST Advisory Circular AC437.55-1 [18] 
and the System Safety Process AC431-35-2A [61] and these are summarised here. 
Hazard Analysis Guidelines under an Experimental Permit (AC437-55-1) 
It is not clear to whom the guide applies to i.e. designer and/or operator because the guidelines refer to 
the ‘operator’ per CFR 401. Within CFR 401, the term Operator means ‘a holder of a license or 
permit under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 701.’ So if we take the case of Space Ship 2 this is being 
designed and tested by Scaled Composites and will be operated by Virgin Galactic. It is assumed that 
the guideline means Scaled Composites in this instance because they will hold the experimental 
license. Should this be the case we are really talking about the design organisation with their systems 
safety analysis that then uses their own test pilots to fly (operate) during tests. 
The AC (along with all FAA-AST regulations and guidelines) is concerned with ‘protecting the 
public’ only. This is commendable however it is clearly more biased towards the orbital aspects with 
flight trajectories (launch and re-entry) that clearly overfly populated areas and with expendable 
propulsion tanks (solid rocket boosters for instance) on the ascent and during re-entry are travelling at 
high Mach numbers with possible damage due to space debris, etc. and so could break up. This should 
not be a factor at all for suborbital flights that take-off (launch) from point A and return to point A; all 
of which will be in a defined and unpopulated corridor. So in terms of protecting the public for 
suborbital flights this aspect should not be a driving factor in the analysis; though it clearly is for the 
FAA-AST as they mandate that the Expected Casualty (Ec) analysis is conducted for commercial 
spaceflight (see further below for Ec discussions).  
                                                     
18
 http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/regulations/ 
Chapter Two    Review 
 
 
Page 83 of 300 
 
This is the main weakness in the FAA-AST approach: it is a one-shop approach that covers orbital 
and suborbital flights and the author contends that the differences are too great and that the different 
domains should be split out with proper and rationalised regulations and guidelines for each. 
At least for the hazard analysis guidelines (AC) it does specify suborbital in the title and so the rest of 
this review shall focus on these aspects. 
The AC provides a (too) simplistic hazard analysis process: 
(a) Identify and describe the hazards 
(b) Determine and assess the risk of each hazard 
(c) Identify and describe risk elimination and mitigation 
(d) Validate & Verify risk elimination and mitigation measures 
FAA-AST mandates a level of safety in the technology of Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLV’s) 
through its permit and licensing process. The AC details that ‘public’ hazards identified as 
‘Hazardous’ or ‘Catastrophic’ must be mitigated to reduce the severity of their impact, or be proven 
through design to have a likelihood of occurrence of either Remote or Extremely Remote (with a 
chance of occurrence of less than 1 in a million), in order to be acceptable for permitting or licensing. 
AC 437.55-1 [18] defines the ‘Acceptable Level of Risk’ to protect public safety and the different 
Hazard Severity and Hazard Likelihood categories used to determine the level of risk.  
The FAA does not mandate any level of acceptable risk for passengers. The FAA allows passengers to 
fly at their own risk and requires only that they are informed of the risk they are taking, by the 
spaceflight Operator. The FAA does mandate an acceptable level of risk for the crew. As part of the 
FAA’s requirement to protect public safety, they mandate that the crew must be able to control a 
Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) and be capable of acting in emergency scenarios. Crew actions and 
RLV operability are covered in the hazard analyses that a ‘permitee’ and licensee must supply and 
show compliance with the FAA acceptability matrix in order to be approved for operation.  
FAA-AST AC 437.55-1 Probability Classifications: These are calibrated such that the 
catastrophic/extremely remote ‘safety objective’ is 1x10-6 per mission and there is no clarification on 
why this value was chosen; in particular when their orbital industry uses the Expected Casualty 9Ec) 
target of 30x10-6 per mission. This is clearly 30 times worse than the ‘safety objective’ proposed 
below and equates to 0.3x10-4 per mission. Then the ‘occasional’ classification cell is two orders of 
magnitude (whereas the others are singular); this is not rational and also the term ‘extremely remote’ 
is not in accord with the best practice methods. 
What does this mean in terms of understanding the cumulative risk from the safety objective of 1x10-6 
per mission for catastrophic failures? The AC does not even mention this and here is a clear lack of 
understanding between hazard probability and overall risk. It actually means that, due to circa 100 
critical failures, that the target is 1x10-4 and 10% of accidents are due to safety critical systems (90% 
due human error and structural aspects) then the target is 1x10-3 per mission. This accords with the 
orbital industry thoughts (such as in the IAASS-ISSB Space Safety Standards Manual [16]); but there 
they suggest that the suborbital domain target should be an order of magnitude better at 1x10-4. There 
is another clear indication that the criterion is different and so are many other considerations. 
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Figure 33: FAA-AST AC 437.55-1 Probability Classifications 
Severity Categorisations: As can be seen in Figure 34 the focus for severity classifications is on the 
‘public’; there is no mention of the crew or passengers (SFPs).  
 
Figure 34: FAA-AST AC 437.55-1 Hazard Severity Classifications 
FAA-AST AC 437.55-1 Risk Matrix is at Figure 35 below. This, like the §23.1309 is based on a 
single line (Go or No-Go approach) which is acceptable to demonstrate that a hazard’s probability 
(failure condition in §23.1309 terms) is met, depending on the severity classification. Step (b) above 
suggests that the operator (designer) should then determine and assess the risk for each hazard; this is 
where the problem arises. In §23.1309 there is no Risk Assessment or Risk Assessment Matrix, the 
designer must meet the specified safety objective for a failure condition hence they have a ‘single 
line’ reflecting the catastrophic/extremely improbable objective for instance. Here the FAA-AST has 
attempted to revert to the risk granularity methodology but then have kept the single line approach; 
this is even done poorly because as depicted below it states that it is acceptable to have 
Frequent/Marginal risks. It is considered that this ‘mix-up’ in strategy is based on the earlier Re-
usable Launch and Re-entry Vehicle System Safety Process [61] in 2005 whereby the Risk 
Acceptability Matrix did include margins for risk (as opposed to meeting a safety objective) and 
Figure 36 further below shows the ‘medium’ tolerability band as well as the unacceptable (high risk) 
and acceptable (low) risk bands. Here by having an order of magnitude between the unacceptable and 
the acceptable allows the ‘operator’ tolerability of risk (as opposed to definitive safety objectives). 
Arguably with 100 failure conditions there should be two orders of magnitude between the 
unacceptable and acceptable boundaries; hence rationale could have been applied and explained. 
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Figure 35: FAA-AST AC 437.55-1 Risk Matrix 
 
Figure 36: FAA-AST AC431.35-2A Hazard Risk Index matrix 
Step (c) further above in the hazard analysis guideline is to ‘Identify and describe risk elimination and 
mitigation’. It then goes on to say that ‘the first priority should be to eliminate the hazard.’ A hazard 
has a likelihood (probability) property and does not have risk i.e. both likelihood and severity. A 
hazard can lead to different accidents and therefore have different outcomes (or consequences); hence 
the risk (severity and probability) is associated with the accident and not the hazard. This may be 
semantics but it is important to establish the basic premise of ones methods otherwise the result is 
confusion as per the FAA-AST because in one breath they were talking about Hazard Risk 
Acceptability Criteria and then in the next breath talking about just Risk Acceptability Matrix. Also in 
both they have left in the indices whereas in §23.1309 there are no such indices; merely a Go-No-go 
line as to whether your probability has met its safety objective or not i.e. there is no mention of risk.  
Section 7.0 mentions acceptable analytical approaches (PHA, FMEA/FMECA and FHA) but should 
also state that other diverse methods should also be included as per ARP 4761 for example; including 
OHHA, OSHA, ZHA and PRA (one would assume that PRAs would be required for the Rocket 
Propulsion System as this is the most problematic in proving and meeting safety objectives). Also 
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within the ‘additional considerations’ under ‘training’ it states that ‘Designing safety into the system 
requires that personnel involved in system development, production and operation understand and 
practice operations and procedures that protect public safety’. Once again, the FAA-AST is only 
concerned with ‘public safety’. Additionally they state ‘Training can help ensure that personnel 
produce a safe system or operation’; for both of these points under ‘Safety Training’ the key terms are 
‘understand and practice operations and procedures’ – however the focus should be twofold; Safety 
Management awareness training for all company members and specific SMS training for key-post 
personnel (the Safety Manager/Ops Manager/Company President, etc. – i.e. to all personnel with 
direct responsibility for the Go/No-Go or Flight Readiness review process). This is a vital component 
of an SMS and should be instigated as early as possible; a safety culture ensconced throughout the 
company leads to a ‘generative culture’. Saying ‘Safety is our Number One Priority’ when you do not 
have a qualified and competent Safety Manager and no SMS in place can actually be detrimental in 
the end (training and defined competencies can be a mitigation event in order to reduce the likelihood 
of an accident occurring). 
Section 8 covers the abort criteria: A dedicated flight safety system (FSS – see definitions Table 1) 
could protect the public and property from harm by terminating powered flight of a vehicle that does 
not stay on its intended course (to maintain the Instantaneous Impact Point [IIP] within its operating 
area. Arguably the analysis should consider both the people on board and the people (and property) on 
the ground and therefore if terminating the thrust is an option then this should be employed - this 
should not mean a total flight termination (destruction). 
A good point of the guideline is that in section 9.0 it states that ‘to obtain a re-usable launch vehicle 
(mission) license (following on from an experimental license), an operator must employ a 
comprehensive system safety program plan consisting of both system safety management and system 
safety engineering.’ It then suggest that as well as the analysis undertaken in accordance with the AC, 
that a system safety process should be employed as detailed in Re-usable Launch and Re-entry 
Vehicle System Safety Process [61] and including: 
 Inclusion of a safety organization  Designation of a safety official  Development of a system safety program plan  Identification of safety-critical systems and events  Documentation of systems and sub-systems hazard analyses and risk assessments 
As opposed to obtaining an experimental permit (for Scaled Composites) to obtain a launch mission 
license will be the responsibility of the operator (in this sense it will mean the operator as Virgin 
Galactic) and this makes sense for some of the bullet points above such as a safety official and 
organization but it is the responsibility of the design organisation (Scaled Composites) to undertake 
the sub-system and system hazard analysis i.e. systems safety engineering and it is up to the operator 
(Virgin Galactic) to undertake system safety management, including operator safety risk management. 
Once again the AC is confusing the terms and only has one term for ‘operator’ which can have two 
meanings. This stems from the orbital launch domain because in the aircraft domain (and in the 
suborbital domain) a design organisation such as Scaled Composites will then hand the 
aircraft/spacecraft over to the operator such as Virgin Galactic (orbital companies such as Space X 
will design and operate the vehicle so the terms and analyses is more biased to that domain). 
System Safety Process AC431-35-2A 
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This AC is a high-level guide to the FAA-AST safety process and once again the focus is on the 
‘public’. The document contains the FAA-AST three-pronged strategy ‘to ensure public health and 
safety and safety of property’ as depicted in Figure 37. 
Expected Casualty 
(Ec)
Analysis
System Safety 
Process
Operating 
Requirments
AND
ENSURES SAFETY of:
the Public
 
Figure 37: FAA-AST 3-pronged strategy to assure ‘Public’ safety 
The document once again refers to the ‘operator’ as described in the previous section and this is 
biased towards orbital companies and within the suborbital domain it is arguably a mix between the 
designer in the first instance (for obtaining an experimental permit) and then for the operator in 
obtaining a mission license. As can be seen the middle portion of the 2 interdependent prongs is the 
system safety process. This is the standard design process backed up by systems safety analysis. 
Within this prong the designer will undertake standard systems safety engineering at sub-system and 
system level, identification of safety-critical items and the safety V&V process. The document 
provides useful guidance and then amplifies the AC 437-55.1 aspects and also describes the system 
safety program plan elements. Figure 2 of the document presents a good diagram depicting the 
System Safety Engineering Process Flow. As it addresses safety-critical scenarios and events it also 
includes flight trajectory analysis and in the case of SoA this is an important factor. Arguably the 
flight will be contained within a NOTAM special SoA area but nonetheless analysis should be 
undertaken as to non-nominal trajectories and the likelihood of causing a 3rd party death(s) (the 
public). Section 6b(2) suggests that safety critical systems may or may not be critical at all times of 
the flight i.e. the ability of the flight path to reach populated areas. It is considered that even in remote 
areas a safety critical failure could affect the people on board (and/or the vehicle) and should be 
considered within the analysis for European operations.  
Figures 3 & 4 represent good diagrams for hazard identification and analysis, including for System 
and Sub-System Hazard Analysis and details acceptable tools and methods. Section 6b (3) (i) covers 
the standard safety precedence for eliminating or mitigating risk and section 6b (3) iv covers two 
specific risk mitigation measures; the FSS and the NOTAM/Notification to Mariners area.  
The left prong from Figure 36 concerns the Ec analysis and this is examined further below. 
The right prong concerns ‘operating requirements’ and these concerns ‘the operator’s ability to 
operate within the limits of acceptable risk to public safety.’ Essentially these are operating 
procedures and limitations required (at the operator level and not design level) and the document 
provides examples of these: 
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 Launch commit criteria and rules  Human activation or initiation of a Flight Termination System to initiate safe 
abort during launch and re-entry  System monitoring, inspection and checkout procedures  Inspection and maintenance for re-flight  Selection of primary and alternate landing sites for vehicle or stages  Surveillance and control of landing areas  Standard limits on weather  Co-ordination with appropriate airspace authorities  Limits on flight regime (ties in with analysis, testing and demonstrating 
confidence in system performance and reliability)  Regulatory limits on flights over populated areas 
As can be seen it is the operator (Virgin Galactic in the example) who is to undertake the left and right 
prongs of the FAA-AST strategy and the designer (Scaled Composites) who undertake the core 
central prong. This vilifies the author’s safety model in that the operator safety risk management is 
where the operating procedures and limitations are managed; however the document is biased towards 
the orbital domain in that it presumes the ‘operator’ is one and the same organization i.e. both 
designer and operator are the same company such as Space-X. 
The document provides an example SSPP which covers all of the points in the main document in a 
template form and with examples of Risk (Hazard) Reports; this is an indication that clearly shows the 
lack of a joined up approach for Designers and Operators and lack of understanding of hazards and 
accidents i.e. the first example has a hazard as 'primary load structural failure: vehicle airframe failure' 
and then in the details of the hazard description says 'consider wings, booms, stabilizers' and the effect 
is 'loss of control, loss of vehicle'. Hence they are mixing up the ICAO Accident 'Structural Failure' 
with the ICAO Accident 'Loss of Control'; for instance by separating the failure conditions properly 
one would then be able to link those to the relevant accident; in this case a stabiliser failure would 
more credibly lead to a 'Loss of Control' Accident, as opposed to a failure condition of 'primary 
structure failure' which leads to the Accident 'Structural Failure' 
Review of CFR Part 417 – Launch Safety  
The FAA-AST has based a lot of their Licensing Rules on the legacy requirements from the vertical 
launches undertaken by NASA and hence the main focus is protection of the ‘public’. The definition 
of ‘public’ can be found in the CFR Part 401 [21] and public safety is defined as: 
Public safety means, for a particular licensed launch, the safety of people and property that are not 
involved in supporting the launch and includes those people and property that may be located within 
the boundary of a launch site, such as visitors, individuals providing goods or services not related to 
launch processing or flight, and any other launch operator and its personnel. 
As per CFR Part 417 [22] the FAA-AST requires Expected Casualty (Ec) Analysis to be undertaken 
in order to demonstrate that an RLV meets the Ec target (30x10-6 risk of general public fatalities).  
This analysis will account for the following items: 
 Regions of land, sea, and air potentially exposed to debris resulting from normal 
flight events and from potential malfunctions.  Waterborne vessels or aircraft exposed to debris from events resulting from potential 
normal or abnormal flight events, including vehicle malfunction. 
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 Operational controls implemented to control risk to the public from debris hazards.  Debris identified from debris analysis.  Vehicle trajectory dispersion effects in the surface impact domain. 
 
The Ec is further discussed below in ‘Review of FAA-AST Safety Critical Hardware Guidelines’. 
Review of Part 460 – Human Spaceflight Requirements 
The FAA-AST has provided Human Spaceflight Requirements and these are covered further below in 
Section 2.3.4 and 2.3.6 for flight crew and Spaceflight Participant requirements. Additionally a review 
of NASA and ESA Human Rating Requirements is covered in 2.3.11.3.  
Review of FAA-AST Validation & Verification Process 
The FAA-AST has provided a safety validation and verification guide [62] to act as a companion to 
their system safety process guide [61] in order to provide relevant information to support a Launch 
License application.  A review of the guide concludes that the document is a high-level reiteration of 
standard practices such as ARP 4751 and does not provide any new methodology for the emerging 
commercial spaceflight industry. In its scope it states that “the specific content of the V&V process 
exceeds the scope of this guide.”  
Review of FAA-AST Safety Critical Hardware Guidelines 
The FAA-AST guideline on the identification of safety-critical items [63] is a reasonable attempt at 
providing specific guidance for RLV developers. 
The guidelines suggest that risk assessments are specifically conducted for: 
 Expected Casualty (Ec)Analysis  Instantaneous Impact Point (IIP) Analysis  IIP Trace Analysis  Dwell Time  Population Density  Casualty Area 
They categorise the hazard contributors into the following categories: 
 Safety-critical hardware  Safety-critical software functions  Safety-critical procedures 
 
The guidelines further define what is considered a safety-critical item and that the activity should be 
conducted separately from the structured risk assessment process. They suggest that if BOTH of the 
following conditions are true then the item is potentially safety critical and may require further 
analysis: 
 If the vehicle is over/in a populated area, or may reach a populated 
area as a result of failure and  The system could credibly fail, with the failure resulting in one or 
more of the conditions below; 
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o Failure causes break-up 
o Failure causes loss of control 
o Failure causes uncontrolled debris 
o Failure causes uncontrolled discharge of hazardous material 
o Failure prohibits safe landing 
 
The guideline is the standard way of providing safe assurance of ‘protecting the public’ and the aim is 
to meet the Ec requirement of 30x10-6 per mission and determine whether safety-critical items are 
identified and therefore to list these in support of the Launch License application. Herein lays one of 
the issues of this approach; if the applicant proves that their analysis is better than the 30x10-6 
requirement (due to their flight trajectory not impinging too much on the public) then they need not 
identify safety-critical items. The guideline states (paragraph 7.3 – safety critical assessment, item 5a) 
“Perform a preliminary risk assessment (on the potentially safety-critical item). If it meets the 
allowable criteria, no further analysis may be required.” 
Additionally the ‘target’ (requirement) of 30x10-6 per mission stems from the standard industry 
practice from the orbital-based missions. A more accurate way of presenting this is either 3x10-5 or 
actually 0.4x10-4 per mission; clearly a low target which is based on previous occurrences from within 
the ‘Space Shuttle’ and rocket industry. Within today’s commercial spaceflight industry we have 
simpler designs and less exacting environment for the suborbital vehicles; it is acknowledged that for 
orbital commercial operations then following the existing requirements would be acceptable until 
more data is obtained in terms of reliability. However suborbital operations should have more 
rationalised criteria and targets and therefore safety-critical items would be listed and managed (as per 
current aerospace requirements) irrespective of whether an item meets the target i.e. within proper 
safety analysis a safety-critical item may have a better reliability value than the target but is still 
analysed as part of its contribution to the accident (such as a catastrophic failure condition). 
Review of FAA-AST Software Safety  
The FAA-AST has provided a software safety and computing system guide [64]. By computing 
system they mean computer system hardware and firmware. The guide states that the majority of 
software problems can be traced to improper design or improper implementation if that 
design….Therefore the software and computing system safety should focus on the fault avoidance, 
removal, detection, and tolerance. This is good guidance but should also state at this high-level 
introduction to include fault tolerance i.e. the software/computing system safety effort is required to 
be joined up with the main safety effort because it should be stated within the software safety 
requirements that should a system fail due to software then the tolerance of the system should not 
result in a catastrophic outcome.  
The guide follows best practice in that it covers the main topics as covered in 2.2.4.2 such as: 
 Software safety planning  Safety Critical Computer System Function Identification and Description  Hazard analyses  Standard Risk Mitigation Measures – here in the detail the document finally 
mentions software fault tolerance  Validation & Verification  Additional considerations; 
o Development Standards 
o Configuration Management and Control 
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o Quality Assurance 
o Anomaly reporting  
o Training 
o Maintenance   Lessons Learned; this section provides a list of broad lessons from a study of 
accidents involving software and computing systems.  One of the key Lessons Learned appears to be ‘estimating and mitigating risks are 
critical aspects of software safety’. 
The Appendices are useful covering ‘generic software safety requirements’ (Appendix A), software 
and computing systems hazard analyses (B) and finally the space vehicle failures and aircraft 
accidents (C). 
Overall the guide is very good and the only important missing aspect is consideration to the Design 
Assurance Levels (DALs) i.e. from the DO-178B standard and also for the computing systems DO-
254 regarding complex hardware. It is considered that this is a key factor in the integration of the 
software safety effort to the main system safety effort.  
Review of FAA-AST Operations & Maintenance Guidelines  
The FAA-AST has provided Operations and Maintenance guidelines and with all of their documents 
the scope covers both orbital and suborbital RLVs. The guide provides a useful set of statements for 
maintenance and operations that could be interpreted as requirements (the applicant should have …..) 
and this is backed up with a ‘rationale’ paragraph. The sections covered include; RLV Maintenance, 
RLV Support Personnel and RLV Operations. 
RLV Maintenance 
This section focuses on the fact that an applicant should have a maintenance program plan and 
maintenance inspection schedules and an accompanying Configuration Management System. These 
are all very generic as one would apply to any program and it is not only until in section 6.7 does it 
reflects Re-Launch Vehicles stating that: 
“The FAA expects that initially flights will have many systems or components 
that are inspected after every flight. Once sufficient experience exists to 
determine the reliability of various components, subsystems, and systems, the 
applicant should update its inspection schedule. An up-to-date inspection 
schedule will ensure that the applicant has a well-documented inspection plan 
based on the design and operation of the RLV that contributes to public safety 
and meets the operational needs of the RLV developer” 
In this respect more guidelines are required and in particular regarding Composite Materials and 
reusable Rocket Propulsion Systems (including hybrid technologies).  
RLV Support Personnel 
This section relates to suggested various roles of support personnel and also that operators should 
have a training plan for these personnel. This is standard information and operators may wish to refer 
to the guidance but it is not considered exceptional in terms of specific RLV/SoA guidance for 
operators. 
RLV Operations 
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This section relates to ‘operations’ and therefore one would expect to see guidance on the operational 
aspects in terms of operating profiles, flight crew issues and so on. In fact the guidance is mainly for 
designers on design aspects for operating the vehicle within its design limitations and with intent of 
usage; example of this include sections on ‘systems engineering’, ‘electrical power-system’ and 
‘structures’ (…the vehicle structure should be designed to preclude failure by use of adequate safety 
factors  …). There are a few specific ‘requirements’ to operators such as use of communications but 
these are standard procedures. 
Summary 
Once again the guidance is to ‘protect the public’ and therefore assuming there will be a trajectory 
over a populated area; in suborbital flights there should be a remote excluded zone for initiating the 
Rocket and this should not be a factor – essentially this is aimed at the orbital domain. 
Also there is no mention of maintenance/operations human error and management thereof and one 
would expect this to be included i.e. maintenance error management systems, including reporting of 
incidents and also the same for flight crews in reporting air/space incidents.  
 Conclusion of FAA Safety Review 2.3.3
The Gap Analysis of the current state of the Industry clearly concludes that the Rules & Guidance are 
still immature and of concern is that they are not robust. Although the FAA want to allow Designers 
and Operators ‘flexibility’ and do not want to ‘stifle’ the Industry’s growth by imposing too restrictive 
regulations, standards must be established that are clear and robust, whilst at the same time be 
pragmatic. The main areas of concern can be summarised as follows: 
 Poorly defined Safety Criteria  No Accident List  No Safety Targets  No Hazard Risk Budget  Guidelines are for ‘operator’ – currently meaning the design organisation 
applying for a launch license for their test flights; what about guidelines for the 
operator meaning Virgin Galactic for instance 
It is clear that the FAA-AST Rules and Guidelines are for the ‘Experimental’ Launch License 
applicants and that the major mitigation is the remoteness of the Launch site i.e. Virgin 
Galactic/Scaled Composites will ‘launch’ their SS2 over the Mojave desert. In Kemp’s book [15] 
regarding the aforementioned he quotes Burt Rutan speaking to the House of Representatives Space 
and Aeronautics Subcommittee about the FAA-AST process: 
‘The process deals primarily with the consequence of failure, whereas the 
aircraft regulatory process deals with reducing the probability of failure’ 
This statement echoes the author’s views from and the FAA-AST’s approach remains the same today. 
It is interesting that Burt Rutan’s comments imply that the FAA-AST should be looking at the aircraft 
regulatory process i.e. certification approach, as opposed to the Launch Licensing approach; this 
seems to have fell upon ‘deaf-ears’ which is a shame because of Burt Rutan’s experience in aerospace 
and now space.  
The safety guidelines are meant for the Design Organisation however they do refer to actions that the 
Operator should do; it is considered that the guidelines are not appropriate for operators and they are 
also not specific enough for DOs. Furthermore they do indeed focus on the consequence of failure to 
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the ‘public’ rather than the bigger picture of risk reduction of the vehicle to protect all parties 
involved. 
These issues are discussed in Chapter 3 with proposed solutions presented for Industry consideration. 
  FAA Regulatory Medical Review & Gap Analysis 2.3.4
The main reason for the FAA regulators stipulating minimum medical requirements is the additional 
hazards inherent in the space environment. As detailed in the author’s Thesis on safety of the 
customer [65], the space participant (SFP) will be subject to acceleration forces in the region of 3 to 
5G and also micro gravity for up to 5 minutes. These forces could aggravate medical conditions in 
SFPs, which could result in an in-flight medical emergency or death (not only is this undesirable for 
the individual, it could compromise the crew and/or other participants in their duties or in their 
health). The medical concerns for suborbital spaceflight as a result of the relatively high G-forces 
include: 
 Neurovestibular – this is most likely in the +Gz or ‘eyeballs down’ acceleration; 
hence seat design should be angled back so that the person feels the acceleration 
more in the +Gx plane (chest to back) as the body can generally withstand a 
higher level of ‘G’. These acceleration forces, coupled with noise and vibration 
may also induce motion sickness.  Cardiovascular – changes in cardiac rate and function which could lead to a heart 
attack.  Musculoskeletal – neck injuries are most likely when experiencing high G-forces.  Pulmonary Function issues – difficulty with breathing due to airway closure or 
pressure on the lungs (the author experienced this during Gx centrifuge 
experiences). 
Additional environmental issues to consider include: 
 Noise – the rocket engine will transmit the noise through the cabin and therefore 
headsets or helmets will be required (certainly by the crew, but as a duty of care 
will also be required for the SFPs). Table 3 in the author’s Thesis [65] assumed 
the maximum SoA/spacecraft noise to be 95dBA and the minimum time (15 
minutes was the minimum time in the table) which resulted in a resultant noise 
exposure of 80 dBA; the rocket phase will only be up to 90 seconds for the Virgin 
Galactic vehicle and therefore this should not pose a major issue for SFPs (apart 
from adding to Space Motion Sickness) however flight crew’s performance may 
be affected.  Vibration – the video footage of Spaceship One’s X-prize winning flights 
highlights a vibration issue in the rocket phase of the flight; once again this will 
only be for up to 90 seconds however this is more of an issue than noise. The 
reason is that vibration can impair the pilot’s performance to track displays and 
maintain situational awareness.  Radiation – the author’s Thesis [65] concluded that radiation should not present a 
major issue for suborbital flights for SFPs but flight crew could be susceptible to 
the effects of radiation over a long period; it was detailed that suborbital pilots 
would be exposed to less amounts (suggested 7-15mSv [Sievert] annual 
exposure) than that experienced by NASA crews and also Nuclear Radiation 
workers. An annual and career limit was also suggested.  Flight Emergencies (fire/smoke, decompression, non-nominal loss of control or 
spins) – various flight emergencies could occur and result in the crew and SFPs 
being exposed to differing situations with medical implications.  
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The overarching FAA guidance for medical criteria is contained within [71] and the following Gap 
Analysis regarding flight crew and participant medical standards is from the Draft FAA guidelines as 
detailed below. 
Flight Crew Medical Requirements  
The flight crew standards concerning medical criteria are defined in CFR 460 ‘Human Spaceflight 
Requirements’ [71] and also in draft guidelines [67]. 
These state that: 
‘The FAA’s Office of Aerospace Medicine (AAM), which includes the Civil 
Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI), the medical certification, research, and 
education wing of the AAM, considers the medical qualification standards for 
2ndclass airman certification to be adequate standards for RLV flight crew on 
a suborbital launch due to its inherently short duration’. 
This is considered one of the FAA-AST’s flexible approaches in that it does not have too prescriptive 
requirements so as not to stifle the industry. This is commendable but only to a point. There are 
certain aspects that require specific rationale or pragmatism or indeed common sense. In the case of 
flight crew only needing a Class II aeromedical certificate is a case in point. The counterargument is 
that the requirement should be more restrictive and hence a Class I aerospace certificate should be the 
required standard; this is corroborated further below in aerospace medical working groups.  
Spaceflight Participant Requirements 
In terms of the SFPs the FAA-AST requirements [66] state that: 
‘Each space flight participant should provide his or her medical history to a 
physician experienced or trained in the concepts of aerospace medicine. The 
physician should determine whether the space flight participant should 
undergo an appropriate physical examination.’ 
This may seem reasonable but this does not provide useful guidelines and leaves the operator to 
determine what medical conditions would be acceptable; also no there are no guidelines as to what 
age is acceptable and what weight limit is acceptable for instance; these aspects are important to 
derive in the beginning and arguably they can then be relaxed as more knowledge is gained after a 
predetermined amount of data has been examined by the experts. Additionally there is currently no 
official 'Go/No-Go' list of conditions that may contraindicate a SFP from participating in a suborbital 
flight. Various working groups in the USA and EASA should leverage any good work done thus far 
and using a European-based working group could provide more positive guidelines.   
The analysis reflects a flexible approach from the FAA-AST in that they do not want to prohibit 
people from flying unnecessarily and tends to place the responsibility onto operators. However some 
operators may follow the guidelines precisely whereas others may include excessive medical 
standards that would exclude many of the prospective SFP. Also there has been no thought given to 
anthropometrics involved; for instance are they assuming that the SFPs will all be within the 5% – 
95% size range? Also what about age restrictions or weight limitations? 
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Medical Papers/Reports 
There are a number of papers and reports on approaches to take for suborbital spaceflight and also 
raising pertinent debate on specific medical ‘conditions’ that may be acceptable or not.  
The author was privileged to partake in a Virgin Galactic Medical Panel where medical conditions 
such as false breasts (as one of their SFP has implants). More genuine concerns included whether 
heart pacemakers could be allowed and about general operations and healing time before flights. A 
paper on Emergency Medicine for Human Suborbital Spaceflights [68] queried conditions such as 
pregnancy and SFP’s psychological conditioning. 
The author presented a co-authored paper at the 3rd International Association for the Advancement of 
Space Safety (IAASS) [70] including discussions on medical criterion: 
Minimum medical fitness requirements are likely to comprise an in depth medical and lifestyle 
questionnaire, consultation with the participant’s general practitioner, clinical examination, 12 lead 
ECG, lung function testing, blood and urine analysis and blood pressure measurement. With these 
tests regarded as the basic standard screening, additional tests would be undertaken dependent upon 
the results from standard screening and the spaceflight participant’s age, with older participants 
subjected to increased scrutiny. The aim should always be to optimise the amount of medical 
screening performed in line with current knowledge. 
Another paper on Suborbital Commercial Spaceflight Crewmember medical issues [69] also proposed 
more stringent and explicit medical and training requirements (though just concentrating on flight 
crew). The paper was produced from the efforts of aerospace medical experts in conjunction with 
industry companies such as XCOR and Blue Origin and included personnel from NASA, the FAA-
AST and notably the Virgin Galactic Chief Medical Officer (and former Wyle Aerospace Physician) 
Jim Vanderploeg. The paper also highlights the shortfall in FAA-AST policy, stating that ‘policy and 
decision processes to be used for waivers and what functional tests (centrifuge, parabolic flight, 
altitude chamber) will be required to demonstrate that an individual can perform in the suborbital 
environment is still undefined by the FAA.’ The paper uses the Virgin Galactic flight profile as the 
model from which to base their working group discussions and concentrated on the following 
‘medical risks’: 
 Acceleration; here the discussions concentrate on the different types and levels of 
‘G’ expected in the flight profile and notably makes a comparison of fighter jet 
profiles in a common phenomenon called the ‘push-pull effect’ – this is whereby 
a pilot experiences –Gz (such as when flying an outside loop) and then 
manoeuvres into a +Gz state which could result in ‘G-Loss of Consciousness’ (G-
LOC). The paper states that this phenomenon has been implicated in several 
combat training fatalities. The relevance here is that at the apogee of the flight 
profile the flight crew may experience –Gz whilst upside down during the 
microgravity phase and then during the re-entry (descent) phase may transition to 
+Gz (and or +Gx) therefore the ‘push-pull effect’ may be an issue. Although G-
LOC may not frequently occur a more likely outcome could be Almost Loss of 
Consciousness (A-LOC) resulting in impaired cognitive performance; this may be 
a frequent event during the ‘push-pull effect’ of transitioning between 
microgravity and the descent.   Microgravity Effects; here the paper suggests that it is possible that 
inexperienced, non-adapted, or overly sensitive individuals might experience 
symptoms (neurovestibular or cardiovascular) associated with even short 
exposures to the space environment.  
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 Cardiovascular Effects; here the discussions concentrate on the Space Shuttle 
astronauts and state that the effects should be minimal for suborbital flights. 
However the suggest that ‘although post-flight orthostatic hypotension should be 
minimal on suborbital flights, the risk of orthostatic hypotension during entry 
may be quite real.  The enhanced parasympathetic tone that occurs after several 
seconds of exposure to –Gz leads to bradycardia, diminished cardiac 
contractility, and peripheral vasodilatation.  This response increases the risk of a 
fall in head-level blood pressure on re-exposure to + Gz.  A full compensatory 
response can take 8 to 10 seconds with the recovery period dependent on both 
duration and magnitude of relative –Gz.  Given that the period of hypoxia latency 
for brain cells is 4 to 6 seconds, the risk for + Gz related symptoms is enhanced at 
lower than expected + Gz levels’  Neurovestibular Effects; here the paper suggests that neurovestibular issues are 
not considered a significant factor in that the exposure to microgravity will be 
less than five minutes duration for each suborbital flight. Neurovestibular 
dysfunction after orbital flight includes an altered ability to sense tilt and roll, 
defects in postural stability, impaired gaze control, and changes in sensory 
integration.  Space Motion Sickness; Microgravity exposure results in space motion sickness 
in about 70% of astronauts flying on orbital space flights for the first time.  It is 
thought to be due to a sensory conflict between visual, vestibular, and 
proprioceptive stimuli.  Susceptibility cannot be predicted by susceptibility to 
ground-based motion sickness or pre-flight testing.  Symptoms typically occur 
within the first 24 hrs. However, symptoms have been reported immediately after 
main engine cut off with dizziness, pallor, sweating, and severe nausea and 
vomiting. Vomiting can crescendo quite suddenly without any prodromal 
symptoms. In a multi-passenger vehicle, one passenger becoming nauseated can 
potentially trigger nausea in the other vehicle occupants. Essentially it is not 
anticipated to be a major concern for the flight crew but some SFPs may be more 
susceptible than others and vomit may be an issue that could ‘float’ forward to the 
cockpit area and possibly affect the flight crew’s performance.  Post-Flight Medical Problems: it is not anticipated that any major issues  will 
exist for suborbital flight crew (however some SFPs may be affected by the 
flight)  Entry Motion Sickness; this is really for orbital crews returning to the Earth’s 
gravity and should not be a factor for suborbital flights.  Emergency Egress Capability; it was noted that 5 to 15% of orbital crews 
suffered from one of the conditions mentioned above and were judged too 
impaired post-landing to perform emergency egress (unaided). This is not 
considered an issue for suborbital flight crew.  Spacecraft Cabin Environment; the paper suggests that without a pressure suit the 
crew is absolutely reliant on cabin integrity being maintained as there is no 
redundancy and depressurization would be a catastrophic event. Additionally the 
atmosphere composition (O2 and CO2) would need to be controlled within safe 
levels so as not to impact performance.  Ionizing Radiation; the paper suggests for the most part, there is no concern 
regarding the acute effects of ionizing radiation because of the short duration of 
the flight and the fact that launch can be controlled depending upon atmospheric 
conditions.  Noise; The physiological effects of extreme acute noise (unprotected) is reduced 
visual acuity, vertigo, nausea, disorientation, ear pain, headache, temporary 
hearing thresh-hold shift, and degradation in pilot performance. Loud noise can 
also interfere with normal speech, making it difficult to understand verbal 
communication and affecting team interaction.   
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 Vibration; Vibration was also noted on the in-cabin videos of several of the 
Spaceship One flights during both ascent and entry. Spaceship One Flight 16P 
experienced significant thrust oscillations at 5-10 Hz towards the end of the two 
phase flow portion of the boost which produced an impressive amount of 
vibration with the pilot's head being slammed against his headrest for several 
seconds as seen on the in-cabin video.  
The issues discussed and the medical recommendations have an impact on the safety effort in a 
positive sense i.e. they are actually controls to hazards or accidents and so these have been extracted 
as such and discussed in Chapter 3.6. 
 Medical Review Conclusions 2.3.5
The FAA has once again adopted the ‘flexible’ approach by not imposing strict medical criteria for 
the flight crew and participants. The main areas of concern are as follows: 
 Flight Crew Medical Criteria – Category 2 only  SFP Medical Criteria – Basic Medical Questionnaire and General Practitioner 
Medical only  No guide as to medical issues to be addressed  
The Medical community are clearly experts in their field and are asking the right questions and 
providing useful guidelines to provide a ‘Go/No-Go’ medical standard; though it is also clear that the 
‘Grey’ area conditions require further research. However the Medical community may not appreciate 
the full extent as to why these Medical criteria are important in terms of safety mitigation against 
Inherent ‘Accidents’ within the accident sequence.  
It is concluded that the FAA have provided criteria that is not sufficiently robust and that having too 
flexible an approach may be detrimental in that some operators may follow the ‘unrestrictive’ 
approach resulting in accidents.  
These issues are discussed in Chapter 3 with proposed guidelines presented for Industry 
consideration. 
 FAA Regulatory Training Review & Gap Analysis 2.3.6
2.3.6.1 FAA Training Regulations 
The FAA has stipulated that Flight Crew require training (67) and that spaceflight participants require 
‘training’ (66). 
Training (based on standard Training Needs Analysis [TNA] approaches) should be detailed in more 
depth within the FAA guidelines and particularly so for SFPs due to their inexperience. Flight Crews 
will no doubt have been recruited from the military (fast jet pilots) and so will be more used to g-
forces and emergency procedures. It is acknowledged that training must be tailored per vehicle type 
but there are general training needs irrespective of type. 
Flight Crew Training Requirements 
The FAA-AST splits the definition of flight crew and RLV pilot to state that the pilot is on-board and 
who has the ability to exercise flight control authority over a launch or re-entry vehicle as opposed to 
a flight crew member as someone who is on-board and performs activities directly relating to the 
launch, re-entry or operation. It is surmised that the FAA-AST are covering the possibility of a cabin 
crew member in addition to the pilots which seems reasonable. In terms of training however the 
requirements are more specific for a pilot in that; 
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“The pilot of an RLV that will operate in the National Airspace System (NAS) 
should possess an FAA pilot certificate, and should hold ratings to operate 
one or more aircraft with similar characteristics for as many phases of the 
mission as practicable” 
‘Aircraft with similar characteristics’ could be construed to be too generic because how many aircraft 
have rockets and also a glide to land characteristic? Also the operation will probably be carried out in 
a cleared (NOTAM) zone and although RLVs/SoAs will operate in the NAS it is within a completely 
different scenario. Yes the pilots should hold a current pilot certificate and they should have flown 
aircraft with medium to high 'g-forces' (more specifically and as an initial starting point, fast jet pilots 
are more suitable as they will have been trained to cope with high stress situations and cope with high 
'g' should a non-nominal situation occur). Once the business is mature and safety has been 
demonstrated then the 'g-force' aspect could be relaxed to allow airline pilots to participate who may 
not have had fast jet experience. 
Additional requirements for the flight crew which in this case may also include cabin crew: 
“Each member of an RLV flight crew should be trained to operate the vehicle 
so that it will not harm the public” 
Here once again the FAA-AST focus on the public and this probably relates to flight safety systems 
and abort scenarios. However in addition there should be a requirement to be trained for on-board 
situations that have nothing to do with the public i.e. a SFP who may be either extremely sick or 
apoplectic, or someone who has had a heart attack and is dying. 
Finally the following requirements concerning training equipment are stipulated: 
“The RLV operator should verify through test, analysis, inspection, or 
demonstration that any flight crew-training device used to meet the training 
program requirements realistically represents the vehicle’s configuration and 
mission 
RLV flight crew training should include nominal and non-nominal flight 
conditions. The non-nominal situations should include i) abort scenarios, ii) 
emergency operations, and iii) procedures that direct the vehicle away from 
the public in the event of a flight crew egress during flight” 
The Flight Crew training guidelines do not specifically state that Centrifuges should be used; instead 
they state that a ‘training device’ should be used that realistically represents the vehicle’s 
configuration and mission. Arguably even a Centrifuge cannot accurately represent these (for instance 
if Virgin Galactic wish to provide Centrifuge training to their Crews in the ‘NASTAR’ facility, this is 
a generic device and may not be representable). They may also have a ‘simulator’ that represents the 
configuration and mission but this will have Fidelity and Capability issues and therefore could present 
hazards in its own right i.e. training the Flight Crew to experience something that is not real or 
representative. 
Spaceflight Participant Training Requirements 
The FAA-AST stipulates that SFP training is as follows: 
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“The RLV operator should provide safety training to each space flight 
participant prior to flight on how to respond to any credible emergency 
situations, which may include but are not limited to cabin depressurization, 
fire, smoke, and emergency egress” 
As a minimum, this is reasonable in terms of safety. However, other more likely situations will occur 
due to the medium to high 'g-forces' that the SFPs will encounter and it is these frequent issues that 
will lead to severe illness or even death (due heart attack or other people landing on each other and 
being crushed and unable to move during 're-entry'). There should be various levels of training 
ranging from awareness to experiential to emergency training. The SFPs will be interacting with the 
flight crew during the training (as well as the flight) and so this will aid in the 'teamwork' required for 
a successful flight.  
Papers on Spaceflight Training 
The author presented a co-authored paper at the 3rd International Association for the Advancement of 
Space Safety (IAASS) [70] including discussions on training and in particular the centrifuge device as 
key safety mitigation. The paper highlighted that first one must understand the accident sequence to 
understand the hazards and therefore what controls are required; in this instance a hazard of 
‘Excessive g-force to passengers’ leading to a ‘musculoskeletal’ accident (G-Induced Loss of 
Consciousness [G-LOC]) resulting in black-out and death – here the safety mitigation (controls) 
suggested included: 
 Design – Seats that move to assist with increase in g-force (both Gx and Gz 
orientation)  Procedures – more benign profile (climb and apogee)  Procedures – rigorous medical criteria  Training – centrifuge experiences including the anti-g straining manoeuvre 
technique 
 Training Review Conclusions 2.3.7
The FAA has once again adopted the ‘flexible’ approach for the flight crew/pilots and also has not 
imposed specific training requirements for the spaceflight participants. The flight crew are required to 
undertake training in a suitable ‘device’ and SFPs are to be given a briefing.  The main areas of 
concern are as follows: 
 Flight Crew Training – As part of the User Requirements, the training devices for 
Crew should stipulate the use of centrifuges as well as simulators and that these 
should be as representative as possible in the following areas: 
o Fidelity; meaning the training devices’ accuracy and ‘trueness’ in 
representing the flight conditions i.e. the visual system in a simulator 
provides real-world and high definition cues for the crew and SFPs. Also if 
‘flying’ at Mach 3 in a vertical climb then the flight instruments represent this 
accurately. 
o Capability; meaning the ability of the training devices to perform the same as 
the platforms(s) in terms of flight profile i.e. capable of representing g-forces 
(in a centrifuge) and ‘high-key’ descent and approach path (high angle 
approach path during the glide to land phase) 
o Concurrency; meaning the training devices’ equipment configuration in 
respect to the platform(s) i.e. instrumentation, seats, cabin windows (both in 
the centrifuge and simulator for instance)  Participants Training – Basic pre-flight briefing on emergency aspects only. As 
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the SFP is more ‘engaged’ in the flight that normal airline passengers, arguably 
they should have access to the same training devices as the Flight Crew and have 
a more defined schedule derived from (as with the crew) a formal Training Needs 
Analysis (TNA). 
It is concluded that the FAA-AST should be more proactive and prescriptive in terms of SFP safety. 
Platform-specific TNA should be undertaken but the FAA should be able to provide a generic TNA 
model as a starting position for operators. 
These issues are discussed in Chapter 3 with proposed guidelines presented for Industry 
consideration. 
  Review of Initial EASA Standpoint 2.3.8
2.3.8.1 Certification ‘v’ Licensing 
EASA has stated their intent to undertake a different approach to personal and commercial spaceflight 
than that of the FAA-AST (as detailed in Section 2.3). The FAA-AST are following Licensing Rules 
for Launches based on the National Administration Legislation and are not requiring the applicants to 
certify their space vehicles per Federal Aviation Regulations.  
EASA may follow known certification standards because of the definition in their position paper [76] 
for the activity which is based on the European Space Agency (ESA) definition19:  
Suborbital flights [performed] by privately funded and/or privately operated 
vehicles 
EASA have added the following to the definition in their paper concerning the integration of 
suborbital flights into the EASA regulatory system [76]:  
‘But limited to winged aircraft, including rocket-powered aeroplanes, and excluding rockets’ 
They have further refined the term suborbital flights with ‘Re-entry Launch Vehicles’ (the FAA term) 
to Suborbital Aircraft (SoA). Arguably the main reasons for this is that the industry is immature (from 
a technical standpoint) and that the European Airspace is busy (from an operating perspective i.e. in 
America there are more remote locations to operate from). Thus, EASA will only consider ‘aircraft’-
based vehicles and will not consider vertical rockets i.e. the spacecraft must have wings. Furthermore 
the vehicle must be able to fly to the upper limits of the atmosphere (which can also be deemed the 
lower levels of space). This is a crucial operating boundary statement by EASA because they only 
have remit to certify an aircraft-based vehicle and therefore cannot certify the ‘space’ part of the 
profile; this important exclusion will be discussed further in 2.3.9. 
There is a clear distinction between the FAA Licensing (whereby the Operator bears the full 
responsibility of its operations) versus the EASA certification approach (whereby the certifying 
authority takes a part of the responsibility). 
The EASA approach identified in the paper would be a pragmatic one in which a SoA would be 
certified under existing (and equivalent) airworthiness codes for a Type Certificate (TC) or Restricted 
Type Certificate (RTC) as a basic starting point and then adapt it and complement it with Special 
                                                     
19
 Galvez A. and Naja G., on Space Tourism, in ESA bulletin 135-August 2008 
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Conditions (SC). An SC may be required when there are inadequate or missing standards as necessary 
to address: 
 Unusual features  Unusual operations  Features for which experience in service on similar design has shown that an 
unsafe condition may develop 
In terms of SoA the operating environment is clearly not normal for standard aviation vehicles and so 
the vehicle’s ability to withstand excessive g-forces and microgravity conditions will require SCs. 
Additionally EASA is not normally presented with Rocket Propulsion Systems within an aircraft and 
so these in particular will have SCs applied. 
The EASA paper then provides guidance on Technical Issues that would have to be addressed in 
addition to the §23.1309 criteria due to the specific characteristics and operations of SoA. The 
guidance included requirements for the following systems/issues whereby SCs may be required: 
 Environmental Control & Life Support System  Smoke detection and fire suppression  Personnel and cargo accommodation  Emergency evacuation  Emergency equipment  On-board recorders  Rocket Boosters/Engines  Attitude/Reaction Control Systems  Propellants  Zero gravity operations  Environmental Requirements  Crew/SFP qualification & training  Verification programme 
These systems will provide challenges for the designer and operator and they will have to work 
closely with the agency in meeting the requirements. 
2.3.8.2  Equivalent Level of Safety 
As part of the certification process EASA will determine an Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) that 
can be applied to SoA. This Thesis aims to provide assistance in this area in the provision of a Policy 
(and associated guidelines). In the update to the EASA position paper [76] EASA discusses the 
possibility of applying the current §23.1309 criteria [87] to SoA; this along with the results of this 
Thesis (as appropriate) will form the basis of a Policy and Guidance Material for Suborbital Airplanes 
(3.2). 
  Review of Suborbital ‘Space Segment’ Safety 2.3.9
EASA’s boundary of their certification ‘competence’ is up to the edge of space and is therefore 
limited to the air domain (and to aircraft rather than vertical rockets). This means that in Europe there 
is no one body (authority) that is regulating the ‘space segment’. Even though this may only be for 3 
to 5 minutes it is the phase of the flight whereby the SoA and its occupants are subjected to 
microgravity conditions and therefore additional safety mitigation is required. Although EASA and 
the FAA-AST have suggested technical considerations for the designer and operator to consider for 
the space segment of the flight to achieve their certification or launch license the actual requirements 
governing the use of the ‘space’ and explicit safety requirements are not regulated (within Europe). 
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Within the FAA-AST their remit for commercial spaceflight operations covers both orbital and 
suborbital and therefore for the suborbital designers and operators it is implicit that they are to meet 
the ‘space’ segment requirements. Within Europe however we will first have to understand the 
general principles of Space Law and Air Law in order to determine whether any demarcation is 
applicable or whether a ‘transit’ segment can be legally bound and agreed. 
2.3.9.1 Space Law 
The following table from the International Space University (ISU) paper on suborbital transport [77] 
Table 10 represents a summary of the principles of space law with the addition of observations made 
during recent space conferences: 
 Principle Information Comments 
Legal basis Outer Space Treaty Ac, 1967. Applicable to space objects Suborbital flights will not reach outer space 
(although this will be argued as to the 
boundary) 
Definition of space 
object 
Includes component parts of a space object, as well as its 
launch vehicle (Art. 2, Liability Convention, 1972) 
The space object (RLV/SoA) will enter the 
space segment 
Fundamental principles Freedom of access implies the right of innocent passage to 
enter and exit space, though some States oppose this notion 
(COPUOS, 2005) 
Exploration and use of outer space for the benefit and in 
the interest of all countries 
No international regulatory standards 
As there is free access to space above the 
national airspace then States can arguably 
enter and re-enter as they see fit so long as 
they do not enter a neighbouring State 
unless they have pre-arranged agreements. 
Current Orbital re-entries do sometimes 
stray over other States without prior notice 
and this can be seen as a security breach.  
Current views (2nd IAA conference) are that 
suborbital should be considered within the 
Space Law domain and therefore go for 
licensing (over complex and expensive 
certification routes) and ‘there are no rules 
on safety, standards or certification and no 
case law to interpret vague terms’ 
Responsibility  and 
liability 
States are responsible for national space activities and 
liable for damage caused by space objects under their 
jurisdiction. 
Private entities are subject to authorization and 
supervision of the State (Liability Convention, 1972) 
In this instance the US (FAA-AST) are 
mandating a launch and re-entry license 
within their own national space activity i.e. 
the intent is that the launch, re-entry and 
landing will take place within its own 
national boundaries (notwithstanding non-
nominal trajectory issues).  
Landing rights In case of unintended landing, the landing state must 
ensure protection and return of astronauts and space 
objects back to their national territory (Rescue Agreement, 
1968) 
Not applicable to suborbital flights. The 
Space Shuttle has Transatlantic Abort 
Landing Agreements with Spain and France 
for instance 
Liability Regimes – 
Damage caused by 
collisions 
Treated under OST, Article II 
Unlimited fault-based liability for collisions with other 
space objects 
Unlimited absolute liability for collisions with aircraft in 
flight 
No claims 
 
Liability Regimes – 
Damage caused to 3rd 
parties on the Earth’s 
surface 
Treated under Liability Convention, Article II  
Applicable for liability of the launching State The term 
“launching State” means: (i) a State which launches or 
procures the launching of a space object; (ii) a State from 
whose territory or facility a space object is launched 
(Article I) 
Unlimited liability and absolute liability: no need for fault 
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 Principle Information Comments 
No liability if: a launching state establishes that the 
damage as resulted from gross negligence or from an act 
or omission with intent on the part of the claimant state 
(Article VI) 
Low history of third party damage claims 
Not applicable to nationals of the launching state or 
foreign national participants. (Article VII) 
Liability Regimes – 
Damage caused to 
passengers  
Treated under Liability Convention, Article III  
Liability for damage sustained to passengers while inside 
the space object is not covered 
Only if caused by another space object 
Unlimited fault-based liability (Article III) 
Not applicable to nationals of the launching state or 
foreign national participants (Article VII) 
The FAA-AST have stipulated ‘liability 
cross-waivers’ for crew and passengers 
(SFPs) i.e. they are to sign an ‘informed 
consent’ that they know the risks. The 
issues to be discussed are whether they will 
stand up in court and also as to the limit of 
the liability 
Table 10: General principles of Space Law – adapted from ISU paper 
2.3.9.2 Air Law:  
As per Space Law above the following table presents a summary of the principles of air law; 
Principle Information Comments 
Legal basis Chicago Convention, 1944. Applying only to civil aircraft Applies to SoA/RLV  
Definition of aircraft Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere 
from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the 
air against the Earth’s surface (Annex 7, Chicago 
Convention, 1944) 
Hence EASA aims to certify only aircraft-
based vehicles (SoA). The FAA-AST have 
used the term RLV and this applies to both 
aircraft-based and vertical rocket-based 
models so this aspect is different in the US 
Fundamental principles Supreme and exclusive sovereignty of States in the airspace 
above their territory. Right of innocent passage applies to 
civil non-scheduled flights only. States may require such 
flights to land International Air Services Transit Agreement 
(IASTA, 1944) extends innocent passage to scheduled 
flights International Air Transport Agreement (IATA, 1944) 
Allows aircraft to embark and disembark passengers 
Bilateral negotiations for countries that have not ratified 
the IASTA or IATA International Standards and 
Recommended Practices applicable to all States 
These bilateral and multilateral traffic rights 
are based on intergovernmental air service 
agreements.  
ICAO believes that suborbital flight can be 
accommodated within the existing air law 
domain (a functionalist approach) 
Responsibility  and 
liability 
Contractual liability for damage to passengers and cargo 
owners (Warsaw Convention, 1929. Montreal Convention, 
1999). Non-contractual third party liability on the ground 
(Rome Convention, 1952) 
 
Landing rights n/a Covered in fundamental principles 
Liability Regimes – 
Damage caused by 
collisions 
No direct provisions for collision of aircrafts with other 
aircrafts 
Likely to be based on fault under national 
law 
 
Liability Regimes – 
Damage caused to 3rd 
parties on the Earth’s 
surface 
Treated under the Rome Convention 1952 & Protocol 1978  
Applicable to liability caused by foreign aircraft to third 
parties on the ground 
Limited liability depending on size of vehicle 
Unlimited liability for damage caused by deliberate act, 
omission with intent, or unlawful flight 
Strict liability standard 
No compensation if damage is not a direct consequence or 
results from fact of passage of the aircraft 
Low history of third party damage claims 
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Principle Information Comments 
National law will apply if damage is caused 
by a national aircraft 
Liability Regimes – 
Damage caused to 
passengers 
Treated under the Warsaw System & 
Montreal Convention 
 
Limited liability (low levels) 
Based on fault and reversed burden of proof 
Unlimited Liability for wilful misconduct 
and absence of ticket 
Not liable if: all necessary measures were 
taken to avoid damage, or if damage is 
caused by negligence of the Plaintiff 
Elimination of liability ceilings 
A two-tier liability system 
 
Table 11: General principles of Air Law – adapted from ISU paper 
 Space Law Conclusions  2.3.10
The ‘space segment’ phase of a suborbital flight is a contentious issue that is yet to be resolved. 
Within Europe it is clear that EASA is competent to certify vehicles within the Air Law domain yet 
are not competent within the Space Law domain. The question is ‘Who is competent to provide 
regulatory oversight of the space segment for suborbital operations’? Is the ICAO competent or 
should this fall to a body such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(UN COPUOS)? 
The ISU paper suggests that ICAO believes suborbital flight can be accommodated within the air law 
domain (a functional approach). Additionally the ISU paper suggests that the current space law is 
inadequate for commercial suborbital flights as the Outer Space Treaty concerns orbital aspects in the 
main. In terms of liability the paper states that: 
“Operators and manufacturers will have to ensure that the appropriate levels 
of safety and reliability are met to prevent liability claims in excess of the 
capacity to handle them” 
Here the ISU are suggesting that the hazard and safety risk analysis should demonstrate that the 
system is safe; to do this properly the author of this thesis contends that a designer and operator would 
have to employ a safety case methodology and also provide evidence that their risks are reduced to ‘so 
far as is reasonably practicable’ (possibly using the ALARP methodology). The current FAA-AST 
guidelines are inadequate in that they do not explicitly detail that such rigour is required in the system 
safety analysis or operator safety risk management. 
Interestingly in the space ‘v’ air law argument the common viewpoint of the industry is arguing for a 
space law approach to be more flexible with emphasis on a licensing approach under State 
responsibility. It is recognized that this approach (including the infamous ‘waivers’) should be 
implemented to allow the industry to grow with the eventual harmonization towards a more formal 
certification approach based on existing frameworks and filling in the gaps where applicable. 
It is concluded that the argument of space law versus air law is far from over and as the suborbital 
industry fore-runners are currently in the initial test-phase of their development, that an answer to the 
debate is required as a matter of priority. This could include an initial agreement for invoking Space 
Law initially until the industry is more mature; this would require special agreements/considerations 
concerning suborbital specific issues as the main aspects of the Outer Space Treaty would not apply. 
Then a harmonized approach could be implemented based on the Air Law under ICAO authority in 
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which vehicles can be certified. These issues should be discussed at the IAASS Suborbital Space 
Safety Technical Committee (SSS TC) as a matter of urgency; here the SSS TC will be able to call 
upon the community to derive the way forward and implement this within the IAASS-ISSB Space 
Safety Standards Manual as ‘good practice’ and thereby use this as a ‘lobbying’ medium to the 
community and authorities. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC review and resolve the issue of Space 
Law versus air Law; this recommendation is taken forward to section 6.4.  
  Review of Other Relevant Space Standards 2.3.11
This section aims to review other relevant space standards such as the European Co-Operation for 
Space Standardization (ECSS) and the IAASS-ISSB Space Safety Standards Manual. 
2.3.11.1 European Co-operation for Space Standardization 
The ECSS document set is vast and the review will focus on the main safety documentation and their 
relevance to the suborbital domain. The standards are produced as a co-operative effort between the 
European Space Agency (ESA), national space agencies and European Industry associations. The 
scope of the documents covers: 
“the safety programme and the safety technical requirements aiming to 
protect flight and ground personnel, the launch vehicle, associated payloads, 
ground support equipment, the general public, public and private property, 
the space system and associated segments and the environment from hazards 
associated with European space systems” 
Space Product Assurance – Safety  
The standard [79] is generally good and indeed is based on best practice. Section 5.0 (Safety 
Programme) is particularly good and can be used for suborbital designers. Section 6.0 (Safety 
Engineering) is also good and in particular details hazard detection – signalling and ‘safing’. The term 
‘safing’ appears a lot and as it is not defined20 it can be assumed that it means to make safe i.e. a 
safing function (or system) could be a shielding from radiation or an emergency oxygen system and a 
‘safing procedure’ could be the operation and use of such a system. The standard does specify safety 
of human spaceflight missions and has the following standards that must be met: 
 A mission abort capability shall be provided  Safing and safe heaven functions shall be provided  Escape and rescue functions shall be provided  The capability to reconfigure the system to restore the functional capability of 
safety critical functions in case of failures or accidents shall be provided  The capability to monitor, detect and assess hazards and effects of slow insidious 
events with hazardous consequences shall be detailed according to project 
constraints and mission objectives  The space system shall provide an on-board medical facility and the capability 
for handling a permanently impaired or deceased crewmember (clearly this can 
be tailored for suborbital in that basic medical equipment could be carried). 
                                                     
20
 Although not defined in the ECSS document the term ‘safing’ is defined in Table 1based on the ISSB Space 
Safety Standards Manual definition 
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The severity classification guidelines are not quite standard and have catastrophic as ‘loss of life, life-
threatening or permanently disabling injury or occupational illness.’ Arguably this is more applicable 
to the Critical/Hazardous severity because infers that one crewmember’s death is catastrophic and 
clearly this is not the case; the loss of the ‘Total System’ (the ISS) and those on board would be 
catastrophic. 
Section 6.6 also details operational safety band this also includes command and control from mission 
control i.e. not the crewmembers on-board and also includes ground operations 
Section 7.0 details safety analysis requirements and techniques and is based on best practice. 
Section 8.0 details safety verification aspects and once again is based on best practice. 
The Appendices cover ‘informative’ and ‘normative’ guidelines which also appear useful. 
Overall this ECSS is a good document to begin a suborbital safety management system but fails to be 
prescriptive in its actual safety criteria (surely ESA knows what criteria is to applied for products 
integrating with the ISS or going aboard Space Shuttles or Space Launchers). Also it fails to join up 
the design hazard analysis with operator safety risk management and therefore the total system risk or 
risk per accident type would not be known; once again disparate safety analysis would result from 
using the standard. 
Space Product Assurance – Software Product Assurance  
The standard [80] provides typical software safety best practice requirements including specifying 
software product assurance programme planning and detailing the handling of critical software. The 
remainder is based on best practice.  
Appendix D [normative] (Tailoring of this Standard based on software criticality) is particularly good 
because it provides software criticality categories. Although they do not correlate to DO-178B or DO-
254 (for the hardware/firmware) it does refer to its own system in relation to catastrophic, critical, 
major and minor severities: 
 
Figure 38: ECSS Software Criticality Categories 
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2.3.11.2 IAASS-ISSB Space Safety Standard 
The ISSB Space Safety Standards Manual [16] was briefly discussed in 2.1.2 and the purpose of this 
section is to put the review into perspective and to recommend a way forward. The standard is aimed 
at the Commercial Manned Spacecraft domain(s) and attempts to cover the suborbital domain as well 
as the orbital domain; it is considered that this was premature and as with the FAA-AST the standard 
is trying to cover too much in the same dialogue. The standard should be split into orbital and 
suborbital Chapters and where there is clear overlap then one chapter could refer to the other one. The 
technical chapters are good but should cover aspects such as software & computing systems 
(hardware/firmware) safety. The document states of its requirements as: 
“The requirements in this document have been established on the basis of the 
safety experience accumulated in manned spaceflight to date. By 
demonstrating design compliance with these requirements, the commercial 
manned spaceflight operator will show to have taken into due consideration 
past experiences and best practices for the sake of making his spacecraft 
design and operations safe”  
The purpose of the manual and its associated Board (ISSB) is to provide flight safety certification 
services to the emerging commercial manned space industry and this is commendable. The manual 
should be updated (it was produced in 2006) and also aim to provide more rationalized guidance and 
best practice in terms of emerging knowledge over the past five years i.e. proposing a Class I 
aerospace medical for flight crew (instead of the FAA-AST Class I) and also to derive a harmonised 
approach to the licensing ‘versus’ certification approaches currently being debated. These are 
recommendations for the IAASS Suborbital Space Safety Technical Committee (which the author 
‘Chairs’) – see 6.4 for the IAASS SSS TC recommendations.  
2.3.11.3 Review of NASA/ESA Human Rating Requirements 
Although mainly concerning orbital vehicles and operations Human Rating Requirements are 
suggested as possible alternatives to standard certification requirements. Indeed a paper at the 2nd IAA 
conference [78] proposes that these will be acceptable for commercial human rated space systems. 
Human Rating Requirements were first derived in NASA whereby their definition stated that; 
“a human-rated system is one that accommodates human needs, effectively 
utilizes human capabilities, controls hazards and manages safety risk 
associated with human spaceflight, and provides to the maximum extent 
practical, the capability to safely recover the crew from hazardous situations” 
ESA have also produced updated Human Rating Requirements and these are based on NASA’s, the 
ECSS documents, ESA involvement in the ISS and from Lessons Learnt from the Challenger and 
Columbia disasters. Here ESA’s definition is more focused on the safety technical requirements for 
human rating systems and state that they; 
“are intended to protect the public, the ground and flight personnel, the space 
system, any interfacing system, public and private property and the 
environment from hazards associated with flight operations, and with ground 
operations with flight personnel on-board the system” 
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They have also identified an explicit catastrophic safety target for orbital operations (Requirement 
104.1) as not exceeding 1x10-3 per mission though they maintain that probabilistic risk assessment 
studies will still be the preferred method for crewed vehicles.  
This section is included as an alternative route to certification and this type of approach may be 
suitable for commercial spaceflight operations in the US in the first instance and then, in the absence 
of EASA certification requirements, the ESA Human Rating Requirements could be tailored to the 
suborbital domain. 
 ISO 14620 Space Systems 2.3.12
Space Systems are also covered at International level with the ISO 14620 series. The series covers 
Space Systems Safety Requirements and is split into three parts: Part 1 covers System Safety 
Requirements; Part 2 covers Launch Site Operations; Part 3 covers Flight Safety Systems. 
These standards are relatively high-level and although aimed at operators (such as a Launch site 
operator) they are also aimed at National Authorities i.e. the quantitative safety objectives of 
hazardous systems with catastrophic or critical hazard related to a launch site should be established 
by the national responsible authority of the launch site country or by its authorized operators21. Thus 
the standards do not provide the safety objectives or targets. This is disappointing and leaves the 
standards to lower level national authorities. In particular they should have provided guidance on the 
Expected number of Casualties (EC) as opposed to leaving that aspect up to NASA; what about other 
national spacecraft launches? These standards are aimed at orbital spaceflight and so arguably as there 
are no specific safety objectives or targets then little can be extracted from them that the other lower-
level standards have. 
 Review of Industry Safety Culture 2.3.13
The existing space safety culture has been criticised over the years as a result of the Space Shuttle 
accidents and as a result the space community has endeavoured to improve its safety management 
efforts. The author has witnessed the ‘continuous improvements’ by the likes of NASA from 
presentations at the IAASS conferences; there they have depicted an impression of a more cohesive 
approach i.e. ‘Design’ and ‘HMI’ teams working together and in a different session, ‘Design’ and 
‘Safety’ working together. It was interesting to note the lack of total system safety approach i.e. 
Design and HMI and Safety and Operations; it is the author’s view that due they will get to this 
‘generative’ culture in the future because of the cancellation of Space Shuttle and NASA working new 
programs with commercial companies such as Space-X, Boeing and Armadillo Aerospace. 
The fledgling suborbital industry has not yet taken flight but arguably the companies and authorities 
should be advocating and engendering a safety culture from the beginning. The review of FAA-AST 
safety-related guidelines in 2.3 highlighted a weakness in that the focus is on Launch Licensing (per 
the existing orbital safety methodology) and ‘protecting the public’ (mainly 3rd parties on the ground 
but also other aircraft in the air). So for orbital companies such as Space-X they will just follow the 
‘normative’ NASA-style approach. The author argues that for suborbital safety (and orbital) the 
companies involved are smaller in comparison to the NASA organisation and therefore should be able 
to establish a safety culture. However there is no mention of explicit safety management activities 
other than specific design features of the vehicles; clearly this is part of the overall safety effort but it 
is the view of the author that these small companies are designers and manufactures who are 
attempting to get a vehicle licensed under experimental terms with the aim of then obtaining Launch 
                                                     
21
 ISO 14620-2, Space Systems Safety Requirements, Part 2 – Launch Site Operations, page 8 
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Licenses for operations (with suitable waivers because the vehicles are not certified by the FAA). 
Taking Virgin Galactic or XCOR as an example they then aim to meet the FAA-AST regulations and 
guidelines by having a safety official (because it says so) and implementing an SSPP. Armadillo 
Aerospace for instance are an extremely small team of designers who are progressing very well and 
could actually beat these other bigger companies to flying a suborbital flight (it is a vertical take-off 
and landing craft with a much simpler design). They will at some point have to follow the FAA-AST 
licensing process and guidelines and appoint a safety official and have an SSPP; once again, in the 
opinion of the author, this will be an afterthought. 
In Europe however, companies realise that they will have to follow an EASA-based regulatory 
approach and this requires companies not only to have a certifiable vehicle for airworthiness but to 
have an SMS approach and also obtain an AOC (for SoA). Herein lays the difference to the FAA-
AST ‘Experimental Licensing, Launch Licensing and waiver’ approach – the early recognition that a 
Safety Management System is an essential component of the certification and operations. This will 
ensure that a safety culture is embedded not only throughout the company personnel but in the design 
of the vehicle due to the well-understood and best practice approach required of certification 
specifications i.e. systems engineering and systems safety management. 
There is a great opportunity for a European company to have safety management as the differentiator 
in their approach to say that of Virgin Galactic, XCOR and Armadillo Aerospace.  The SATURN 
SAFETY MODEL at section 3.4 provides a proposed method of a contiguous safety approach from 
designer to operator thereby requiring a joint approach in the safety effort. By implementing this 
model and approach a safety culture can be established right from the outset and this may prove 
crucial in terms of business success as a result of safety success. 
 Validation & Verification Summary for Suborbital Aircraft 2.3.14
In light of no new methodologies or rationalised approaches provided by the FAA-AST guidelines 
this section provides further thought on the V&V process in terms of issues presented by the 
suborbital industry.  
Validation and Verification will be even more important in the nascent suborbital industry because 
unlike the aviation industry with millions of hours of history to call upon and with aircraft 
components tested until destruction or to meet specific requirements, the suborbital designers will 
have very little evidence to work from and thus are presented with extremely difficult challenges. In 
particular the novel designs constitute composite materials and the main issue and heart of the 
vehicles – the Rocket Propulsion System. The RPS may be ‘off-the-shelf’ systems or developed from 
new such as Virgin Galactic’s hybrid rocket motor with rubber and nitrous oxide; here it will be 
extremely difficult to meet requirements. 
What tools and techniques will be required to help demonstrate that the system has met requirements? 
Section 2.2.16 provided thoughts on future V&V processes stating that there were ‘challenges in 
methods to deal with verification using low design data-intensity, to enhance the scope of functional 
verification with the development of integrated functional mock-up and techniques for the integrated 
product and process verification’. Prospective designers will be engaged with Certification and 
Verification Engineers in providing design evidence through Computer Aided Design models, wind-
tunnel models and even prototypes (of the RPS and of the vehicle as a separate entity). In most cases 
these two systems will be developed separately and then brought together for final assembly and 
integrated testing. Here is the challenge for the fledgling designers and the V&V will be essential in 
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detailing that requirements have been met; if this part of the analysis is not robust then the industry 
may get into difficulties before it has even left the ground.   
  Personal Spaceflight Review Conclusions 2.3.15
The Personal Spaceflight review has highlighted many areas of concern which stem from a clear lack 
of understanding the principles of Safety Management and in particular of the approach to take and 
how to use applicable criteria. The FAA are leading the way and do not want to stifle the new 
ventures by imposing too strict a criteria. However, the author considers the FAA is being too liberal 
in its use of the ‘flexible’ approach.   
In regards to Safety Management there is a distinct lack of safety criteria and a lack of understanding 
of what constitute an ‘Accident Sequence’ and therefore what is required in terms of mitigation 
(controls). The FAA have not acknowledged there will be different RLVs with different 
flight/launch/land profiles and the ‘Report to Congress’ [81] have simply cited in their corroboration 
of the FAA documents that it is too early in the development to worry about whether Vertical and 
Horizontal craft should be considered separately.  
The FAA Medical criterion is not sufficiently robust. It is concluded that the FAA have provided 
criteria that is not sufficiently robust and that having too flexible an approach may be detrimental in 
that some operators may follow the ‘unrestrictive’ approach resulting in accidents.  
The FAA Training requirements are not sufficiently robust (in particular for participants).It is 
concluded that the FAA-AST should be more proactive and prescriptive in terms of SFP safety. 
Platform-specific Training Needs Analysis (TNA) should be undertaken but the FAA should be able 
to provide a generic TNA model as a starting position for Operators. 
The FAA Launch Licensing approach to the airworthiness and hence certification of the prospective 
spacecraft would not be acceptable in Europe. For operations in America, the FAA clearly wants to let 
the nascent Industry grow by not requiring certification; in particular for the early experimental 
Licensing phase. Here the designers would be applying for an experimental permit to fly and would 
not be able to fly passengers. Following successful experimental flights the Operator would then have 
to apply for an Operator’s Launch License.  
EASA are adopting a pragmatic approach and one that is willing to certify aeroplane-based spacecraft 
(SoAs) under the existing regulatory framework with special conditions (SC) as appropriate. Within 
this framework, safety criterion is an essential component and the Equivalent Level of Safety for the 
SoA needs to be robust and defendable. The extant §23.1309 catastrophic failure condition criterion 
(in the order of 1x10-7 or 1x10-8 per flight hour) will be different to that proposed by the FAA-AST 
criterion (1E-6 per mission). Due to these differences in approaches it is clear that more specific and 
rationalised guidelines are required. 
 Current ‘State’ To ‘Future State’ Statement 2.3.16
The above conclusion highlighted that the current ‘state’ of the Personal Spaceflight Industry is 
immature both in commercialisation and in terms of Safety Management. There are many gaps in the 
current SMS guidelines for Design Organisations and Operators and these will become problematic in 
demonstrating that a Re-Launch Vehicle or Suborbital Aircraft is acceptably safe. The review 
conducted within Chapter 2 has highlighted these ‘gaps’ not only in terms of the fledgling industry’s 
guidelines but also in the generic guidelines applicable to the aviation industry. To move forward to a 
‘future state’, clearer guidelines are essential and Chapter 3 looks at innovative methods to fill the 
gaps.  
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CHAPTER THREE – Influence of Safety Management in Spaceflight  
  INTRODUCTION 3.
The purpose of this Chapter is to ascertain whether the research has been able to influence Safety 
Management within the industry by three distinctly separate approaches; by practical application, by 
assisting in developing policies and by identifying new methodologies that could be applied to the 
industry (and possibly beyond). The aim is also to continue with the gap analysis undertaken in 
Chapter Two (Industry’s ‘current position’) and determine whether a ‘future state’ can be proposed. 
The analysis of the review will be discussed concentrating on the three aspects: 
 Section 3.1 – Setting up a new Suborbital Space Safety Technical Committee 
(SSS TC) in order to influence the community   Section 3.2 – Providing assistance in determining Policy for Suborbital Aircraft 
(SoA) under EASA remit.   Section 3.4 – Providing an Exemplar Safety Model appropriate for Commercial 
Spaceflight that can also set the standards for the aerospace sector and arguably 
other sectors with complex systems used by operators. 
 SUBORBITAL SPACE SAFETY TECHNICAL COMMITTEE 3.1.
The author has been a member of the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety 
(IAASS) since 2006 and has presented papers on safety management aspects at the IAASS 
conferences (see Appendix 8 through 12). With the emergence of the suborbital industry there is 
growing awareness (and concern) within the IAASS regarding the new field. To that end and after 
being on the Suborbital Space Safety Panel at the 4th IAASS conference in May 2010, the author 
proposed to the President of the IAASS that a new Suborbital Space Safety Technical Committee 
(SSS TC) should be formed to address the emerging issues. On the 31st March 2011 the proposal was 
agreed and the author was invited to Chair the SSS TC, form a suitable committee, provide suitable 
topics and ensure any overlap with other TCs was suitably managed. This has been progressed and an 
Explanatory Note was submitted to the IAASS (see APPENDIX 13 - Safety Suborbital Space Safety 
Technical Committee ‘Explanatory Note’). 
 Technical Committee Initial Task 3.1.1
The author (as the Chair of the SSS TC) formed the committee from the regulators, industry 
forerunners, and specialists with suitable skills. A kick-off teleconference was held on 1st July 2011 to 
welcome the members and to outline the strategy and to update the members from the presentations of 
the 2nd IAA [54]. The author then presented the initial task for the committee which was for each 
member to summarise the current status within their area concerning suborbital space flight; this 
would then be presented as a paper (and poster presentation) at the 5th IAASS conference in October 
2011. The author also explained that the SSS TC would be further split into sub-committees with the 
following domains: 
 Regulatory/licensing; this would cover the current and difficult topic of Licensing 
‘versus’ Certification and look towards a possible harmonized approach. 
Additionally this group would cover Spaceports and different criteria for vertical 
RLVs and aircraft-based SoAs.  Technical (System Safety); this would cover the technical issues concerning the 
vehicle(s)   Operational Aspects’ this would cover training, medical and flight standards 
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Note: At the time of submission the TC has been split into the three sub-committees and the following 
topics have been selected for each to discuss and present at the 5th IAASS conference: 
 Regulatory Group – ‘Regulating the Space Sector’  Technical Group – ‘Survivability/Recoverability of Suborbital Aircraft’  Operations Group – ‘Spaceport Safety Considerations’ 
   Technical Committee Further Work from Thesis Recommendations 3.1.2
It is considered that any specific and relevant recommendations from the Thesis is presented as 
agenda items for the IAASS SSS TC; the recommendations will be discussed at workshops or for 
internal papers and as appropriate to update the IAASS ISSB Space Safety Standards manual [89]. 
  SUBORBITAL AIRCRAFT – EASA POLICY 3.2.
Based on the results of the gap analysis (current state) of the FAA Rules & Guidance, it is necessary 
to try and move to a ‘future state’ that has a robust safety argument as its provenance. The FAA-AST 
will need to update and improve upon their guidance in the near future as ‘operators’ will soon be 
unveiling SoA /Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLV) in order to start their Test & Evaluation phase. 
Once this phase is complete the real operators have also stated their intent to operate from Europe and 
other parts of the world (Virgin Galactic proposing to operate from Sweden, Scotland and the Middle 
East, and XCOR proposing to operate from Spain, Germany and Korea). 
Within Europe, EASA need to develop its own safety governing Rules & Guidance such that future 
SoA Designers/Manufacturers, Operators and current Spaceports can work within the same [robust 
and rationalised] Safety Management System. This Chapter focuses on providing rationale for an 
EASA Policy as part of their Regulatory Framework. Thereafter operators would have to follow the 
standard certification aspects in accordance with the SoA Policy. 
It is recognised that Europe does not have rules or guidelines that are specific to SoA operations 
within the EASA framework. To enable some form of rules and guidelines to be implemented within 
Europe, EASA was tasked to provide a Preliminary Regulatory Impact Assessment (Pre-RIA) in order 
to determine whether EASA needed to take any action regarding SoA and also to what level of action. 
The author was tasked to assist EASA in this preparatory step. The projected roadmap to the EASA 
SoA Pre-RIA includes the following: 
 Pre-RIA; this activity involved working with the EASA SoA team to derive the 
rationale for proposing an EASA Regulatory activity. This covered identifying 
the following; 
o The market 
o The main hazards/risks (high level risks based on known and generic 
profiles) 
o The baseline assessment in terms of 
o Safety risks and issues 
o Environmental risks and issues 
o Economic risks and issues 
o Societal risks and issues 
o Regulatory Co-Ordination and Harmonisation  Assessment of Options 
o In this instance the option chosen was to implement an SoA Policy 
The next phase will begin when and if the European Commission approves the SoA rulemaking task; 
the next steps will include: 
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 Terms of Reference   Full RIA; this expands on the Pre-RIA in order to justify fully the impact of the 
activity  SoA Policy (the option chosen as part of the Pre-RIA process); this includes the 
requirements and the guidelines for SoA operations  Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) detailing;  Explanatory Note  The SoA Policy  The full RIA  Public Workshop; it is necessary to engage the ‘public’ which essentially means 
the interested industry organisations and can also include the view of the general 
public. 
 
 EASA SoA Policy – Model 3.2.1
To assist in the development of a robust EASA SoA Policy ‘future state’ the following Model has 
been constructed in order to demonstrate the robustness and applicability of the Policy. The model is 
based on the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) not only because it provides a visual argument as to the 
claim that the SoA Policy is effective but that a goal-based regulatory approach can be a pragmatic 
way of introducing the new Policy. Indeed J Penny et.al from the UK CAA and co-authors from the 
consultancy ‘Adelard’ discussed such an approach in their paper [90]; 
“Goal-based regulation” does not specify the means of achieving compliance but sets goals 
that allow alternative ways of achieving compliance, e.g. “People shall be prevented from 
falling over the edge of the cliff”. In “prescriptive regulation” the specific means of achieving 
compliance is mandated, e.g. “You shall install a 1 meter high rail at the edge of the cliff”. 
There is an increasing tendency to adopt a goal-based approach to safety regulation, and 
there are good technical and commercial reasons for believing this approach is preferable to 
more prescriptive regulation. It is however important to address the practical problems 
associated with goal-based regulation in order for it to be applied effectively. 
Another driver for adopting goal-based regulation, from a legal viewpoint, is that overly-restrictive 
regulation may be viewed as a barrier to open markets. Various international agreements, EC 
Directives and Regulations are intended to promote open markets and equivalent safety across 
nations. Whilst it is necessary to prescribe interoperability requirements and minimum levels of 
safety, prescription in other areas would defeat the aim of facilitating open markets and competition. 
Finally, from a commercial viewpoint, prescriptive regulations could affect the cost and technical 
quality of available solutions provided by commercial suppliers. 
The Top-Level is produced below in Figure 39 and the full SoA Policy GSN including the argument 
and evidence is contained at APPENDIX 5 - Suborbital Aircraft Policy – Goal Structuring Notation.   
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Figure 39: EASA Suborbital Aircraft Policy Goal Structuring Notation
Top Strategy
Argue that Sub-Orbital Aircraft
Operations are acceptably safe in the
defined operating environment by
demonstration that the European
Governance is robust in terms of 
Airworthiness, Operations, ATM-ANS,
Spaceports and Operator Safety Risk
Management
G1
EASA SoA Airworthiness
Requirements and
Guidelines are effective
G2
EASA SoA Flight Crew
Licensing/Operational
Requirements are effective
G3
EASA SoA ATM/ANS
Requirements are effective
G4
EASA SoA Spaceport
Requirements are
effective
G5
EASA SoA Operator Safety
Risk Management
Requirements & Guidelines
are effective
C_Top_3
Definition of 'defined operating
environments': Aircraft flying above
FL600 without reaching Orbit and used
for commercial operations (either air
transport or aerial work)
C_Top_1
Sub-Orbital Aircraft definition: Aircraft
(airborne with wings) able to climb
to the upper limits of the
atmosphere, which may be
considered the lower reaches of
outer space
Top Goal
EASA Sub-Orbital Aircraft
Policy is appropriate to
ensure acceptably safe
operations within the 
defined operating
environments
C_Top_2
Acceptably Safe Operations:
Airworthiness aircraft
operated and managed to
maintain (or better) the
safety target
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  EASA SoA Policy - Safety Case Framework 3.2.2
The EASA SoA Policy is summarised below and the full Policy Goal Structuring Notation is at 
APPENDIX 5 - Suborbital Aircraft Policy – Goal Structuring Notation. At the time of thesis 
submission the European Commission were debating as to whether the SoA Policy task should 
proceed following the Pre-Regulatory Assessment and therefore the task is not complete.  
Top Goal: The EASA SoA Policy is appropriate to ensure safe operations within the Air 
Domain 
The Context of which the ‘Top Goal’ is defined as follows: 
 Context 1 [C_Top_1]: Definition of SoA - Aircraft (airborne with wings) able to 
climb to the upper limits of the atmosphere, which may be considered the lower 
reaches of outer space  C_Top_2: Definition of Acceptably Safe - Airworthiness aircraft operated and 
managed to maintain (or better) the safety target  C_Top_3: Definition of Air Domain – Aircraft flying above FL600 without 
reaching orbit and used for commercial operations 
The Top Goal is supported by a Strategy (Top Strategy) which demonstrates that the EASA SoA 
Policy is robust to ensure safe Suborbital commercial operations. This Top Strategy is supported by 5 
strands of the argument; EASA SoA Airworthiness Requirements are effective - Goal (G1), EASA 
SoA Flight Crew Licensing/Operational Requirements are effective - (G2), EASA SoA ATM/ANS 
requirements are effective - (G3), EASA SoA Spaceport Requirements are effective (G4) and EASA 
SoA Operator Safety Risk Management Requirements & Guidelines are effective (G5): 
(G1): EASA SoA Airworthiness Requirements are effective:  
The recent, rapid and successful developments in the domain of commercial spaceflights have 
highlighted the need to develop corresponding regulations in order to protect the flight crew and 
passengers on board a SoA and also to ensure the risks to the non-involved people on the ground or in 
the air are appropriately mitigated. 
The EC legislator gave responsibility of aviation safety to EASA, including airworthiness, air 
operations and flight crew licensing. In relation to commercial spaceflight, EASA’s remit focuses on 
aircraft, the definition of which excludes rockets and capsules. EASA’s scope in regulating 
commercial spaceflight also accords with European Space Agency’s (ESA) definition of space 
tourism as ‘suborbital flights [performed] by privately funded and/or privately operated vehicles’22 
but (in EASA’s viewpoint [76]) limited to winged aircraft, including rocket-powered aeroplanes, and 
excluding rockets. Thus EASA’s remit is focused on ‘Suborbital Aircraft’ as: 
“This term encompasses both the operational pattern (suborbital, therefore 
requiring less speed/energy to climb and be spent on return) and the type of 
vehicle, namely an aeroplane (airborne with wings) able to climb up to the 
upper limits of the atmosphere, which may be also considered as the lower 
limit of outer space” 
This means that EASA intend to govern any commercial suborbital operations within Europe in 
accordance with their existing regulatory framework and hence the argument (to support the goal G1) 
                                                     
22
 Galvez A. and Naja G., on Space Tourism, in ESA bulletin 135-August 2008 
Chapter Three  Influence 
 
 
Page 116 of 300 
 
is based on the current EASA processes and procedures concerned with regulating aeroplanes, 
supplemented with Special Conditions and supported by relevant existing FAA-AST regulations and 
guidelines.   
G1 is supported by two sub-goals: 
(a) (G1.1); Applicable Basic Requirements are effective for SoA Operations The evidence to 
support this goal is that EASA has the authority of the European Commission and from 
the Law (the Basic Regulation) by which Member States have transferred their 
competence to undertake airworthiness certification. To achieve this EASA issues Type 
Certificates based on an aircraft meeting airworthiness codes in the form of Certification 
Specifications (and in particular to SoA, CS-23) and acceptable means of compliance as 
appropriate.  
(b) (G1.2); Additional Special Conditions and requirements are identified and are effective 
for SoA operations. The argument that Special Conditions (SCs) are identified is that 
EASA has considered the systems of the SoA in the suborbital operating environment and 
have derived additional (special) certification requirements. 
The evidence provided in the Appendix details the specific extant basic regulations (such as EASA 
831, 8411 and 1450 for ECLSS) and identifies additional SCs and guidelines for system requirements 
(such as initial considerations for ECLSS), human factors considerations (FAA-F460.15) and non-air 
breathing propulsion systems to name a few. The evidence refers to the FAA-AST regulatory and 
guideline aspects where these were considered relevant (such as FAA-AST 460-11 for ECLSS). There 
was however FAA-AST aspects that were not considered appropriate for EASA Policy such as the 
safety objectives requirements. In this instance EASA plans to base the final criterion on a 
rationalised approach aligned from CS-23 but modified and complemented for SoA requirements. 
Note: in this perspective EASA has suspended the task whilst the EC make their final decision on the 
rulemaking priorities. However based on the author’s analysis the recommended approach should be 
to adopt a ‘Safety Target’ approach (top-down) but to also have implicit ‘safety objective’ 
requirements for failure conditions (bottom-up). The rationale is that the RPS is the driving failure 
condition and arguably will take up a lot of the Safety Target’s risk budget (typically at best 1x10-4 
per mission). With a catastrophic Safety Target in the order of 1x10-4 to 1x10-5 per flight hour, then it 
is clear that the modelling of the RPS will rely heavily on the exposure factor being added in at the 
system analysis level and also this will drive designers to incorporate safety features as mitigation in 
order to try and achieve the overall system safety target. By having failure condition safety objectives 
set as additional requirements this will enable designers to optimise the existing technologies with 
well-defined and low probability values with the more novel design features with un-proven reliability 
data hence providing a challenge to the systems analyst. A Safety Target of 1x10-5 per flight hour 
means a derived system level failure condition safety objective of 1x10-8 per flight hour. As 
mentioned this should be achievable for most systems however the RPS analysis (with exposure 
factors and safety features) may achieve 1x10-6 per flight hour; this equates to 90% of the Risk Budget 
and therefore by summing the other system’s safety objectives the overall target will be ‘bust’ i.e. it 
will not meet the requirements. A more realistic catastrophic safety target would be 1x10-4 per flight 
hour because then the designer will have a realistic chance of at least getting to within one order of 
magnitude of the target (due to the RPS) but hopefully the designers may be able to achieve the target. 
In the case where the target is not met (but within one order of magnitude) then the argument should 
provide operator mitigation such as: 
 Additional safety features in the event of a fire/explosion 
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 Operator Limitations: Only initiate the RPS in a designated remote corridor  Operator Procedures: Abort procedures, etc.  Operator Training: Training for non-nominal events 
Further rationale for setting the safety target at 1x10-4 pfh is that this is the order of magnitude that 
industry experts have derived; these views are from the IAASS-ISSB Space Safety Manual and 
designer views (such as Reaction Engine’s abort methodology for Skylon’s certification path) and the 
target is close to the FAA-AST guidelines. Additionally to put the target into perspective this is 100 
times safer than the Space Shuttle and equally 100 times less safe than commercial aircraft with 
millions of hours of service history to validate the origins of safety objectives.  This appears a 
reasonable baseline for the start of the development phase. Arguably over time and with more than 
1000 safe flights then a probability function may start to be derived that is more aligned with a CS-23 
Class III aircraft. 
Evidence (G1): The evidence is incomplete at the time of submission. 
(G2): EASA SoA Flight Crew Licensing/Operational Requirements are effective:  
The argument for G2 is that EASA has existing Flight Crew Licensing (FCL) requirements and these 
will form the basis of the SoA FCL requirements. The argument is then to provide additional 
identified requirements towards the SoA FCL requirements; flight crew are deemed 1st party 
personnel for legal and safety classification reasons. In addition to flight crew EASA is required to 
provide requirements for space flight participants (SFPs); these are deemed to be 2nd party personnel 
(see definitions Table 1 for 1st and 2nd party definitions). In this area of FCL and SFP requirements the 
approach taken by the FAA-AST is considered not as stringent as it should be and hence the 
differences in requirements are stated. 
 G2 is supported by two sub-goals: 
(a) (G2.1); FCL and SFP requirements are identified and specific to SoA operations; 1st party 
requirements (flight crew) are considered more stringent than those of transport aircraft 
flight crew due to the exacting environmental aspects that they will be exposed to and 
hence the criterion should be set high – in particular for the early phases of the nascent 
industry.  Hence EASA consideration is for a licensed air transport or commercial rated 
pilot; in addition consideration could be for a SoA specific rating of flight test pilot 
standard and/or military fast jet pilot standard (in particular for the test phases and early 
commercial flights). The medical standards are for a Class I Aerospace Medical 
Certificate (as opposed to a Class II required by the FAA-AAST). The rationale is backed 
up by aerospace medical practitioners and in particular in a paper [67] on suborbital 
medical issues. In terms of training, the FAA-AST guidance [71] is considered acceptable 
for EASA requirements: however in addition in regards to training requirements EASA 
considers that centrifuge training is mandatory for flight crew whom should be trained to 
cope with Gz and Gx (this is not stated within the FAA-AST guidelines); also that 
hypobaric training (within an altitude chamber) is also mandatory such that flight crew 
can recognize the signs and symptoms of decompression so that emergency procedures 
can be quickly implemented (donning an oxygen mask and selecting 100% pressure 
breathing as an example). In terms of SFPs EASA concurs with the standard medical 
checks performed by the individual’s General Practitioner and also the operator’s flight 
surgeon prior to training and prior to flight. However EASA’s approach is that SFPs 
require training as safety mitigation so that they do not become a flight safety concern 
during the flight and therefore affect the flight crew’s ability to maintain control of the 
vehicle. Therefore in addition to the FAA-AST ‘safety briefing’ training [66] EASA plans 
to mandate centrifuge training and simulator training as a minimum.  In particular the 
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simulator training and safety briefs will cover normal procedures and also focus on non-
nominal drills; these considerations for emergency drills are detailed in the GSN at the 
Appendix but include pressurisation failures, fire, loss of control (as per Scaled 
Composite’s SS1 flight) and crash landing/emergency egress. 
(b) (G2.2); Operational requirements and guidelines are identified and specific to SoA 
operations; this goal requires further work as it is not complete. Operational requirements 
will consider single-pilot operations for example as there is a single-piloted craft being 
developed in America (XCOR’s Lynx SoA) and they stated their intent to fly within 
Europe. Additional considerations will concern remote telemetry and control; safety 
critical systems such as the RPS should have relevant parameters that are monitored by 
telemetry and by cockpit instruments (such as pressures, temperatures etc.) such that 
malfunction procedures or reconfiguration can be employed to result in a safe 
configuration (safing) before reaching a catastrophic condition. In this instance the FAA-
AST requirements should be acceptable for EASA operations (FAA-AST 417.307). 
Furthermore EASA will only certify SoA (as opposed to vehicles with expendable rocket 
boosters) and therefore will adopt Special Conditions for ‘Thrust Termination Systems’ 
as opposed to Flight Termination Systems or Flight Safety Systems (though the later 
could be included as this can also mean the pilot as part of the flight safety system). In 
this respect the FAA-AST requirements (431.35(5) will need modifying to meet EASA 
requirements so as to protect the occupants of the SoA as well as the ‘public’.  
Evidence (G2): The evidence is incomplete at the time of submission.  
(G3): EASA SoA ATM/ANS requirements are effective:  
The argument is that EASA has an existing and effective Air Traffic Management (ATM)/Air 
Navigation System (ANS) that is underpinned by aviation law in the European Union and these will 
form the baseline for SoA policy. The argument is then to provide additional identified requirements 
that would accommodate SoA in the existing framework. The Goal is supported by two sub-goals: 
(a) (G3.1); Existing ATM/ANS Requirements and guidelines are effective. These are well 
established and based on Regulation (EC) 1108/200923. This goal requires more 
substantiation. 
(b) (G3.2); Additional SoA ATM/ANS Requirements and guidelines are identified and are 
effective; The integration of SoA into the current ATM/ANS system will require 
additional requirements and guidelines to assure the safety of the SoA, other aircraft and 
the uninvolved public (3rd parties). The main areas in terms of the following: 
o Flight Planning:   Issue a NOTAM of the intended suborbital flight. The NOTAM will 
provide sufficient mitigation to exclude other air vehicles. This must be 
for a ‘corridor’ of specified altitude, length and width. Additionally under  
§437.57 ‘Operating Area Containment’; 
• this mainly concerns protecting the public on the ground and that 
the planned trajectory (orbital connotations) and non-nominal 
trajectory should remain within the containment area  Ensure standard integration and separation with aviation traffic when not 
in the ‘corridor’.  Ensure the maximum altitude of the NOTAM is no greater than 150km 
(above this altitude the NOTAM is no longer valid and the Operator must 
                                                     
23
 http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/940.pdf 
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seek orbital collision avoidance analysis)  The Spaceport authority should also ensure that the NOTAM area has 
minimal (or none) populated areas i.e. over the desert, inhabitable 
mountains or over the sea  The Spaceport authority should provide ‘windows of opportunity’ for 
SoA/RLV Operators whereby the air traffic is ‘light’ within or near the 
corridor; this can reduce the exposure of other air traffic thereby reducing 
the exposure to a mid-air collision   
o Flight Rules:   Separation; normal rules apply for the SoA within standard controlled 
and uncontrolled airspace when not in the ‘space flight corridor’. 
Additionally §437.71 – Flight Rules apply; 
• (b)(1) Follow flight rules that ensures compliance with §437.57 
(above) 
• (d) A permittee may not operate a reusable suborbital rocket in 
areas designated in a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) unless 
authorized by ATC  VFR-IFR; depending on design the operator must be certified for either 
VFR only or VFR-IFR if the appropriate equipment is within the design 
of the vehicle.  Communications; standard communications apply when within 
controlled and uncontrolled airspace which accords with §437.69. 
Evidence (G3): The evidence is incomplete at the time of submission. 
(G4): EASA SoA Spaceport Requirements (additional requirements to aerodromes) are effective:  
The argument is that Spaceport Requirements are effective and this is partly substantiated because 
current aerodromes are required to be certified and the FAA has CFR Part 139 [99] which is 
appropriate. Additionally to the requirements of CFR Part 139, the FAA introduced AC 150/5200-37 
[26] which details SMS guidance for Airport Operators. The argument is then to provide additional 
identified requirements that would accommodate SoA in the existing aerodrome framework to enable 
it to become a Spaceport. New-build Spaceports should be able to be designed to the SoA Policy 
requirements based on the existing aerodrome framework as well as additional requirements. G4 is 
supported by the following: 
(a) (G4.1); SoA Spaceport Requirements & Guidelines are identified and are effective; the 
existing requirements of FAA-AST CFR 420 [96] detail the requirements for Spaceports 
effectively including the explicit safety objective in terms of risk to the ‘public’ per 
mission (Ec≤ 30 × 10−6). Additionally the explosive siting part, CFR 420 §420.63 to 69, 
covers the following very well;  An explosive site plan  Safe storage of rocket propellants (RP) (assumes RP-1)   Safe handling of rocket propellants  Issues of Solid and Liquid propellants located at same spaceport  Calculated minimum separation distance (of combined propellants)  Intervening barriers   Crowd (public) safety within the bounds of the spaceport – depends on 
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the vehicle type and propellants used. 
Additionally CFR 420 §420.71 concerns lightning protection at the launch site.  
 
These CFR 420 requirements can be amplified with the FAA-AST Environmental 
guidelines [95] where safety aspects are relevant (such as airspace, health & safety, 
hazardous materials and hazard waste management and noise).  
Evidence (G4): The evidence is incomplete at the time of submission.  
(G5): EASA SoA Operator Safety Risk Management Requirements & Guidelines are effective: 
This argument involves new approaches in which EASA intend to adopt a ‘Total System’ approach to 
include FCL, Operations and ATM/ANS as well as airworthiness. In terms of safe operations, 
although guidelines do exist for air operators, such as ARP 5150, it is considered that EASA provide 
specific guidelines for the nascent industry such that operators will be able to integrate their Safety 
Management System (and Operator Safety Risk Management) with the design organisation’s system 
safety analysis for certification requirements. The rationale is that the ‘Total System’ is then managed 
effectively. This is considered achievable because the design organisations will be working extremely 
close with the operators and in some cases these may well be one in the same organisation. This then 
calls for a contiguous safety effort which will enhance the certification process. This may be even 
more important should a specific SoA design not meet challenging safety objectives or a safety target. 
The goal is supported by two sub-goals:    
(a) (G5.1); Operator Safety Risk Management requirements are identified and effective for 
SoA operations; Here it is EASA’s intent that operators are required to have a formal 
Safety Management System which incorporates a Hazard Management System. Operators 
should provide a Safety Management Plan which details the high level safety 
requirements and safety targets/safety objectives and these should then flow down as 
derived safety requirements to the design organisations (DO) system safety analysis; 
indeed the SMP will be the baseline from which the DO provides their System Safety 
Program Plan (SSPP). This document then details how the Operator’s Safety 
Requirements will be met by the designed system. This way a contiguous safety effort 
can be achieved which provides safe assurance for the ‘Total System’.   Additionally operators are to obtain an Air Operating Certificate (AOC) per their 
aviation counterparts. This may have Special Conditions applied due to the novel 
environmental and operating conditions. 
(b) (G5.2); Operator Safety Risk Management guidelines are identified and effective for SoA 
operations; There is a gap between the DO guidelines such as ARP 4754/4761, ECSS 
documents and Advisory Circulars such as AC437.55-1/ AC431-35-2A (for commercial 
spaceflight hazard analyses and system safety process – which is a mixed guidelines for 
DOs and operators for obtaining an experimental launch permit) and operator guidelines 
such as ARP 5150 (and AC120-92) and ECSS document with basic operator information. 
Therefore EASA will provide guidance for operators (this has not been completed as yet 
– it is intended that the supplemental considerations in section 3.3 is reviewed with the 
EASA SoA team and incorporate as guidance material as necessary). 
Evidence (G5): The evidence is incomplete at the time of submission. 
 EASA SoA Policy – Conclusions 3.2.3
The EASA SoA Policy safety case presented is a Top-Level GSN and this has been developed for the 
thesis to show that the Policy meets the top goal (the full argument is presented at APPENDIX 5 - 
Suborbital Aircraft Policy – Goal Structuring Notation).  
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The GSN uses a goal-based approach because the aim was to set Policy i.e. standards, regulation and 
guidelines. The argument concludes that the Policy is robust within the existing EASA regulatory 
framework but that Special Conditions (SC) are required because of the novel designs and novel 
operating environment. The evidence is based on existing regulations and guidance with the addition 
of FAA-AST regulations and guidance. However it was found that some areas of the FAA-AST 
information was not appropriate for EASA regulatory and guideline purposes and therefore this was 
highlighted and additional standards proposed based on further evidence from industry experts, such 
as the Aerospace Medical Working Groups for determining appropriate flight crew standards. 
Although the argument is robust for the defined operating environment (up to, but not including the 
‘space segment’) the SoA clearly enters the space segment for nominally 3-5 minutes and therefore 
the safety of the SoA is not certified under EASA for that phase of the flight. This is a major safety 
issue and one that needs to be addressed within Europe; the FAA-AST does not define the limits of 
their jurisdiction and therefore do not have the issue. This is carried forward to the IAASS Suborbital 
Space Safety Technical Committee recommendation Chapter 6.4.   
At this time (submission of the thesis) EASA have not yet continued with the Policy and are awaiting 
further approval from the European Commission. Therefore the SoA Policy is not fully substantiated, 
meaning that not all arguments and evidence has been completed and therefore validated by the 
EASA team. When the SoA Policy is endorsed by the EC it is recommended that the author continues 
the SoA Policy Regulatory safety case with the EASA team; this recommendation is carried forward 
to the general ‘further work’ Chapter 6.3. 
Additionally, ‘supplemental’ or supporting analysis has been provided in the next section and is 
deliberately and explicitly detailed in depth such that EASA could determine whether to keep the 
Policy ‘high-level’ to provide flexibility or whether EASA wanted to be more explicit in their 
guidelines to assist Designers and operators. 
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 SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDELINES FOR CONSIDERATION 3.3.
As the EASA Policy is purposely high level, it was considered necessary to further analyse the aspects 
identified within Chapter 2 and in particular the gaps that were identified. The purpose of this section 
in addition to the EASA Policy is therefore to provide any rationale (that would otherwise not be 
prudent within a Policy document) and to be more explicit (as opposed to generalising a requirement 
or guideline). 
  Safety Objectives 3.3.1
It is important to establish safety criteria and in the early phases of development, testing and operation 
this may be difficult to achieve – especially covering different modes of spacecraft designs and 
profiles (aluminium-based ‘v’ composite and horizontal ‘v’ vertical take-off/landing etc.). However, a 
baseline must be established from which to work from. The FAA have implicitly determined that their 
risk acceptability criteria is related to individual hazards and that they will fall in the ‘high’ category 
(Hazard Risk Index 1-6 & 8) or the ‘low’ category (HRI 7 & 9-20). This approach may be satisfactory 
for hazard risk acceptability classification; however it does not allow for additional levels of accident 
risk acceptance and would hinder rather than assist in management ownership and decision-making. 
Furthermore how have they derived the numerical probabilities and does the criterion apply to all 
spacecraft? – as opposed to aviation air vehicles, suborbital spaceflight operators intend to have 
different profiles (horizontal ‘v’ vertical take-off/launch and landing) and hence will have different 
risks. So do we need to consider separate tables or have additional criteria within the same 
classification table? Also during these early stages how does the Industry set Safety Targets and hence 
derive Hazard Risk Budgets? 
The review and gap analysis in 2.3.2 highlighted the following deficiencies: 
 No Safety Target (and consequently no Hazard Risk Budget)  Poor Safety Risk Acceptance Criteria  Severity only to 3rd Party (the public and the public’s property)  No Accident List 
The above highlights the deficiencies in the FAA-AST system that needs to be corrected in order to be 
acceptable within an EASA regulatory framework. The following sections supplement the EASA SoA 
Policy argument for SoA operations: 
Accident (Loss) Safety Target 
The FAA guidance [18] does not include a Safety Target or indeed a Hazard Risk Budget (seeing as 
the Risk Matrix is a hazard-based Matrix).  A Safety Target is important as it reflects the Risk of the 
vehicle; in essence it is the cumulative probability of technical failures/faults i.e. of the failure 
condition probabilities. Within civilian aviation it is recognised that the safety target is ‘loss of aircraft 
(and ergo loss of life) due to technical safety critical failures should be no greater than 1 x 10-7 (1 in 
10 Million flights). This ‘incredible’ figure is due to the extensive testing and history in the aviation 
industry; this is based on the total Loss of aircraft probability of 1x10-6   per flying hour. For the 
immature suborbital spaceflight industry this probability will not apply due to unproven technologies 
flying in unproven and harsh environments. Therefore a realistic probability must be set. It is 
proposed that the Accident (Loss) Safety Target is 1x10-4   per flying hour for Loss of the SoA (the 
catastrophic A/B line for SoA). The rationale follows the ‘1309’ philosophy that 10% of accidents are 
due to critical systems and with 100 ‘hazards’, the single hazard (failure condition) budget is set at 
three orders of magnitude lower i.e. 1x10-7 per flying hour. The rationale is that the early stages of 
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development operational flights could be conducted with non-human payloads and flight crew (to gain 
experience). Then when sufficient hours are accumulated such as 1000 hours the safety target may be 
reviewed and arguably set at 1x10-5 per flying hour which is a preferred and more socially acceptable 
target i.e. only one order of magnitude less than current aviation. Initially the argument is that the 
nascent suborbital industry safety target is two orders of magnitude worse than aviation but over two 
orders of magnitude better than the Space Shuttle therefore this puts it into perspective for the public. 
Although the Accident (Loss) Safety Target is a ‘top-down’ approach, it still accords with the bottom-
up approach of using safety objectives for individual failure conditions (as described above for a Part 
23 Class III aircraft). Therefore the current certification framework (for normal aircraft) applies to 
SoA. With the implementation of a top Safety Target, the DO Safety Manager will be able to work 
closely with the Operator’s Safety Manager in order to: 
 Comply fully with failure condition’s safety objectives  Partially comply with failure condition’s safety objectives by being within one 
order of magnitude; 
o In this instance DOs should be able demonstrate that other critical systems 
have more than achieved their safety objective and therefore a trade-off in 
probabilities will ensure the design criteria are still met  Not comply with failure condition’s safety objectives by more than one order of 
magnitude; 
o Examples of this instance will be the SoA Rocket system whereby industry 
knowledge can at best provide a predictive occurrence rate of 1x10-4 or 1x10-5 
per flying hour. In this instance the DO must discuss the following with the 
Operator in order to take further credit in the analysis 
In this instance where catastrophic failure condition’s safety objectives have not been 
met, per the §25.1309 guidelines [46] as detailed by the ARAC report: 
An acceptable alternative method is to perform all of the following: 
(1) Demonstrate that well proven methods for the design and construction of 
the systems in question have been utilized; and 
(2) Determine the average probability per flight hour of each failure 
condition using structured methods, such as fault tree analysis, markov 
analysis, or dependency diagrams; and 
(3) Demonstrate that the sum of the Average Probabilities per Flight Hour of 
all Catastrophic Failure Conditions caused by systems is extremely remote. 
 
Here using the above guidelines a DO must engage with the operator and continue the 
analysis from the failure condition to a specific accident because then they will be 
able to apply the following operator-based procedures and limitations in order to 
further reduce the risk to the system.  
 Operator Limitations – these should be agreed and adhered to in order to take 
appropriate credit; 
o Limit the area of operation to a restricted zone (limit to 3rd parties) 
o Limit the exposure time of the rocket i.e. it might be nice to fly higher to 
150km, but actually by limiting the apogee to 110km, then further credit can 
be taken 
o No Limitations And Exceptions (regarding deferrable faults concerning the 
rocket)  Operator Procedures – these can provide good mitigation on most aspects apart 
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from a rocket explosion, however notably  the following may apply; 
o Flight Termination System (FTS)/Thrust Termination System (TTS) – this is 
a key procedural requirement to enable the pilot to abort the flight by shutting 
off the rocket should any anomalies be detected.  Air/Ground Segment Operating Parameters Monitoring – safety critical systems 
such as the Rocket system should have relevant parameters that are monitored by 
telemetry and by cockpit instruments (such as pressures, temperatures etc.). This 
is such that malfunction procedures or reconfiguration can be employed to result 
in a safe configuration before reaching a catastrophic condition.  Maintenance/Operator Procedures (Dormant Failures) – these can be specific to a 
system such as the Rocket whereby analysis identifies a switch that could 
potentially fail that requires checking before flight (or a switch that enables the 
mixing of the oxidizer for instance – better this results in a fire/explosion on the 
ground than a catastrophic explosion  in flight)  
Risk Acceptance Criteria 
The FAA-AST guidance [18] Risk Acceptance is essentially either a pass of a fail in that there are two 
categories:  Category 1 – High (1-9); Elimination or mitigation actions must be taken to 
reduce the risk  Category 2 – Low (10-20); Risk is acceptable 
This is unfortunately a step backwards in that the previous version included a ‘Medium’ risk category 
which allowed Operators the ability to manage risk and to accept those conditions which may not 
have met the criteria (such as rocket systems). This ‘single’ line is more akin to the criterion required 
of Design Organisations i.e. a failure condition’s safety objectives. 
The EASA Risk Acceptance Criteria should in the first instance set a safety target and supplement this 
with explicit safety objectives for certification using Table 17. Then the designers should work with 
the operators using the Risk Matrix in Table 19; this allows an element of risk acceptability whereas 
the FAA-AST system does not allow Operators to accept risk. 
Accident Lists 
The FAA guidance (2) does not include an Accident List as per normal aviation analysis; these are 
detailed in the ICAO SMSM [24]. The FAA-AST has not stipulated a total system ‘accident list’ 
because they have opted for a hazard risk management approach without rationale for safety targets or 
risk budget. This is because the failure condition approach is for Design Organisations (DO) and the 
FAA are currently dealing with DOs attempting to gain an ‘Experimental Permit’ to fly. 
The proposed scheme utilises the accident risk management approach and aligns with aviation 
categorisation of ‘accidents’ (as detailed in Section 2.2.5.2). In general there are in the order of 10 
accidents applicable to an aircraft and these can be assumed to be the same as on a spacecraft; 
following on from this, it can be assumed that there are 10 safety critical ‘hazards’ contributing to 
each accident, therefore an aircraft (spacecraft) could have 100 hazards. Each hazard would then be 
assigned a risk budget in order to meet the total system (accident) safety target. As EASA recognise 
the higher-level ICAO guidelines, the following generic aircraft (spacecraft) accidents are proposed 
based on the ICAO accident list; the list has been modified by rationalising those descriptions that 
could be a subset of another accident in order to provide clearer definitions and are presented in the 
AMC/Guidelines for EASA: 
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Accident No. Accident Title Accident Description Notes/ Accidents Not Used (due 
subset of other SSE) 
A1 CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain – CFIT 
leading to loss of aircraft [assumes loss of all 
personnel on board] 
 
A2 MAC Mid-Air Collision (MAC) leading to loss of 
aircraft [assumes loss of all personnel on 
board] 
 
A3 LOC-I Loss of Control – In flight (LOC-I) leading 
to loss of aircraft [assumes loss of all 
personnel on board] 
System/Component failure or 
malfunction – non-power-plant Note – 
this would lead to LOC so is not 
included 
A4 LOC-G Loss of Control – Ground (LOC-G) leading 
to loss of aircraft [assumes loss of all 
personnel on board] 
 
A5 Explosion  Explosion (Fuel Related) leading to loss of 
aircraft [assumes loss of all personnel on 
board] 
 
A6 Fire (flight) Fire during flight* leading to loss of aircraft 
[assumes loss of all personnel on board] 
*Flight considered from engines 
running to engine shutdown) – 
‘smoke’ in itself will lead to 
incapacitation and/or loss of visibility 
in cockpit for example and therefore 
would lead to a different accident such 
as CFIT or LOC-I/G 
A7 Fire (non-flight) Fire on the ground not in flight, including 
post survivable crash and pre-engine start 
leading to loss of aircraft [assumes loss of all 
personnel on board] 
 
A8 Loss of Thrust Loss of Thrust (system/component failure or 
malfunction – power-plant) leading to loss of 
aircraft [assumes loss of all personnel on 
board]  
 
A9 Structural 
Failure 
Structural Failure leading to loss of aircraft 
[assumes loss of all personnel on board] 
 
Table 12: Proposed Exemplar Accident List 
The accidents above assume loss of spacecraft and loss of life. A single death (of a passenger for 
instance) is considered an accident however this is classified as a ‘Critical’ severity (for 1st /2nd 
Parties). 
Along with the Accident List, there is also a list for ‘Serious Incidents’. These are also detailed as 
Safety Significant Events in ARP 5150 [75] and are defined in the ICAO Taxonomy [49]. The ICAO 
definition of a ‘Serious Incident’ is ‘An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident 
nearly occurred’.  
The severity Table 15 further below also includes Incidents (Serious, Major, Minor) and is relevant to 
the Safety Model. The list of Serious Incidents (SSEs) in the ICAO taxonomy is as follows; once 
again per the accidents, the list has been modified by rationalising those descriptions that could be a 
subset of another SSE in order to provide clearer definitions: 
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Accident  
No. (SSE) 
Safety Significant 
Event Title 
Safety Significant Event Description Notes/ SSE Not used (due subset of 
other SSE) 
SSE1 Near MAC A near collision requiring an avoidance 
manoeuvre, or when an avoiding 
manoeuvre would have been appropriate to 
avoid a collision or an unsafe situation 
(near MAC) 
 
SSE 2 Near CFIT Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) only 
marginally avoided 
An aborted take-off on a closed or engaged 
runway, or a take-off from such runway 
with marginal separation from obstacle(s) 
A landing or attempted landing on a 
closed or engaged runway 
Take-off or landing incidents, such as 
undershooting, overrunning or running 
off the side of runways 
SSE 3 Fire/Smoke  All fires and smoke in the passenger 
compartment or in cargo compartments, or 
engine fires, even though such fires are 
extinguished with extinguishing agents 
 
SSE 4 Near LOC-I (System 
failures In-Flight) 
Multiple malfunctions of one or more 
aircraft systems that seriously affect the 
operation of the aircraft 
Failure of more than one system in a 
redundancy system which is mandatory 
for flight guidance and navigation 
SSE 5 Crew Incapacitation Any case of flight crew incapacitation in 
flight 
 
SSE 6 Emergency Oxygen 
Use 
Any events which required the emergency 
use of oxygen by the flight crew 
 
SSE 7 Near Structural 
Failure 
Aircraft structural failure or engine 
disintegration which is not classified as an 
accident 
 
SSE 8 Fuel Emergency Any fuel state which would require the 
declaration of an emergency by the pilot 
 
SSE 9 Near LOC-I 
(performance) 
Gross failure to achieve predicted 
performance during take-off or initial 
climb/rocket phase 
 
SSE 10 Near LOC-I (Ops) Weather phenomena, operation outside the 
approved flight envelope or other 
occurrences which could have caused 
difficulties controlling the aircraft 
‘System failures’ removed from this 
category as they are really covered by 
the description in SSE4 
Table 13: Proposed Exemplar Serious Incident (Safety Significant Event) List 
Inherent-based hazards (OHHA & OSHA as described in 2.2.4) should be linked to a relevant 
accident so that the event can be managed at the appropriate level i.e. explicitly managed and 
controlled below the hazard level or explicitly managed and controlled at the accident level (and 
beyond to the consequences – in order to reduce severity for instance). Chapter 2.2.5.2 discussed 
various inherent-based hazards leading to ‘Inherent Accidents’ and within the safety model these need 
to be explicitly detailed. These Inherent Accidents are more difficult to name and some guidance is 
available in the European Safety and Health at Work publications and medical definitions. An 
example is a slip-trip hazard leading to musculoskeletal accident and this can have varying severities 
such as minor injuries (Minor severity in Table 15 below) to individual death (Hazardous/Critical 
severity in Table 15 below). The following table presents the proposed Inherent Accident List 
necessary to undertake the joint DO-Operator safety analysis per the new safety model: 
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Inherent 
Accident No. 
Inherent Accident 
Title 
Inherent Accident Description Notes 
IA1 Musculoskeletal An event whereby the body has suffered a 
muscle or skeletal-based trauma 
 
IA2 Cardiovascular Where changes in cardiac rate and 
function could lead to a heart attack 
 
IA3 Neurovestibular An event whereby the body has suffered 
from a conflict between visual, vestibular, 
and proprioceptive stimuli leading to 
dizziness, pallor, sweating, and severe 
nausea and vomiting 
 
IA4 Pulmonary 
Function 
An event whereby the body has suffered 
from difficulty in breathing (includes 
asphyxiation and loss of oxygen due 
pressurisation issues) 
Although this may lead to heart attack 
(IA2 above) it is distinct in its 
classification in particular to spaceflight 
and therefore warrants its own Accident 
classification 
IA5 Burns An event whereby the body has been 
affected by electrical, fluid or solid fires or 
energy transfer 
 
IA6 Aural An event whereby excessive noise results 
in injury 
 
IA7 Ocular An event whereby excessive light results 
in injury 
 
Table 14: Proposed Exemplar Inherent Accident List 
These Inherent Accidents could all credibly lead to a hazardous severity with the consequence as 
death. They could also lead to Major (severe injuries) and Minor (slight injuries) or even Negligible 
(discomfort) events; all should be explicitly linked and managed because the flights may become not 
socially acceptable if people are vomiting every flight or are returning on every flight with Minor 
injuries through g-forces.   
SoA Accident Severity Classification 
The FAA guidance [18] interestingly applies severity to the hazard (actually hazard-accident cell that 
combines probability and severity in the Risk Matrix). The above citation from paragraph 5b of [18] 
focuses on effect to the public and to property. Also within the severity category table, Catastrophic is 
only ‘death or serious injury to the public’ and the Critical category is ‘major property damage to the 
public, major safety-critical system damage or reduced capability, significant reduction in safety 
margins, or significant increase in crew workload’; it is considered that the FAA have based their 
criteria on the current NASA approach (as opposed to aviation best practice), which essentially looks 
at risk of launch and launch trajectory mishaps with the harm to the public and property being the 
focus. The proposed severity categories for the EASA approach consider the effect to people, the asset 
and the environment: 
 1st Parties – individuals directly involved in operating the spacecraft/suborbital 
aircraft  2nd Parties – individuals directly involved in supporting the spacecraft/suborbital 
aircraft (i.e. maintainers) and individuals participating in the flight who are not 
members of the flight crew (i.e. passengers)   3rd Parties – the uninvolved public  Asset – Loss of, damage to and degradation of performance of the spacecraft  Environment – damage to the environment (from explosions or rocket fuel leaks) 
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Description 
& Category 
Actual or 
Potential 
Occurrence 
Effect To People Effect to Asset Effect to 
Environment 1st Parties 2nd Parties 3rd Parties 
Catastrophic 
 
Accident Multiple 1st Party 
deaths 
 
Multiple 2nd 
Party deaths 
 
Single 3rd 
Party death 
Loss of 
spacecraft 
Extreme  
widespread 
environmental 
damage 
Hazardous 
 
Serious 
Incident - 
Asset 
or 
Accident 
(people 
death/injury) 
Single 1st Party 
death 
Physical distress 
or excessive 
workload impairs 
ability to perform 
tasks 
Single 2nd Party 
death 
 
Multiple 
Serious 
injuries 3rd 
Party 
(requires 
hospital 
treatment 
more than 2 
days) 
Severe damage 
to spacecraft 
Large 
reduction in 
Functional 
capabilities or 
safety margins 
Severe 
environmental 
damage 
Major 
 
Major 
Incident 
Multiple Serious 
injuries/ illnesses 
to 1st Parties 
(requires hospital 
treatment more 
than 2 days) 
Physical 
discomfort or a 
significant 
increase in 
workload 
Multiple 
Serious injuries/ 
illnesses to 2nd 
Parties (requires 
hospital 
treatment more 
than 2 days) 
Physical 
discomfort 
Single 
Serious 
injury to 3rd 
Party 
(requires 
hospital 
treatment 
more than 2 
days) 
Major damage 
to spacecraft 
Significant 
reduction in 
functional  
capabilities or 
safety margins 
Major 
environmental 
damage 
Minor 
 
Minor 
Incident 
Minor 
injuries/illnesses 
to 1st Parties 
(requires first aid 
and/or hospital 
treatment for less 
than 2 days) 
Slight increase in 
workload 
Minor 
injuries/illnesses 
to 2nd Parties 
(requires first 
aid and/or 
hospital 
treatment for 
less than 2 days) 
 
Minor injury 
to 3rd Parties 
(requires 
first aid 
and/or 
hospital 
treatment for 
less than 2 
days) 
Minor damage 
to spacecraft 
Slight 
reduction in 
functional 
capabilities or 
safety margins 
Minor 
environmental 
damage 
Negligible 
 
Occurrence 
without 
safety effect 
Inconvenience Inconvenience 
(requires 
assistance and is 
reportable) 
Single 
Minor injury 
to 3rd Party 
Less than 
Minor damage 
 
Less than minor 
environmental 
damage 
Table 15: Proposed Severity Classification 
The severity classifications in Table 15 also include the Part 23 definitions in terms of reduction in 
safety margin and increase pilot workload. 
SoA Probability Classification 
Table 16 reflects an ELOS of a Part 23 Class III aircraft however, due to the Special Conditions and 
using a Safety Target approach for SoA, the safety objective is set at 1x10-7 per flying hour for 
‘extremely improbable’ catastrophic failures (as opposed to 1x10-8 per flying hour for Class III 
aircraft). 
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Likelihood Quantitative Description Qualitative Description 
Frequent X > 10-2 Likely to occur one or more times in the life of the system  
Probable 10-2 > X > 10-3 Likely to occur several times in the life of the system  
Occasional 10-3 > X > 10-4 Likely to occur sometime in the life of the system  
Remote 10-4 > X > 10-5 Remote Likelihood of occurring in the life of the system 
Extremely Remote 10-5 > X > 10-6 Unlikely to occur in the life of the system  
Improbable 10-6 > X > 10-7 Extremely unlikely to occur in the life of the system  
Extremely 
Improbable 
X < 10-7 So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced in 
the life of the system 
Table 16: EASA SoA Proposed Likelihood/Probability 
Option 1: Safety Objectives Approach for Design Organisations 
Option 1 is a safety objectives approach: The Safety Objectives Risk Matrix at Figure 40 reflects an 
Equivalent Level of Safety for a Part 23 Class III aircraft and has been extrapolated into a cohesive 
and logarithmic Risk Matrix. The DOs must adhere to the set criteria as per normal certification 
requirements for each severity of failure condition as defined in the Part 23 Functional Hazard 
Analysis. In terms of SoA there will also be Special Conditions to consider. 
 
Figure 40: Standard Safety Objectives Approach for Design Organisation 
The option 1 approach is what design organisations are used to however it is acknowledged that the 
nascent suborbital industry will have difficulty in meeting such rigorous safety objectives in particular 
for the RPS. 
Option 2: Safety Target Approach for Design Organisations 
Option 2 is a safety target approach: The Safety Target approach at Table 17 is calibrated for 100 
hazards (per severity classification) such that the safety target of 1x0-4 per flying hour will not be 
exceeded so long as the number of failure conditions per cell multiplied by the numerical value in the 
cell does not exceed the value of 1000 (this is merely a value and not a hazard risk index). The table is 
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calibrated this way such that it is explicit to design analysts that the safety target must not be exceeded 
and that it allows for systems that will not meet a safety objective of 1x10-7 per flying hour such as the 
rocket propulsion system (RPS). In terms of systems like the RPS it will drive designers to achieve 
better than 1x10-4 per flying hour even if by just a slight margin. Should this not be achievable and a 
design has this one failure condition at the 1x10-4 per flying hour level then this means that the other 
99 failure conditions must be below the 1x10-7 per flying hour threshold to achieve the overall target. 
In this instance due to the RPS, the designer would argue their case with the regulatory authorities that 
the safety target has been met due to the remaining 99 failure conditions being acceptable (less than 
the acceptable safety objective threshold of 1x10-7 per flying hour). 
Note: By implementing a contiguous safety model approach (as per the SATURN Safety Model) then 
the design analysis will continue to the operator analysis. In cases where the design criterion has not 
been met then in exceptional circumstances the designer could argue the case by a combination of 
engineering judgment and operator judgment and using the continued accident sequence as evidence 
that the residual risk is acceptable; this must be within the ‘tolerable’ region within the operator’s risk 
matrix. 
The assumption for this method in the early phases of design analysis is that the top of the cell is 
taken as the probability value i.e. ‘Improbable’ equates to 1x10-6 per flying hour; the rationale is to be 
more conservative with the estimations. Clearly the designer may wish to use the mean value of the 
cell in order to take the average value of the cell i.e. ‘improbable’ could now equate to 5x10-7 per 
flying hour. As more analysis and evidence is gathered then the actual probability values can be taken 
and therefore the cumulative values (per severity classification) will be more representative. 
In the exemplar table below it is only the yellow and amber (tolerable) values that are cumulatively 
summed i.e. the red is unacceptable and the green cells (acceptable) are not summed because the 
designer has met the implicit safety objectives and therefore their contribution to the safety target is 
already accounted for. 
 Severity (Safety Event) 
Likelihood/Probability Negligible 
 
Minor  
(Minor 
Incident) 
Major 
(Major 
Incident) 
Hazardous 
(Serious 
Incident) 
Catastrophic 
(Accident) 
Frequent                      > 10-2 100 1000 1001 1001 1001 
Probable               10-2 to 10-3 10 100 1000 1001 1001 
Occasional           10-3  to 10-4 
 10 100 1000 1001 
Remote                10-4  to 10-5 
  10 100 1000 
Extremely Remote10-5  to 10-6 
   10 100 
Improbable           10-6 to 10-7 
    10 
Extremely Improbable  <10-7 
     
Table 17: Proposed Designer’s Safety Target (Failure Condition/Hazard) based Risk Matrix for Designers and 
calibrated for 100 hazards per severity. The number of hazards in the cell is multiplied by the numerical value in the 
cell and this along with the other tolerable cells shall not exceed 1000 when cumulatively summed 
So to be explicit there are really three safety targets for designers: 
(a) Catastrophic Safety Target – 1x10-4 per flying hour 
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(b) Hazardous Safety Target – 1x10-3 per flying hour 
(c) Major Safety Target – 1x10-2 per flying hour 
(d) Minor Safety Target – not set; best practice arguments apply 
In terms of Negligible classifications these should also be managed but do not require a safety target 
as there should be no safety occurrence.   
Further rationale is to link the design analysis with the operator safety risk management as detailed 
further below. The operator safety risk management uses the same probability and severity definitions 
and risk areas (the shape of the risk matrix) but their analysis is concerned with the accident risk 
management. This is achieved by managing the operating procedural controls, training controls and 
limitation controls higher up the accident sequence as described in section 3.4.  
SoA Failure Condition Classifications and Probability Terms  
(a) In assessing the acceptability of design, EASA recognised the need to establish rational 
probability values based on an Equivalent Level of Safety but mindful of the Special 
Conditions applicable to SoA.  The classification of failure conditions should be conducted per best practice as 
defined in AC§23.1309 with the probability definitions per the guide in Table 17 
above. 
SoA Identification of Failure Conditions and Considerations assessing their effects  
As detailed in Chapter 2.2.4 it is necessary to conduct an FHA at the beginning of a project. In this 
instance Design Organisations will conduct the FHA for their SoA and will develop their Functional 
Block Diagrams (FBD) down to System level in order to determine the relevant failure condition from 
which to base their design and system safety analysis. A ‘partial’ FHA is already contained within AC 
23.1309 [87] and this was intended as guidelines for smaller, Part 23 aircraft design organisations that 
may not be used to standard requirements as per their Part 25 counterpart design organisations. 
Nevertheless the partial FHA can be considered as a useful starting point for a SoA (which is arguably 
a Part 23 type of vehicle). Prior to conducting an FHA from an SoA FBD, it was considered a useful 
exercise to develop the §23.1309 partial FHA and to include SoA specific failure conditions based on 
the author’s knowledge of the various SoA designs and from the FAA-AST relevant guidelines and 
EASA paper [76]. In this instance to capture the SoA functions (and carrier aircraft as appropriate) 
two additional columns have been added to the FHA table to ascertain whether the failure conditions 
were applicable or not and to insert pertinent failure conditions for the SoA and carrier aircraft 
(integration thereof). The partial FHA is detailed at APPENDIX 6 - Exemplar Suborbital Aircraft 
(Partial) Functional Hazard Analysis – Failure Condition Level. 
In addition to the ‘partial FHA’ detailed in (a) above, it is further considered that a generic (partial) 
aircraft-level FHA is necessary to derive safety requirements and safety objective criteria. 
Additionally this would have been conducted prior to a System level FHA as standard practice. An 
aircraft-level FHA is defined in ARP 4761 [85] as: 
The aircraft level FHA is a high level, qualitative assessment of the basic 
functions of the aircraft as defined at the beginning of aircraft development. 
An aircraft level FHA should identify and classify the failure conditions 
associated with the aircraft level functions. However, if separate systems use 
similar architectures or identical complex components and introduce 
additional aircraft level failure conditions involving multiple functions then 
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the FHA should be modified to identify and classify these new failure 
conditions. The classification of these failure conditions establishes the safety 
requirements that an aircraft must meet. The goal in conducting this FHA is 
to clearly identify each failure condition along with the rationale for its 
severity classification. 
A generic SoA Functional Block Diagram (FBD) has been constructed to provide an initial baseline 
for the FHA. The FBD has been derived by following standard aviation-based functions. These 
functions have then been broken down into separate functions which in turn break down to lower-
level specific functions. The FBD is base-lined at a high level such that the initial platform level FHA 
can be conducted: 
 To Aviate (fly) 
o To provide thrust 
o To provide control of the aircraft (in the air) 
o To provide control of the aircraft (on the ground) 
o To provide structural integrity 
o To provide visibility   To Navigate 
o To provide awareness of aircraft state (in terms of attitude, altitude, heading 
and speed) 
o To provide aircraft current position and flight path data  To Communicate 
o To provide external visual clues (meaning to communicate visually) 
o To provide external communications 
o To provide internal communications 
o To provide external data communications  To Transport (including containment) 
o To provide habitable areas 
o To provide crew seats/restraint 
o To provide passenger seat/restraint 
o To provide normal ingress/egress 
o To provide emergency egress 
o To provide ability to contain aircraft fluid systems 
o To provide ability to contain aircraft equipment 
o To provide ability to release containment of fluids 
o To provide ability to air carriage (SoA transported by Carrier Aircraft)  To Display aircraft conditions 
o To detect and warn of aircraft conditions 
o To manage equipment and systems operation 
Figure 41 below details some of the identified functions and then further breaks them down to a level 
from which platform-level hazards may also be derived (Key (Platform) Hazards – see 3.4.4).  
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AVIATE FUNCTION
PROVIDE THRUST 
PROVIDE ROCKET 
MOTIVE SOURCE
PROVIDE 
CONTROL OF 
AIRCRAFT ON 
GROUND
PROVIDE 
VISIBILITY
PROVIDE 
STRUCTURAL 
INTEGRITY
 NAVIGATE FUNCTION
PROVIDE 
CONTROL OF 
AIRCRAFT 
ATTITUDE
PROVIDE  SAFE FLIGHT FOR 
SUB-ORBITAL AIRCRAFT
COMMUNICATE FUNCTION
TRANSPORTATION FUNCTION 
(OF PEOPLE), AND 
CONTAINMENT (OF AIRCRAFT 
PROVISIONS)
 PROVIDE 
HABITABLE 
AREAS
PROVIDE CREW 
SEATING AND 
RESTRAINT
 PROVIDE 
CONDITIONING OF 
HABITABLE 
AREAS
 PROVIDE 
PASSENGER 
SEATING AND 
RESTRAINT
PROVIDE CREW 
SEATING 
(G-FORCE 
PROTECTION)
 PROVIDE CREW 
RESTRAINT
 PROVIDE 
PASSENGER 
SEATING
(G-FORCE 
PROTECTION)
PROVIDE 
PASSENGER 
RESTRAINT
PROVIDE ABILITY 
FOR NORMAL 
INGRESS/EGRESS
 PROVIDE ABILITY 
FOR EMERGENCY 
INGRESS/EGRESS
 PROVIDE ABILITY TO 
CONTAIN AIRCRAFT 
FLUIDS (FUEL, OIL, 
ETC)
PROVIDE ABILITY 
TO CONTAIN AND 
CONTROL 
AIRCRAFT 
EQUIPMENT
 PROVIDE ABILITY 
TO JETTISON 
CONTROLLED 
AMOUNT OF FUEL/
PROPELLANT
DISPLAY AIRCRAFT 
CONDITIONS FUNCTION
PROVIDE 
VENTILATION OF 
HABITABLE 
AREAS
PROVIDE ABILITY 
FOR SoA AIR 
CARRIAGE & 
DEPLOYMENT
PROVIDE ABILITY 
FOR SoA 
CARRIAGE
 PROVIDE ABILITY 
TO DEPLOY SoA
PROVIDE ABILITY 
TO HOLD 
AIRCRAFT FLUIDS 
(NON-ROCKET)
PROVIDE ABILITY 
TO HOLD ROCKET 
PROPELLANT/ 
OXIDIZER
Key To Sub-Orbital Aircraft 
High Level (platform) 
Functional Block Diagram: 
= Aircraft Level Function
= Lower Level Function
= Aviation Function
 
Figure 41: SoA Functional Block Diagram – Partial Top Level Shown As Example
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(a) The aircraft level FHA inputs (from ARP 4761) are as follows:  The list of top-level functions (from the FBD such as Lift, Thrust, etc.)  The aircraft objectives and customer requirements (e.g. number of passengers, 
range, etc.)  Initial design decisions (e.g. number of engines, conventional tail, etc.) 
In terms of the generic (partial) FHA for SoA the second and third points above relate to individual 
projects however it will be assumed the SoA is a standard ‘business-jet’ like aircraft with aero-engines 
in addition to a rocket and that it will have a ‘carrier’ aircraft for an air-launch (a carrier aircraft is 
also chosen to include the ‘integration’ aspects). The SoA FHA is at APPENDIX 7 - Exemplar 
Suborbital Aircraft (Partial) Functional Hazard Analysis – Aircraft Level. The FHA was derived from 
the following sources: 
 AC 23.1309  EASA paper  Authors knowledge and interpretation of systems 
The FHA established whether the functional requirement was applicable to the SoA and/or the Carrier 
aircraft (integration aspects only as the aircraft will be certified in its own rights). The SoA aspects 
that were generic such as the provision of a ‘flight control system for the pitch axis’ were deemed 
‘applicable’ and this judgment continued for the other identified requirements. Those aspects that 
were derived as SoA specific and of interest are included in the summary table below: 
    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital 
Aircraft 
Systems Function 
Total Loss 
of Function 
(with 
warning) 
Loss of 
Primary 
Means of 
Providing 
Function 
Misleading 
and/or 
malfunction  
(without 
warning) 
General 
Functional 
Failure 
(Loss or 
Incorrect)     
Systems 
Reaction 
Control 
System  Hazardous Hazardous Catastrophic   
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional 
identified for 
Suborbital ops 
RCS must be able to 
operate and not 
interfere with 
normal controls any 
stability 
augmentation 
system 
Systems 
Display of 
toxic gas 
levels Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic   
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional 
identified for 
Suborbital ops 
closed loop system 
so need to ensure 
levels of CO2 are 
not high and 
incapacitate pilots 
Power-
plant 
(Excess 
Loads) 
Rupture of 
pressurised 
components 
(oxidiser 
tank)       Hazardous   
Catastrophic for 
SoA 
Power-
plant 
(Excess 
Loads) 
Abnormal 
thrust 
vectors       
Variable - 
engineering 
judgment 
required; 
Hazardous? 
Causes by engine 
mount failures, 
inadvertent thrust 
reverser 
deployment, 
compressor surge, 
nozzle failures 
Nozzle blockage/ 
asymmetric ablation 
Power-
plant 
(thrust) 
Rocket 
Thrust Loss       
Major to 
Hazardous 
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional 
identified for 
Suborbital ops;  
In this instance, the 
SoA would abort 
the rocket phase and 
recover stability and 
then do a normal 
glide/approach 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital 
Aircraft 
Systems Function 
Total Loss 
of Function 
(with 
warning) 
Loss of 
Primary 
Means of 
Providing 
Function 
Misleading 
and/or 
malfunction  
(without 
warning) 
General 
Functional 
Failure 
(Loss or 
Incorrect)     
Propellant 
Fuel or 
propellant/ 
oxidiser 
feed/fuel 
supply       
Major to 
Hazardous 
(depending 
on phase) 
for SoA; 
Catastrophic 
for carrier   Applicable  
Propellant 
Rocket 
abort        Catastrophic 
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional 
identified for 
Suborbital ops 
should a non-
nominal situation 
occur (LOC or 
excessive vibration) 
then the rocket 
phase must be able 
to be aborted to 
avoid a Catastrophic 
outcome 
Propellant 
fuel/propell
ant/ oxidiser 
tank 
integrity       Catastrophic   Applicable  
Fire Risks 
Fire risk due 
to oxygen        Catastrophic   
Fire suppression 
system needs to be 
considered for 
closed loop cabin 
Other 
Risks 
Unintended 
SoA - 
Carrier 
separation       
Hazardous 
if sufficient 
height to 
obtain 
aerodynamic 
glide to 
land; 
otherwise 
Catastrophic   
Engineering 
judgment as new 
technology 
Other 
Risks 
Seat 
Restraint 
whilst under 
'g' force        Hazardous 
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional 
identified for 
Suborbital ops 
Marginal to 
Hazardous to 
participants  
Table 18: Summary of SoA-specific considerations in the FHA 
As detailed in Table 18 the SoA-specific functional failures are centred around the RPS and additional 
environmentally-driven aspects such as the Reaction Control System, g-force related aspects and the 
unique aspect of carrier aircraft integration (where applicable by design).  
SoA Depth of Analysis Considerations  
The depth of analysis flowchart from AC§23.1309 (figure 3 in §23.1309) is a standard process for 
determining whether quantitative analysis is required or more simple qualitative analysis. The 
methodology is considered suitable for SoA design organisations to follow.  
SoA Assessment of Failure Conditions Probabilities and Analysis Considerations  
Although design organisations may follow a safety target approach by using the approach in Table 17 
they should apply the implicit safety objectives for the relevant severity classification. However the 
safety target approach does allow for some flexibility. 
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(a) Analysis of Negligible Failure Conditions: the DO should derive these from the FHA 
and/or safety appraisal and justify that best practice has been used in the design and to 
demonstrate independence from other functions. 
(b)  Analysis of Minor Failure Conditions: the DO should derive these from the FHA and/or 
safety appraisal and justify that best practice has been used in the design and to 
demonstrate independence from other functions. Additionally the DO should provide an 
assessment based on engineering judgment from qualitative assessment (and where 
possible provide quantitative assessment).  
(c) Analysis of Major Failure Conditions: the DO should derive these from the FHA and 
from an assessment based on engineering judgment from qualitative assessment (and 
where possible provide quantitative assessment). The DO should employ formal 
techniques such as FMEA supported by failure rates and FTA to demonstrate safety of the 
relevant systems and that redundancy actually exists. The DO should ensure that the 
cumulative assessment of Major failure conditions is no more than probable i.e. no more 
than 1x10-2 pfh in accordance with Table 17 
(d) Analysis of Hazardous and Catastrophic Failure Conditions: the DO should derive these 
from the FHA and from thorough safety analysis based on a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative analyses. The DO should follow the full guidance on the use of tools and 
techniques as provided in §23.1309. As per the ARAC’s analysis on the AC for §23.1309, 
any analysis used as evidence that a failure condition is extremely improbable should 
include justification of any assumptions made, data sources and analytical techniques to 
account for the variability and uncertainty in the analytical process. Additionally, the DO 
should ensure that the cumulative assessment of Hazardous and Catastrophic failure 
conditions meets the safety targets in accordance with Table 16; 
o Catastrophic – 1x10-4 per flying hour 
o Hazardous – 1x10-3 per flying hour 
SoA Operational and Maintenance Considerations 
Operational and Maintenance considerations are dealt with on two distinct levels for these guidelines; 
firstly from a Safety Management/Safety Analysis perspective and secondly from an operating 
perspective in terms of flight crew licensing, operating procedures and maintenance factors. The 
rationale to include the Operational Safety Management aspects is to have an integrated approach 
within the Policy and guidelines. Indeed EASA are looking to cover not only the airworthiness 
aspects but aim to start looking at the ‘Total System’. 
 Safety Management Considerations: 3.3.2
Safety Analysis considerations for Design Organisations:  
Safety Analysis Considerations for Flight Crew and Maintenance Tasks: These tasks, which are 
related to compliance (to failure condition’s safety objectives), should be appropriate and reasonable; 
examples of this are pre-flight tests (such as ‘Press-to-Test’) or selection of a switch to an alternate 
source (to check for latent failures). Credit can be taken for these design aspects that have a 
procedural requirement associated with them; in this instance it is reasonable to take full credit 
because the flight crew/maintainers can realistically be anticipated to perform them correctly when 
called for and hence a quantitative value of ‘one’ can be assigned.  
Safety Analysis Considerations for Flight Crew Errors: Design analysis (to demonstrate compliance to 
Failure Conditions) should not include probability values for flight crew error. Should a Failure 
Condition’s safety objective be difficult to achieve then the Designer should communicate this to the 
certification authority; a Special Condition (SC) may be required. The Designer would also have to 
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provide qualitative arguments for additional mitigation such as flight crew actions (post the Failure 
Condition) and possible Limitations and Warnings that may be applied; credit may be taken for this 
this type of mitigation by the Operator higher in the Accident sequence (see below).  
Safety Analysis considerations for Operators:  
Operator Accident Risk Management; 
Safety Analysis Considerations for Operators: In the case of SoA operations the Designer will 
inevitably be working closely with the Operator and hence the Operator should continue the analysis 
from the Failure Condition point (the hazard) to the conclusion of the Accident Sequence. The 
rationale is that the Accident Risk can be managed more effectively by the Operator by applying 
Limitations, Warnings, Training and Procedural mitigation that are applicable from the hazard (failure 
condition) to the accident. The Operator Safety Risk Management should integrate with the Design 
Organisation Safety Analysis in order to provide a contiguous ‘Total System’s Approach’. 
 Severity (Safety Event) 
Likelihood/Probability Negligible 
 
Minor  
(Minor 
Incident) 
Major 
(Major 
Incident) 
Hazardous 
(Serious 
Incident) 
Catastrophic 
(Accident) 
Frequent                      > 10-2 C+ B A A A 
Probable               10-2 to 10-3 C- C+ B A A 
Occasional           10-3  to 10-4 D C- C+ B A 
Remote                10-4  to 10-5 D D C- C+ B 
Extremely Remote10-5  to 10-6 D D D C- C+ 
Improbable           10-6 to 10-7 D D D D C- 
Extremely Improbable  <10-7 D D D D D 
Table 19: Proposed Operator’s Accident Risk Matrix 
Table 19 has been rationalised into an Accident Risk Matrix and aligns with Table 17 for the 
designers’ safety target based (failure conditions) risk matrix; the classification also conforms to the 
ALARP principle to allow for total system risk acceptance/ management. The ‘shape’ of the risk 
matrix tends towards the risk-averse because of the immaturity and high-risk nature of the proposed 
spaceflight activities. The matrix has been ‘calibrated’ to allow for 100 ‘arbitrary’ critical system’s 
failure conditions per the origins of safety objectives as detailed in AC 23.1309 [87]. 
 The following Risk Acceptance Criteria is primarily for the Operator but can be used for the DO as 
the Risk Matrix has the same classifications. 
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Accident Risk 
Classification 
Accident Risk Acceptance and Authorisation Criteria 
A 
 
Unacceptable 
B Undesirable but may be tolerable with the authorisation of the Spacecraft Operator’s 
President/Company Board 
C 
 
Tolerable. Acceptable with the authorisation of the Safety Panel 
D 
 
Broadly acceptable 
Table 20: Proposed Risk Acceptability Criteria 
Operator Flight Safety Program;  
 Flight Safety Program. The Operator should implement a Flight Safety program 
based upon the Flight Operations and Quality Assurance (FOQA) program. This 
is standard ‘best practice’ and involves:  Risk Profiles. These should be based on severity as well as frequency of 
occurrences (these can be used to feed back into the Total System Approach 
mentioned above)  Occurrence Reporting System; The occurrence reporting system for operators 
needs to be considered and detailed within the SMP and includes;  
o Air Safety Reports – these are standards reports within a Mandatory 
Occurrence Reporting scheme. In addition this form may have to be adjusted 
for the suborbital domain. This is noted as a recommendation at 6.4.9 
o Health & Safety Reports – these are also standard reports for incidents 
occurred on the ground. Any injuries or accidents in flight should have an 
occurrence report (as above) in the first instance and then this can be reported 
in terms of health and safety  As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The FAA guidance [18] does not 
include ALARP methodology however it is recognised in the ANSI GEIA 
Standard (Best Practices for System Safety Development and Execution) [84] as 
well as in the UK.  European countries do not employ the ALARP process 
however countries do use similar processes: 
o France: Globalement Au Moins Aussi Bon (GAMAB) [73] 
This is whereby a new system must offer a level of risk globally as least as 
good as the one offered by any equivalent existing system 
o Germany: Minimum Endogenous Mortality (Rm), (MEM) [74] 
This is hazards due to a new system should not significantly augment Rm 
(equal to 2.10-4 fatalities/person year) 
 Operational and Maintenance Considerations:  Operational Considerations:   The main aspect covered in the EASA SoA Policy is in terms of Flight Crew 
Licensing (FCL)  Maintenance Considerations:   The main aspect covered in the EASA SoA Policy will be in the guidance 
material (section 3.3) 
In essence Reducing Risk is a common goal in safety management terms and one that should be 
applied at the Accident level i.e. for Operators; Design Organisations should continue to apply ‘safe 
design’ principles and adopt the safety precedence sequence in order to meet their safety targets (and 
implicit safety objectives). It is considered that due to the different approaches throughout Europe that 
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the ALARP process shall not be included in the EASA SoA Policy but will be included in the 
‘Exemplar Safety Model’ in Section 3.4.9. It is discussed here as Operators should be reminded that 
they should employ a process whereby they (along with the DO) can demonstrate (by some form of 
cost benefit analysis or similar) that the Risks have been reduced as far as possible; Operators should 
bear in mind that they would have to produce this as evidence in a court if an accident occurred.  
 Supplemental Considerations Conclusion 3.3.3
The aim of this section was to provide more detailed guidelines for EASA to consider as supplemental 
information to support the SoA Policy for both Design Organisations and Operators alike. The section 
provided explicit severity and probability classifications that would be suitable for DOs and Operators 
and therefore they would use the same metrics within a contiguous safety model. These categories 
then formed the basis for the Risk Matrix and Risk Acceptance criterion. To assist the Operators 
specific Accident Lists were derived based on ICAO standards such that they could continue the 
accident sequence analysis from the DO through to the concluding accident risks. 
The rationale for having these guidelines is to standardise the baseline safety management system 
components such as Safety Requirements, Safety Targets (and derived safety objectives) and specific, 
recognised Accidents to which Operators can manage their ‘recovery barriers’ leading on from the 
standard failure conditions and hazardous state. 
It is concluded that a contiguous safety approach can only be achieved by using common metrics and 
this is not currently adopted in aviation. The EASA SoA Policy supplemental guidelines can provide 
this information to assist the nascent suborbital designers and operators in effectively managing the 
airworthiness and safety of the SoA ‘Total System’. The designers should adopt the safety target 
approach (with implicit safety objectives) as detailed in Table 17 and the operators should adopt the 
Total System approach as detailed in Table 19. The aim for the operators is then to demonstrate that 
the Accident Risks are reduced and managed by the use of operating procedures, training and 
limitations as controls such the Total System Risk (per severity) also meets the safety target and 
maintains this throughout the life of the system.
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 EXEMPLAR SAFETY MODEL – SPACEFLIGHT OR AVIATION 3.4.
The review sections in Chapter Two highlighted ‘best practice’ Safety Management Systems and 
activities and also highlighted some weaknesses (gaps) in both the emerging spaceflight safety 
methodology and also in the extant aviation-based methodology. The review concluded that the ‘best 
practice’ guidelines were bespoke to Design Organisations or to Operators; there was no cohesive 
approach that could take the base events of the DO analysis (FMECA data) right through the accident 
sequence to the Operator Safety Risk Management and fed back into the FMECA data to close the 
loop. This section proposes a ‘World Class Safety Model’ that is generic enough to be considered for 
both the emerging spaceflight industry (orbital or Suborbital) and also for the aviation industry; 
arguably it can also be applied to other Industries where a complex system exists. 
  Exemplar Safety Model – Cohesive Approach 3.4.1
The current status of analytical approach is considered to be bespoke and this is corroborated by a 
lack of ‘integrated’ guidance material. Figure 42 below depicts the current status.  
 
Figure 42: Author’s depiction of current safety analysis 
To achieve an integrated approach based on the current system requires the DO and Operator to 
engage more closely so that a closed loop system may be implemented. Figure 43 below shows the 
relationship that should be considered as standard between the DO and Operator; however as clearly 
demonstrated in the Case Study at section 3.4.7 this is not the industry standard practice as yet. 
Moreover, the Operator is not involved in other DO safety activities such as HMI, Systems and Safety 
Engineering and other useful analysis such as the OHHA and OSHA activities; these latter two in 
particular are especially relevant to the Operator’s hazards as it involves the effects to and caused by 
the ‘front-line’ pilots and support personnel. Figure 44 depicts these separate activities and these 
bespoke activities were indeed the ‘norm’ on a project that the author has recently been involved with. 
These activities are, in their own right, extremely important however they are all inextricably linked 
and more emphasis should be placed on an integrated approach.  
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Figure 43: Ideal depiction of safety analysis 
 
Figure 44: Current aerospace program that the author was involved in (also previous working model for NASA as 
presented at the 4th IAASS conference) 
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Figure 45: Proposed Integrated Design, Certification and Safety Model for new projects in the Spaceflight and 
Aviation domains 
Figure 45 is the proposed approach for the suborbital spaceflight domain (and arguably should be 
applied to all aerospace projects). The approach is that the three main domains (Safety/HMI and 
Design) should be represented at all meetings in the suborbital airplane design and development 
lifecycle including the concept, assessment, design, manufacture, test phase through to operations and 
disposal. 
Additionally Operators should be involved at the outset because they will be able to participate in 
setting ‘User Requirements’. Then arguably the Operator community (including pilots and safety 
manager) should be involved at meetings throughout the project and in particular HMI working 
groups. In terms of safety management and systems safety engineering, Operators (especially pilots) 
will be able to contribute towards verification and validation of Fault Trees and in particular in getting 
the accident sequence correct.  
  Exemplar Safety Model – The Amplified Accident Sequence 3.4.2
The following figure represents a standard ‘Accident Sequence’. This is a simplistic representation 
and one that includes the consequence (or harm). When considering the basic sequence it becomes 
clear that it does not represent what the DO achieves (in terms of safety analysis) and it also does not 
achieve what the Operator does (in terms of managing the operating risks i.e. an Operator’s cause may 
actually be a DOs hazard). As was concluded in the review phase (2.2.17) there is currently no 
‘joined-up’ approach and this was the initial starting point for introducing a new safety model. 
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Figure 46: Standard Accident Sequence 
 Exemplar Safety Model - Construct 3.4.3
The ‘SATURN SAFETY MODEL’ attempts to provide a cohesive, full circle sequence that apportions 
responsibility at the right point and enables Designers and Operators to use the same construct as 
opposed to current disparate ‘best practice’. The model takes cognisance of the best practice 
guidelines for DOs and Operators and of other theoretical models attempts at providing solutions in 
the Operator domain. Examples of the best practice and ‘other’ references include: 
 ARP 4761 (for DOs)  ARP 4754 (for DOs)  ARP 5150 (for Operators)  FAA System Safety Handbook (for DOs)  FAA-AST documents (for launch license operators – this can also mean the 
designer who is test flying the vehicle under an experimental permit)  EASA ‘ARMS’ (for Airline Operators) 
The SATURN SAFETY MODEL’ aims to provide clarity and ease of transition to useful tools such as 
simple Event Trees and spread-sheets to assist Operators and finally an effective hazard log tool. 
 Introducing ‘Key (Platform) Hazards’ 3.4.4
The SATURN SAFETY MODEL is derived from understanding the boundaries of the Design 
Organisation safety analysis and the boundaries of the Operator Safety Risk Management. In Figure 
47 below a diagonal line has been inserted to show the boundary between the two functions. From this 
it is clear to see that the DO is responsible up to the Failure Condition (in order to demonstrate that 
the airworthiness meets the certification criteria [safety objectives]). The review in Chapter two 
(2.2.10) detailed that the Operator then undertakes bespoke Risk Assessments and hence the sequence 
of events (the accident sequence) is not a contiguous representation of causal factor to accident 
scenario. Although during a subsequent review a ‘prime hazard’ term was identified in GAIN’s 
Operator’s Flight Safety Handbook [33] Appendix E; here the prime hazard was used in an accident 
sequence that started with ‘initiating hazards’ and then followed by contributory hazards. Although 
the sequence was not well constructed and the three levels of hazard slightly confusing the intent of 
having a prime hazard was noted. This was used in an accident sequence example but not further 
explained and so there is no further reference to this within the main part of the document. 
The SATURN SAFETY MODEL construct joins the two disparate safety analyses by means of a ‘Key 
(Platform) Hazard’ (depicted as KH in the Operator analysis part). This is the author’s initiative and 
represents a higher-level ‘platform’ (aircraft/spacecraft) event.  
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Figure 47 below shows the SATURN SAFETY MODEL construct in simplistic form. 
  
Figure 47: Exemplar Safety Model: DO analysis using Fault Trees up to the Hazard (failure condition), then 
Operator analysis encompassing Aircraft level Fault Tree and Event Tree, following on to Safety Risk Management 
and feedback to the base events of the Fault Tree (FMECA data updates) 
The Key (Platform) Hazard is derived from the higher-level ‘blocks’ of a typical FHA’s Functional 
Block Diagram (FBD). Figure 50 below represents an exemplar FBD to determine the key 
aircraft/spacecraft functions; this can then become useful in determining higher level Key (Platform) 
Hazards i.e. when a hazardous state truly exists in that moment of time within the sequence. In 
essence should a failure condition exist then this does not immediately (in most cases) lead to an 
accident as there may be standard procedural pilot cross-checks that would apply. However should the 
pilot cross-checks (and training) fail, then a hazardous state will now be present; even then, the 
following sequence could have an emergency drill and/or training to compensate for the hazardous 
state in order to prevent the accident. So, in order to be explicit in an accident sequence it is necessary 
to split the analysis accordingly as in Figure 47 (DO Failure Condition Analysis & Operator Safety 
Risk Analysis).  
It is worth restating the definition of a failure condition: 
“A condition having an effect on either the airplane or its occupants, or both, 
either direct or consequential which is caused or contributed to by one or 
more failures or errors considering flight phase and relevant adverse 
operational or environmental conditions or external events” 
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The definition implies that failures or errors (causes) contribute to a failure effect (the failure 
condition) which relates to the specific phase of flight within environmental context (exposure for say 
flying in IMC) that impact on the aircraft (the consequence of the failure condition i.e. catastrophic, 
hazardous etc.). 
Therefore the failure condition (system based hazard) sits at the boundary of the system and interacts 
with the aircraft boundary with predetermined consequences as depicted in Figure 48 below: 
 
Figure 48: Boundary of Failure Condition to Aircraft Level Key (Platform) Hazards 
In Figure 48 we can see that a failure condition (FC) such as ‘misleading altimeter’ (determined as a 
catastrophic FC meeting 1x10-9 pfh) in itself does not at that moment constitute a hazardous state; it 
becomes consequentially a hazardous state (key (platform) hazard) when the flight path changes and 
if the warnings and pilots actions fail to correct the condition. Even then to result in a catastrophic 
accident would require the aircraft to be near the ground or another aircraft and then still the 
avoidance system would have to fail or pilot once again not reacting in time. Let us also consider the 
‘loss of altimeter’ case which is deemed to be a hazardous FC (meeting 1x10-7 pfh): in this instance 
the safety margins are reduced and this may lead to a hazardous state per the ‘misleading’ scenario 
above; in the explicit SATURN SAFETY MODEL we would then link this to a Safety Significant 
Event (SSE) of Near CFIT and Near MAC (see Table 13) via a Key (Platform) Hazard (the hazardous 
state). However one could argue that this event could also lead to a catastrophic event though by its 
probability classification it is two orders of magnitude less likely to result in a catastrophic event. 
Here we have found that the FAA/EASA FHA criterion is one-dimensional in the FC to Severity 
relationship and that a designer could simply model his analysis (by FTA) for each case i.e. a FTA for 
misleading altimeter to meet 1x10-9 pfh for the catastrophic scenario and a separate FTA for loss of 
altimeter to meet 1x10-7 pfh for the hazardous scenario. 
However the SATURN SAFETY MODEL contends that by explicitly continuing the sequence via Key 
(Platform) Hazards up to and beyond the actual accident then it can be proven that the lower severity 
FCs could be linked via the appropriate Key (Platform) Hazards to its designated severity accident 
Aircraft Level 
Boundary and Key 
Hazards (the 
hazardous state) 
System N1  
System N2 
Causes (red circles) 
functional flow path 
(inner arrows) to FC at 
System boundaries 
Failure Condition 
(FC) Boundary 
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and also the higher severity accident; this would have to be modelled correctly and the analyst would 
ask the questions ‘what is the worst possible outcome’ and ‘what is most credible outcome’; then it is 
a matter of choice as to whether both should be included in the analysis and whether this is practicable 
and manageable. Figure 49 below details the linking of FCs to Key (Platform) Hazards to either 
Accidents (Table 12) or Safety Significant Events (Table 13) – note; controls are not shown: 
 
Figure 49: Accident sequence depicting Failure Conditions to Key (Platform) Hazards to Accidents/Safety Significant 
Events  
To continue the supposition regarding lesser severity classifications per failure condition one could 
argue the following: 
Catastrophic FC = 10-9 pfh (target) x 1 (implicit in definition) = 10-9 pfh “Catastrophic severity” 
Hazardous FC = 10-7 pfh (target) x 10-2 (implicit in definition) = 10-9 pfh “Catastrophic severity”    
Major FC = 10-5 pfh (target) x 10-4 (implicit in definition) = 10-9 pfh “Catastrophic severity” 
Minor FC = 10-3 pfh (target) x 10-6 (implicit in definition) = 10-9 pfh “Catastrophic severity”        
The above simply states that it is less likely (6 orders of magnitude) that a Minor FC would result in a 
catastrophic severity scenario and therefore this is why the FCs have a derived severity attached to 
them; however when the sequence is explicitly detailed as in the SATURN SAFETY MODEL the case 
could be argued for a hazardous FC resulting in not only a hazardous SSE but also a catastrophic 
accident as depicted in Figure 49; the rationale is that this is within 2 orders of magnitude and could 
be deemed credible. 
The Key (Platform) Hazards are the linking mechanism as these are a component of the aircraft level 
boundary whereas the FC boundary is still at the system-based level; it is recognised that a system 
may comprise redundancy i.e. separate display systems supplied from separate sources and have 
additional safety features as controls but still belong to the misleading altitude FC. 
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Figure 50: Exemplar Suborbital Spaceflight Functional Block Diagram 1st Level (light blue - Key (Platform) Hazards derived from here) & 2nd Level (Failure conditions) 
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In order to illustrate the process, the function ‘To Provide Thrust’ will be examined in terms of a 
simple FHA approach. Table 21 below contains the results of the high-level FHA. Where the function 
was deemed to be more suited to a lower-level function this is detailed as ‘N/A’ (not applicable – 
more suited to System-level functional failure condition). 
Function Failure Mode Functional 
Failure 
Effect Classification Key (Platform) 
Hazard (KH) or 
Lower-level Failure 
Condition 
Provide 
Rocket 
propulsion 
 
No Loss of 
Propulsion 
Rocket stops 
producing propulsion 
Hazardous Lower-Level Failure 
Condition leading to 
KH of ‘Recoverable’ 
Loss of propulsion  
(SSE) Irrecoverable 
Loss of propulsion 
(Accident) 
Too much Power-plant 
runaway 
Rocket produces too 
much propulsion with 
possible explosion 
Hazardous-
Catastrophic 
Lower-Level Failure 
Condition 
Too Little Insufficient 
propulsion 
Rocket produces 
insufficient 
propulsion to 
complete ascent 
Hazardous As per first line above  
Un-commanded 
(provided when 
not required) 
Un-commanded 
propulsion 
Propulsion provided 
when not required 
which can lead to loss 
of control 
Hazardous-
Catastrophic 
KH = Loss of 
Propulsive Control 
Incorrect  Abnormal Thrust 
Vector 
Propulsion provides 
abnormal vector 
leading to loss of 
control 
Hazardous-
Catastrophic 
KH = Loss of 
Propulsive Control 
Uncontained Uncontained 
rocket propulsion 
Rocket combustion or 
propulsion not 
contained leading to 
explosion 
Catastrophic KH = Uncontained 
fire/explosion 
Table 21: Exemplar FHA – also used to determine Key (Platform) Hazards 
In terms of the SATURN SAFETY MODEL at Figure 49, the Key (Platform) Hazard following on 
from the Failure Condition i.e. Misleading Altitude  Failure Condition) leads to Undetected Vertical 
Position Error (Key (Platform) Hazard). The Operator analysis takes up the safety analysis from the 
Failure Condition and therefore the Operator is responsible for assessing the Risk of an Accident (or 
Serious Incident) occurring and applying suitable mitigation. In this instance to prevent the 
Misleading Altitude Display becoming a platform-level hazardous event (the wrong place at the 
wrong time for instance) i.e. Undetected vertical Position Error , the Operator can instigate a 
procedural control that ensures the pilots cross-check their instruments with alternate sources. The 
rationale is that the Failure Condition Misleading Altitude Display does not directly lead to an 
Accident; it requires other factors to be present in the accident sequence and one of those is the direct 
input of the pilot. 
  Exemplar Safety Model – Design Organisation Analysis 3.4.5
The DO analysis begins at the Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) derived from the initial safety 
requirements and preliminary hazard identification activity. Then as part of the analysis process FTAs 
are produced for each system and sub-system culminating in the Failure Condition as the top event. 
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3.4.5.1 DO Level Fault Trees 
The DO level FTA is necessary to demonstrate compliance to certification requirements i.e. that a 
catastrophic failure condition has met the safety objective of 1x10-9 per flying hour (for Part 25 
aircraft) and that hazardous FCs have met their safety objective of 1x10-7 per flying hour 
For SoA the guidelines should detail the necessity for DOs to provide Fault Trees as part of their 
safety analysis to demonstrate compliance to safety objectives. Within Figure 47 it is clear to see that 
the DO analysis required is to use Fault Trees to determine the failure condition’s probability. A Fault 
Tree is required for each identified failure condition and the DO should be mindful of the overall 
Safety Target that the safety objectives are derived from; indeed for a Safety Target approach the 100 
catastrophic FCs should be summed to determine whether the safety target has been achieved; within 
the FTA tool the DO will need to provide the separate FC Fault Trees in the combined library and 
then link the events to the top gate i.e. called ‘catastrophic safety rate achieved’ or similar. The same 
must then be carried out for the hazardous and major FCs.  
Exposure Factors 
The use of Exposure Factors is essential within the Design Safety Analysis as this can then more 
accurately reflect the nature of the failure condition and therefore its contribution towards the 
accident. Figure 51 below shows an exemplar Fault Tree construct for the Failure Condition ‘Engine 
(rocket) Explosion’ incorporating the exposure factor (X-FACTOR) for the rocket phase; in  this 
instance the X-FACTOR has been set to 90 seconds of a 1-hour flight. As can be seen this has a 
positive effect on the probability of the engine explosion in the sequence and this will assist the DO in 
attempting to meet the required safety objectives or safety target. 
Special Conditions (SC) may have to be applied for SoA in that it is widely known that typical 
‘rockets’ achieve in the order of 1x10-4 per flying hour failure rate. This is why that it is so important 
to model the exposure factor (time for rocket burn) into the FTA. As the catastrophic safety objective 
(for example 1x10-8 per flying hour) will not be achieved then this will have to be declared by the DO 
to the authority i.e. EASA. However, the next step is for the DO to be able to (in the first instance) 
demonstrate that the ‘trade-off’ between other well-proven systems (such as the landing gear) will 
have more than met their safety objective and so the overall Safety Target (for Loss i.e. catastrophic) 
is still met. Should this not be the case then the DO must discuss with the Operator to take credit for 
some of the Operator Risk Reduction measures such as Limitations and Operating Procedures; these 
will bring the probability down to a ‘Tolerable’ level to allow for certification. 
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Figure 51: Example use of FTA with the Exposure Factor ANDed 
  Exemplar Safety Model – Operator Safety Risk Management 3.4.6
The review of Operator Safety Risk Management highlighted shortcomings in that Risk Management 
was conducted on an occurrence-based need i.e. based on the highest number of occurrences in the 
FOQA Risk Profile chart. In order to be more effective and understand the spacecraft/aircraft 
Individual Risks (per Accident or SSE) and also the Total Risk, Operators need to undertake high-
level safety analysis using both prospective and retrospective and diverse techniques. The proposed 
technique is using a combination of Fault Tree or Event Tree Analysis and by managing the failure of 
controls (based on occurrences/Air Safety Reports): 
Aircraft Level Fault Tree 
The aircraft (SoA) level FTA contains the consolidated failure conditions (presented by the DO) and 
provides the ability to display (on separate Fault Trees) the sum of; 
 catastrophic failure conditions   hazardous failure conditions  major failure conditions 
These top gates in these Fault Trees can then arguably be summed (presuming independence) to arrive 
at the Total System Risk (Section 3.4.10). However it is also important to be able to show the 
catastrophic Accident FTAs only in order to demonstrate compliance to the design Safety Target (for 
Loss of the platform) for certification. 
Aircraft Level Event Tree 
The above FTAs created by the DO were summed to determine whether the safety targets had been 
achieved. That is the first step towards certification within an EASA regulatory framework. Then the 
Operator continues the sequence via Key (Platform) Hazards to the accident and beyond 
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(consequences). This can be done using FTA or using an Event Tree Analysis (ETA). The aircraft 
(SoA) level ETA takes the DO failure condition title as the ‘initiating event’ and models the controls 
(and failures thereof) to verify the accident probabilities and also to identify further controls 
(including post-crash/post event controls). 
Human Error Controls 
Credit can be taken for Pilot Procedural aspects, however this must not be taken as credit within the 
DO FTA; instead this should be applied as controls within the Operator FTA/ETA (see section 3.4.6.3 
below). 
3.4.6.1 Safety Risk Management 
As opposed to the EASA ‘ARMS’ tool, which has an Event Risk Classification using a bespoke risk 
classification scheme and then another Safety Issues risk assessment scheme, the SATURN SAFETY 
MODEL focuses on the combined Safety Risk (stemming from a failure condition/hazard) and also 
provides a step to examine the control(s) that failed; the ARMS tool discounts those controls that 
failed and concentrates on those that were (likely) to be successful. Additionally the methodology is 
based on sectors. There are problems with this approach: the first is the use of sectors as this does not 
correlate to flight hours; the second is that the estimations may not be conservative enough (as they do 
not relate to human error analysis) and therefore the resultant ‘risk’ may be biased towards a lower 
value hence hiding the real risk. Within the Event Risk Classification matrix the metrics have been 
derived from accident data and appear irrelevant and based on aircraft loss values. 
3.4.6.2 Managing Occurrences 
Managing occurrences is an essential part of Operator Safety Risk Management.   
When an event occurs and is reported (as an Aircraft Safety Report [ASR]) the Operator’s Safety 
Manager must log the occurrence and try to analyse it. This is part of their standard Flight Operations 
Quality Assurance (FOQA) system. This involves: 
 Identifying the Hazard  Logging it on their Risk Profile system  Undertaking risk assessments on those aspects that have the highest frequency 
(the top bars in the risk profile) or those with the highest severity; the aim would 
be to have a combined profile scheme combining frequency of the occurrence and 
the severity. 
Integrating Occurrences into the Safety Model 
Normally this is where the Operator stops (after conducting his Risk Assessment after identifying a 
‘high-hitter’ on the Risk Profile) and also the Design Organisation should then determine whether 
they have airworthiness issues (reliability issues with components/sub-systems) which may result in 
modification action; once they have addressed this then they invariably stop there as having done their 
part.  
The SATURN SAFETY MODEL requires the Operator Occurrence to be fed back into the Design 
Organisation analysis in order to determine whether the Contributing Cause (and hence Failure 
Condition) probability has increased which may in turn increase the likelihood of a Key (Platform) 
Hazard and in turn increase the likelihood of an Accident or SSE. This is the ‘Feedback System’ and 
needs a two-pronged approach as detailed in 3.4.6.3 below. 
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3.4.6.3 Exemplar Safety Model – Feedback System 
Feedback of SSE occurrences: These SSE occurrences are reported in the form of ASRs (and this is 
concurred as a best practice method of reporting) however additional information/action is required 
for the SATURN SAFETY MODEL: 
(a) Update to phase of flight to include: 
o Launch 
o Rocket Initiation 
o Space Segment 
o Re-entry from Space Segment 
o New Section in Air Safety Report to detail: 
o Control Failure; here the question is asked on which of the following 
failed; 
 Operator Procedure failure  Lack of Training/Experience in event  Limitation breached  Standby Equipment failure  Warning System failure 
o Contributory Causes; 
 Functional Failures – to the DO base events to back up/add to the 
FMECA data 
 Human Factors – to the Operator Safety Risk Management 
section of the Hazard Log 
As can be seen the ASR requires updating for the suborbital domain needs and to incorporate the 
suborbital flight phases and also to incorporate the analysis of failed controls and the 
equipment/human error causes of the event. This is captured in the recommendations section 6.4.9. 
3.4.6.4 Exemplar Safety Model – Analysis of Controls 
When an event occurs we must first examine the accident sequence to determine if the cause and 
hazard exists or whether the event is a new cause or hazard which needs to be entered into the hazard 
log and analysed further. Once this is achieved we can then determine the Controls within the accident 
sequence; both ‘Defence ‘A’ (avoidance barriers) and Defence ‘B’ (recovery barriers or Risk 
Reduction controls) as depicted in Figure 3; Haddon-Cave’s analysis of the Nimrod Accident.  
The key is to analyse which of the existing failed controls in the sequence i.e. to identify the control(s) 
that was not effective. To do this the analyst must first have defined the controls properly and in the 
hazard log these should be given a status i.e. implemented or if not implemented then perhaps 
‘active’. The controls are as per the fail safe design concept detailed in AC25.1309 [51]: 
 Eliminate the hazard  Reduce the likelihood  Reduce the severity  Implement safety features 
Chapter Three  Influence 
 
 
Page 153 of 300 
 
 Implement Warning Devices  Provide procedures  Provide Training 
In practical terms these can be grouped as follows: 
 Design control; the system design analysis should follow the fail-safe design 
philosophy and also identify safety-critical systems. In order to design a safe 
system and to meet failure condition’s safety objectives the designer will 
incorporate;  Redundancy  Hardware  Power Supplies  Sensors  Software  Procedural Control 
o Flight Crew 
o Maintenance/support  Training 
o Flight Crew 
o Maintenance/support  
Quantification of Operator Controls 
The review in 2.2.8.2 derived human error probabilities for operator-based controls from a 
comparison of human error probability methods and aligning it with Reason’s take on Rasmussen’s 
Skill-Rule-Knowledge Based performance levels: 
 Control measures for high Stress emergency situations = 2 x 10-1  Control measures for well-rehearsed procedures to prevent a hazardous situation  
= 5 x 10-2  Control measures for simple routine operations = 3 x 10-3 per flying hour  Training for normal procedures = 0 i.e. no additional credit  Emergency Training = 2 x 10-1 per flying hour based on the high stress situations  Limitation = = 1 x 10-2 per flying hour based on the general omission error where 
care is required or general error of supervision 
Additionally the review examined a Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) whereby the 
model re-classifies failures and ‘errors’ to variability in performance and encompasses an alternative 
approach to capture the dynamic nature of how events occur; to use resonance rather than failure. 
Within the model the man and machine are considered part of the system.  
Figure 52 below takes the basic construct of the model and tries to advance it in terms of defining the 
quality margins and span of control as specific human error rates. Here the modified FRAM suggests 
that the higher within the accident sequence the event occurs or the pilot enters a high stress situation 
due to external factors then the more likely he is to make a mistake when carrying out a procedural 
control.  
Additionally the model suggest that during nominal situations that external factors can also influence 
the performance of a pilot such as managerial (organisational) factors; in this instance the pilot may 
be more prone to errors during simple routine operations i.e. 3 x 10-3 per flying hour. 
The thick dotted line represents an accident sequence whereby the pilot errs during the simple routine 
operation and then this is amplified by other factors such as equipment failure and or environmental 
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aspects and it can be seen that this could lead to a stressful situation (as in the Air France AF447 
accident) whereby the resonance becomes out of control with possible loss of the aircraft.  
 
Figure 52: Modified Functional Resonance Accident Model –includes quantitative error rates 
Identification of Failed Controls 
The Safety Manager should be able to identify which of the controls has failed in the accident 
sequence and then be able to take appropriate action to try and prevent the occurrence happening 
again. 
Figure 53 below details the different types of control in specific order within the proposed Safety 
Model; the model integrates the Fault Tree Analysis approach (to determine failure condition 
probabilities) with an Event Tree Analysis approach (to determine the operator-based controls and 
their effectiveness). The controls should then been given a probability of success (and failure) in the 
Event Tree Analysis based on the strength of the control in preventing an accident and in line with the 
quantitative values for human error described above: 
 Preventative controls (avoidance barriers) i.e. design-related up to the failure 
condition;  C1 – Standby Displays (for instance); these have probability values within the 
DO Fault Trees and therefore credit is taken towards the Failure Condition’s 
probability  Recovery controls i.e. procedures and training and limitations – but also some 
design controls LHWS/TCAS  C2 – Pilot cross check of instruments; measures for simple routine operations = 3 
x 10-3per flying hour  C3 – Pilots trained to conduct cross checks and interpret results to make informed 
decisions = 0 (no additional credit)  C4 – Design control immediately before accident such as a collision avoidance 
system or stall warning and assisted recovery system = probability based on 
reliability of equipment  C5 – Emergency drill = 2 x 10-1  C6 – Emergency training for the immediate action drills = 2 x 10-1  C7 – Limitation = 1 x 10-2 per flying hour based on the general omission error 
where care is required or general error of supervision  
Chapter Three  Influence 
 
 
Page 155 of 300 
 
Within the Operator’s Event Tree Analysis the initiating event would be the Failure Condition and 
this has a known probability.  
 
Figure 53: Accident Sequence showing specific controls (design, procedural, training and limitation) 
From the sequence in Figure 53 we can see that in order for an accident to occur would require the 
prime equipment (system) to fail, failure of the operating procedures (to use the design [redundancy] 
control) which then leads to the Key (Platform) Hazard (hazardous state) and finally failure of any 
emergency procedures, lack of training and/or breach of any limitations. This was explained earlier in 
a ‘step-through’ of a sequence by ‘failing’ various equipment and controls as was postulated in the 
Air France AF447 accident. As well as identifying quantitative probabilities for human error as 
described previously and linking these to variables in performance (modified FRAM above) it is 
considered necessary to provide these with a weighting scheme in order to quantify the priority of the 
safety precedence sequence and the operator-based controls. These Risk Reduction methods (controls) 
are an important part of the ALARP evaluation. 
As detailed above, section 2.2.4 suggests that the OSHA activity is one method that addresses 
operating and support procedures. The OSHA model should provide a sequence of activities to 
analyse; it is up to the analyst how far back and how far forward he goes (from the actual flight) when 
analysing the procedures.  From the author’s knowledge of working with a Design Organisation, they 
were only interested in analysing the equipment specific elements of the OSHA sequence model. It is 
hypothesised that the Operators would also only be interested in their Operating procedures and 
likewise the Support Services (including maintenance) would only be interested in their Support 
procedures.  
In the ‘Swiss-Cheese’ model below, we are analysing the ‘Controls’ (the barriers or defences in 
depth) from the design aspect through to the operations and support aspects; the rationale is that the 
author wanted to focus on the Safety Model boundaries. In Section 6.4 a recommendation is made for 
future research into extending the boundaries of the Safety Model to include OSHA sequences that go 
beyond the immediate aircraft Risks by analysing the other engineering and managerial 
(Organisational) support aspects; these are the Socio-Theoretical aspects in Leverson’s STAMP 
model [36] as described in 2.2.6.4. 
In the model below we are looking for BOTH ‘Latent and Active’ failures by employing the OSHA 
technique.  
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Figure 54: Spaceflight Accident Sequence with ‘Active & ‘Latent’ failures 
Integrated Approach Analysis 
The SATURN SAFETY MODEL links the DO failure conditions/hazards to the Operator Safety Risks 
in order to have an explicit and integrated sequence of events that can be managed more effectively. 
The following example step-through shows how the various controls interact (DO controls and 
Operator controls) in an attempt to assure safety of the SoA/spacecraft: 
(a) Risk of Accident with all systems working; 
1. Prime System ‘Serviceable (‘S’) – 1x10-4 
2. Standby System ‘S’ – 1x10-4 (this is a Design control) 
3. Exposure Factor (if applicable) – 1x10-1 
4. Current Status of Total System = 1x10-9 pfh (catastrophic failure condition 
reached for Part 25 aircraft) 
5. Operating Procedure (normal) control (pilot) – 3x10-3 (failure rate for human 
error under normal well practised drill) 
6. Training (normal) control – set to 0 (implicit within a normal procedure)  
7. Current Operator Risk of Accident = 3x10-12 per flying hour 
 Now we will see the effect of a prime system failure; 
 Risk of Accident with; 
1. Prime System ‘Un-Serviceable (‘U/S’) – 0 
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2. Standby System ‘S’ – 1x10-4 (this is a Design control) 
3. Exposure Factor (if applicable) – 1x10-1 
4. Operating Procedure (normal) control (pilot) – 3x10-3 
5. Training (normal) control – set to 0 (implicit within a normal procedure) 
6. Updated Status with unserviceable prime item = 3 x10-8 pfh (catastrophic 
failure condition for Part 25 aircraft now breached but operating procedures 
AND training are in effect and credit is taken, therefore the aircraft is still 
safe i.e. the likelihood of a catastrophic Accident is still ‘extremely remote’ 
even with a primary system failure and a successful normal drill carried out)  Risk of Accident with prime system failed and the first levels of recovery controls 
failed i.e. the pilots did not carry out the normal operating procedure (per the 
AF447 accident [see case study summary at section 3.4.7]); 
1. Prime System ‘Un-Serviceable (‘U/S’) – 0 
2. Standby System ‘S’ – 1x10-4 (this is a Design control) 
3. Exposure Factor (if applicable) – 1x10-1 
4. Operating Procedure (emergency) control (pilot) – 2 x 10-1 (failure rate for 
human error under emergency drill) 
5. Training (emergency) control – 2 x 10-1 (author’s considered engineering 
judgement for credit to be taken for training)  
6. Updated Status = 4 x10-7 pfh (catastrophic failure condition for Part 25 
aircraft now further breached but emergency operating procedures AND 
emergency training are in effect and credit is taken (in the negative sense for 
a Loss Model), therefore the aircraft is still safe i.e. the likelihood of a 
catastrophic Accident is still ‘extremely remote’ even with a primary system 
failure)  Risk of Accident with prime system failed and second levels of recovery controls 
failed i.e. the pilots did not carry out the emergency/operating procedures/training 
(per the AF447 accident [see case study summary at section 3.4.7]); ; 
1. Prime System ‘Un-Serviceable (‘U/S’) – 0 
2. Standby System ‘S’ – 1x10-4 (this is a Design control); arguably in this 
instance (AF447) a design control was the ‘stall’ system which worked but 
the pilots did not apply the appropriate technique 
3. Exposure Factor (if applicable) – 1x10-1 
4. Operating Procedure (emergency) control (pilot) – set to 0 no credit taken 
5. Training (emergency) control – set to 0 no credit taken 
6. Updated Status = 1 x10-5 pfh (catastrophic failure condition for Part 25 is now 
considered to be probable), therefore the aircraft is not safe and in terms of 
Risk Acceptance the situation is ‘Unacceptable’. 
The relevance of the above sequences and explicit realisation of the emerging situation is often not 
considered because of the disparate safety analysis i.e. the DO tends to stop at the failure condition 
(having met the safety objective) and the operator does not know the risk probability of the continued 
sequence with operator controls. When broken down in this manner it is clear that an unacceptable 
Risk is derived and hence the controls should be strengthened or new controls implemented (such as 
Limitations). 
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Figure 55: Saturn Safety Model – Generic Sequence detailing Design Controls & Operator Controls with Key 
(Platform) Hazard Introduced 
3.4.6.5 Exemplar Safety Model – Strengthening & Implementing Controls to Reduce Risk 
When an occurrence is considered a Safety Significant Event (SSE) then arguably the associated 
Accident Risk may have increased. Operators (and DOs) should then work to try and reduce the Risk 
and to ensure that a failed control is strengthened or a different control is implemented as required. 
The safety model at Figure 55 depicts the accident sequence helps to map out the barrier controls 
versus the recovery controls. 
 STEP 1: IDENTIFICATION OF FAILED CONTROL(S): analyse the Air Safety 
Report  and note;  Causes; it is important to analyse the described ‘event and cause’ section of the 
ASR   
Equipment – if the prime equipment failed did the back-up work? 
Human – note if the equipment was working and the cause was due to the 
pilot (determine if this is a general lack of skill or actually a skill-based 
failure i.e. the procedure was not followed correctly); in the latter case note 
this as a failed control 
Environmental – note if external factors played a part such as icing, wind-
shear etc.  Controls; list the design and operator controls in  a logical order 
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List the Limitations  
Once this causes and controls are listed then the safety manager (with the assistance of a 
pilot) can examine and pinpoint which control(s) failed i.e. if a fault is enunciated to the 
pilot did he follow the correct procedures. 
Additionally could a Limitation been implemented i.e. in the case of the Air France 
AF447  accident had a Limitation been imposed (of not flying through icing conditions or 
not flying at altitudes with super-cooled icing conditions – thus resulting in extra fuel 
required) then the accident would not have occurred.  
 STEP 2: STRENGTHENING OF FAILED CONTROL(S); once the failed 
controls are identified from Step 1 above the safety manager and pilot should 
determine whether any of these need strengthening as follows;  Design: 
Improve the reliability of the standby system equipment 
Implement a new safety features 
Implement a new warning device  Operator controls: 
Amend or re-brief normal procedures 
Amend the specific training or ensure pilots are trained more often 
Amend or re-brief emergency procedures 
Amend the emergency training or ensure pilots are trained more often 
Add a Limitation or change and re-brief the existing Limitation 
  STEP 3: SHOW THIS ON THE WATERFALL DIAGRAM; the safety manager 
should detail the existing risk and the resultant risk for each stage of 
strengthening the controls (this may need to be shown over time because 
procedural controls can be managed/implemented quickly but design changes 
take time) 
  STEP 4: DOCUMENT THIS IN THE HAZARD LOG; the safety manager 
should record the above in the hazard log and determine whether the accident 
probability has changed as a result of the failed equipment, failed controls and the 
introduction of any new or improved controls. 
A Waterfall diagram can be useful to show the existing level of Risk followed by the Risk as a result 
of a serious event. Then the proposed Risk reduction is detailed over an appropriate timescale. 
Figure 56 shows a tolerable level of risk (say for an individual accident of Loss of Control) and a new 
risk being identified i.e. a pitot-tube issue. A design organisation would initiate a Service Bulletin due 
to the fault but where does that leave the operator (instantaneously) in terms of risk? The designer 
normally gives a time period for implementing the SB but in the case of Air France AF447 they were 
still flying ten days after the issue of the SB (to change the pitot-tubes). The operator should have 
reviewed the previous occurrences in a ‘Hazard Review Board’ with the safety manager, chief pilot 
and design representative as a minimum. Then they could have used ‘steps 1 and 2’ above and 
identified the following control failures: 
 Design Control failures: 
Redundant system failures – design organisation issued pitot-tubes  Operator Control failures 
Chapter Three  Influence 
 
 
Page 160 of 300 
 
Amend or re-brief normal procedures (this has now been done by Air France) 
Amend the specific training or ensure pilots are trained more often (this has now 
been done by Air France) 
Amend or re-brief emergency procedures (this has now been done by Air France) 
Amend the emergency training or ensure pilots are trained more often (this has 
now been done by Air France) 
Add a Limitation – this was not done and is not required now because the design 
control has effectively reduced the risk 
These could be plotted on the Waterfall diagram to show proactive safety management in dealing with 
the risk whilst awaiting the design to be fully implemented (across the fleet). 
 
Figure 56: Typical UK MoD Project Team Safety Risk ‘Waterfall’ diagram depicting the change in Risk due to a 
Safety Significant Event and subsequent mitigation strategies 
 Case Studies 3.4.7
To illustrate the reasoning for such a strategy the Air France flight AF447 & Space Shuttles 
Challenger & Columbia disasters are examined from the ‘Saturn Safety Model’ perspective and 
presented at Appendices 3 & 4 respectively. 
3.4.7.1 Case Study Summary – Air France Flight AF447 Disaster 
On 01 June 2009, Air France (AF) Flight 447 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean en-route from Brazil to 
France. The Accident is still ‘Under Investigation’ because the Accident Data Recorder (the black 
box) has yet to be found. This case study builds on the current facts that are known from the BEA 
Interim Reports No.2 [91] and No.3 [92]. 
The Case Study of the AF447 disaster is representative of the disconnect that exists between Design 
Organisations and Airline Operators. The author acknowledges that they do communicate, particularly 
in the form of Service Bulletins (SB) when a Safety Significant Event (Serious Incident) requires 
changes to design or procedural/maintenance inspection strategies (as per the TWA flight 800 that 
resulted in Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 requirements and subsequent SBs). 
The Case Study shows that previous Serious Incidents (from the Automatic Communication 
Addressing and Reporting System [ACARS]) resulted in SBs concerning a new design for the pitot-
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tubes yet Air France were still flying aircraft with the standard pitot-tubes; the issues highlighted in 
the Case Study include: 
 Known Issues 
o ACARS – previous flights etc. 
o SBs raised, some Operators implemented others not (Cost versus Safety? i.e. 
to cancel cross-Atlantic flights would be costly and this may have been a 
factor in the management’s decision to keep flying) 
o AF447 – ACARS and flight crew not experienced/trained; the Captain was on 
a rest period and two co-pilots were flying  Complacency 
o Management is terms of lack of urgency towards SB 
o Flight Crew procedures and training; Examination of their last training 
records and check rides made it clear that the co-pilots had not been trained 
for manual airplane handling of approach to stall and stall recovery at high 
altitude [92]   Lack of (Safety) Risk Management 
o No mitigation undertaken by Air France  Training – simulator training for Unreliable IAS should have been 
carried out immediately on receipt of the SB and formal analysis by 
the Air France Safety Manager  Procedures; the Chief Pilot should have revised the procedures for 
Unreliable IAS   Limitation; limitations should have been imposed on Transatlantic 
flights;  Flights limited to <31,000ft (FL310) or that determined not 
to be susceptible to super-cooled conditions – this would 
mean carrying extra fuel/less payload  Flights in or near Cumulonimbus clouds forbidden – once 
again this may mean carrying extra fuel to divert around 
these clouds (on the night other aircraft diverted up to 90 
miles around these sort of clouds in the area)  
In essence, by using a properly constructed ‘Safety Model’ and using an ALARP Evaluation process, 
the Operator should clearly understand the Accident Risks presented by their aircraft and its 
operations. One this is determined the Operator can then know explicitly what Avoidance Controls 
and Recovery Controls are linked to specific Accidents and Key (Platform) Hazards. Thus, when a 
Safety Significant Event occurs the Operator’s Safety Manager will be able to reference the SSE 
contributory factors into the ‘Safety Model’ and determine which control measure(s) failed – or 
indeed whether the contributors had not previously been considered in the safety analysis (in which 
case the Operator would ensure analysis was undertaken to correct the omission). 
Once the failed control(s) has been identified then these (weighting factors/probabilities) can be 
amended in the FTA/ETA to show the updated Accident Risk and its effect on the overall Aircraft 
Total Risk. This will provide ammunition to strengthen the failed controls. 
The SATURN SAFETY MODEL in Figure 55 depicts the high-level generic sequence from the causal 
factor (pitot tube i.e. sensor failure) to the accident Loss of Control. The breakdown of this model in 
APPENDIX 3 – Case Study for ‘SATURN SAFETY MODEL’ (Air France Flight 447 Disaster) shows 
the failures as: 
 Design Control: Redundant sensors – the 3 pitot tubes were the same and 
therefore were subject to common mode failures 
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 Key (Platform) Hazard procedural control failure – operating procedure to control 
the aircraft for ‘Unreliable Indicated Airspeed (IAS)’ (at 5 degrees nose up and 
85 per cent power  is the standard procedure);  
[Although having identified and called out the loss of the speed indications, 
neither of the two co-pilots called the procedure “Unreliable IAS”] [92]  Emergency recovery procedures (and training) – once passed the hazardous state 
of undetected speed error the pilot should have recovered the aircraft before the 
onset of stall i.e. the warnings of stall normally include ‘stick-shakers’ and 
warning horns; neither of the pilots formally identified the stall situation [92]. 
Had they done so (and had the appropriate training) they would have pushed the 
nose of the aircraft down to regain airspeed and hence lift over the wings. The 
author (previously a Flight [Air] Engineer) has practised stall procedures as part 
of flight crew drills both in normal training and in recurrent simulator training on 
the VC10 aircraft. Additionally crews were trained on ‘wind-shear’ approaches 
and this involved ‘riding’ the stall warning systems with full power. This sort of 
training was not conducted by the two co-pilots according to the BEA report [93].  No Limitations in place either to; 
o Avoid the altitude that the pitot-tubes could be subject to super-cooled water 
droplets and icing i.e. fly below Flight Level 310 (this would require more 
fuel to be carried to cross the Atlantic) 
o Avoid Flight in Icing conditions and flight in or near thunderstorms i.e. fly 
around (divert off track) any Cumulonimbus clouds (this would require more 
fuel to be carried if the forecast indicated clouds)  
Any of these design or operator controls could have broken the accident chain (as described in 2.2.9 
‘Safety Culture’) and hence this was a totally avoidable accident. 
In terms of a joint DO-Operator analysis the following Waterfall diagram should have been used to 
identify the new safety risk (to the operator) and then analysis should have been identified with the 
risk reducing (from each control) until eventual risk elimination by design. 
 
Figure 57: Safety Risk diagram for the Air France AF447 Scenario 
The BEA Interim Report No.3 states that Air France has introduced the operator control measures in 
terms of briefing, training (in simulators) and revised the Unreliable IAS procedures. Also the design 
Chapter Three  Influence 
 
 
Page 163 of 300 
 
measures required of the SB have been implemented and so the Safety Risk is now down to a 
Tolerable level of risk per the diagram in Figure 57. 
3.4.7.2 Case Study Summary – Space Shuttles Challenger & Columbia 
The rationale for also including the Space Shuttle disasters is twofold; firstly they represent the space 
community and secondly because of the closeness of the Design Authority and the Operator (namely 
NASA – they contract for the Space Shuttles to be built and then they Operate them). This case study 
summary will focus on the common themes of the two accidents within the framework of the 
SATURN SAFETY MODEL. 
Both the Challenger & Columbia disasters were essentially avoidable due to the common mode of 
managerial failure (Risk Normalisation). As NASA are responsible for both ends of the mitigation 
scale (design barrier controls and operator recovery controls) there is no excuse for not managing the 
hazards and Risks correctly.  
Investigation by Dr Richard Feynman [8] detailed that: 
 Unreliability of O-Ring seal was well known  NASA had data on ‘blowbys’   On eve of the launch engineers at the suppliers stated that the launch should NOT 
go ahead at temperatures below 53°F  NASA challenged the advice and the engineer supplier management backed down  The Launch occurred early on the morning of 28 Jan 1986 with the seal 
temperature at 29°F  The management decision led to the accident probably based on ‘Risk 
Normalisation’  
This can be translated into the following categories: 
 Known Issues 
o O-Ring issues on previous spaceflights (Challenger) 
o Foam Tiles had previous detached (Columbia) 
o Engineering concerns raised (Cost versus Safety?) (Challenger & Columbia)  Complacency 
o NASA safety culture was deemed ‘lamentable’ by Diane Vaughan [7] (for 
Challenger, but there was still no improvement some 17 years later for 
Columbia)   Lack of (Safety) Risk Management 
o No mitigation 
o Procedure – the Flight Readiness Review is the final ‘managerial’ process 
and  this is where the ‘cost versus safety versus late scheduling’ was an issue 
for NASA; this is where the link in the accident chain can and should have 
been broken (Challenger & Columbia) 
o Procedure for a damaged Space Shuttle in Space – was there one? There may 
be a scenario (such as the fatal Columbia sortie) whereby the vehicle is 
deemed unrecoverable (at that moment) and therefore the ‘Plan B’ procedure 
should be to keep the astronauts on the ISS until a rescue Launch can be 
made. In the meantime the astronauts can take extensive pictures (which they 
did) to aid in the decision on repairing the damage (or not). Arguably if the 
decision was that the vehicle was not repairable then there should have been 
two further options;  Leave it attached to the ISS for training and spares purposes  Controlled destruction of the vehicle by re-entry into the ocean or by 
sending it into ‘deep space’/towards the sun, etc. 
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In a sobering reality, the decision of all of the above could have been made on a cost (of losing the 
vehicle i.e. leaving it in space) versus the benefit concerning the cost of the 7 astronaut’s lives for 
Columbia; however this is merely a thought and no evidence points to this. In the military and in 
spaceflight the flight crew know the risks and know that they may die but clearly all is done that is 
reasonably possible to provide safe vehicles. 
The SATURN SAFETY MODEL in Figure 55 depicts the high-level generic sequence from the causal 
factor (i.e. o-ring failure) to the accident Loss of Control. The breakdown of this model in 
APPENDIX 4 – Case Study for ‘SATURN SAFETY MODEL’ (Space Shuttle Challenger & Columbia 
Disasters) shows the failures as: 
Space Shuttle Challenger; 
 Pressure sensors not providing sufficient data in time  Flight Termination System – not able to protect the astronauts in time  Crew Pod ejection – not able to protect the astronauts in time  Limitation ignored – the 53° F limitation for the O-Rings were ignored by the 
management against the engineer’s advice 
Space Shuttle Columbia; 
 Cause Control failure – Lack of Quality Assurance to check the adhesive 
properties of the heat resistant foam tiles   Lack of Space Shuttle repair policy whilst docked at the ISS (leading to decision 
to return Columbia without repair)   Crew Pod ejection – low survivability; as the airframe started to break up the 
crew should have been able to eject the crew pod safely and float the Earth. This 
facility was not properly thought out  
3.4.7.3 Summary of Space Shuttle Disasters 
Both Space Shuttles and crew were lost due to a catalogue of errors involving management and as a 
result of NASA’s lamentable safety culture. It is clear that for the orbital space operations the various 
levels of controls should be explicitly detailed within accident sequences and these controls should be 
examined and managed more thoroughly (than say their aviation counterparts) due to the exacting 
environment and fantastic momentum that the Shuttles endure. This was not done effectively in both 
of these accidents and arguably considering the Heimlich Ratio (Figure 5) and Space-related accidents 
and serious incidents (Table 3) then it would appear that the poor accident rate could have been a lot 
worse.  
These space-related case studies (and the Air France AF447 case study) should be stark reminders to 
the nascent suborbital domain to manage their operations effectively from the onset and in particular 
to have a contiguous and explicit safety model from which to understand their accident risks and from 
which to effectively and proactively manage their controls. 
 Exemplar Safety Model – The Hazard and Safety Risk Management Log  3.4.8
As a result of the introduction of a Safety Model a prototype Hazard Log has been developed that 
accommodates the methodology of the Safety Model. As opposed to Design Organisation hazard logs 
and separate Operator Safety Risk management tools (risk profiles and hazard logs), the Saturn 
SMART Hazard Log provides an integrated approach that is User-friendly and provides relevant 
information and reports to enable Duty-Holders to make appropriate Safety-related decisions; mainly 
concerning Risk but also concerning design changes. 
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In designing the Saturn SMART hazard log it was important to start with ICAO User Requirements as 
detailed in Section 2.2.7: 
 Record hazards  Have hazards with unique assigned numbers  Describe each hazard  Detail the consequences  Assess the likelihood and severity of the Safety Risks  Detail safety risk controls (mitigation measures)  Be updated for new hazards and safety risk controls 
Additional Identified Requirements for the Integrated Safety Model are as follows: 
 Tool must be capable of recording relationships and associations between 
Accidents, Hazards (Key (Platform) Hazards, System Hazards i.e. failure 
conditions and Inherent Hazards), Causes and Controls  In addition the tool must be able to cope  with differing layers of hazards i.e. a 
lower-level system hazard, a Failure Condition and a Key (Platform) Hazard (as 
well as Inherent hazards)  Tool must be capable of recording probability/frequency values as attributes of 
these entities (including pre- and post-control values for Accidents and Hazards)  Tool must be able to assign severity values to Accidents  Tool must be able to display Accident Risk classifications  Tool must be capable of recording Air Safety Reports and displaying in standard 
Risk Profile format  Tool must be User-Friendly; this means ease of Navigation between screens, 
visually representation of the hazard-accident relationships and visual and logic 
numbering scheme  Tools must have a search function for ease of use 
In simplistic terms the architecture for the relationships (between cause, hazard, accidents and 
controls) required a ‘Many-to-Many’ tabular scheme in order to accommodate the requirements. 
Figure 58 below depicts the construct of the database in terms of relationships: 
 
Figure 58: Saturn SMART Hazard Log Construct 
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Thereafter the tool was developed to have layered user-friendly screens to enable a clear and visual 
representation of the hazard-accident sequence and to enable the user to be able to navigate to the 
different levels by use of a logical numbering scheme and easy to follow steps. 
The purpose of the tools is to demonstrate that the contiguous safety approach can be managed i.e. 
within a safety tool. Figure 59 shows an early version of the ‘working area’: 
 
Figure 59: Saturn SMART Hazard Log development  
 Exemplar Safety Model – Applying ALARP  3.4.9
The review of the ALARP principle in Chapter 2.2.6.3 highlighted that there was confusion in terms 
of applying the ALARP principle (based on workplace risks and measured in risk of death per person 
per year) with an aircraft’s airworthiness and safety risks. This section aims to clarify the differences 
and provide an example (for the inherent people-based risk reduction) to help illustrate the ALARP 
process as applied to a space-related vehicle (SoA) or indeed an aircraft. 
Functional & Operator-based Risk Reduction 
It is considered that the DOs are familiar with and should continue with the fail safe design 
philosophy and employing the safety precedence sequence to reduce the likelihood of an event and in 
order to meet safety objectives. Here they are applying mitigation in order to reduce the risk of an 
accident happening but actually they are ultimately reducing the probability of a failure condition (and 
where possible reducing the severity by eliminating a hazard or introducing a safety feature such as a 
physical barrier that may limit the propagation of a hazardous state). 
It is considered that the SATURN SAFETY MODEL should be followed and that Operators follow 
through with the contiguous safety effort in terms of managing the risks at the Accident Level. To do 
this Operator’s aim is to reduce the risks by the implementation of operating procedures, training and 
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Limitations. Their focus is on operating occurrences and ensuring that the controls (or failures 
thereof) are analysed sufficiently and also to ensure the occurrences are fed back to the DO in order 
that the DO can update the base events within their fault trees. Should events occur that lead to a 
required design change as the mitigation then it is here that the ALARP principle could be employed. 
The Cost Benefit Analysis technique then explicitly shows as part of the optimisation analysis 
whether the cost of implementing the change (risk reduction) is grossly disproportionate to the benefit 
gained.  This can be calculated in terms of flying hours initially to obtain an ‘ALARP Budget’ (see 
example at 4.1.2). Sensitivity analysis can then be carried out on the ALARP calculation by varying 
parameters such as the probability or the disproportionality value based on implementation of 
different control measures.  
Once the analysis has been conducted and the functional-based risk reduction identified and analysed 
within the ALARP calculation then the operator can provide a Safety Justification statement as to why 
the system (including the operator procedures, etc.) is safe. 
Inherent (people-based) Risk Reduction 
In terms of people-based risks i.e. the ‘inherent’ risks, this also needs to be analysed in order to 
determine whether the risks are acceptable in terms of societal risks. This will allow both regulators 
and the individual fee-paying passengers to determine whether the risk of death per person per year is 
acceptable. To determine the inherent risk of death per person per year requires the flying hour 
airworthiness risks to be cross-referred to the exposure of certain groups (1st, 2nd and 3rd parties) to the 
risks involved. Figure 60 below details the proposed methodology and the following examples relate 
the flying hour to risk of death per person per year: 
 Airline pilot: flying an airworthy aircraft that meets its safety objectives of 1x10-9 
per flying hour for catastrophic failure conditions therefore meet the overall 
objective of 1x10-6 per flying hour for Loss of Aircraft conditions. Figure 60 
shows that for an Upper Level of Tolerability (ULT) of exposure to risk of death 
per person per year (pppy) of 1 in 1000 then the limit on flying hours equals 
1000.    First it is important to work out the average exposure per population group i.e. for 
the pilots. This should take into account the total number of flying hours for the 
airline and the number of pilots employed.   Currently pilots are limited to 1000 hours24 for fatigue reasons and therefore are 
within an acceptable (tolerable) risk region (see figure below). To reduce the risk 
to pilots further, the following mitigation could be implemented; 
o Limit Pilot Flying Hours; limit pilot flying hours. In the extreme Figure 60 
shows that with pilots flying only 100 hours per year than the risk has 
reduced buy an order of magnitude to 1 in 10,000 pppy. However this would 
not be practical and so managers should apply a reasoned and pragmatic 
approach in managing the exposure of risk to their pilots. At least by being 
aware of the issue and showing by use of Figure 60  that if a limit of 500 
flying hours was imposed that their exposure to risk would be reduced 
fivefold to 1 in 5000 risk of death pppy. 
o Simulator Training; by limiting flying hours managers should increase the 
simulator training hours so that pilots can keep current. This will have an 
additional benefit in the pilots skills will increase thereby adding to the safety 
effort – this may have averted the Air France Flight 447 disaster in that the 
                                                     
24
 http://www.risingup.com/fars/info/part121-503-FAR.shtml 
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crew would have recognised the issue and acted earlier and with the correct 
actions.  Suborbital Aircraft Pilot; here is a chance to better understand the exposure to 
risk to SoA pilots. Let us assume that the joint approach in 3.4.10 is used and we 
have a catastrophic risk as 1x10-5 per flying hour; 
o Flying Hours; here we can clearly see that an SoA pilot should be limited to 
100 hours per year  Spaceflight Participant: An SFP whom flies once a year is clearly exposed to the 
risks far less than the pilot. The risk of a catastrophic event is 1 in 100,000 per 
person per year and is within the tolerable risk band; the risk of a single death is 1 
in 10,000. Should the target not be as stringent (or set as a requirement) and an 
operator has a launch license in the US then they are required to provide the SFPs 
with all necessary information to enable the SFPs to assess the risk such that they 
can then sign a waiver. In this instance should the evidence show (using Fault 
Tree Analysis) that the cumulative catastrophic risk is nit 1x10-5 per flying hour 
and is 1x10-4 per flying hour then they can see that their risk of death is 1 in 
10,000 per person per year. This therefore backs up the argument that the SFP is 
volunteering for an adventurous activity (as opposed to a transport service from 
point A to point B) and therefore accepts that the risks will be higher than that of 
the commercial aircraft that they flew in to the Spaceport.  
o Non-catastrophic risk; although we normally discuss catastrophic events it is 
more likely that we will be talking about the risk of death per person per year 
in suborbital flights as there are other more likely scenarios of severe injuries 
due to the high-g forces or non-nominal situations (including personal 
medical issues). Here we may apply an assumption that for every death there 
are 10 severe injuries and 100 minor injuries. So to calculate the risk of 
injuries we would start from the baseline that the catastrophic risk is 1x10-4 
per flying hour then the hazardous risk is 1x10-3 pfh and major risk is 1x10-2 
pfh and minor risk is 1x10-1 pfh (see operator’s risk matrix at Table 19). 
These are the A/B boundaries i.e. the targets and the designers will be aiming 
to meet the ‘D’ (Broadly Acceptable) safety objectives in terms of their 
failure conditions and inherent hazards. The reality is that the designer can 
aim to provide assurance that they will meet the safety objectives and that 
their 100 arbitrary hazards will then sum to be equal to the B/C boundary (for 
each severity classification). Therefore it is this value that we can derive as 
the likelihood for informing people as to their explicit risks which equates to 
the following:  Hazardous (likelihood of single death) = 1x10-4 pfh (B/C boundary) = risk of 
death pppy of 1 in 10,000 with 1 hour flight per person  Major (likelihood of severe injury) = 1x10-3 pfh (B/C boundary) = risk of severe 
injury pppy of 1 in 1,000 with 1 hour flight per person  Minor (likelihood of minor injury) = 1x10-2 pfh (B/C boundary) = risk of minor 
injury pppy of 1 in 100 with 1 hour flight per person 
Looking at this in perspective it appears reasonable to assume that 1 in 100 people will receive minor 
injuries due to g-force related or non-nominal-related events (based on an average of 5 passengers per 
flight this would be 20 flights); this may be a combination of the vehicle and flight profile but will 
clearly be related to each individual’s medical condition i.e. ability to cope on such flights. This is 
why the medical and training criterion is so important (as mitigation to specific inherent hazards like 
excessive ‘g-force’). 
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Figure 60: Exemplar Functional-based to People-based conversion of Risk values 
It is considered that further analysis should be undertaken to better understand the operating and 
support risks that the various groups will be exposed to i.e. pilots, spaceflight participants, support 
personnel and third parties. This will require OHHA and OSHA activities to be undertaken and also to 
provide approximate numbers of people per group i.e. 10 pilots per Operator, 6 spaceflight 
participants per flight (with only one flight per year per SFP assumed) and 20 support personnel 
(directly involved in the support activities on or around the aircraft). The OHHA and OSHA activities 
will detail functional and inherent hazards that can cause harm to the different groups in terms of: 
 Hazardous classification (single death 1st/2nd parties per Table 15):   Major classification (severe injuries 1st/2nd parties per Table 15):  Minor classification (minor injuries 1st/2nd parties per Table 15):  Negligible classification (inconvenience and requires assistance and is reportable 
for 2nd parties only per Table 15): 
As can be seen above Operators may have relatively high risk concerns with these OHHA-OSHA type 
hazards and these need to be identified in the first instance and then managed to ALARP (or similar) 
in the second instance. Additionally due to the potential for high risks in operating and support SoAs 
these categories need to be considered within the Total System’s Risk as detailed in 3.4.11 below. 
 Safety Target 3.4.10
The SATURN SAFETY MODEL takes cognisance of the Safety Target combined with safety 
objectives methodology that would suit a new integrated safety approach. Currently in the aviation 
domain the safety objective approach is used for the DOs and Operators tend to have safety 
goals/objective in terms of Risk Profiles (to reduce the number of events and in particular SSEs). A 
Safety Target approach alone focuses on the key risks rather than the airworthiness codes and this 
limits the use of this approach to the issue of restricted certificates and permits to fly.  
The Safety Target combined with safety objectives by airworthiness codes is important within the 
SoA domain in order to provide a flexible but robust method of demonstrating compliance for 
certification. This is even more important due to the failure rate associated with the Rocket Propulsion 
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System; a rocket may achieve 1x10-4 per fling hour at best (1x10-6 when combined with exposure 
factors possibly) and therefore would fail to meet catastrophic safety objectives. Within a safety target 
approach although this would take up a large portion of the safety budget then this drives the designer 
to design the rest of the system to meet the safety objectives (1x10-7 per flying hour for instance) in 
order to meet the safety target. 
 Total System Risk – Total Risk Per Severity Classification 3.4.11
Aircraft Design Organisations are only interested in meeting failure condition safety objectives in 
order to get their aircraft certified as ‘airworthy’; though they must clearly demonstrate compliance to 
the requirements for Continued Airworthiness. As they do not primarily concern themselves with the 
Operator Safety Risk Management aspects, they assume that because the safety objectives have been 
met then the overall System must be safe. 
Now that the DO analysis is complete and the Operator has constructed Accident (& Incident) 
sequences, the Operators will be able to estimate and evaluate the single Accident/Incident Risks (r) 
effectively (for instance using the Accident Risk Matrix at Table 19 ) and also undertake Risk 
Reduction activities. These Accident/Incident Risks (r) are derived from undertaking the standard 
functional hazard analysis and linking these to the Accidents in Table 12 and Table 13. Additionally 
the Inherent-based analysis (OHHA and OSHA) must be linked to appropriate Inherent-based 
Accidents.  
Once all of the identified single (Accident/Incident) Risks (r) have been accepted, their cumulative 
probabilities will be known i.e. the sum of contributing hazards (failure conditions and inherent 
hazards) equates to the Accident/Incident’s probability. The single (Accident/Incident) Risks (r) could 
then be summed to determine the Total Risk per Severity Classification (RS) and then the Total 
System Risk (R) could be calculated for the platform. 
However great care must be applied when undertaking this task as the different Accidents and 
Incidents will have different severity classifications; these will require a ‘weighting’ scheme to be 
applied (typically 10, 1, 0.1 and 0.01). After summing the Severity Risks (RS) in each severity column 
one could then see the level of Risk (R) by joining the cumulative points by drawing a line. This 
approach is akin to the ‘iso-risk’ lines in Figure 61 below. 
The relationships of the individual accident risks (r), the Total Risk per Severity Classification (RS) 
and the Total Risk (R) can be presented thus: 
R = RS (catastrophic) +RS (hazardous) +RS (major) +RS (minor) +RS (negligible) [Equation 4] 
Where RS = r(n1) + r(n2) + r(n3) ….. 
By having a Risk Matrix, the Operator will be able to determine: 
 Whether the DO’s failure conditions meet their respective safety objectives  Where each ‘single Risk’ (r) (Accident/Incident) is classified. Where Risks are 
‘B’ or ‘C’ class Risks the Operator will be able to determine which failure 
condition(s) is the main contributor in order to undertake Risk Reduction to 
ALARP   What the total risk per severity classification is (RS); this is important when a 
catastrophic safety target is to be met for instance  What the cumulative ‘Total System Risk’ (R) is and whether it meets the 
determined Total Safety Target.  
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So what is the Tolerable Level of Safety (Equivalent Level of Safety) for a commercial spacecraft? 
What Safety Target can we set for the whole platform(s)?  It is considered that this is the only real 
problematic area for further consideration. At present, Total System Risk Target is not considered by 
Design Organisations or Operators in the aviation industry and there is no guidance on achieving this. 
One such method could employ the use of ‘iso-risk’ lines as suggested by Tech American Standards 
[84]. Their scheme dictates that to measure the total system risk (R), one needs to provide a measure 
of severity (in terms of fatalities) and a measure of probability of the occurrence. The ‘measures’ of 
total system risk (R), include: 
 Expected Loss Rate  Maximum Loss Rate  Most Probable Loss Rate  Conditional Loss Rate  
In relation to ‘Conditional Loss Rate’ the sum of the probabilities for all hazards is considered (with 
the assumption of independence) and this could be most appropriate. 
Understanding the Total System Risk (R) is even more important within an emerging and novel 
industry where immature technology is yet to be rigorously proved; but first a Target (ELOS) must be 
set. 
 
Figure 61: Tech America Standard exemplar Total System Risk Assessment Criteria incorporating ‘Iso-Risk’ lines 
Arguably DOs will undertake a combined test and evaluation process (with Operators) but this will 
still not provide sufficient quantitative evidence of failure condition probabilities in some cases; 
instead qualitative engineering judgment may be used and hence the ‘confidence’ level of this type of 
analysis will need to be clearly stated. Thus, Operators in the United States will need to take the DO’s 
analysis (that may have met safety objectives that do not have the standard high confidence levels per 
aviation) and apply their Safety Risk Management efforts as described above. This approach is 
considered necessary in order to fully understand the Risk presented by the whole platform(s). In 
Europe however, a different approach will be taken; one which is based on known certification 
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processes. This will be to a predetermined safety target (for catastrophic loss) and therefore it will be 
important to derive the cumulative risks per severity classification (RS). 
 To Launch or Not to Launch 3.4.12
The Challenger disaster in 1996 provides a good example whereby a Flight Readiness Review (FRR) 
system was in place at NASA but the Management’s (in the 5-M model at Figure 22) decision to 
launch over-ruled the engineering advice not to launch due to the temperature limits of the ‘O-ring’ 
seals; the Space Shuttle launched with temperatures of 29°F, whereas the design specifications were 
53°F. 
The FRR is a good method to providing a ‘Go/No-Go’ decision regarding a launch of a suborbital 
aircraft and it is essential that key stakeholders are represented at the FRR and decisions recorded 
such that the Accountable person and Responsible person(s) (within  the RACI chart at Table 22) 
formally agree on the decision. The following chart presents an exemplar SoA FRR Flight Risk 
Assessment (FRA). The current chart is split into two segments; the flight/environment segment and 
the human factors segment. The rationale is to represent the 5-M model’s path to mission success 
rather than mishap. 
The events chosen were from the author’s knowledge of flight operations and the suborbital domain 
and include: 
 Flight Plan/ATM  Flight Profile  Weather conditions  SoA status in terms of Limitations and Deferred Faults  Carrier aircraft (if applicable) status in terms of Limitations and Deferred Faults  Flight Crew 
o Qualification/Currency 
o Simulator Currency 
o Human Factor#1 – Fatigue/Complacency  Passengers 
o Human Factor#2 – interaction in flight 
These are basic issues that could have an impact on a flight and there will clearly be more. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 3.4.12 in relation to Flight Readiness Review (FRR) Flight Risk Assessments. These 
recommendations are collated at 6.4.8.
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FLIGHT FACTORS 
 Flight Plan Changes 
No Changes Few Changes Big Changes 
Flight Plan/ 
ATM Integration  
Test Pilot 1 2 3 
Experienced Pilot 2 3 5 
Mix – Test Pilot or Experienced + 
Training Pilot 3 4 6 
 Complexity 
Routine Standard Complex 
Flight Profile Standard profile 2 3 4 
Extreme Apogee profile 3 4 6 
Other profile 5 6 8 
 Forecast Weather 
VMC/ low wind <3km/moderate wind Forecast clouds/ strong wind 
Take-Off Weather 
Conditions 
Good WX Conditions 1 2 3 
Fair WX Conditions 2 3 4 
Marginal WX Conditions 3 4 5 
 SoA Serviceability 
Excellent  Good Average 
Suborbital Aircraft 
Limitation Factors 
Low/Non-Critical Limitations or 
Modifications 
1 3 4 
1 or 2 Major Limitations or 
Modifications 
2 3 7 
Many Major Limitations or 
Modifications 
3 5 6 
 Carrier Aircraft Serviceability 
Excellent  Good Average 
Carrier Aircraft 
Limitation Factors  
(if applicable) 
Low/Non-Critical Limitations or 
Modifications 
1 3 4 
1 or 2 Major Limitations or 
Modifications 
2 3 7 
Many Major Limitations or 
Modifications 
3 5 6 
 
 
 
 
 
HUMAN FACTORS 
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 FLIGHT CREW CURRENCY (Last Flight) 
<7 Days <7 Days<30 >30 Days 
FLIGHT CREW 
Qualification/ 
Currency 
Test Pilot 1 2 3 
Experienced Pilot 2 3 4 
Mix – Test Pilot or Experienced + 
Training Pilot 
4 5 6 
 Pilot Currency (Last Simulator sortie) 
<14 Days >14 Days <30 >30 Days 
FLIGHT CREW 
Simulator Currency 
Test Pilot 1 2 3 
Experienced Pilot 2 3 5 
Mix – Test Pilot or Experienced + 
Training Pilot 
3 5 6 
 No. of Consecutive Flights in 36 hour period 
1 2 >2 
HUMAN FACTOR 
#1 – Flight Crew 
(fatigue/ 
complacency) 
Test Pilot 1 2 3 
Experienced Pilot 2 3 4 
Mix – Test Pilot or Experienced + 
Training Pilot 
3 4 5 
Experienced Pilot 2 3 5 
Mix – Test Pilot or Experienced + 
Training Pilot 
3 5 7 
 Number on Board ‘v’ fitness level 
>4 >2 but >4 <2 
HUMAN FACTOR 
#2 – Space Flight 
Participant 
Fitness level  (factor of 
fitness/age/ability to cope as 
determined by Chief Medical Officer) 
 
2 
 
4 
 
6 
 
FLIGHT RISK LOW MED-LOW MED-HIGH HIGH 
Score 
 
10-20 20-30 30-40 >40 
Classification Risk is low and no flight issues 
present – GO 
The flight involves some concern that needs 
discussion as to the acceptability – GO once 
agreed 
The flight involves complex issues that need to be 
individually discussed before a GO decision is 
made. Formal Authority required from 
Accountable person (CEO) 
STOP. The flight involves very high risks 
and these must be addressed to determine 
whether the flight should continue. In some 
cases a further Limitation may be required 
in order to achieve a ‘GO’ status – this must 
be formally agreed by the Manager (CEO)  
Table 22: Exemplar FRR – Flight Risk Assessment
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 SPACEPORT SYNTHESIS 3.5.
 Introducing Spaceports 3.5.1
What is a Spaceport? According to Wikipedia25 a spaceport is: 
A spaceport or cosmodrome (Russian: коɫмодɪом) is a site for launching (or 
receiving) spacecraft, by analogy with seaport for ships or airport for 
aircraft. The word spaceport, and even more so cosmodrome, has 
traditionally been used for sites capable of launching spacecraft into orbit 
around Earth or on interplanetary trajectories. However, rocket launch sites 
for purely suborbital flights are sometimes called spaceports. In recent years 
new and proposed sites for suborbital human flights have commonly been 
named spaceports.   
‘Spaceports’ are emerging all over the world in an attempt to lure SoA/RLV Operators to commence 
operations in their area and thereby attracting ‘space tourism’ and boosting their economies. 
Examples include ‘Spaceport Scotland’26 and ‘Spaceport Sweden’27 who aim to lure Virgin Galactic 
to operate from their area. The issue for both of these opportunists and many more is that the 
necessary safety and environmental regulatory requirements are not in place. 
  Identifying Spaceport Requirements 3.5.2
In some cases spaceports are already in operation as airports and this is the case for the two cited 
above; Spaceport Scotland is currently Royal Air Force Lossiemouth and Spaceport Sweden is 
currently Kiruna Airport. In the United States there are many existing orbital spaceports and some of 
these may attract the SoA/RLV operators with the cancellation of the Space Shuttle Program. In these 
cases whereby existing infrastructure and operating rules are in place then the spaceport authorities 
will need to identify the delta requirements to be able to operate as a spaceport. 
However where new runways are being built as a spaceport, they may arguably qualify as being an 
airport. 
In both cases, existing or new-build, regulatory requirements must be considered in the first instance.  
In terms of regulations or guidelines the FAA-AST have only provided environmental guidelines and 
consequently have only undertaken environmental assessments (EAs - see 3.5.3 below). There are no 
spaceport safety requirements from EASA as yet and the FAA-AST safety-related aspects are not 
separate and explicit as they are detailed within the general Launch Site License regulations of CFR 
420 [96]. 
Additional issues to be resolved for those European and other non-US spaceports wanting to obtain 
business from Virgin Galactic (and other US-designed vehicles) is that the US ‘export controls’ (on 
technology) will currently impact the ability to do so. This aspect is still to be worked out by the 
spaceports, operators and regulators. 
The approach taken for this Section is to review the EAs and determine whether any correlation to 
safety can be derived. Then relevant safety requirements shall be reviewed within the CFR 420. 
Additionally a review of existing airport safety requirements will provide further discussion. 
                                                     
25
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spaceport 
26
 http://www.spaceportscotland.org/ 
27
 http://www.spaceportsweden.com/ 
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 Spaceport Environmental Requirements 3.5.3
Currently the FAA-AST has certified two spaceports in terms of an Environmental Assessment (EA); 
Blue Origin’s West Texas Commercial Launch Site [93] and draft EA for Oklahoma Spaceport [94]. 
The EAs were conducted against the FAA-AST Environmental Guidelines [95] and examined the 
following environmental aspects: 
 Air Quality  Airspace*  Biological Resources  Cultural Resources  Geology and Soils  Hazardous Materials and hazard waste management*  Health and Safety*  Land Use  Noise*  Socioeconomic Impacts  Environmental Justice  Traffic and transportation  Visual and aesthetic resources  Water resources 
Those aspects that correlate to safety issues will be discussed further and are annotated thus (*). 
These EAs were assessed against the FAA-AST environmental guidelines [95] for obtaining a launch 
license permit.  
Airspace: the EA details that by maintaining the vehicle within an air corridor the safety impact 
should be minimal:  
Given the short window for need of exclusive airspace use, the infrequent launches (approximately 
once per week), and expected procedures for rerouting or rescheduling air traffic, the use of FAA-
approved temporary restricted airspace procedures is not expected to significantly impact airspace use 
in the area.  
The airspace requirements also concern the selection of the spaceport and also that alternative sites for 
the spaceport are nominated together with arguments for and against in relation to the primary and 
secondary locations; issues cited could be mountainous regions or the lack of emergency landing 
alternative. 
Hazardous Materials: the EA discusses the RPS and in particular the propellants. The requirements 
are for robust methods of storage, transportation and handling and testing.  
Propellants used for the New Shepard RLV include rocket propulsion grade kerosene (RP-1) 
(12,000lbs per launch) and 90 per cent concentration hydrogen peroxide (103,000lbs per launch). 
The explosives are stored in a dedicated area in Department of Transport approved shipping 
containers. In terms of RLV replenishment the loading system would monitor propellant flow rates, 
pressures, temperatures and propellant load delivered. 
Health & Safety: H&S issues are discussed and said to be minimal with an anticipated injury of ‘1’ 
with ‘0.5’ days lost time. Additionally the EA discusses the non-nominal situations whereby their 
ground personnel may be subject to occupational health hazards: 
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In the case where impact of the spent abort module does not result in a fire, the Emergency Response 
Team would wait at a safe stand-off distance until it is determined that a fire will not start (at least 60 
minutes after impact). 
After the fire resulting from impact has burned out or after it is determined that a fire will not start, the 
Emergency Response Team would don personal protective equipment (fire resistant Nomex coveralls, 
gloves, air packs, face shields) and approach the impact site to inspect for unburned solid propellant. 
Noise: Blue Origin’s RLV is a vertical rocket and hence the noise levels will be an issue. The EA 
states: 
A low-level jet flyover could have sound approximately 100 dBA, depending on altitude and power 
level. Very large rocket launches such as the Space Shuttle have sound levels around 175 dBA at 50 
feet from the test pad. Humans begin to experience pain at levels above 100 dBA 
Blue Origin’s RLV noise emissions are 85dBA at the site and only reduce to 80dBA at 8 miles. In this 
instance the spaceport is remotely situated and only relevant and authorised personnel will be on site 
and these can be provided with hearing protection. For those outside of the spaceport, blue Origin will 
have to provide warning signs detailing when the launches are to take place and that noise will be an 
issue. 
Oklahoma’s noise issues are represented by a variation of concept X, Y and Z RLVs. For concepts X 
& Z they do not anticipate any noise issues whereas for concept Y RLV (an XCOR-type of vehicle) 
they anticipate the noise will be similar to that of Blue Origin’s above i.e. 76dBA to 86dBA. 
 Spaceport Safety Requirements 3.5.4
Spaceport Safety Requirements can be derived from existing airport regulatory requirements plus 
those derived from the EA above, from CFR 420 [96], from existing airport requirements and also 
from industry knowledge.  
CFR 420 §420.19 details an explicit safety objective in terms of risk to the ‘public’ as this 
methodology is carried over from the standard NASA orbital flights; indeed the FAA-AAST covers 
orbital flights and are demanding this effort of analysis for the suborbital operators as well: 
(1) A safe launch must possess a risk level estimated, in accordance with the requirements of this part, 
not to exceed an expected average number of 0.00003 casualties (Ec) to the collective member of the 
public exposed to hazards from the flight (Ec≤ 30 × 10−6). 
As per the Air Traffic Management aspects detailed below, suborbital flights will be contained within 
an airspace/space corridor and the exposure to the public should be minimized by this restriction 
alone. Additionally the model of SoA/RLV will further dictate the likelihood of exposure to the public 
as follows: 
 Virgin Galactic (Space Ship 2) – air drop within the safe corridor and glide to 
land within the safe corridor therefore public exposure none or minimal  Blue Origin (New Shepard RLV) – vertical launch and descent in the middle of 
the desert within a safe corridor therefore public exposure none or minimal  XCOR (Lynx) – this model could provide exposure to the public because the 
vehicle ignites its rocket on the ‘runway’ and the rocket phase is maintained until 
nearing the apogee. With this model the selection of spaceports to operate from 
should be limited to those in remote locations such as in a desert or mountainous 
regions or possibly next to the sea in a remote site i.e. well away from a City or 
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town.  
CFR 420 §420.63 to 69 concerns the Explosive Siting aspects and details the following: 
 An explosive site plan  Safe storage of rocket propellants (RP) (assumes RP-1)   Safe handling of rocket propellants  Issues of Solid and Liquid propellants located at same spaceport  Calculated minimum separation distance (of combined propellants)  Intervening barriers   Crowd (public) safety within the bounds of the spaceport – depends on the 
vehicle type and propellants used. The safe distance is dependent on the 
calculation derived from the type of explosive and amount used. In the Blue 
Origin case (combined total of 115,000lbs of explosive) the safe distance for a 
‘1.3 grade’ of explosive is 375ft. 
CFR 420 §420.71 concerns Lightning protection at the launch site: 
(a) A licensee shall ensure that the public is not exposed to hazards due to the initiation of 
explosives by lightning. 
As with ‘insensitive munitions’ propellants are subject to heat or ignition sources (such as lightning) 
and methods must be introduced to mitigate the ‘extremely improbable’ event. The requirements 
detail standard bonding and test/inspections but also include a procedural mitigation in the cases 
where ‘no lightning protection system is required’; this is when a ‘lightning warning system is 
available to permit termination of operations and withdrawal of the public to public area distance 
prior to an electrical storm or for an explosive hazard facility containing explosives that cannot be 
initiated by lightning.’  
 Spaceport Air Traffic Management Requirements 3.5.5
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is an essential component in assuring the safety of SoA/RLV flights. 
The FAA-AST has not issued guidance for the spaceport specifically however their launch license 
regulations and guidelines for Operators provide requirements and in particular to ATM is CFR Part 
437 [97] as follows: 
 FAA CFR §437.57 – Operating Area Containment; this mainly concerns 
protecting the public on the ground and that the planned trajectory (orbital 
connotations) and non-nominal trajectory should remain within the containment 
area  FAA CFR §437.69 – Communications (a) to maintain communications with air 
traffic control during all phases of flight  FAA CFR §437.71 – Flight Rules  
o (b)(1) Follow flight rules that ensures compliance with §437.57 (above) 
o (d) A permittee may not operate a reusable suborbital rocket in areas 
designated in a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) unless authorized by (1) ATC 
In terms of an operating containment area for SoA/RLVs Dan Murray’s28 paper on Air Traffic 
considerations for future spaceports highlights the issue of protecting the public and also protecting 
other aircraft should the SoA/RLV ‘explode’; he cites the concern of a one pound fragment of steel 
(from an exploding vehicle) having the potential to puncture the body of an aircraft flying below and 
further cites the Space Shuttle Columbia accident as evidence.  His paper looks at the possibility of 
                                                     
28
 Dan Murray is one of the FAA-AST specialists  
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introducing ‘corridors’ either between airways (in high-density flight areas) or even across airways; 
both of these would require NOTAMs and possible use of the corridors at off-peak times or days i.e. 
he suggests air traffic is considered lighter on a Wednesday or Saturday and before 10am as opposed 
to a Monday or Friday. 
 Aviation Airport Requirements 3.5.6
Airports are required to be certified and the FAA has CFR Part 139 [99]. As detailed at the start of 
this Section some emerging spaceports are currently airports and these will already have certification 
to operate. The airport certification requirements cover: 
 139.301 Records.   139.303 Personnel.   139.305 Paved areas.   139.307 Unpaved areas.   139.309 Safety areas.   139.311 Marking, signs, and lighting.   139.313 Snow and ice control.   139.315 Aircraft rescue and fire-fighting: Index determination.   139.317 Aircraft rescue and fire-fighting: Equipment and agents.   139.319 Aircraft rescue and fire-fighting: Operational requirements.   139.321 Handling and storing of hazardous substances and materials.   139.323 Traffic and wind direction indicators.   139.325 Airport emergency plan.   139.327 Self-inspection program.   139.329 Pedestrians and Ground Vehicles.   139.331 Obstructions.   139.333 Protection of NAVAIDS.   139.335 Public protection.   139.337 Wildlife hazard management.   139.339 Airport condition reporting.   139.341 Identifying, marking, and lighting construction and other unserviceable 
areas.   139.343 Noncomplying conditions. 
Additionally to the requirements above the FAA introduced AC 150/5200-37 [26] which details 
guidance for an SMS for Airport Operators. The Safety Risk Management provides useful guidance 
for airport hazard identification: 
 The equipment (example: construction equipment on a movement surface)   Operating environment (example: cold, night, low visibility)   Human element (example: shift work)   Operational procedures (example: staffing levels)   Maintenance procedures (example: nightly movement area inspections by airport 
electricians)   External services (example: ramp traffic by Fixed-Base Operator (FBO) or law 
enforcement vehicles)  
CAP 642 also provides useful ‘Airside Safety Management’ principles and details common hazards 
as: 
 Vehicles striking aircraft and/or people  Hazards to passengers on the apron  Moving aircraft (including aircraft on pushback or being towed) 
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 Live aircraft engines (including helicopters)  Falls and falling objects  Operation of air-bridges  Manual handling  Noise  Work equipment (including machinery)  Hazardous substances and Dangerous Goods (including radioactive substances)  Inadequate lighting, glare or confusing lights  Adverse weather conditions (including winter operations)  Slips and trips  Electrical hazards  Faults and defects 
Derived Spaceport Safety Requirements - ATM 
The above requirements for Operators can then be turned into requirements for Spaceport Air Traffic 
Management: 
(a) Flight Planning: the Spaceport, on receipt of a notified suborbital flight plan, must; 
o Issue a NOTAM of the intended suborbital flight. The NOTAM will provide 
sufficient mitigation to exclude other air vehicles. This must be for a ‘corridor’ of 
specified altitude, length and width 
o Ensure standard integration and separation with aviation traffic when not in the 
‘corridor’ 
o Ensure the maximum altitude of the NOTAM is no greater than 150km (above 
this altitude the NOTAM is no longer valid and the Operator must seek orbital 
collision avoidance analysis) 
o The Spaceport authority should also ensure that the NOTAM area has minimal 
(or none) populated areas i.e. over the desert, inhabitable mountains or over the 
sea 
o The Spaceport authority should provide ‘windows of opportunity’ for SoA/RLV 
Operators whereby the air traffic is ‘light’ within or near the corridor; this can 
reduce the exposure of other air traffic thereby reducing the exposure to a mid-air 
collision    Flight Rules; the SoA/RLV should remain within visual flight rule (VFR) 
conditions at all times unless the vehicle is certified for Instrument Flight Rules 
(IFR)  Communications: the Spaceport must be able to remain on contact with the 
SoA/RLV by; 
o Radio communications (mandated for the SoA/RLV) 
o Data communications   IFF (mandated for the SoA/RLV)  Tracking (desirable for the SoA/RLV) – includes real-time position and 
velocity  
Spaceport Safety Management System 
An existing airport should have an SMS in place and be compliant to standards however in the case of 
a new Spaceport or an airport evolving to be a Spaceport should ensure that an effective SMS is 
implemented. This is particularly important in the development of a new Spaceport with the 
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opportunity to build a safety culture with the right ethos from the beginning. This will require an 
effective and robust Safety Management Plan to get all stakeholders on board.  
Safety Management Plan 
The Spaceport Authority should provide a Safety Management Plan as the overarching document to 
which organisations such as ATM, SoA/RLV Operators and supporting entities are to be compliant 
with. This is an opportunity to provide a useful tool and effective structure in which to orchestrate the 
combined safety effort for the different organisations that will form the Spaceport Safety Panel. The 
SMP will detail the safety criteria safety requirements for all to follow. Additionally the SMP should 
provide a RACI chart (detailing who is responsible accountable, consulted and informed) in terms of 
safety because otherwise one organisation may think that the Spaceport Authorities are responsible 
when in actual fact the SoA operator is responsible for instance. The SMP will also cover the 
Emergency Response Plan & Major Incident Plan as Annexes.  
Spaceport Safety Case(s) 
The Safety Management System should comprise explicit safety cases for Spaceports due to the 
additional hazards and issues highlight in the sections above. The following guidelines are proposed: 
 Spaceport Safety Case: this is the overarching safety case that provides a robust 
argument supported by evidence that the Spaceport is acceptably safe. This is 
supported by the following sub-tier safety cases/goals: 
o Spaceport Safety Management; this is one leg of the safety argument and is 
the Spaceport SMS. Here the argument should describe the following;  Spaceport Safety Organisation (and Safety Panel) with 
representatives from;  Spaceport Safety Manager  ATM Safety Representative  Operator Safety Manager(s)  Maintenance Safety Representative  Supporting Activity Representatives (as required)   Spaceport Safety Policies  Spaceport Safety Targets and Safety Requirements 
o ATM Safety Case; the Air Traffic domain are already well versed in safety 
management and working to safety requirements, objectives and targets. This 
will need to have additional work to address the changes enforced by 
operating SoA/RLVs. Specific areas to address will be;  Flight Planning  Flight Operations  Communications safety case 
o Maintenance Safety Case  Support Activities Safety Case 
o Explosives Safety Case  Storage  Handling  Transportation 
o Customer (SoA/RLV Operator) Safety Case: the Spaceport Authorities need 
to provide a leading role in the safety of the Spaceport as far as Operators go  
 Hazard & Risk Management 3.5.7
In terms of hazard and risk management the Spaceport Safety Case will have to derive safety targets 
and safety objectives for the following: 
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 Spaceport Functional Safety – Air Traffic Equipment; the ATM Safety Case will 
conform to existing requirements for commercial aviation. This details a safety 
objective approach i.e. 1x10-9 per flying hour for failure of equipment and then 
also considers the ATC operator human factors. The addition of managing 
SoA/RLVs will need to be factored in to the SMS; a subcomponent of SMS is 
‘Change Management’ and integrating SoA/RLVs will provide challenges and 
additional safety requirements as detailed above i.e. the establishment of an air 
corridor. These changes should be able fit within the existing ARM framework. 
  Spaceport Inherent Safety; This aspect will cover the operating and support 
activities (OSHA) and occupational health activities (OHHA) concerned with the 
existing airport (if applicable) and integrating the new processes and procedures 
with operating SoA/RLVs. The ‘safety target’ should be based on an Equivalent 
Level of Safety (ELOS) to that of operating aircraft with the exception of storing 
and handling propellants. Arguably the exposure to the risks should be identified 
and from this the Spaceport Authorities should be able to determine the risk of 
death per person per year (per group of people) as detailed in the ALARP section 
(3.4.9).    
  Spaceport Conclusion 3.5.8
Spaceports are indeed emerging all over the world; a few have been assessed by the regulators and 
can operate as such – the others are Spaceports in name only for the time being. There are Spaceports 
that are being constructed from new and these have an excellent chance of providing a safe operating 
base; however it is important for these Spaceports to follow guidelines and also derive Safety 
Requirements based on other best practice such as from within the aviation aerodrome safety 
management systems. Additionally these Spaceports should begin with a Safety Management Plan 
which should kick-off their safety culture and define the safety activities required. It should also be 
underpinned by a Spaceport safety case in order to ensure all aspects have been covered in providing a 
safe ‘system’. As for current airports that aspire to become Spaceports there are fundamental 
additional requirements when considering Rocket Propulsion Systems and the integration of 
spacecraft to the existing Air Traffic Management system. 
It is concluded that both of these approaches are achievable as long as the Spaceport operators 
consider implementing a fully integrated SMS from the beginning and one that engages with the 
spacecraft operators such that all known hazards and risks can be effectively managed
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 REDUCING OPERATOR RISKS – MEDICAL, TRAINING & PROTECTIVE 3.6.
EQUIPMENT STRATEGIES 
The review conducted in Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.6 highlighted gaps in the FAA-AST Rules and 
Guidelines; this is the current state. To get to a ‘future state’ the following Medical, Training and 
Protective Equipment strategies are recommended in order to reduce the risks to flight crew and SFPs 
(as controls to Inherent Hazards and Inherent Accidents). For each current (FAA-AST) medical or 
training mitigation there is a ‘recommendation’ for a more robust strategy and this is then further 
backed up (where appropriate) by the findings of the Aerospace Medical Association Working Group 
(AsMA) [69] as discussed in Chapter 2.3.4.  
  Current Flight Crew Medical Mitigation  3.6.1
The FAA-AST has only stipulated that a Class II medical certificate is required as detailed in the Gap 
Analysis in section 2.3.4 . 
3.6.1.1 Recommended Flight Crew Medical Criterion Strategy 
Class I Aerospace Medical Certificate  
The Flight Crew medical criterion should be based on the most stringent criterion (during the early 
phases in particular) and this is a Class I medical certificate. This standard is also what military fast jet 
pilots must attain due to the exacting environmental stresses imposed on the pilot. 
AsMA: A FAA first-class medical certificate using the same age-based schedule as is required for 
ATP pilots. An FAA first-class medical certification (instead of the current FAA requirement for an 
FAA second-class certification) differs from a second-class only in that it requires an EKG and has to 
be renewed every 6 instead of 12 months over the age of 40. 
Dosimeter for Radiation Exposure  
Flight Crew should be provided with passive radiation dosimeters so that their exposure can be 
monitored; the author’s previous Thesis [65] proposed an annual limit of 50mSv and a career limit of 
100mSv (it is anticipated that a typical annual dosage may be in the order of 7-15 mSv). Additionally, 
Operators should introduce limitations for pilots in terms of maximum dosage over their career.   
AsMA: Passive ionizing radiation dosimeters worn by each flight crewmember 
Fatigue Management 
Flight Crew may fly daily or even twice daily depending on vehicle availability and demand. This 
may be more exacting on the body than is realized and pilots may suffer fatigue which can lead to 
human error and subsequent incidents or accidents. Operators should undertake the FRR Risk 
Assessment as per Table 22 whereby fatigue is detailed and in order to reduce the risk of a flight it 
may be necessary to provide a pilot who has not flown that day or the day before. Clearly more 
analysis is required to understand the fatigue involved in suborbital flights. 
AsMA: The pilot experience on suborbital flights will be very time intense and probably repetitive 
with some pilots flying daily. The effects of repetitive exposures to the physiological stresses of 
suborbital flight have never been experienced. 
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  Current SFP Medical Mitigation  3.6.2
The FAA-AST has only stipulated that a basic medical questionnaire and General Practitioner’s 
medical certificate is required; thus leaving the decision as to the fitness of the SFP down to the 
Operator’s physician (herein after known as the Flight Surgeon). 
3.6.2.1 Recommended SFP Medical Criterion Strategy 
The decision as to whether a prospective SFP is medically ‘fit’ should not be left to what the 
prospective SFP’s medical history states (as supplied by the individual’s doctor). 
SFP Medical 
Two-tiered approach of GP Medical BUT with specified questionnaire. This would be followed by the 
Operator’s Aerospace Physician undertaking a medical on arrival. The Operator medical is designed 
for two reasons; firstly to ascertain whether the SFP can undergo centrifuge experiential training and 
secondly to be able to participate in the suborbital flight. Figure 62 below details a combined strategy 
for medical and centrifuge training. 
SFP Go/No-Go List 
A list containing those medical issues that may contraindicate an SFP from participating in a 
suborbital flight should be derived and provided in the SoA Policy as guidance material. 
 
Figure 62: Exemplar Medical and Training Criterion Strategy 
Medical Telemetry 
Medical Telemetry for both passengers and flight crew on board SoAs could be deemed as an 
essential requirement; in particular in the early days of flight test and initial flights. It may then 
become standard practice.  
A Flight Surgeon (Aviation Medicine Specialist) should be employed by the Operator to monitor the 
SFPs and the Flight Crew.  Figure 63 below is an example of such a Telemetry system. 
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Figure 63: Telemetry ‘vest’ to monitor SFPs and Flight Crew 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 3.6.2 in relation to Flight Crew & Space Flight Participant Medical & Protective 
Equipment Standards. These recommendations are collated at 6.4.8.     
  Current Flight Crew Training Mitigation 3.6.3
The FAA-AST Flight Crew requirements for training state that the RLV flight crew should be trained 
to operate the vehicle so that it will not harm the public and that the pilots should hold ratings to 
operate one or more aircraft with similar characteristics for as many phases of the mission as 
practicable. These aspects were reviewed in 2.3.6 along with the requirements to provide a simulator. 
As mitigation this is considered fairly generic and the FAA-AST tend not to be too prescriptive. 
However it is considered that in the early phases of development, the regulators should stipulate 
rigorous standards and these could perhaps over time be relaxed (rather than the other way round due 
to accidents). 
 Recommended Flight Crew Training Strategy 3.6.4
The proposed Flight Crew training strategy is to have more explicit requirements in addition to those 
stipulated by the FAA-AST. As a minimum the following training components are recommended: 
Centrifuge Training 
The centrifuge is not detailed within the FAA-AST guidelines however it is considered an essential 
component as part of a training strategy. The benefits of a centrifuge is that it can simulate both Gz 
profiles (eyeballs down) for the transition between horizontal and vertical flight and Gx profiles (chest 
to back) for the descent phase. Additionally it is assumed that the SoA pilots will be either test pilots 
and/or ex-military fast jet pilots who have undergone centrifuge training. However some operators 
may recruit per the minimum FAA-AST requirements. In either case it will be essential that pilots 
have centrifuge currency as part of the safety mitigation. 
AsMA: Recent centrifuge or other G-training may be beneficial if there is significant (> +3) Gz 
acceleration forces in the flight and the flight crewmembers do not have adequate +Gz training in 
other environments. 
AsMA: Anti-G suit use on early flights until more experience has been obtained as there will be 
significant (>3) +Gz acceleration forces in the flight profile and deterioration of +Gz tolerance may 
Chapter Three  Influence 
 
 
Page 186 of 300 
 
occur due to the "push-pull effect" after several minutes of 0g. There is no data concerning +Gz 
tolerance following four minutes of 0g. 
AsMA: Higher g forces or longer exposures to acceleration could potentially increase the frequency 
of dysrhythmias.  As long as the head, neck and spine are stabilized before the acceleration exposure 
and remain so until the exposure is completed, the potential for musculoskeletal injury is markedly 
reduced. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 2.3.6 and above centrifuge and anti-g suit proposals. These recommendations are collated 
at 6.4.8. 
Simulator Training 
The FAA-AST requirements concerning simulator aspects are generally sound and state that the flight 
crew training device (should) realistically represents the vehicle's configuration and mission. It is 
imperative that the simulator accurately represents the vehicle in terms of ‘concurrency’; this is 
whereby the configuration is the same as the aircraft (instrumentation, switches, seats, doors, etc.). 
The rationale is that the other two attributes of a SoA simulator (fidelity and capability) will not 
accurately reflect the vehicle and therefore can affect the aim of the training. In terms of fidelity 
(concerning the visual and motion system and accuracy of the instrumentation) it will be extremely 
difficult to represent high g-forces in all axes. The simulator will not be able to accurately represent 
the vehicle’s capabilities in terms of the ‘pull-up’, ascent, space segment (with upside down and 
reaction control aspects) and the high-g descent. Nonetheless, the simulator is an essential component 
of flight crew training. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 2.3.6 and above simulator proposals. These recommendations are collated at 6.4.8.     
Parabolic Flight Training 
In terms of flight crew training it is considered desirable that they experience microgravity conditions 
however it is not considered an essential requirement because the flight crew will be strapped in their 
seats and controlling the flight. 
 AsMA: Parabolic flight training may be beneficial as it does provide some experience to the 
acceleration-weightlessness-deceleration environment, although no studies have shown that it 
contributes to establishing a "dual adaptive" state.  Some personnel have experienced motion sickness 
with the initial exposure to parabolic flight, but develop tolerance with adaptation to the changing 
gravitational fields. 
Altitude Chamber Training 
Military fast jet pilots (and all other aircrew) are trained to recognize the signs and symptoms of 
decompression so that they can carry out emergency procedures, including donning an oxygen mask 
and switching to 100% oxygen under pressure breathing conditions. This is also considered essential 
for Suborbital flights because the flight crew must be able to respond to the earliest indications of 
pressurisation problems in order to maintain control of the vehicle. The altitude chamber provides 
simulated pressurisation failures by climbing the ‘chamber’ to 25,000 feet (ft.), 45,000ft (pressure 
breathing is required at this altitude) and the author has observed an altitude of 100,000ft in a chamber 
(though this was for experimental purposes and no-one was inside the chamber). 
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AsMA: Physiologic training (altitude chamber) to ensure flight crew recognition of signs and 
symptoms associated with decompression including hypoxic changes. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 2.3.6 and above altitude training proposals. These recommendations are collated at 6.4.8. 
  Current SFP Training Mitigation 3.6.5
The FAA-AST has only stipulated that a basic training is required for SFPs in the form of briefings; 
thus the individual’s would not know ether they could cope with the nominal (and non-nominal) ‘g’ 
forces during the flight. The FAA-AST guidelines for Flight Crew training are slight better but still 
require further refinement and to be more explicit in some instances. 
 Recommended SFP Training Strategy 3.6.6
As per the flight crew training strategy, the SFP training strategy must have more explicit 
requirements than those stipulated by the FAA-AST. The SFP training strategy should include the 
following: 
Briefings: 
Space Awareness briefing; this should consist of various videos on  the history of human spaceflight, 
including space tourism, and also provide a tutorial on the space environment and explaining the 
rationale for some of the training that SFPs will encounter (detailed below)  
SoA briefing; this briefing should be explicitly related to the SoA that the SFPs will fly in. It should 
include the basic attributes of the vehicles both on the ground and in the air. This should include a 
video and possibly mock-ups in the classroom environment in order to familiarise the SFPs with the 
vehicle. 
Emergency briefing; this briefing, once again in the classroom environment, should concern the 
vehicles safety equipment (fire extinguishers, goggles, oxygen masks, protective clothing) and the 
actions that SFPs should take in an emergency. SFPs should then be given a ‘safety information’ 
booklet that they can study. 
Centrifuge Training 
As per flight crew, the centrifuge is not detailed within the FAA-AST guidelines however it is 
considered an essential component as part of a training strategy. The benefits of a centrifuge is that it 
can simulate both Gz profiles (eyeballs down) for the transition between horizontal and vertical flight 
and Gx profiles (chest to back) for the descent phase. In terms of SFPs this is essential because, unlike 
the pilots/flight crew, they will not have experienced sustained g-forces. They will also not have 
received training in carrying out an ‘Anti-G Straining Manoeuvre (AGSM). 
Simulator Training 
The simulator is an excellent training tool for the flight crew but in the case of Suborbital flights it can 
also be an essential part of the SFP training strategy. Having received briefings about the vehicle, the 
SFPs can then be physically trained on the equipment in terms of the following; 
 Normal Ingress/Egress; it is important that the SFPs are familiar with the basic 
configuration of the vehicle and are able to enter and exit  Operation of Seats; the seats (and restraint system) may actually save their lives 
so a demonstration and practice in the use of the seat and restrain system is vital. 
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This may be even more important if the seats are designed to recline with certain 
phases of flight to assist in countering the effects of g-forces.  Operation/Procedure for returning to seat (after microgravity phase); should SFPs 
be allowed to ‘float’ in the short duration of microgravity then it will be essential 
that they return to their seat and are restrained for the descent phase. If this does 
not occur it is envisaged that they will naturally be forced to the floor under the g-
forces; this may have dire consequences should another SFP also be forced on top 
of another SFP as this would result in experiencing twice the weight of the person 
on the chest resulting in injury or indeed death.   Emergency Training 
o Pressurisation failure; depending on the vehicle and operating requirements in 
the event of a pressurisation failure during the rocket phase and microgravity 
phase then the vehicle occupants will be in grave danger. This failure 
condition should then provide a logical argument to provide the occupants 
with a pressure suit and person oxygen system. The SFPs will then be trained 
to either shut their helmet or select 100% oxygen (or indeed this may happen 
automatically). In this instance it is important that SFPs receive full training 
in the use of their ‘spacesuit’ and in particular what to do in the event of a 
pressurisation failure. The author has first-hand experience from the altitude 
chamber in pressure breathing and it is extremely difficult for ‘first-timers’ 
(pilots are used to this).  
o Fire; in the event of a fire whilst airborne there is little the flight crew will be 
able to do as they will be trying to land the vehicle as quickly and safely as 
they can. This therefore leads to the issue of fire-fighting. In the event that 
there is no ‘cabin crew’ (this would be a good argument to having cabin 
crew) then it would be up to an SFP to attempt to fight the fire. This leads on 
to training in the use of the fire-fighting equipment, which could be an issue 
with some SFPs not being physically or mentally able to do this. 
o Loss of control; as occurred on the X-Prize flights, Space-Ship One had an 
instance of roll ‘runaway’. This non-nominal situation could occur on flights 
and although pilots are trained and used to this sort of manoeuvre, SFPs are 
certainly not. During the rocket phase and descent phase SFPs should be 
restrained in their seats and this should not normally be an issue; though it is 
worth briefing SFPs on and demonstrating the use of a possible ‘locked’ 
position of the restraint system. 
o Crash Landing; this event could occur from a loss of control incident or other 
flight events and as per normal aviation a procedure should be implemented 
and then practiced in the simulator for the SFPs to ‘adopt the position’ (if 
appropriate). 
o Emergency Egress; in the event of the crashed landing then the SFPs may 
have to egress quickly. This may involve unstrapping normally or there may 
be a Quick-Release Button, followed by exiting the vehicle. Once again this 
can be practiced in the simulator. 
In terms of emergency training some operators may feel that demonstrating too many of these aspects 
may frighten SFPs and so may wish to selectively omit some training. It is considered that the 
characteristic type of the SFP is an ‘adventure seeker’ and in fact that they will demand to be involved 
as much as possible and to undertake as much training as is required. Operators should not reduce 
safety training as part of cost cutting.  
Parabolic Flight Training 
Although not essential for flight crew, should SFPs be allowed to leave their seats in the microgravity 
phase of the flight then it is considered essential that they have parabolic flight training. The XCOR 
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Lynx29 vehicle for instance is a two-seater cockpit (one pilot, one fee-paying SFP) and in this instance 
as the SFP will not be leaving the seat then there is no requirement for parabolic flight training. 
Psychological Training 
The physiological training elements detailed above will undoubtedly provide psychological benefits 
for the SFPs in overcoming any fears or concerns regarding the flight. Indeed much can be done to 
prepare the SFP for their once-in-a-lifetime experience including a countermeasures program. 
Professor Robert Bor [100] has such a program for aviation and this sort of approach could be adopted 
by operators: 
 Education about the physical principles of flight and the process by which the 
flight crew control the aircraft  Experiential learning through participating in a simulated or actual flight 
situation  Training and techniques to manage the physiological symptoms of anxiety 
Another psychological benefit of the physiological training is that the SFPs will feel properly 
integrated with the flight crew and it will no doubt feel for of a team mission rather than a mere 
individual ‘joy-ride’.  
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 2.3.6 and the above SFP proposals. These recommendations are collated at 6.4.8.  
    Risk Reducing Equipment  3.6.7
The review in Chapter 2.3.4 highlighted a number of ‘inherent’ issues that flight crew and SFPs will 
be subject to and some of these have been discussed above as medical and training issues. The final 
risk reduction methods concern ancillary protective equipment in order to prevent inherent hazards 
and accidents: 
Noise Reduction 
The reviews and discussions above highlight the noise issue during the ‘launch’ or rocket phase and 
even though this may only be for 90 seconds it can have an impact on safety and on comfort. To 
reduce the risk from this hazard the mitigation should include: Fully enclosed Space Helmet + 
effective circum-aural seals + Active Noise Reduction (ANR) + Communications Ear-Plugs (CEP): 
 Fully enclosed Space Helmet with/or,  Effective circum-aural seals and,  Active Noise Reduction (ANR) or  Communications ear plugs (CEP) 
AsMA: Auditory protection in the helmet or headset for all crew members 
Anti-Vibration Measures 
the rocket phase will not only result in excessive noise it will also result in a marked level of 
vibration. The hazards associated with vibration will not only affect the individual but will also affect 
the performance of the flight crew. Mitigation measures should include: 
                                                     
29
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 Anti-vibration mounts on the cockpit console  Anti-Vibration seats  Seats with shaped head rests to prevent the flight crew’s helmet moving in the 
lateral sense 
AsMA: Mitigation strategies for reducing vibration would be to aggressively decrease vibration in the 
design of the vehicle, isolate the pilot by seat design, and the use of a helmet to isolate the head which 
has been shown to improve display reading performance and vibrational tolerance30 
Pressure Suits 
Should the cabin suffer decompression during the rocket phase or the ‘space phase’ then the 
occupants are likely to suffer death leading to a loss of the vehicle as well. Passenger aircraft do not 
need this as they can deploy and emergency oxygen system and reduce the aircraft’s height rapidly to 
below 12,000 ft. Although designers (like Scaled Composites) believe that a ‘shirt-sleeve’ 
environment is preferred (to demonstrate that their design is robust) there is always the likelihood of a 
catastrophic failure of the pressurised vehicle and therefore appropriate mitigation should be adopted: 
 Flight Crew should have full pressure suits (especially during early phase of 
flights)  SFPs should have partial-pressure suits or specially designed suborbital spacesuit 
for emergency situations (see 4.1.2) 
AsMA: Pressure suit use may be adopted by some commercial space flight operators as it would be 
beneficial in the case of failure of the pressurized vehicle. Without a pressure suit the crew is 
absolutely reliant on cabin integrity being maintained as there is no redundancy and depressurization 
would be a catastrophic event. 
Anti-G Suits 
From personal experience, the purpose of anti-g trousers is twofold: it gives an extra 1-2G protection 
and it also gives the wearer notice of the onset of ‘G’. This would benefit the pilot and help reduce the 
workload. In terms of SFPs there may be a case for anti-g trousers depending on aircraft design and 
flight profile. Alternatively the SFPs could have tight-fitting ‘long-johns’ (undergarments) and zipped 
gaiters as part of their spacesuit (or as part of special spaceflight coveralls if no spacesuit).  
AsMa: There are currently no plans to utilize anti-G suits similar to the Shuttle pilots during re-entry 
on these flights, but could be considered for the pilots as the cost is minimal and a beneficial effect is 
possible. 
Dosimeters 
The authors Thesis [65] found that although the radiation exposure levels have been shown to be 
negligible for participants and small for pilots, there is still a risk for the pilot over a period of time. 
There should be a career limit for exposure to ionising radiation (100mSv career limit for the pilots 
per the Authors’ findings) and this can be achieved through wearing a dosimeter and recording each 
flight crew member’s exposure. Further mitigation can then be crew scheduling as an individual starts 
to reach the limit. 
                                                     
30
 AsMA paper referencing; Taub HA. Dial Reading Performance as a Function of Frequency of Vibration and 
Head Restraint System. AMRL-TR-66-57> Wright Patterson AFB. Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory. 
1966. 
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AsMa: All flight crewmembers should be required to wear personal dosimeters to track an individual's 
accumulated dose for each mission, as do radiation workers and medical imaging personnel, to ensure 
compliance with OSHA standards 
Fire Fighting Equipment 
Should the hazard analysis identify that there is a possibility of an on-board fire then risk reduction 
methods need to be employed. One such method is by providing fire-fighting equipment 
(extinguishers) and where appropriate fire detection and warning systems (such as in avionics bays). 
Access should be provided if possible to potential fire-risk areas and the flight crew should be 
provided with personal protective equipment such as fire-gloves. 
Medical Emergency Equipment 
Although a suborbital flight is considered a short-duration event there may be circumstances where 
medical equipment is identified as a risk reduction measure. The main factor in the identification of 
this aspect is vehicle design; clearly XCOR’s RLV with one passenger and one pilot strapped in with 
a profile that transports the occupants to suborbital apogee in 15 minutes may not require medical 
equipment. However a design and flight profile such as Virgin Galactic’s will afford sufficient time to 
enable first aid to be conducted. Additionally this may be even more appropriate should the spaceport 
be in a remote location such as Spaceport America in New Mexico; here the medical facilities may be 
able to cope with small emergencies but the nearest hospital is 2-hours away.   
     Summary of Proposed Operating Mitigation Measures  3.6.8
The reviews conducted in Chapter 2.3.4 and 2.3.6 and the proposed guidelines in Chapter 3.6 above 
are important in terms of medical, training and personal equipment mitigating strategies (or operator 
safety controls), but these must be focused and managed within the accident sequence. The following 
table assimilates the issues and mitigation measures discussed within this Chapter to specific hazards 
or accidents as appropriate. 
Note: A hazard control attempts to prevent the hazard occurring and therefore an accident control 
attempts to prevent the accident occurring i.e. the hazard already exists.
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Section Issue/Cause Hazard Control1 Associated Hazard Accident Control2 Associated Accident3 Accident Severity 
3.6.7 Noise from 
rocket 
Internal soundproofing Exposure to excessive 
Noise 
Helmet  Musculoskeletal (temporary 
loss of hearing) 
Negligible 
3.6.7 Noise from 
rocket 
Helmet with ANR and 
CEP 
Loss of/ Degraded 
Communication 
 Loss of Situational Awareness Catastrophic 
3.6.7 Vibration from 
rocket 
Anti-vibration seats Exposure to excessive 
Vibration 
 Musculoskeletal (pains) 
Cardiopulmonary 
(restricted breathing) 
Major 
3.6.7 Vibration from 
rocket 
Anti-vibration seats 
Anti-vibration mounts 
for cockpit console 
Impaired ability to 
read instruments 
 Loss of Control Catastrophic 
3.6.7 Hull/window 
crack 
 Decompression Pressure Suits 
Altitude Chamber training (pilots) 
Asphyxiation Catastrophic 
3.6.7 Hull/window 
crack 
Design - Double skin  
Design - load factors 
Primary structure 
failure 
 Structural failure Catastrophic 
3.6.7 Flight in 
ionising 
radiation 
Design - Double skin  
 
Exposure to ionising 
radiation 
Procedure -Dosimeter for pilots 
Limitation – Career limit for pilots 
Limitation – flight in known solar flare prohibited 
Musculoskeletal Hazardous-Major 
3.6.7 g-forces  Design – Seat to recline 
position  
Exposure to excessive 
g-forces 
Anti-g suit 
Centrifuge Training 
Cardiovascular (G-LOC leading 
to death) 
Hazardous  
3.6.7 g-forces  Exposure to excessive 
g-forces 
Anti-g suit 
Centrifuge Training 
2-pilot operations 
Loss of Control Catastrophic 
3.6.7 O2 and CO2 
build up 
Ventilation (blower) 
 
Exposure to 
Hazardous/Toxic 
Materials  
Pressure suit/helmet/with oxygen system (plus 
100% emergency oxygen) 
Asphyxiation Catastrophic-
Hazardous 
3.6.7 Many causes Design certification/ 
qualification of 
equipment 
Cockpit/cabin Fire On-board fire fighting equipment 
Warning System 
Fire/Explosion Catastrophic 
3.6.7 Vehicle design Design Slips & Trips Simulator training (includes briefing and 
demonstration) 
Musculoskeletal Major-Minor 
3.6.7 Inherent Flight 
profile 
 Space Motion 
Sickness 
Parabolic flight training 
Centrifuge training (Gx) 
Neurovestibular (sickness)  
 
3.6.7 Inherent Flight 
profile 
SFPs to take SMS 
tablets (not pilots) 
Space Motion 
Sickness 
Perspex (clear) barrier between SFPs and flight 
crew (prevents vomit from ‘floating’ to cockpit 
which could impair pilots ability to fly 
Loss of Control Catastrophic 
Table 23: Operator Risk Reduction Measures – against specific hazards or accidents 
Notes: (1) Hazard control is an attempt to prevent the hazard occurring. (2) Accident control is an attempt to prevent the accident occurring. (3) The Accidents are from the proposed Accident Lists (Table 12) 
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CHAPTER FOUR – Synthesis of Emerging Technologies  
  INTRODUCTION 4.
This Chapter aims to provide discussions on emerging technologies within the Suborbital domain. 
The topics chosen are based on issues that have been discussed at conferences and from the author’s 
viewpoint. Additionally the opportunity arose to analyse a different approach to personal spaceflight – 
that of the challenges in providing a safe mode of transport almost to space (‘near space’) in a helium-
powered balloon.  
 SPACESUITS 4.1.
Historically spacesuits were designed for operations on the Space Shuttle or on the Soyuz spacecraft. 
With the emergence of the suborbital flights a new approach is being considered – to fly with or 
without spacesuits. 
  NASA Designs 4.1.1
Spacesuits are essential for astronaut protection during launch, re-entry and of course during extra-
vehicular activities (EVA). Additionally during visits to the International Space Station (ISS) 
astronauts require spacesuits in case of emergencies on board. In discussions with the astronaut Mario 
Runco31 he stated that one of the main issues was the fact that the spacesuit was a two-part suit and 
also that the gloves hampered operations. It is not envisaged that NASA-style pressure suits would be 
suitable for the smaller suborbital craft.    
  Suborbital Specific 4.1.2
In terms of suborbital flights there are discussions ‘for & against’ spacesuits and these may be 
operator and vehicle specific. Indeed Virgin Galactic passengers may wish to have spacesuits (to look 
the part) whereas Burt Rutan (the designer from Scaled Composites) was cited as wanting passengers 
to fly in a ‘shirt-sleeve’ environment; this was probably his way of stating that his design is safe. 
Nonetheless it is an issue that requires further discussion. The argument against having pressure suits 
would be that the hull (including windows) was double-skinned and therefore the design is robust – 
this is the argument Virgin Galactic and Scaled Composites are debating.32 It is considered by the 
author that the early flights should have pressure suits until the SoA/RLVs have proven reliability. 
The issue was also discussed in 3.6.7 with a recommendation for further analysis as part of the IAASS 
SSS Technical Committee. Figure 64 below shows a spacesuit designed by Orbital Outfitters [101] for 
the suborbital market and this comes with various safety features in order to ‘provide a line of 
protection in the event of a loss of atmospheric pressure within the vehicle’: 
 Has an automatic rapid activation function  The design provides an independent 15 minute back-up  Has in-built communication system  Has an integrated sensor system to record real-time biometric information   Can be integrated into a parachute harness 
                                                     
31
 Mario Runco was a guest speaker at the first ‘Manned Space Flight Course’ in Sweden, Aug 2006 
32
 As stated by Jim Vanderploeg (Virgin Galactic Chief Medical Officer) at the 2nd IAA Conference, Arcachon, 
30 May – 1 June 2011 
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Figure 64: Suborbital Spacesuit by Orbital Outfitters 
The benefit of this spacesuit (for the suborbital domain) is that credit can be taken for the great safety 
features because they are real life-saving mitigation factors. 
SoA/RLV operators (and designers) should undertake analysis per the SATURN SAFETY MODEL 
which is a contiguous approach from designer to operator, and they would then be able to complete 
the accident sequences properly. By this it is meant that the operator could complete an Event Tree 
Analysis to demonstrate that in the event of a loss of pressurisation that there are further mitigation to 
prevent the death of those on board (and in particular the flight crew who could then prevent the loss 
of the vehicle and therefore the outcome would be a Serious Significant Event (SSE) as opposed to a 
real accident (Loss of Control due to pressurisation failure resulting in loss of all on board and loss of 
vehicle). 
Optimisation Analysis 
Optimisation analysis is whereby the potential controls are listed and then analysis is undertaken to 
determine which of the controls are taken forward. There are two safety-based techniques that can be 
applied; cost benefit analysis (CBA) or decision analysis and these should be backed up by a 
sensitivity analysis. 
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
CBA33 is used in the UK’s Health and Safety Executive’s ALARP process [56] whereby the benefits 
gained are all defined in terms of monetary costs; this is known as the ALARP Budget i.e. it is how 
much a duty holder should spend in order to reduce a residual risk to ALARP. The HSE define CBA 
as: 
“It is a defined methodology for valuing costs and benefits that enables broad 
comparisons to be made between health and safety risk reduction measures 
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 http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpcba.htm 
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on a consistent basis, giving a measure of transparency to the decision 
making process” 
There are various ways of calculating the cost and the metrics involved for aircraft/SoA related 
systems will include the following. As an example some assumed and arbitrary figures are provided 
for a SoA and these are shown in brackets:  
 P = Probability of the accident (associated with a failure condition) [1x10-5 per 
flying hour]  E = Exposure to the Risk through life [2500 – SoA designed for 5 year life with 
500 predicted hours per year based on 5 vehicles flying 100 hours each per year]  VH = Value of 1 occurrence in human terms i.e. Number of people involved times 
value of prevented fatality or injury (whether flight crew, spaceflight participants 
or public) [2 flight crew plus 6 SFP = 8] times £3M arbitrary value of life as an 
example = £24M  DF = Disproportionality Factor [6 – this is based on a C Class medium Risk]  VA = Value of 1 occurrence in non-human terms (for loss of asset – this is not 
included for inherent people accidents) [£20M] 
The ALARP Budget is worked out thus: 
(P x E x VH x DF) + (P x E x VA) [Equation 5] 
= £3.6M + £500,000 = £4.1M 
This means that for this particular accident (as a result of a failure condition or inherent hazard – in 
regards to flight crew or SFPs dying as a result of loss of pressurisation) the operator (duty holder) 
should be prepared to spend £4.1M to reduce the risk of death to the flight crew and/or SFPs. The 
value of the asset (VA) is not included if the analysis concerned the SFPs only; whereas if the flight 
crew were incapacitated then the vehicle may be lost and so the value is added. This can also be 
argued as the reason to provide flight crew with spacesuits; the argument for SFPs could be claimed 
by CBA or by ‘decision analysis’ (see below). 
The next stage is to determine the actual cost of the spacesuits in this instance and this should be the 
total through-life cost. Let us argue that the Orbital Outfitter’s spacesuit is £500k each including 
through-life costs. With eight people on board this comes to £4M and therefore is under the ALARP 
Budget; ergo the duty holder should introduce spacesuits as the control measure. If the spacesuits 
were £5M each then at £40M total cost this could be argued as ‘grossly disproportionate’ i.e. the cost 
far outweighs the benefits gained. Either way in this case the factor may be simply down to a society-
based decision. 
Note: the values and equation used here represents a simplified method in order to demonstrate the 
principle of CBA in the ALARP process. There are far more comprehensive methods using spread-
sheets to include all of the variables involved such as training, lesser severity accidents and so on. 
Decision Analysis 
In the case of the spacesuit it might be more socially or politically acceptable that SFPs (and in 
particular flight crew) are provided with spacesuits and this is simply a decision made by the duty 
holder. This is probably the case with Virgin Galactic in that Burt Rutan wanted a ‘short-sleeve’ 
environment whereas the Virgin Galactic team (and their customers) wanted to look like an astronaut. 
 Sensitivity Analysis 
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Once the CBA has been conducted a sensitivity analysis should be undertaken in order to assist the 
duty holder with the decision where uncertainties prevent a final decision. The HSE define this 
activity as: 
“A sensitivity analysis consists of varying one or more of the 
parameters/assumptions of the CBA to see how these variations affect the 
CBA outcomes” 
In the example above should the probability be reduced to 1x10-6 per flying hour as part of the 
sensitivity analysis then the ALARP Budget is reduced to £320,000. Or if the number of people on 
board was limited to 6 and the Value of life reduced to £2M then the ALARP Budget is £3.2M. 
 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS 4.2.
Emergency systems are required on normal aircraft and in terms of the aircraft crash landing or 
ditching, these range from airworthiness seats to escape slides and dinghies. Designers and Operators 
should be discussing emergency systems from the outset in a development program and requirements 
should stem from User Requirements and fed down to System Requirements. From a bystanders point 
of view it would appear that designers like Scaled Composites have adopted a ‘solution-based’ 
approach rather than having a customer in the first instance determining what the User Requirements 
are. Indeed what are Designers doing to decide whether or not they should incorporate emergency 
systems such as a Ballistic Recovery System – it could be argued that to demonstrate that they have 
reduced their Risks to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) they should provide quantitative 
analysis i.e. using the CBA technique as described above. 
In a presentation on Crew Survivability, Jonathon Clark34 gave a moving account of how it was 
possible that the Crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia would have been alive (but possibly 
unconscious) after the craft broke up and was hurtling to the Earth. He stated that rather than 
‘emergency’ and ‘rescue’ capabilities that Spacecraft should feature survivability measures as this 
was the most likely of the choices of mitigation for post-accident mitigation.  
 Ballistic Recovery System 
A Ballistic Recovery System (BRS) is essentially a parachute system that deploys in the event of a 
loss of control emergency and the aircraft/spacecraft then parachutes safely to the ground. Figure 65 
details a BRS deployed on a General Aviation aircraft. To date the BRS has saved 261 lives35. 
                                                     
34
 Presentation at the 2nd IAASS Conference, Chicago, July 2007, “Crew Survivability: The New Frontier of 
Safety by Design in the Post Shuttle World,” Jonathon Clark’s wife was an astronaut on board of Space Shuttle 
Columbia. 
35
 261 lives saved as at 25 Apr 2011: http://www.brsparachutes.com/lives_saved.aspx 
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Figure 65: Ballistic Recovery System 
Arguably if a Suborbital Aircraft/Reusable Launch Vehicle is in an uncontrolled ballistic descent then 
the BRS would have to be capable of arresting the fall and maintaining structural integrity of the 
BRS-to-aircraft connectors. In addition to BRS as mitigation for the SoA/RLV it could be used for 
personal jettison pods as describe below. 
 Personal Parachutes 
Personal parachutes are used with gliders and arguably most current SoA/RLV designs have a ‘glide 
approach and land’ model and so parachutes could be introduced as part of safety mitigation (see 
4.4.8 under Hot Air Balloons). Additionally high-performance aircraft ‘thrill rides’ can be undertaken 
by the general public and they are provided with a parachute in case of emergency.36 Sports 
Parachutists and military parachutists have a main parachute and a reserve parachute. There are 
various methods of opening the parachutes ranging from static-line release to automatic altitude 
release systems. The reserve parachute is operated in the event of main parachute failures. In terms of 
parachutes for people flying in gliders they only have one parachute as this acts as the ‘reserve’ in 
case of aircraft failures. 
It is interesting that the spacesuit designer (Orbital Outfitters) state that their spacesuit ‘can be 
integrated into parachute harnesses’; this ratifies the author’s view that parachutes should be used as 
a personal safety feature for suborbital flights (meaning that other safety-minded engineers think in 
terms of mitigation – the spacesuit is a control and so is a parachute).  
Jettison Sphere/Seats 
In military fast jets pilots are provided with an ejection seat because of the high speed at point of 
ejection i.e. they are ‘assisted’ in leaving the aircraft by means of a rocket-fired ejection seat. To 
further assist the pilot in safely ejecting the canopy is also ejected or it is removed by detonation via 
miniature detonation chord. 
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 http://www.extrabatics.com/Thrillrides.aspx 
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To implement such a system in a suborbital aircraft would depend on the design of the vehicle. In 
standard business-jet SoA such as the EADS-Astrium vehicle carrying six passengers this would not 
be practicable. However the XCOR Lynx I & Lynx II RLV is a two-seater vehicle with the passenger 
sitting alongside the pilot. In this instance the vehicle could be designed to have ejection seats and this 
would be particularly relevant to the Lynx vehicles because the vehicle is rocket-powered from the 
runway. In the event of an abort scenario of Loss of Control or Fire then the occupants would be able 
to escape. 
In terms of a Jettison Sphere, these would be more relevant to orbital systems or could be employed 
on suborbital aircraft should the design have this in mind from the beginning. In particular jettison 
spheres could be a practical solution for vertical take-off and landing vehicles such as Blue Origin’s 
‘Sheppard’ RLV.  Here, if the SFPs are positioned around the circumference of the hull then they 
could be secured in a personal ‘pod’ for take-off and landing and this could also be a jettison-able 
pod. The pod would then have a BRS as the means to arrest the fall and bring the SFP safely to the 
ground. 
 ROCKET PROPULSION SYSTEMS 4.3.
  Rocket Propulsion 4.3.1
The various suborbital spacecraft designs have different Rocket Propulsion Systems (RPS) with some 
based on existing technology and some having new and innovative designs. The RPS is the heart of 
the spacecraft and this is the most technically challenging aspect in designing new suborbital 
spacecraft. There are different RPS models being developed for the suborbital market and the 
following presents a summary of the basic types of rocket motors and their propellants: 
Liquid Rockets 
Liquid Rocket Propellant is a common type of propellant which yields the highest specific impulse 
(Isp) i.e. the efficiency of the rocket motor (analogous to miles per gallon) in terms of impulse per unit 
of propellant. In Liquid systems both the fuel and the oxidizer (also a liquid) are brought together in 
the combustion chamber and ignited. Liquid propellant was used on the Space Shuttle and in the 
stages of vertical rockets such as Ariane 5 and Delta IV37 and due to the reliability factors liquid 
propellant is being used as a natural progression within some suborbital rocket motors. Some common 
liquid-fuel combinations include: 
 Liquid Oxygen (LOX) and kerosene (commonly known as RP-1);  
o XCOR’s Lynx RLV uses this type of propellant. Additionally XCOR are 
making progress with their cryogenic LOX pump and stated at the 2nd IAA 
that they had bench-tested it for 8 hours with no wear and therefore after 
testing were estimating a reliability rate of 5000 hours.  
o Rocketplane XP will also use LOX-Kerosene 
o EADS-Astrium’s space-plane will also use LOX-Kerosene  LOX and methane; 
o Armadillo Aerospace use this type of propellant in their MORPHEOUS 
VTOL vehicle 
Liquid Rocket Issues 
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 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liquid_rocket_propellants 
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Issues with Liquid rockets (as with jet engines) is that they require ignition immediately it is selected 
otherwise too much liquid will be in the combustion chamber and then they can either fail to start or 
should ignition occur late then a fire can occur (wet start) or within a pressure vessel a catastrophic 
failure may occur due to the excessive pressures (hard starts). 
Handling and Storage of LOX can be problematic but well-practised procedures can help mitigate 
some of the issues. 
Hybrid Rockets 
Hybrid Rockets use two different sorts of propellants in different states normally comprising of one 
solid and the other gas or liquid. As opposed to the Liquid system the solid portion of the hybrid 
system is already in the chamber and the generally the oxidizer is injected into the chamber and 
ignited. Figure 66 below details a typical hybrid rocket motor configuration38. The solid fuel used in 
Space Ship One was rubber and the liquid oxidizer was ‘laughing gas’ or Nitrous oxide (N2O). 
 
Figure 66: Typical Hybrid Rocket Motor 
 
Hybrids tend to combine the safety features and advantages of both solid fuel and liquid fuel rockets 
and therefore could be construed to be safer; in particular in the storage of the solid fuel.  
In Kenny Kemp’s book [15], he discusses the Virgin Galactic hybrid rocket motor with George 
Whitesides (Virgin Galactic Chief Technical Officer in 2007, now Chief Executive Officer): 
“The beauty is that because the propellants are separated physically and by 
phase – meaning one is a liquid and one is a solid – they cannot intimately 
mix in the event of a leak or something going wrong. So consequently, they 
cannot explode. They can’t detonate and they are very failure-tolerant. If the 
fuel inside a motor case cracks, it is not catastrophic the way it is with solid 
rocket propellant. Composite is the favoured way to go because it is very 
lightweight and very tough. And because the solid fuel lines the case on the 
inside, it acts as insulation. You have 5,000 degrees temperatures on the 
inside but there is all the fuel between the intense heat and the outer casing. 
The fuel slowly burns away, so the side of the case never feels the fierce 
combustion temperatures. The case does not see extreme temperatures until 
the very last moment when you are done” 
Today however the design of the Spaceship 2 rocket has evolved and it is considered by fellow 
enthusiasts that it is the rocket design that is holding up the program due to various issues; this is 
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 http://www.spg-corp.com/space-propulsion-group-resources.html 
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partly corroborated by the fact that the test phase has only recently begun and has not yet involved the 
rocket. 
Hybrid Rocket Issues 
In theory hybrid rockets should be safer and more cost-effective than their liquid rocket counterparts 
as long as they are carefully constructed. Indeed filling the solid fuel chamber with the oxidizer (say 
in the case of a valve leak) would not necessarily explode and therefore the explosive equivalence is 
often quoted as 0%39. 
The issues mentioned above concerning Virgin Galactic (Scaled Composites) and in particular their 
accident involving cold-flow tests is a reminder that rockets are however volatile and can explode 
unexpectedly. Issues with hybrid rockets are (from footnote): 
 Pressure vessel failures; Chamber insulation failure may allow hot combustion 
gases near the chamber walls leading to a "burn-through" in which the vessel 
ruptures  Blow-back; flame or hot gasses from the combustion chamber can propagate 
back through the injector, igniting the oxidizer and leading to a tank explosion  Hard Starts; An excess of oxidizer in the combustion chamber prior to ignition, 
particularly for monopropellants resulting in a temporary over-pressure or 
"spike" at ignition 
Table 24 below compares the liquid rocket propellant with those of the hybrid40 (encompassing both 
liquid and solid fuels) and details some safety additional considerations. 
Rocket Description Advantages Disadvantages Safety Considerations 
Liquid Propellant (such as 
hydrazine, hydrogen 
peroxide or nitrous oxide) 
flows over a catalyst and 
exothermically 
decomposes; hot gases 
are emitted through 
nozzle. 
Simple in concept, 
throttle-able, low 
temperatures in 
combustion chamber 
catalysts can be easily contaminated, 
monopropellants can detonate if 
contaminated or provoked, Isp is 
perhaps 1/3 of best liquids 
Handling of LOX – 
procedures and training 
must be effective 
 
Solid Ignitable, self-sustaining 
solid fuel/oxidiser mixture 
("grain") with central 
hole and nozzle 
Simple, often no moving 
parts, reasonably good 
mass fraction, reasonable 
Isp A thrust schedule can 
be designed into the 
grain. 
Throttling, burn termination, and re-
ignition require special designs. 
Handling issues from ignitable mixture. 
Lower performance than liquid rockets. 
If grain cracks it can block nozzle with 
disastrous results. Grain cracks burn 
and widen during burn. Refuelling 
harder than simply filling tanks. 
storage of the solid fuel 
safer but 
handling/refuelling has 
issues  
 
Hybrid Separate oxidiser/fuel; 
typically the oxidiser is 
liquid and kept in a tank 
and the fuel is solid. 
Quite simple, solid fuel is 
essentially inert without 
oxidiser, safer; cracks do 
not escalate, throttle-able 
and easy to switch off. 
Some oxidisers are monopropellants, 
can explode in own right; mechanical 
failure of solid propellant can block 
nozzle (very rare with rubberised 
propellant), central hole widens over 
burn and negatively affects mixture 
ratio 
Issues with ‘spikes’ at 
ignition and so pressure 
vessel must incorporate 
good safety margins 
Also low-frequency 
pulses noted on Space 
Ship One flight 
Table 24: Comparison of Rocket Motor Propellants 
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Propellant Accidents  
The above sections highlighted strengths and weaknesses of types of rockets and their propellants and 
this section will summarise the accidents associated with propellants and in particular during the RPS 
ignition phase whether in flight or on the launch pad.  
The accidents involving the RPS tends to be catastrophic and this was the case for Space Shuttle 
Challenger (1986) and on the launch pad for a Soyuz T-10 (1983) [see Table 2 and Table 3]. The 
Scaled Composites accident whilst testing their hybrid rocket system killed 3 of their scientists and 
severely injured more. Scaled Composites then published lessons learned [13] from the accident in the 
hope that industry will learn from the dangers of Nitrous Oxide. Key points included: 
 Adiabatic Compression; Designs should attempt to minimize adiabatic 
compression in the system during flow of the N2O oxidizer.  Decomposition in Liquid; the system pressure significantly affects the ignition 
sensitivity of liquid N2O. For example, N2O flowing at 130 psi in an epoxy 
composite pipe would not react even with a 2500 J ignition energy input. 
However, at 600 psi, the required ignition energy was only 6 J.  Pressure Vessel Design; In the event that ignition prevention measures and 
deflagration wave mitigations fail, pressure vessel designs should allow for a 
controlled failure upon overpressure. In large oxidizer systems operated at high 
pressures, the energy released during a tank rupture for whatever reason 
(structural, overpressure, feedback, decomposition) is very high. This failure 
mode should be designed for with burst disk or other similar safety precautions 
that can safely reduce the PV energy in the vessel without catastrophic failure. 
The Accident (according to the exemplar accident list at Table 12) is clearly accident A5 ‘Explosion’.  
 An explosion would results in the following effects: 
o Explosive blast resulting in;  Debris from an explosions which may injure or kill support 
personnel nearby (if on the launch pad or runway)  Damage to the vehicle  Damage to nearby equipment/buildings 
o Heat energy resulting in;  Burns (thermal radiation) to personnel inside the vehicle or to 
support personnel nearby (if on the launch pad or runway)  Fires to surrounding property 
o Release of toxic gases resulting in;  Pulmonary Function disorders (difficulty in breathing) leading to 
asphyxiation  Exposure to hazardous/toxic materials (absorption through skin) 
Accidents can also happen whilst in the Storage and Transportation phases and this was covered in the 
Spaceport section at 3.5. 
Conclusions on RPS 
Rocket Propulsion Systems are arguably the most hazardous and least reliable systems that will be 
part of a suborbital vehicle and therefore this requires the most effort from the early design phase and 
throughout the lifecycle; User and System Requirements must be detailed and Safety Requirements 
must be stated and linked to these primary requirements; then after the initial functional hazard 
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analysis further derived safety requirements will flow down to the RPS and further still to sub-systems 
of the RPS. The design and manufacture must follow best practice and the use of materials must be 
considered carefully. The test phases must be treated with the utmost diligence and even simple cold-
flow tests must follow stringent operating procedures encompassing all necessary mitigation such as 
segregation (of man and machine i.e. distance and shielding), personnel protective equipment, 
warnings and cautions. Handling propellants must also follow the same rigorous process in particular 
for LOX and cryogenic equipment.  
Even with well-defined engineering and operating procedures the above section highlights that 
systems safety management can play a role in assuring safety with safety-specific techniques; in this 
instance Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (OSHA) and Occupational Health Hazard Analysis 
(OHHA). The OSHA in particular would examine the procedures from a safety perspective, looking 
for human factor errors (where people skip steps or the procedure is actually in the wrong order or 
missing a step) and also looks at the concurrency and complexity of tasks and takes into account the 
environmental conditions for the RPS tests or activities.    
 NEAR SPACE BALLOONS 4.4.
Space Balloons may seem a strange conception but they have been in existence for decades. The early 
‘high altitude’ balloons were used for weather data gathering and later were developed to carry 
humans prior to the Russian success in sending a human into space using rocket-power. Since then 
there have a only been a few high altitude balloon flights with humans on board; in particular the 
‘Excelsior III’ balloon used for his third and record-breaking high-altitude ‘jump’ by Colonel Joseph 
Kittinger on 16 Aug 1960 from a height of 31.3km41. 
The FAA defines a balloon as; ‘a balloon is a lighter-than-air aircraft that is not engine driven, and 
that sustains flight through the use of either gas buoyancy or an airborne heater’42.  
  BLOON – ‘Zero2infinity’ 4.4.1
Zero2Infinity are a new company developing a ‘near space’ balloon (BLOON) with the goal of 
attaining a height of 36km for their 2-3 hour flight. The vehicle will be able to accommodate 4 
passengers and 2 pilots. 
 BLOON Technology 4.4.2
The BLOON technology strategy is to base the approach on existing technology but have a novel 
integrated solution and flight profile up to an altitude of 40km.  
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Figure 67: BLOON’s Sail 
The sail is basically a balloon filled with inert helium. It bears the whole system through the 
atmosphere, with no fuel or propellant, no noise and no discomfort.  
 
Figure 68: BLOON’s ‘Pod’, Descent Aerofoil, Chain and Landing Sub-system 
The chain links the pod and the sail. It also contains the necessary communication and localization 
systems and BLOON's emergency landing system. 
The Pod will serve as the passenger (and pilot) cabin whereby the splendours of the Earth will be 
viewed in a comfortable ‘shirt-sleeved’ environment.  
The Landing System shown in Figure 68 is deployed in the descent phase. The system is comprised of 
two segments: 
 Textile-based decelerators: ensures a quiet descent, directing the pod to its 
chosen landing site.  Inflatable absorbing systems: enables the attenuation of forces to make the 
landing as comfortable as possible  
 BLOON Safety 4.4.3
BLOON will have a robust safety-by-design philosophy which will adopt three levels of redundancy. 
Additionally there is no rocket-power involved that the technology and therefore this could be 
considered >90% safer (meaning that 80-90% of the spacecraft risk is due to the rocket propulsion 
system and 9% of the risk is during re-entry). 
 Tier 1 – Balloon based on known design and filled with Inert Helium   Tier 2 – Textile-based decelerators   Tier 3 – Emergency Landing System 
Additionally the pod will have two pilots and is designed on a submarine/ISS philosophy whereby the 
occupants do not have to wear pressure suits because of the exacting load factors that BLOON will 
design to (exceeding those of SoAs or RLVs). Additionally the pod will be under lower and more 
predictable quasi-static loads unlike SoAs or RLVs. 
A progressive test strategy is also envisaged with early testing conducted in Sweden’s Esrange Space 
Centre. Then it is envisaged that first commercial flights will be over low-populated areas until more 
reliability data is gathered.  
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BLOON’s technology and safety strategy appear sound and based on known technology (for the 
atmospheric balloon); however the technology for the human capsule or ‘pod’ is novel and will be 
challenging to get certified. Standard balloon certification routes can be followed but additional rules 
and guidelines will need to be applied and these will have to be rationalised. These aspects will be 
covered in the following sections. 
 Review of Current Information 4.4.4
4.4.4.1 Hot Air Balloons 
Hot Air Balloons are flown regularly and appear to have a reasonable safety record and this is backed 
up by the UK CAA’s CAP 780 [102]: 
“There were 27 reportable accidents involving UK public transport balloons 
in the period 1998- 2007. None of these reportable accidents was fatal, 
although there were 10 serious injuries and 41 minor injuries. There were no 
serious incidents involving UK public transport balloons in the period 1998- 
2007. There were 100 occurrences, of which two were considered to be high 
severity. No utilisation data are available for UK public transport balloon 
operations; therefore rates of accident, serious incident and occurrence 
cannot be calculated.” 
An American website has published accident rates for balloons though only include a two-year 
period: 
Year # of 
Accidents 
# of 
Fatalities 
Flight 
Hours 
Accidents per 
100,000 Hours 
1997 17 2 48,700 34.90 
1996 22 2 68,000 32.37 
Total 39 4 116,700 33.62 
Table 25: Hot Air Balloon Accident Statistics 
Table 25 above shows the accident rate for hot air balloons as 33.62 per 116,700 flying hours43 which 
equates to an accident rate of 2.9e-04 per flying hour. As a comparison General Aviation accident 
rates are currently 7 in 100,00044 which equates to 7x10-5 per flying hour or 0.7x10-4 per flying hour 
(with an implicit target of 1 in 10,000). Although the comparison is made here the reality is that 
balloons fly lower (mainly) and slower and hence the number of deaths is low; therefore is the 
comparison meaningful?  
CS-31HB – Certification Specification for Hot Air Balloons 
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 https://www.facworld.com/FACWORLD.nsf/Doc/Hotairballoon 
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Hot Air Balloons are certified against CS31HB.25 [103] and have guidelines published in AMC 
31HB.25 (b) [contained in Book 2 of the CS31-HB]. The only relevant safety requirement appears to 
be related to the design load factor which is 1.5 except for the following aspect: 
A factor of safety of 5 or more must be used in envelope design. A reduced factor of 2 or more may 
be used if it is shown that the selected factor will preclude failure due to creep or instantaneous 
rupture from lack of rip stoppers. The selected factor must be applied to the more critical of the 
maximum operating pressure or envelope stress. (See AMC 31HB.25 (b)) 
The CS and AMC contain design and construction requirements and operating limitations but these do 
not reflect any safety objectives. 
Additionally, the AMC covers ‘equipment’ on board and states: 
The correct functioning should not be impaired by operational circumstances 
such as icing, heavy rain, high humidity or low and high temperatures. The 
equipment, systems, and installations should be designed to prevent hazards 
to the balloon in the event of a probable malfunction or failure of that 
equipment.  
When ATC equipment and/or positioning lights as possibly required by 
operational rules are installed, it should be shown that the electrical system is 
such that the operation of this equipment is not adversely affected by 
operational circumstances. 
Arguably equipment should have their own safety case and the hazards should be analysed 
accordingly and a probability of failure stated which should meet standard aviation requirements (and 
safety objectives). 
As the CS did not contain any safety objective requirements other relevant documents were reviewed. 
CAP494 – British Civil Airworthiness Requirements 
CAP494 [104] contains similar design, construction and operating requirements as the CS-31HB but 
in addition contains basic safety objectives i.e. ‘the envelope shall not distort in a manner likely to 
lead to a hazardous loss of lift or control’, however the document does not categorise the safety 
objectives. 
4.4.4.2 Transport Airships 
A review of Transport Airship Requirements (TARs) was undertaken to determine whether there were 
any suitable cross-over from airships to hot air balloons (in particular to assist in determining effective 
criteria for ‘near space’ balloons). 
TAR 1309 – Equipment, Systems and Installations 
The airship requirements have explicit safety objectives as per the aviation requirements: 
(1) Any catastrophic failure condition 
(i) is extremely improbable; and 
(ii) does not result from a single failure; and 
(2) Any hazardous failure condition is extremely remote; and 
(3) Any major failure condition is remote. 
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TAR 571 – General 
The structure must be designed, as far as practicable, to avoid points of stress concentration where 
variable stresses above the fatigue limit are likely to occur in normal service. An evaluation of the 
strength, detail design, and fabrication must show that catastrophic failure due to fatigue, corrosion, or 
accidental damage, will be avoided throughout the operational life of the airship. 
A probability approach may be used in these latter assessments, substantiating that catastrophic failure 
is extremely improbable. 
TAR 581 – Lightning Protection 
The airship must be protected against catastrophic effects from lightning. 
TAR 671 – Control Systems (General) – if applicable 
(1) Any single failure not shown to be extremely improbable, excluding jamming, (for 
example, disconnection or failure of mechanical elements, or structural failure of hydraulic 
components, such as actuators, control spool housing, and valves). 
(2) Any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, excluding jamming 
(for example dual electrical or hydraulic system failures, or any single failure in combination 
with any probable hydraulic or electrical failure). 
(3) Any jam in a control position normally encountered during cargo loading/unloading, 
passenger boarding/un-boarding, take-off, climb, cruise, normal turns, and descent and 
landing unless the jam is shown to be extremely improbable or can be alleviated. A runaway 
of a flight control to an adverse position and jam must be accounted for if such runaway and 
subsequent jamming is not extremely improbable. 
TAR 803 – Emergency Evacuation 
If the occurrence of fire hazard for the passenger and crew compartments in crash landings cannot be 
considered extremely improbable, it must be shown that the maximum passengers capacity, including 
the number of crew members required by the operating rules for which certification is requested, can 
be evacuated from the airship to the ground under simulated emergency conditions within 90 seconds. 
4.4.4.3 BLOON’s Equipment 
Parafoils 
The second descent phase for BLOON involves the deployment of a ‘parafoil’ which is essentially a 
non-rigid textile aerofoil as depicted in Figure 68. The parafoil was developed by Domina Jalbert45 in 
1964 and he envisaged its use in airborne delivery platforms or for the recovery of space equipment. 
Due to its aerofoil shape, the parafoil has greater steer-ability, allows for increased glide range and 
allows for greater control (flare for instance) in particular for landing.  As opposed to a round 
parachute, the parafoil is considered a ‘square’ parachute (actually rectangular) and this feature, along 
with the ability to deflect one end or the other in order to turn (or deflect both for a flare manoeuvre) 
is the main differentiator in its selection for airborne delivery platforms and hence the BLOON 
project.  
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NASA has used parafoils on a number of programs including the X-38 and the Genesis program with 
varying success. The X-38 program was a crew return vehicle that required a parafoil to slow the 
landing speed from 250 knots vehicle design speed to 40 knots; the parafoil’s ability to flare was a 
major feature in its selection, along with the steer-ability. The NASA report [105] detailed 300 
successful tests of a subscale parafoil (wing area 750ft2) and 33 tests with full scale parafoils (5000 ft2 
and 7500 ft2); though these tests were from aircraft at various altitudes and using an extractor 
parachute which then deployed the drogue prior to deploying the parafoil. The requirements for the 
tests did not include safety objectives but were noted as: 
 Repeatable, low dynamic, on-heading openings  Space-rated materials  High design factors  Increased failure tolerance  Parachute weight and volume restrictions  Landing impact velocity and acceleration limits. 
The X-38 program was subsequently cancelled however the US Department of Defence then took 
over the program and developed the parafoil with a guidance system for use in the delivery of cargo 
loads. No statistics are available for the equipment. 
A parafoil was also used on NASA’s Genesis project which cited a 100% success rate during the test 
phase of the parafoil. However after the Sample Return Capsule had re-entered Earth’s atmosphere 
the ‘Drogue’ parachute failed to deploy and hence the parafoil was not deployed; this resulted in the 
Capsule being destroyed. The Mishap Investigation Board’s Report [106] found that the root cause 
was failure of the ‘G-Switch’ which should have activated and deployed the drogue ‘chute’ in order to 
deploy the parafoil. As the load was a space capsule then the resultant consequence of the accident 
was catastrophic loss of the equipment. Figure 69 details the Genesis parafoil and details the 
suspension lines and risers. 
 
Figure 69: NASA Spacecraft ‘GENESIS’ Sample Return Capsule with Parafoil deployed 
Military airborne delivery equipment (ADE) tends to have one or more round parachutes depending 
on the size of the load. For a heavier load (or equivalent to the Near-Space Pod or X-38 program) two 
or three parachutes are used compared to the single parafoil.  
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Indeed military ADE technology has developed since the X-38 program and a good analogy is the 
evolution of the Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS) program. JPADS combines the Army's 
Precision and Extended Glide Airdrop System (PEGASYS) program with the USAF's Precision 
Airdrop System (PADS) program to meet joint requirements for precision airdrop and wants to satisfy 
four identified principal needs/”gaps” in the joint airdrop functional area; increased ground accuracy, 
standoff delivery, increased air carrier survivability, and improved effectiveness/assessment feedback 
regarding airdrop mission operations. JPADS has four projected weight increments linked to a 
common mission planner and/or aircraft components: JPADS-2K for up to 2,200lbs; JPADS-10K – 
10,000 lbs.; JPADS-30K for up to 30,000lbs; and JPADS-60K for up to 60,000 lbs.  
These systems require incrementally larger canopies and in comparison the X-38 would fit into the 
JPADS-30K category whereas the BLOON system fits into the JPADS-10K category and therefore 
has lower technological challenges. A similar system is the Smart Parafoil Autonomous Delivery 
System (SPADES) which is in the ‘2K’ weight range which aims to be certified against Dutch 
military airworthiness requirements46.  
The author has knowledge of square and round parachutes due to working on the safety aspects for 
these systems and the following are considered typical hazards: 
 Parachute fails to deploy: due to the following causes; 
o Extractor failure (drogue parachute failure) 
o Static line not attached 
o Parachute canopy cells ripped 
o Air Starvation – parachutes side-by-side often have this 
o Contamination – water/icing  Premature Parachute disconnect:  due to the following causes; 
o Mechanical disconnect failure 
o Air Starvation (as the load then senses ‘relief’ and the mechanical disconnect 
releases the parachute  Obstruction in the Drop Zone (inherent hazard); in this instance the parafoil is 
steer-able so obstructions should not be an issue 
The above hazards would apply to BLOON’s parafoil system and there will be many more hazards to 
analyse and to manage with appropriate mitigation (see 4.4.9 below regarding Functional Hazard 
Analysis); indeed in the case of the ‘GENESIS’ parachute malfunction the BLOON profile is more 
benign but the hazard analysis will need to be conducted for ‘drogue not deployed’ (for the parafoil).  
The Pod ECLSS 
BLOON’s pod is designed for two pilots and four passengers and is planned to fly to an altitude of 
40km with the total flight lasting two hours. As opposed to hot air balloons or even transport air 
balloons the BLOON pod will require an environmental conditioning and life support system 
(ECLSS). This will be a closed-loop system and must comply with basic requirements such as those 
contained in FAA 460.11 [71] as follows: 
(a) An operator must provide atmospheric conditions adequate to sustain life and 
consciousness for all inhabited areas within a vehicle. The operator or flight crew must 
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monitor and control the following atmospheric conditions in the inhabited areas or 
demonstrate through the license or permit process that an alternate means provides an 
equivalent level of safety— 
(1) Composition of the atmosphere, which includes oxygen and carbon dioxide, and 
any revitalization; 
(2) Pressure, temperature and humidity; 
(3) Contaminants that include particulates and any harmful or hazardous 
concentrations of gases, or vapours; and 
(4) Ventilation and circulation. 
(b) An operator must provide an adequate redundant or secondary oxygen supply for the 
flight crew. 
(c) An operator must 
(1) Provide a redundant means of preventing cabin depressurization; or 
(2) Prevent incapacitation of any of the flight crew in the event of loss of cabin 
pressure. 
In addition to the closed-loop system, BLOON’s design of the pod’s interior incorporates three 
pressure-isolated zones that have two functions concerning privacy (for intimate flights) and primarily 
for safety; in the event of slow depressurisation the crew and passengers can move to one of the 
isolated zones as safety mitigation. 
The pod also employs an emergency system which can provide an extra mass flow inlet in order to 
compensate for the exiting air as a result of depressurization thereby maintaining the internal pressure 
within safe values during the time required for the emergency procedure; the emergency procedure 
will consist of taking the passengers to one of the three pressure isolated modules in the pod and then 
initiating an emergency descent using textile-based decelerators or even a free fall to a safe height. 
Avionics Equipment 
Although the Pod will not employ Complex Programmable Equipment (CPE) such as for essential 
flight requirements in Suborbital Aircraft any equipment used in the system such as automatic flight 
control system for the parafoil guidance system, navigational equipment or communications 
equipment must be safe and hence follow the relevant certification requirements. BLOON’s 
equipment is stated to be a transponder, radar reflector and Global Positioning System. 
4.4.4.4 BLOON’s Flight Profile  
The Ascent Phase  
Helium Lift-Off  
The balloon starts the ascent due to the lifting force of helium. The helium expands, thus getting 
colder, as the balloon goes up in the troposphere at an average ascent speed of 5 m/s. This ascent rate 
quickly drops to 2 m/s at the tropopause since the helium’s temperature is colder than the atmospheric 
temperature. A ballast release is then required to increase the ascent rate. This operation shall be 
repeated as many times as necessary. The ballasting system is a simple hatch, which is remotely 
controlled and can be opened and closed to release small lead or glass spheres. This system will be 
controlled from the inside of the cabin. 
The Descent Phase 
Venting & Free-fall 
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The initial part of the descent involves opening the venting valves which are located at the top of the 
balloon and are remotely controlled. At cruise altitude the solar radiation is very high and it makes the 
helium temperature increase thus over-expanding the balloon. The valves will remain open about 40-
50 minutes (depending on the helium temperature) so that the balloon slowly starts descending 
(V<1m/s). Additional venting operations will be necessary to reach a descent rate of 3-4m/s. In the 
event the descent rate exceeds a limit value (i.e. 4m/s) it can be reduced by releasing additional 
ballast. 
BLOON has the ability to include a ‘free-fall’ phase between the vent phase and deployment of the 
parafoil. This could provide a 30-second microgravity phase prior to deployment of the drogue 
parachute which then deploys the parafoil.  
4.4.4.5 BLOON Operator Considerations 
Other issues that BLOON may wish to consider include: 
 Wind – this is a major factor affecting the safe flight of a Hot Air Balloon and 
also the parafoil. Limitations will have to be in place regarding wind-speed limits  Icing – At altitude this may be a factor and certain control systems may have to 
have anti-ice capabilities  Lightning  - This is an ‘extremely improbable’ event but one that must be 
considered in terms of mitigation strategies; bonding of equipment and static 
wicks are design features and also procedural controls will be to check the 
weather and avoid the chance of lightning  Bird-strike – The windows should be designed to withstand a large bird impact at 
altitude. As this event may be ‘occasional’ then the design strength plays a major 
factor in mitigating the issue. Additionally this may play a major factor in 
determining whether or not to have pressure suits or emergency oxygen available 
i.e. in the case of a cracked window due bird-strike and the pod is subject to de-
compression. Finally the operator procedures should include pre-flight planning 
in terms of weather and also obtaining information on bird migration and nesting 
so that the areas can be avoided.  Loose Articles – The windows should also be shatter-proof against passenger’s 
loose articles in particular in the descent phase (post sail release and prior to the 
parafoil deployment i.e. in the microgravity phase   Flight Corridor – The flight profile is up to 40km and for two hours duration and 
therefore a flight corridor will need to be established with a NOTAM in place 
with the ATM system. Additionally; 
o The NOTAM will provide sufficient mitigation to exclude other air vehicles. 
This must be for a ‘corridor’ of specified altitude, length and width 
o The operator should engage with ATC to derive ‘windows of opportunity’ for 
BLOON whereby the air traffic is ‘light’ within or near the corridor; this can 
reduce the exposure of other air traffic thereby reducing the exposure to a 
mid-air collision. Initially for the test phase BLOON will fly from Esrange 
Space Centre (Kiruna, Sweden); Esrange has launched many high-altitude 
balloons and sounding rockets and therefore Air Traffic should not present an 
issue. However when flying commercially a flight corridor will be required.  Pilot’s License and Medical – Standard requirements for Hot Air Balloons could 
apply with perhaps more stringent elements due to the extreme altitude and 
technology and additional training for specialist medical equipment  Pax requirements – Passengers should have Medical Certificates from their 
general Practitioners, however it is advisable to have specific questions relating to 
the flight  Safety equipment – the following safety equipment should be provided; 
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o Fire fighting appliances will be required in the pod 
o Medical Equipment - Additionally as the pod is a more serene flight than a 
SoA and with more room, medical first aid equipment could be carried 
o Pilot and Passenger seat restraints will be required 
o Protection against sun glare 
o Personal Parachutes (see 4.4.4.4 above and 4.4.8 below) 
o Emergency Oxygen supply 
o Pressure suits for test flights and early flights in order to acquire enough 
confidence with the system; indeed BLOON already plan to conduct their 
first flights using pressure suits similar to the ones used by Russian MIG 
pilots like the VKK-6M or the VMSK-4. 
 Certification Route 4.4.5
BLOON could arguably apply for certification through the Spanish Civil Aviation Authorities 
(Directorate General of Civil Aviation) as per normal hot air balloons using CS-31B. Clearly the main 
difference is the ‘near space’ altitude and flight profile which would require integration with the 
Spanish (and European) ATM System with appropriate NOTAMs. BLOON could also engage EASA 
for specialist advice and possible certification if outside the competence of the Spanish Authorities. 
Special Conditions will apply (Special Conditions will also apply to Suborbital Aircraft for example) 
and these will be discussed with the authority as part of the certification of the vehicle; some of these 
SCs are detailed in Table 29 below such as Environmental Conditioning and Life Support Systems 
(ECLSS). 
Recommendation: It is recommended that BLOON engage EASA’s assistance in determining suitable 
safety criteria for their near space system. This recommendation is carried forward to 6.3. 
 Proposed Safety Criteria for ‘Near Space’ Balloons 4.4.6
There appears to be little quantitative requirements in terms of certifying balloons and air ships and 
therefore there are certainly no existing criteria applicable to the BLOON project. So is the answer to 
apply an Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) approach in which BLOON provides evidence of 
equivalence to the existing CS-31B in the form of design analysis and operating procedures and 
supplementing specific additional requirements (such as relevant TARs or Special Conditions 
identified by the designer and regulator)? 
In terms of safety criteria, should the BLOON project have a safety target approach, a failure 
condition safety objective approach or a simplified safety requirement approach? With a simplistic hot 
air balloon system, statistics showing a failure rate of 2.9e-04 per flying hour (as detailed in 4.4.4 
above); can we derive a safety target for a more complex system using this accident rate as a baseline? 
It is considered that the hot air balloon accident rate sample is too small (only over a two-year period) 
and so more rationale is required in the derivation of such a target. The BLOON vehicle will be a low 
usage product (lower than hot air balloons) and one could argue that a safety target of 1 in 10,000 
(1x10-4) catastrophic events could be achievable. Additional reasoning is that the BLOON is not like 
an aircraft/SoA/RLV in that there are not 100 catastrophic failure conditions (probably 10 catastrophic 
events) and so the achievement of the safety target is not unrealistic; whereas in the case of SoA it 
will be challenging to meet a catastrophic safety target of 1x10-4 per flying hour because of the rocket 
propulsion system reliability. 
It could also be argued that qualitative criteria will suffice as that is what hot air balloons are currently 
certified to. The following is based on the analysis for the SoA but simplified using qualitative 
descriptions for likelihood (probability) classifications and using standard severity classifications: 
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Likelihood 
(preferred 
option to meet 
CS) 
Probability (optional internal 
company classifications to assist in 
determining whether internal safety 
target is met) 
Qualitative Description 
Frequent >1x10-2 Likely to occur often in the life of the system  
Probable 10-2 to 10-3 Likely to occur several times in the life of the system  
Occasional 10-3  to 10-4 Likely to occur sometime in the life of the system  
Remote 10-4  to 10-5 Remote Likelihood of occurring in the life of the system  
Improbable 10-5 to 10-6 Extremely unlikely to occur in the life of the system 
Extremely 
Improbable 
<10-6 So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be 
experienced in the life of the system 
Table 26: Proposed Likelihood Classification for BLOON 
Description 
& Category 
Actual or 
Potential 
Occurrence 
Effect To People Effect to Asset Effect to 
Environment 1st Parties 2nd Parties 3rd Parties 
Catastrophic 
 
Accident Multiple 1st Party 
deaths 
 
Multiple 2nd 
Party deaths 
 
Single 3rd 
Party death 
Loss of 
spacecraft 
Extreme  
widespread 
environmental 
damage 
Hazardous 
 
Serious 
Incident - 
Asset 
or 
Accident 
(people 
death/injury) 
Single 1st Party 
death 
Physical distress 
or excessive 
workload impairs 
ability to perform 
tasks 
Single 2nd Party 
death 
 
Multiple 
Serious 
injuries 3rd 
Party 
(requires 
hospital 
treatment 
more than 2 
days) 
Severe damage 
to spacecraft 
Large 
reduction in 
Functional 
capabilities or 
safety margins 
Severe 
environmental 
damage 
Major 
 
Major 
Incident 
Multiple Serious 
injuries/ illnesses 
to 1st Parties 
(requires hospital 
treatment more 
than 2 days) 
Physical 
discomfort or a 
significant 
increase in 
workload 
Multiple 
Serious injuries/ 
illnesses to 2nd 
Parties (requires 
hospital 
treatment more 
than 2 days) 
Physical 
discomfort 
Single 
Serious 
injury to 3rd 
Party 
(requires 
hospital 
treatment 
more than 2 
days) 
Major damage 
to spacecraft 
Significant 
reduction in 
functional  
capabilities or 
safety margins 
Major 
environmental 
damage 
Minor 
 
Minor 
Incident 
Minor 
injuries/illnesses 
to 1st Parties 
(requires first aid 
and/or hospital 
treatment for less 
than 2 days) 
Slight increase in 
workload 
Minor 
injuries/illnesses 
to 2nd Parties 
(requires first 
aid and/or 
hospital 
treatment for 
less than 2 days) 
 
Minor injury 
to 3rd Parties 
(requires 
first aid 
and/or 
hospital 
treatment for 
less than 2 
days) 
Minor damage 
to spacecraft 
Slight 
reduction in 
functional 
capabilities or 
safety margins 
Minor 
environmental 
damage 
Negligible 
 
Occurrence 
without 
safety effect 
Inconvenience Inconvenience 
(requires 
assistance and is 
reportable) 
Single 
Minor injury 
to 3rd Party 
Less than 
Minor damage 
 
Less than minor 
environmental 
damage 
Table 27: Proposed Severity Classifications for BLOON 
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The following Risk Matrix (based on the SATURN SAFETY MODEL) is proposed for BLOON. The 
rationale is that the matrix can be used with the qualitative approach but also with the (internal 
company) quantitative approach; the rationale for the later approach is to determine whether the 
evidence can be gained to meet a safety target (of 1 in 10,000 catastrophic failures for instance). The 
purpose of this would be to demonstrate that the ELOS requirements of CS-31B and associated 
Special Conditions had been met and indeed exceeded. Using this top-down approach for an emerging 
and novel system would be a pragmatic approach. In terms of individual safety critical systems we 
can then derive that the designer must be able to demonstrate the 10 catastrophic failure conditions 
meets the circa 1 in 100,000 per flying hours failure rate; this should be achievable for the known sub-
systems such as the parafoil, balloon and helium sub-system. The pod is the notable exception and the 
designer would have to argue excessive safety margins (per submarine/ISS design margins) in terms 
of providing evidence that the load factor has been met with a lot of reserve and that the operating 
profile is benign (as opposed to high-g SoA/RLVs); along with BLOON’s emergency 
depressurisation strategy. Also by having a safety target approach (with implicit safety objectives) 
then arguably the 10 catastrophic failure conditions could be in the catastrophic ‘C’ cell (for 1 in 
100,000) and still meet the safety target of 1 in 10,000. 
The Risk Matrix categories accord with the Transport Airship Requirements in the absence of specific 
criteria from CS-31B: 
(1) Any catastrophic failure condition 
(i) is extremely improbable; and 
(ii) does not result from a single failure; and 
(2) Any hazardous failure condition is extremely remote; and 
(3) Any major failure condition is remote. 
 Severity (Safety Event) 
Likelihood/Probability Catastrophic 
(Accident) 
Critical/ 
Hazardous 
(Serious Incident) 
Major 
(Major 
Incident) 
Minor  
(Minor 
Incident) 
Negligible 
 
Frequent                      > 10-2 A A A B C 
Probable               10-2 to 10-3 A A B C D 
Occasional           10-3  to 10-4 A B C D D 
Remote                10-4  to 10-5 B C D D D 
Extremely Remote10-5 to10-6 C D D D D 
Extremely Improbable  <10-6 D D D D D 
Table 28: Proposed Risk Matrix for BLOON 
An alternate method of determining a loss rate is to use the ‘abort rate’ methodology as detailed in 
section 2.2.6.1 (for a winged spacecraft low test rate strategy) whereby 2 abort events were required 
for a vehicle loss and this then had an assumption of only 50% of accidents resulting in fatalities. 
Their analysis detailed that ‘this implies a vehicle loss rate of 1 in 20,000 which equates to a loss of 
life probability of 1 in 40,000 and therefore they claim that their initial estimates suggest they are 
more than one hundred times ‘safer’ than the Space Shuttle’. 
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 Proposed Technological Requirements 4.4.7
From the above discussions and general review of suborbital technical requirements in 2.3.8.2 the 
following additional safety-based Technical Requirements could be applicable to BLOON: 
ID Requirement Source Rationale 
1 CS-31B standard requirements 
(that are applicable) 
CS31-B/ 
AMC to CS31-
B 
EASA and National Aviation Authorities will 
understand the CS for Hot Air Balloons and then 
BLOON can engage with the Authorities’ Subject 
Matter Expert to derive Special Conditions (and 
safety targets/objectives). Of particular importance 
(among others that are applicable) is the means to 
indicate the maximum envelope skin temperature or 
maximum internal air temperature during operation. 
2 ECLSS requirements FAA 460.11 CS31-B concerns ‘baskets’ that are not pressurised 
clearly. The pod will be a closed-loop system and 
must conform to standards 
3 Pod Structural Load TAR 571 In that ‘An evaluation of the strength, detail design, 
and fabrication must show that catastrophic failure 
due to fatigue, corrosion, or accidental damage, will 
be avoided throughout the operational life of the 
[pod]’ 
4 Emergency Oxygen System FAA 460.11 In addition to the closed-loop system in case of 
depressurisation a redundant system should be 
employed i.e. the use of individual emergency oxygen 
or other suitable design feature (such as the BLOON 
three pressure isolated modules and extra mass inlet 
flow) 
5 Smoke Detection & Fire 
Suppression System 
EASA 
851-865 
FAA 460.13 
Fire suppression must be compatible with a closed-
loop system. Fan blowers may be required to ensure 
smoke can be detected throughout the flight i.e. 
during possible microgravity periods  
6 Doors EASA 783 No untimely opening of doors but to have the means 
of opening quickly in the event of an emergency 
7 Bird-strike impact requirements 
(from outside) 
EASA 775 windows should be designed to withstand a large bird 
impact at altitude 
8 Loose article impact 
requirements (from inside) 
EASA 775 windows should also be shatter-proof against 
passenger’s loose articles in particular in the descent 
phase (post sail release and prior to the parafoil 
deployment i.e. in the microgravity phase 
9 Lightning Protection TAR 581 The airship must be protected against catastrophic 
effects from lightning 
10 Weather Limits Non-specific (in addition to Balloon requirements) i.e. Wind for 
the parafoil and Icing for the landing and emergency 
systems 
11 Seats & Restraints EASA 785 Hot Air balloons have handles for passenger restraint 
whereas the pod will have seats fitted – these (and the 
restraints) must meet EASA requirements 
12 Emergency Evacuation TAR 807 
EASA 803, 
805-813 
On top of the 90-second requirement on the ground, 
BLOON should consider in-flight bail-out in 
emergency situations and by the use of parachutes 
13 Personal Parachute 
Requirements 
Civil/ Military 
standards 
Only applicable if used as an emergency measure 
(recommended) 
14 Parafoil requirements Parafoil 
Standards 
Institute of 
America 
PSIA and other relevant standards for parafoils  
15 Extractor (drogue) parachute Military/NASA Extractor parachute should have an ELOS of the 
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ID Requirement Source Rationale 
requirements standards GENESIS system and can therefore be argued to be 
better as the re-entry is not from orbit 
16 Medical Equipment Non-specific as the pod is a more serene flight than a SoA and with 
more room, medical first aid equipment could be 
carried 
17 Passenger information signs EASA 791 Required as part of certification 
18 Validation & Verification 
programme 
FAA 460.17 This should be standard within the design lifecycle 
for the equipment and also include safety V&V 
19 Software Safety DO-178-B Depending on equipment employed – may not be 
applicable 
20 Complex Hardware DO-254 Depending on equipment employed – may not be 
applicable 
Table 29: Proposed Additional Technical Requirements for BLOON 
 Proposed Additional Safety Mitigation 4.4.8
BLOON’s strategy of a balloon-style near space ride is clearly safer in terms of not being subject to 
RPS issues and high g-force issues and current designs have sound mitigation built in. From the above 
discussions additional safety mitigation could be implemented and strengthen the safety case.  
 Survivability Measures 
o Personal Parachutes – in the event of an envelope failure, arguably the 
parafoil can be deployed (via the drogue chute). In the unlikely event of 
either a drogue chute failure or a parafoil failure (either to deploy or to be 
able to provide control) then what is the last line of safety for the passengers 
and crew? The landing system (inflatable absorbing system) is really only to 
assist in normal landings and with hard landings, so would not be of any use 
in the case of high altitude parafoil failures. An option is to provide 
passengers with personal parachutes. These are presently issued to people on 
experience flights in gliders and for high-performance flights such as in the 
‘Extra 300’ flights47. However although these are an additional level of 
emergency mitigation it also brings challenges in terms of training and ‘bail-
out’ hazards. However it is here that the designer could employ the safety 
technique of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) to determine that the costs versus 
the benefit gained. 
o Personal Capsules – Capsules or escape pods could be designed that 
incorporate their own parachute system. Again the designer could employ the 
CBA technique to determine that the costs of designing such a system would 
be grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained. 
 Proposed Safety Management Strategy 4.4.9
As the BLOON project is more complex than a hot air balloon it is recommended that a safety case 
strategy is adopted and backed up by a robust Safety Management System; especially as BLOON 
state that ‘safety is our first priority’. This should start with a Safety Management Plan for the project 
accompanied by a simplified System Safety Program Plan for the designers. 
In terms of safety assessment and to assist in providing certification evidence for this more complex 
system it would be prudent to demonstrate that hazards have been identified and their likelihood’s 
established and that residual risks have been classified and are being managed to as low as reasonably 
practicable. 
                                                     
47
 http://www.extrabatics.com/Thrillrides.aspx 
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The SATURN SAFETY MODEL detailed in the thesis would be appropriate for BLOON’s safety 
analysis. 
The Functional Block Diagram (FBD) approach should be used and the exemplar FBD (Figure 41) is 
reproduced below in Figure 70 with those functions that are not applicable ‘crossed-out’; the purpose 
of this is to demonstrate that the functions do need to be analysed but also that there are far fewer 
relevant functions. Additionally some of the functions needed to be changed to represent BLOON’s 
design such as replacing ‘provide engine motive thrust’ with ‘provide helium-assisted lift’ and 
‘replacing ‘provide control of aircraft roll attitude’ with ‘provide directional control of parafoil’ as 
detailed below: 
 To Aviate (fly) 
o To provide helium-assisted lift’ 
o To provide control of the platform (in the air) 
o To provide directional control  
o To provide control of the platform (on the ground) 
o To provide structural integrity 
o To provide visibility   To Navigate 
o To provide awareness of platform state (in terms of altitude, heading and 
(vertical) speed) 
o To provide platform current position and flight path data  To Communicate 
o To provide external visual clues (meaning to communicate visually) 
o To provide external communications  To Transport (including containment) 
o To provide habitable areas 
o To provide crew seats/restraint 
o To provide passenger seat/restraint 
o To provide normal ingress/egress 
o To provide emergency egress 
o To provide ability to contain helium systems 
o To provide ability to contain aircraft equipment 
o To provide ability to release containment of helium  To Display platform conditions 
o To detect and warn of platform conditions 
o To manage equipment and systems operation 
These remaining and retitled functions would then be analysed in a platform level FHA. Following 
this the sub-system FHAs would be undertaken along with Occupational Health Hazard Analysis, 
Operating & Support Hazard Analysis and Zonal Hazard Analysis.
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Figure 70: Functional Block Diagram representing the Suborbital Aircraft functions and those aspects not relevant (crossed out) to BLOON
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4.4.10 BLOON REVIEW CONCLUSION 
The BLOON project presents an interesting and unique design and ‘near space’ operating profile and 
this appears to have less risk than the current SoA/RLV spacecraft designs with Rocket Propulsion 
System hazards and high-g-forces. The current design philosophy and safety strategy appears robust 
at this early phase and is based on a three-tier safety philosophy.  
The review concludes that there are no specific certification criteria for the design apart from the hot 
air balloon criteria (CS-31B); this does not cover all of the BLOON aspects and does not detail 
quantitative safety objectives. The certification could be undertaken with the Spanish Authorities in 
the normal manner for hot air balloons with the addition of Special Conditions such as for the ECLSS 
and other operating issues such as design requirements for bird-strike impact with the windows. 
BLOON could employ an Equivalent Level of Safety approach to meet the requirements of the CS 
and Special Conditions and indeed can be industry fore-runners in setting safety standards and safety 
objectives. EASA could also assist in this or with the whole certification of BLOON. 
In terms of Safety Management the BLOON project states that ‘safety is our first priority’ and this 
should be backed up with the implementation of a robust Safety Management System and employing 
a safety case strategy due to the additional complexities of the system (over normal hot air balloons). 
A Safety Manager should be an essential part of the team from the early phases of design progression 
and be responsible directly to the Chief Executive Officer as well as the Program Engineer. 
Additionally an Independent Safety Auditor could be employed though an Independent Technical 
Evaluator may provide sufficient oversight for the authorities.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – Validation of Research 
 FINDINGS 5.1.
The thesis has uncovered various levels and types of safety best practice and guidelines for 
organizations to follow and has found that in the main these are being followed to the best of people’s 
competences. However it was interesting to find that the metrics used in determining the safety level 
of an aircraft (and spacecraft) stopped at the design organisations boundary i.e. the infamous 1x10-9 
per flight hour for a catastrophic failure condition for aircraft. This value was derived from analysis of 
historic accident rates which were 1 in a million (1x10-6 per flight hour). This was then broken down 
into 10% of accidents due to safety critical system failures and with 100 arbitrary safety critical 
systems thus resulting in 1x10-9 per flight hour. In the suborbital safety domain the Federal Aviation 
Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA-AST) have provided regulations 
and safety guidance material in the form of Advisory Circulars and other generic guidance and it was 
found that the safety criterion within has not been rationalised (per the aviation criterion mentioned 
above) and that this is not helping the industry48.  Furthermore it was found that although some of the 
generic guidance was based on aviation and NASA best practice this was not necessarily relevant for 
the nascent suborbital domain; an example of this that the FAA-AST is focused on protecting the 
‘public’ i.e. 3rd parties and has not been concerned with protecting the flight crew and space flight 
participants (SFP). The reason for this is that the boundaries of the FAA-AST are considered too 
expansive  in that ‘commercial spaceflight’ covers not only the suborbital domain but also the  orbital 
industry; here is the main problem in that the regulations and guidelines are really for a Launch 
License to orbit and these  have been modified slightly for the suborbital domain. Clearly with designs 
such as Virgin Galactic’s air-launched aircraft-based vehicle which flies within a remote and excluded 
corridor (vertically as well as horizontally excluded) then the risk to the public will be very low 
indeed as compared to a vertical orbital-bound vehicle that will at some point overfly a populated 
area; both in terms of people on the ground and aircraft in the air. 
It was found that aircraft operators use risk profiling from their Flight Operations Quality Assurance 
(FOQA) process and some airline safety managers did not even use a hazard log. Therefore the 
airworthiness or design risks presented by 100 catastrophic failure conditions were not taken forward 
in an accident sequence whereby operator procedures, training and operating limitations should be 
used as controls to prevent an accident. 
This lack of contiguous safety approach provided an interesting challenge to develop such a model for 
the suborbital industry and then possibly for the aviation industry. 
The review also found that there were no such regulations or guidelines for suborbital operations in 
Europe and this provided an opportunity to establish these with EASA and therefore assist in 
influencing the European-based suborbital designers and operators.  
 SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS 5.2.
The research found that the FAA-AST safety criterion was extremely poor and that they were 
employing a launch license approach; the significance of this meant that the FAA-AST methodology 
would not be appropriate within a European regulatory framework.  
                                                     
48
 Based on the author’s discussions and work for Virgin Galactic and from the views of the industry noted at 
space conferences (2nd IAA and 4th IAASS) 
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Another of the major findings of the research was that the safety analysis was not contiguous from the 
designer to the operator and therefore the operator was not fully aware of the risks of the aircraft 
(spacecraft). This is clearly presented within a case study of the Air France AF447 disaster whereby 
the designer knew about the design issues with the pitot-tubes and instigated a Service Bulletin for all 
operators to change them; Air France were still flying ten days later without changing procedures, 
training or introducing limitations and subsequently the aircraft and all on board were lost. The 
SATURN SAFETY MODEL shows the failings and had the operator employed proactive safety 
management and in particular using an explicit model then the people would still be alive today. This 
is the same for the Space Shuttle’s Challenger and Columbia and these also were subject to a case 
study using the new model.     
 FUTURE RESEARCH 5.3.
The thesis highlighted various issues that were outside the scope of the main objectives and these 
were summarised with recommendations for future research. Most of the future research 
recommendations can be direct actions for the International Association for the Advancement of 
Space Safety (IAASS) new Suborbital Space Safety Technical Committee (SSS TC) which the author 
initiated and is the Chair of; hence these are on the agenda to be resolved as near-to-medium 
objectives. 
Further research is required with EASA to substantiate the SoA Policy (goal-based regulatory safety 
case) due to the timeframe of European Commission’s decision to continue with the task.  
 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS  5.4.
The results of the thesis show that a new safety model is required for the emerging suborbital domain 
and that this could also be applicable for the aviation domain. 
The results of the EASA Suborbital Aircraft Policy safety argument shows that the regulations and 
guidelines of the existing EASA framework can accommodate SoA requirements; but this requires the 
addition of Special Conditions. The evidence was backed up by using FAA-AST regulations and 
guidelines as references where applicable however there were instances when these were considered 
not robust enough for EASA SoA certification requirements or for EASA SoA guidelines; examples 
being that the FAA-AST only require a Class II Aerospace Medical Certificate for flight crew 
whereas EASA now require a Class I and the FAA-AST only consider the ‘public’ in terms of 
Expected Casualty (Ec) and use a launch license approach whereas EASA intend to certify the SoA 
and therefore also consider the pilots and SFPs.  
 SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 5.5.
It is considered that the results are significant in that this thesis has highlighted a gap in the safety 
methodology being employed today by designers and operators in that they are not employing a 
contiguous approach to safety; rather that they are doing things very well in their own area of 
responsibility and this can have drastically negative effects as demonstrated in the Air France Flight 
AF447 case study. The results have shown that by using a contiguous safety approach and by 
employing a formal safety model then the safety manager (responsible person) and the operator’s 
Chief Executive Officer (accountable person) will know their Accident Risks and Total System Risks 
and will therefore be able to manage these by reducing the risks so far as is reasonably practicable i.e. 
being able to demonstrate this by means of cost benefit analysis or decision analysis and to justify this 
within their safety statements for each risk. 
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In terms of the EASA SoA Policy it was expected that the case for safety could be argued however the 
significant aspect is that EASA are not competent to certify the ‘space segment’ (as they have stated 
all along) and this has not been addressed by the industry thus far. This is a significant issue that 
needs to be resolved by the suborbital community and this is within the remit of the IAASS Suborbital 
Space Safety Technical Committee and this is recommended as such in Chapter Six.  
 AUTHOR’S VALIDATION OF THE ‘THESIS CASE’ 5.6.
 Personal Validation 5.6.1
The structure of this Thesis was governed by the Goal Structured Notation methodology and the 
Goals were presented in Section 1.3. To validate the ‘Top Goal’ (that the research strategy meets the 
criteria for award of a PhD) it was necessary to examine the evidence provided to support the sub-
goals (G1 to G4) i.e. was the literature and industry review effective and were innovative 
methodologies and guidance provided as a result of the review. Finally it was important that the thesis 
was effectively validated. 
 (G1): The review of spaceflight-related literature and industry standards ensures a thorough 
understanding of personal spaceflight issues; G1 is supported by Evidence of sufficient literature 
review (E1.1) and Evidence of Personal Spaceflight Industry review (E1.2): 
Evidence E1.1: The review of spaceflight safety literature focused on existing orbital 
spaceflight aspects in order to determine whether any lessons could be identified that would 
carry forward to the suborbital industry. Here it was useful to identify not only the infamous 
disasters but also the ‘near misses’ in order to gain a better understanding of the risks 
involved in spaceflight. The second part of the literature review concentrated on the safety 
tools and techniques available that may be appropriate for use in the suborbital vehicle design 
and operations. This was important because rather than just accept ‘the norm’ in civil aviation 
and governmental-led space programs the review provided a chance to analyse the standards 
and guidelines in order to determine which would be suitable for the suborbital domain. Here 
it was found that there was a ‘disconnect’ between the design system safety analysis and the 
operator safety risk management. This meant that operators were basing their risk assessments 
qualitatively in a bespoke manner and therefore could not possibly comprehend the risks 
presented to the aircraft either by severity type or indeed the total risk presented by the 
aircraft. 
The evidence is substantiated in sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
Evidence E1.2: The personal spaceflight industry review focused on the nascent suborbital 
domain and as the industry is yet to get off the ground this provided a useful opportunity to 
determine whether the regulations and guidance material were acceptable or not. The FAA-
AST is the leading regulatory body as the fore-runners in the industry are based in America. 
The reviews concentrated on the FAA-AST safety-related documents and although some were 
found reasonable and based on good practice others were found to be more applicable to the 
orbital domain rather than the suborbital domain. Here it was found that the FAA-AST is 
covering ‘commercial spaceflight’ which includes both orbital and suborbital; the author 
contends that the two fields are distinct enough to warrant their own regulations and 
guidelines (though it is acknowledged that some common areas exist and so these could be 
rationalised as such). Within Europe the review highlighted that EASA have no such 
regulations or guidance material and so this presented an opportunity to assist in providing 
rationalised safety management information within a new framework. EASA had provided a 
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stance that they believed that suborbital aircraft (SoA) could be dealt with in an existing 
European certification framework but EASA were not authorised by the European 
Commission to do so as yet. Additionally the author had attended many spaceflight 
conferences and established many contacts within the domain and was able to review the 
industry presentations to gauge whether a safety culture was emerging and also whether the 
correct legal authority had been established to govern the suborbital flights. 
The evidence is substantiated in section 2.3. 
(G2): The Gap Analysis is comprehensive in order to meet the aims and objectives; G2 is supported 
by Evidence (E2.1) Authors Papers and Evidence (E2.2) Authors Gap Analysis. 
Evidence E2.1: The review included identifying the ‘current state’ of the industry and analysed 
whether gaps existed such that possible methodologies and guidelines could be developed to assist in 
deriving a ‘future state’. Throughout the period of the research a number of papers were authored and 
presented at the space-related conferences in order to promote the gaps and important aspects within 
the suborbital industry. 
The evidence is substantiated at Appendices 8 – 12.  
Evidence E2.2: The gap analysis was a contiguous effort through the review and therefore this 
evidence is implicitly linked with E1.1 and E1.2.   
(G3): The proposed methodologies and guidelines are innovative and appropriate for the identified 
disciplines; G3 is supported by Evidence (E3.1) EASA SoA Policy GSN (Rules & Guidelines), (E3.2) 
Suborbital Spaceflight Training (&Medical) Analysis, (E3.3) Operator Analysis and Evidence, (E3.4) 
Spaceport Analysis,  (E3.5) Synthesis of Emerging technologies) and (E3.6) New Safety Model. 
 Evidence E3.1: The task to support EASA in deriving a SoA Policy and guidance material provided 
an opportunity to influence the suborbital domain in terms of safety criteria (for certification aspects) 
and safety management considerations (as supplemental considerations for guidance material). The 
author assisted in the initial Pre-Regulatory Impact Assessment which is a process that determines 
whether the risk and effort is within EASA’s remit and competence. Then the author continued with 
the EASA team looking at the baseline Policy structure. The author then produced a goal-based 
argument for the Policy (that needed to be instantiated) and also continued with more detailed safety 
management activities for later when deriving guidance material for designers and operators. The 
current status is that the European Commission has yet to make the decision to continue with the task 
despite a number of potential designers/operators requesting assistance from EASA in certifying their 
SoA. 
The evidence is substantiated at 3.2, 3.3 and APPENDIX 5 - Suborbital Aircraft Policy – Goal 
Structuring Notation. 
Evidence 3.2: The suborbital spaceflight training and medical review highlighted that the FAA-AST 
approach was too ‘flexible’ and although in Europe it is not the intent to stifle the industry the 
regulations and guidelines must be sufficiently robust in order to minimise accidents or incidents. The 
author’s knowledge coupled with industry expert opinion provided guidelines that were appropriate 
for the nascent industry.  
The evidence is substantiated at section 3.6. 
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Evidence E3.3: Although the planned SoA operators such as Virgin Galactic and Rocketplane were 
not able to assist in the thesis Zero2Infinity were able to assist in providing information from which to 
analyse their design and operations. The ‘near space’ balloon and pod system was an interesting 
model to analyse from a safety management perspective and to determine whether the operator would 
be receptive from the guidance provided. 
The evidence is substantiated at section 4.4. 
Evidence 3.4: The Spaceport analysis was conducted by synthesis only. This was achieved by 
reviewing the FAA-AST Environmental Requirements for Spaceports, reviewing the Launch Site 
safety documents and also reviewing the standard airport requirements. This enabled a cohesive set of 
requirements to be formed for a Spaceport Safety Management System. 
The evidence is substantiated at section 3.5. 
Evidence 3.5: There are various emerging technologies within the suborbital domain and these are 
discussed as to the potential issues and risks presented by the systems. In particular rocket propulsion 
systems and emergency systems (such as ballistic recovery systems, spacesuits and parachutes) are 
discussed. In the later the case for spacesuits is explored further and a safety tool is used to assist in 
the decision as to whether to employ spacesuits or not. The tool used is Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
which stems from the UK Health and Safety Executive’s ALARP principle. This can also be backed 
up by sensitivity analysis where the parameters in the CBA calculation can be altered. Finally a 
‘decision’ analysis is a formal way of stating that a control measure is introduced (such as a spacesuit) 
for socio-political reasons even if the CBA calculation suggests that the cost is disproportionate to the 
benefit gained. 
The evidence is substantiated at section 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
Evidence E3.6: The review highlighted a lack of contiguous safety analysis in the aviation and space 
domains (from designer to operator) despite there being good practice guidelines at the designer level 
and the operator level. Ultimately this meant that the operator is unaware of the risks presented by the 
aircraft and was unaware of the effect of operator control failures; this was proved by the use of case 
studies (Air France AF447 disaster and the Space Shuttle disasters). This provided an opportunity to 
close the gap and determine whether a contiguous safety model was possible. The author identified 
that a platform level hazard existed (a ‘Key (Platform) Hazard’) which formed the missing link in the 
contiguous safety model. This is then linked to specific ICAO-based accidents (and/or Safety 
Significant Events) at the operator safety risk analysis and finally a feedback method is employed to 
the base events of the designer analysis. 
The evidence is substantiated at section 3.4. 
(G4): The validation process is effective in ensuring the Thesis has met the Top Goal; G4 is supported 
by Evidence (E4.1) Authors Findings, Evidence (E4.2) Authors Discussions, Authors 
Recommendations (E4.3) and also Validation by EASA Evidence (E4.1.1), Operator Validation 
Evidence (E4.1.2)  
Evidence E4.1, E4.2 and E4.3 are substantiated in sections 5.1 through to 5.5. 
Evidence E4.1.1: EASA validation is substantiated at section 5.7.1 
Evidence E4.1.2: Operator validation (Zero2Infinity). The evidence is substantiated at section 5.7.2. 
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 VALIDATION BY REGULATORY BODIES & INDUSTRY 5.7.
 EASA Validation 5.7.1
The following provides the validation from EASA’s perspective. The relevant Chapters 2.4.8 
(review), 3.3 and 3.4 (with Appendix 4) cover the analysis concerning the EASA Suborbital Aircraft 
Policy and guidelines. As stated within the relevant chapters the EASA main SoA task has yet to be 
authorised from the EC and the research has focused on the preliminary phases of suitability and 
applicability. Additionally Chapter 3.4 provides ‘supplemental considerations’ which is the author’s 
more explicit analysis that may be used by EASA in preparing their guidelines for the European-based 
suborbital industry. 
Andy Quinn’s thesis is a comprehensive synthesis, as well as a projective 
reflexion on the current and future main challenges faced by the personal 
spaceflight industry in terms of safety. His work may be profitably used as a 
baseline of discussions in future cooperative research works. However, 
although being in charge of the safety of aviation in Europe, i.e. for the safety 
of European citizens with respect to operation of aircraft, including Sub-
orbital Aircraft in the European airspace, at the present stage, EASA is not 
officially involved in any rulemaking or certification task for SoA. Therefore, 
the above validation reflects only a personal opinion, based on the 
professional experience of the reviewer both as ESA Astronaut Safety 
Manager and EASA SoA Coordinator. Also, it should be noted that 
discussions on the safety objective to apply to SoA are still not conclusive, 
although a consensus amongst EASA experts was aiming at a level similar to 
the one of Class III Commuters, as indicated in AMC 23.1309. 
  Jean Bruno Marciacq 
  EASA SoA Coordinator 
  zero2infintiy Validation  5.7.2
The following provides the validation from a designer/operator’s perspective. The relevant Chapter 
4.4 covers the analysis of the BLOON project based on research undertaken for this thesis. 
As the first sustainable experiential aerospace company, zero2infinity’s 
mission is to elevate our planetary consciousness. zero2infinity’s maiden 
vehicle, BLOON, has been designed from day-1 to provide the 21st 
century traveller with the most life-enriching and meaningful journey beyond 
the blue skies into the blackness of Space. So we are fortunate to live in a time 
when a new industry is developing. The general public is about to enlarge its 
sphere of accessibility above commercial aircraft routes to ever higher 
spaces. More than anything else, safety is the enabler. It's the make or break 
criterion for the success of the industry. Andy's work on the topic 
is comprehensive, ground-breaking and will long be a reference. The analysis 
shows some points to think about and I think that the Functional Block 
Diagram is particularly complete and interesting. Also the section 4.4.7 
(Proposed Technological Requirements) could be very useful to analyse the 
safety issues concerning particular parts or subsystems. 
Jose Miguel Bermudez Miquel (on behalf of Jose Mariano Lopez Urdiales, CEO) 
Product Developer, zero2infinity (BLOON Project)
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CHAPTER SIX – Conclusions & Recommendations 
 CONLUSIONS ON SAFETY 6.1.
The review provided the author with an interesting task of examining existing safety management 
system methodologies within the aviation and space domains and to back this up with academic 
reviews in order to piece the puzzle together. It is concluded that in general all aspects of both 
industries are ‘doing their bit for safety’. However the various organizational component parts are 
doing their bit in accordance with their way of doing things and herein lay the problem; there is not a 
contiguous safety effort.  
Previously at NASA49 designers, HMI, safety and operators did not come together until required at 
certain milestones and finally at the last stages of the development. Also the disparate organizations 
had resulted in a poor safety culture and hence management were cited as contributors in the Space 
Shuttle disasters. Today in NASA we have designers talking to safety and we have designers talking 
to HMI, but we do not have designers talking to HMI and safety50. What are the safety objectives that 
design organisations have to meet and what does this mean in terms of catastrophic safety targets i.e. 
does NASA have one? In particular for the ISS the focus is on ‘product safety’ and there are stringent 
requirements backed up by effective operating procedures; but none of this appears to be managed at 
the total system level and thus it could be argued that the Total System Risk is unknown. The Space 
Shuttle safety is based on the ISS standards and requirements and once again do they know the Total 
System Risk. As the Shuttle Program ends and NASA discuss future commercial programs they are 
talking about ‘certification’ and safety of the crew and passengers; finally progress in the right 
direction (as opposed to just being concerned about the ‘public’ safety). 
Within aviation we have airbus meeting certification standards with their safety analysis and operators 
(such as Air France) doing their operator safety risk management; however they use different metrics 
and therefore the operators are assuming a lot from their design colleagues and have not fully 
understood the accident sequence and their role in ensuring safety of the aircraft. The thesis uses the 
AF447 disaster in proving the systemic disconnect and proving that a contiguous safety model 
approach could have averted the accident. 
The nascent suborbital industry is led by fore-runners in America with poor guidelines on safety 
because the FAA-AST regulatory and guideline scope is for ‘commercial’ spaceflight and this 
includes orbital and suborbital. These two domains are literally miles apart and also miles apart in 
terms of the approach required to provide safe assurance of the vehicles and therefore the flight crew 
and space flight participants. The suborbital safety effort within Europe will focus on an existing 
EASA regulatory framework for aircraft certification and this is a different approach to the FAA-AST 
and their launch license approach which is biased towards the orbital vehicles i.e. vertical launch and 
with an equatorial-based flight trajectory and hence this will be over a populated area at some point. 
Currently these fore-runners have provided some interesting design solutions for their experimental 
phase but it is assumed that these will then be employed for operations; the problem here is that there 
are good safety features but the designs have not fully explored the survivability/crashworthiness 
aspects that would have been part of the systems safety analysis at the beginning of a project. It is 
known that one of these leading companies did not even have a safety manager until recently and they 
                                                     
49
 The author’s view on NASA presentations and how they have progressed and improved their processes. 4th 
IAASS, Huntsville, May 2010 
50
 As per footnote 48 
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have been designing the vehicle for many years now (and involving the operator from the beginning); 
hence there is concern from the general space industry51 about the safety culture and safety 
management of these ‘newcomers’. This is not surprising due to the lack of rationalised safety 
guidelines; after all these are not companies who have a long established history in aircraft or 
spacecraft design/manufacturing for the commercial market.  
 OTHER CONLUSIONS 6.2.
The thesis provided an opportunity to provide a synthesis on emerging technologies within the 
suborbital domain and also to provide a synthesis on the safety management at a Spaceport. 
It is concluded that the fore-runners in the suborbital domain are experimental-based designers and 
these are providing some unique and disparate models which appear exciting and novel. However to 
win the second space race they appear to have missed a couple of steps in the design lifecycle and 
gone for the engineering solution-driven approach. An example is that in the event of a Loss of 
Control (for instance in the ‘space segment’ i.e. the RCS has failed and they are still upside down and 
unable to recover due aerodynamic forces) then an accident control would be to have a Ballistic 
Recovery System (BRS). This realisation would only have been a resulting conclusion from a formal 
Functional Hazard Analysis at the beginning of the program. This could also have been backed up 
with an optimisation approach whereby a Cost Benefit Analysis would prove whether the cost of 
introducing a BRS proved beneficial (in terms of reducing the severity [consequence]); even in the US 
where Space Flight Participants will be required to sign a ‘waiver’ not to sue and that they know the 
risks involved, the lawyers (in  the event of a Loss of Control accident) will no doubt look for what 
was mitigation was reasonably afforded their clients – in this instance the operators will probably lose 
the argument. 
Spaceports are just glorified airports – or are they? With some RLV/SoA designs such as EADS-
Astrium’s rocket-plane and indeed Rocketplane’s own design, the vehicles take-off and can land 
under normal engine power and therefore should be able to take-off from an airport. However in this 
case, the airport would have to get additional certification in terms of storing and handling of rocket 
propellants and therefore may take the name of a Spaceport/Airport in any case. Other designs such as 
XCOR (rocket initiated on the runway) or Armadillo Aerospace’s vertical RLV will not be able to 
launch from a normal airport and hence must be certified as a Spaceport. The addition of rocket 
propellant and noise issues are governed in the US by the FAA-AST Environmental Guidelines and 
therefore this thesis has been able to derive safety requirements based on those guidelines with the 
addition of airport guidelines and additional knowledge gained from the industry. It is considered that 
Spaceports can be certified and can operate safely by incorporating a Safety Management System 
early on in their design and throughout their operation.   
 RECOMMENDATIONS ON SAFETY 6.3.
 New Safety Model 6.3.1
The review highlighted gaps in the current safety management methods in terms of a lack of 
contiguous safety approach between designers and operators. There is effective guidelines for 
designers in order to achieve an airworthy aircraft (spacecraft) and there is some guidelines for 
operators to identify and manage their hazards and risks; however these are not joined up and 
therefore there is a danger that the operator is unaware of his overall (total system) risk  - or even 
                                                     
51
 ‘Concern about the safety of these newcomers’ was stated at the 4th IAASS conference in Huntsville, 
Alabama, May 2010. 
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individual or severity class risks. The SATURN SAFETY MODEL proposed in Chapter 3.4 presents a 
contiguous safety model that was validated by using case studies both in the aviation domain (Air 
France flight AF447) and in the space domain (Space Shuttles Challenger & Columbia). 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the safety model is presented to the suborbital industry, 
authorities and agencies for consideration. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the safety model is presented to the aviation industry, 
authorities and agencies for consideration. 
  Continuation of EASA Task 6.3.2
At the time of thesis submission EASA were awaiting approval from the EC to continue with the 
Suborbital Aircraft Policy. In the meantime the author continued the analysis and goal-based 
regulatory safety case. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that EASA continue to substantiate the SoA Policy (goal-based 
regulatory safety case) when approval is received from the EC to continue the task.  
 EASA to Derive Safety Criteria for Near Space Balloons 6.3.3
The BLOON project is a near space balloon and although CS31-B could apply in part, Special 
Conditions will be required for the BLOON system. Additionally there are no formal safety targets or 
safety objectives and it is recommended that BLOON engages with EASA to derive a safety target as 
a minimum. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that BLOON engage EASA’s assistance in determining 
suitable safety criteria for their near space system. 
 OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY BY THE IAASS SSS TC 6.4.
Further work considerations for the IAASS Suborbital Space Safety Technical Committee include: 
 Suborbital Space Segment Safety 6.4.1
Within Europe EASA is competent to certify SoA up to but not including the space segment of the 
flight. The FAA-AST has no delineation in terms of a Launch License ‘environment’ (domain) and 
they are also not certifying RLVs therefore they do not have the issue. The safety of SoA within the 
space segment requires discussion mainly in terms of the legal aspects i.e. who is competent to accept 
responsibility (for safety and of course liability). The design of the vehicles will strive to provide for 
safe flight i.e. ECLSS, Reaction Control Systems and in terms of the operator, the requirements to 
ensure Space Flight Participants are secured in their seats for the descent and hence this is not the real 
issue for EASA because the descent is within the remit of EASA. 
The argument is whether to adopt a Space Law regime or an Air Law regime and the outcome of this 
debate will then realise whom the regulators are and as to whether the vehicles (RLV or SoA) should 
be licensed or certified.  
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake the analysis and provide the 
best practice/guidelines to the appropriate authorities.   
 Vertical Launch Criteria 6.4.2
Vertical Launch System in the European Arena: Spaceport Sweden are considering Vertical Launches 
as well as trying to get Virgin Galactic to operate from there. Vertical launches are considerably more 
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hazardous than horizontal or air-launch systems due to the potential for explosion on rocket initiation. 
Flight Safety abort systems are required (more so that for horizontal systems arguably) because an 
occurrence could result in a Fire/Explosion and the aim is to try and prevent the death of not only 
those on board but also the support staff (2nd party) and spectators (3rd party). Further work is 
required in this area to determine the criteria to which safety should be demonstrated. Using the 
logarithmic methodology from the American Standards approach [84] one could simply add another 
level of severity and probability to that of horizontal/air-launch.  
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis in relation to 
vertical launch criteria within the suborbital domain.  
 Abort Rate Criteria 6.4.3
There are difficulties in establishing loss rates for new equipment and section 2.2.6 discussed an 
‘abort rate’ that was calculated from a loss rate. The analysis should be further investigated and in 
particular this may be useful for the suborbital vertical launch/vertical landing vehicles such as 
Armadillo Aerospace. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC reviews the ‘abort rate’ methodology 
provided by Reaction Engines Ltd (for their orbital based design ‘SKYLON’) at the 2nd IAA 
conference in order to determine its merit for use in the suborbital domain.  
 Safety Model Hazard Log   6.4.4
The Safety Model detailed in Section 3.4 culminated in the development of a prototype Hazard Log 
that accommodates the methodology of the Safety Model. As opposed to Design Organisation hazard 
logs and separate Operator Safety Risk management tools (risk profiles and hazard logs), the Saturn 
SMART Hazard Log provides an integrated approach that is User-friendly and provides relevant 
information and reports to enable Duty-Holders to make appropriate Safety-related decisions; mainly 
concerning Risk but also concerning design changes.  
The Saturn SMART Hazard Log has been developed to a prototype stage in order to gauge the 
viability of the tool. This must now be developed further to include a web-based Server. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the Hazard Log tool is developed further with a 
mainstream software provider. 
 Organisational Safety Risks 6.4.5
The SATURN SAFETY MODEL in highlighted a need to include the organisational and support 
activities as part of the safety analysis. The Operating & Support Hazard Analysis (OSHA) is a good 
technique that can uncover many organisational and human-related issues that should be considered 
(in particular by the Operator). 
 FRR Flight Risk Assessment 6.4.6
The FRR Flight Risk Assessment is a tool to assist in the decision-making for suborbital operations. It 
should be validated and reviewed to include further aspects to consider prior to flight in order to 
ensure that all relevant flight-related risks have been assessed. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 3.4.12 in relation to Flight Readiness Review (FRR) Flight Risk Assessments.  
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 Suborbital Medical Standards 6.4.7
There are currently no detailed and rationalised medical standards for Suborbital Space Flights. The 
following recommendations should be carried out to provide a more robust and rationalised approach 
to medical standards for suborbital flights. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 3.6 in relation to Flight Crew & Space Flight Participant Medical & Protective Equipment 
Standards.  
 Suborbital Training Standards 6.4.8
There are currently no detailed and rationalised training standards for Suborbital Flights. The 
following recommendations should be carried out to provide a more robust and rationalised approach 
to training for suborbital flights. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 2.3.6 and above centrifuge and anti-g suit proposals 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 2.3.3 and above simulator proposals 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 2.3.6 and above altitude training proposals 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS SSS TC undertake analysis based on the 
findings in 2.3.6 in regards to Space Flight Participants 
 Occurrence Reporting 6.4.9
The existing Air Safety Reporting scheme requires reviewing to include suborbital flight phases and 
aspects as applicable. 
Recommendation: It is recommended that the IAASS TC undertake a review of the Air Safety 
Reports (mishap reports) with regards to suborbital domain requirements. 
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Acronyms/Abbreviations 
Acronym/ 
Abbreviation 
Meaning 
AC Advisory Circular 
ACARS Automatic Communication Addressing and Reporting System 
ADE Airborne Delivery Equipment 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance 
ANR Active Noise Reduction 
AOC Air Operator Certificate 
ARMS Aviation Risk Management Solution 
ARP Aerospace Recommended Practices 
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuits 
AsMA Aerospace Medical Association Working Group 
ASR Air Safety Report 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
ATO Abort to Orbit 
BRS Ballistic Recovery System 
CAA Civil Aviation Authority 
CAP Civil Aviation Publication 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CEP Communications Ear Plug 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CHS Commercial Human-Rated Systems 
CLSAA Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act 
COPUOUS Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
CPE Complex Programmable Equipment 
CPLD Complex Programmable Logic Devices 
CS Certification Specification 
DAL Design Assurance Level 
Def-Stan Defence Standard 
DO Design Organisation 
EA Environmental Assessment 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
EC European Commission 
Ec Expected Casualty 
ECLSS Environmental Conditioning and Life Support System 
ELOS Equivalent Level of Safety 
ETA Event Tree Analysis 
EU European Union 
EVA Extra Vehicular Activity 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAA-AST Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
FAA-AVS Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety 
FAI Fédération Aéronautique Internationale 
FBD Functional Block Diagram 
FC Failure Condition 
FCL Flight Crew Licensing 
FHA Functional Hazard Analysis 
FMECA Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
  Acronyms/Abbreviations 
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FOQA Flight Operations Quality Assurance 
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Arrays 
FRAM Functional Resonance Accident Model 
FRR Flight Readiness Review 
FSS/FTS Flight Safety System/Flight Termination System 
ft Feet 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GA General Aviation 
GAIN Global Aviation Information Network 
GAMAB Globalement Au Moins Aussi Bon 
G-LOC G-Induced Loss of Consciousness 
GSN Goal Structuring Notation 
HF Human Factors 
HMI/HME Human Machine Integration/Engineering 
HRI Hazard Risk Indices 
HSE Health & Safety Executive 
IAA International Academy of Aeronautics 
IAASS International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IIP Instantaneous Impact Point 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
ISS International Space Station 
ISSF International Space Safety Federation 
ISU International Space University 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
JPADS Joint Precision Airborne Delivery System 
JSSG Joint Services Specification Guide 
LOX Liquid Oxygen 
MoD Ministry of Defence 
N2O Nitrous Oxide 
NAS National Airspace 
NASA National Aerospace and Space Administration 
NOTAM Notification to Airman 
NPA Notice of Proposed Amendment 
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
OHHA Occupational Health Hazard Analysis 
OSHA Operating and Support Hazard Analysis 
PADS Precision Airborne Delivery System 
PEGASYS Precision and Extended Glide Airdrop System 
PFH Per Flight Hour 
PHL Preliminary Hazard List 
PPPY Per Person Per Year 
PRE Preliminary Risk Estimation 
PSSA Preliminary System Safety Assessment 
RIA Regulatory Impact Assessment 
RLV Reusable Launch Vehicle 
RPS Rocket Propulsion System 
RTC Restricted Type Certificate 
SB Service Bulletin 
SC Safety Case 
SC Special Conditions 
SCR Safety Case Report 
  Acronyms/Abbreviations 
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S-FME(C)A Software Failure Modes Effects (and Criticality) Analysis 
SFP Space Flight Participant 
SHA System Hazard Analysis (same as SSA- System Safety Analysis) 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
SMS Safety Management System 
SoA Suborbital Aircraft 
SRK Skills-Rule-Knowledge (based errors) 
SS1/SS2 Space Ship 1 and 2 
SSE Safety Significant Event 
SSS Suborbital Space Safety 
SSWG Software Safety Working Group 
STAMP Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
SWG Safety Working Group 
TAL Transatlantic Landing 
TC  Technical Committee 
TNA Training Needs Analysis 
TTS Thrust Termination System 
ULT Upper Level of Tolerability 
UN  United Nations  
V&V Validation & Verification 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VTOL Vertical Take-Off and Landing 
WK2 White Knight 2 
ZHA Zonal Hazard Analysis 
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APPENDIX 1 - PhD Proposal – 2006 
DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES  
Background 
Travelling at 3 times the speed of sound during the ascent and experiencing 5 times Earth’s nominal 
gravitational forces during re-entry is not a normal flight profile. Two dates will remain key moments 
in the new and exciting field of Space Tourism – 29th September and 4th October 2004, when 
Spaceship One (SS1) achieved heights of 103km and a record breaking 112km respectively. The 
flight was a 2-stage launch profile: the first stage was up to 50,000ft with the SS1 attached to a 
’Mother-Ship’ (the White Knight) to save on fuel; the second stage was the release of SS1 at 50,000ft, 
followed by rocket ignition taking SS1 to the pre-requisite ‘space height’ of 100km at 3 times the 
speed of sound. The spacecraft spent 5 minutes in the space environment under its own momentum 
and then returned through the atmosphere under gravity using a unique wing feathering system before 
returning to normal configuration and gliding back to the departure runway. 
How does the general public, let alone highly trained flight crew, cope with these and other exacting 
environmental factors during a suborbital spaceflight?  To enable the innovative space tourism 
industry to achieve success, designers and operators must constantly view the challenge from a safety 
perspective. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has produced regulatory guidelines to cover 
the varying design proposals of prospective Re-Launch Vehicle (RLV) operators and these guidelines 
provide baseline measures. The challenge for the RLV Operators is to employ safety criteria to meet 
and exceed the guidelines.  
Project Description 
The aim of this project is to examine how, and if, introducing a safety management system from 
scratch can influence the commercial space travel industry. In particular, I will be introducing a 
holistic Safety Management System (SMS) and will review different approaches. Due to the 
complexities of space travel, I review the Safety Case approach, including the Goal Structured 
Notation (GSN) methodology. During the implementation of the SMS, I will be able to examine the 
influence from a ‘Through Life Management Plan’ (TLMP) perspective, including environmental 
legislative requirements. Spaceports and Spaceflight Training will also be discussed as part of 
Industry’s business and safety integration.  
New and Raw Data 
I aim to produce a survey questionnaire on Safety and should have access to the prospective Space 
Tourists. I aim to analyse the results and correlate these to the proposed mitigation measures and 
discuss any gapped issues.  
Having access to Medical data during the pre-flight screening and training will give another input to 
the SMS and mitigation factors to consider. 
I would then aim to instigate a Test Phase questionnaire for pilots and other flight crew and analyse 
the results, once again looking at further mitigation factors, as appropriate. Also, during this phase, I 
would integrate my investigations with the Medical telemetry, looking at whether mitigating measures 
were effective, or whether further measures are required in design, procedures or training. 
Finally, during the first few months of the In-Service Phase, useful data from passenger surveys and 
medical telemetry would give valuable knowledge from which to instigate change management, as 
appropriate. 
The holistic programme should evolve along the following path: 
Design Phase 
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It is essential to have senior management ‘buy-in’ to safety management at the beginning and to 
resource this accordingly; Safety Policy statement from the company President/CEO is the start. 
It is critical to begin constructing the safety case framework and the Hazard Log. From this, I would 
expect to demonstrate the influence of the SMS (safety by design) in mitigating hazards by:  modification to the design  introduction of operational procedures  training 
Test Phase  Examining the difference of ‘As Designed’ and ‘As Flown’ safety cases.  Change Management; adjustments to design, procedures and training may be 
required and an effective SMS, incorporating documented change management 
procedures.  Psychological and Physiological aspects to be managed from the crew’s 
perspective and then adapted for the general public.  Pre-Operations phase passenger survey on safety perspectives.  Assessment of training and medical telemetry results of crew and test subjects. 
In-Service Phase  Monitoring of initial space flights and examining results/surveys from the general 
public – to include medical telemetry of passengers.  Change & Risk Management strategies. 
Objectives  Primary. My primary objective is to provide an effective SMS solution to 
commercial spaceflight operations and activities, whilst examining the influences 
of safety management during the project.   Secondary.  My secondary objectives are to provide an assessment of the next 
steps to orbital operations, with respect to differences in psychological and 
physiological requirements.  
RESOURCES 
I intend to use the following sources: 
Correspondence and meetings with different RLV Operators 
Visits/ Seminars/ Courses/ Surveys/ Related books, magazine articles/ Internet sites 
Primary experience in introducing an SMS 
Primary experience on the proposed training schedule 
Having read a previous students PhD dissertation 
OUTLINE OF MAIN CHAPTERS 
Introduction 
Review of Space Tourism Regulations 
Review of SMS 
Review of Hazard and Risk Management 
Review of Safety Case methodology 
Examine Influence of SMS during design, test and In-Service phases 
Examine different RLV Operator’s approach to safety 
Examine the role of Safety & Environmental Management at Spaceports 
Examine the role of Spaceflight Training for Flight Crew & Passengers 
A look at future Orbital Space Travel challenges  
Recommendations 
Summary, Conclusions, Further Work 
TIMESCALE 
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Apr/May 06 - PhD approval 
2006-9  - Examination of SMS influence 
2008/9  - Write-up first draft 
2009  - Revise/re-write as appropriate to final draft  
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APPENDIX 2 – Timeline of Related Research Activities 
Activity 
Date 
Spaceflight/Research 
Activity 
General Topic Specific Presentation/ 
Meeting 
Remarks 
Sep 2006 Introductory Meeting 
with City University to 
kick-off suborbital space 
research 
Kick-Off meeting to 
discuss research 
possibilities 
Meeting   
Sep 2006 Conference – 56th IAC 
Valencia 
Space Conference  Paper & Presentation on 
SMS for commercial 
spaceflight 
First presentation at 
major event – well 
received and interesting 
discussions on topic 
with Director of BNSC 
May 2007 Conference - 2nd IAASS, 
Chicago 
Space Safety conference Networking 
Information gathering 
Varying lectures from 
NASA/ESA and more 
specifically from the 
FAA on Commercial 
Spaceflight 
June 2007 Microgravity paper 
presented to QinetiQ for 
discussions with UK CAA 
Possibility of 
certification of 
microgravity flights in 
the UK 
Paper Meeting with the UK 
CAA was positive in 
that they would be 
receptive to submission 
of microgravity aircraft 
(modified) 
May 2008 Conference – 1st IAA, 
Arcachon, France 
Space Conference  Meeting with 
Rocketplane VP (Chuck 
Lauer) 
Reasonable conference 
no progress in 
regulations for personal 
spaceflight.  
Meeting with Chuck 
Lauer very positive Jan 
2008 
Sep 2008 Space Tourism 
Presentation to Kingswood 
School, Bath 
Spaceflight Presentation Presentation First presentation on 
generic personal 
spaceflight  
Oct 2008 Conference – 3rd IAASS, 
Rome 
Space Safety conference Paper & Presentation on 
Centrifuge as key 
mitigation for personal 
spaceflight. 
Networking. 
Information gathering. 
Excellent conference 
with more focus on 
emerging commercial 
field – good contacts 
with EASA/ESA reps 
and follow-up phone 
interview by Rob 
Coppinger (Flight 
International/Global) 
Oct 2008 University of Bath –
External Supervisor 
External supervisor 
appointed – Professor 
Paul Maropoulous, Head 
of Mech. Eng. at 
University of Bath 
Kick-off meeting  Discussion on status 
and way forward 
Jan 2009 Space Tourism 
Presentation to the MKAS, 
Milton Keynes  
Spaceflight Presentation Presentation Updated presentation on 
generic personal 
spaceflight  
Feb 2009 Space Tourism 
Presentation to the IET, 
University of  Bath 
Spaceflight Presentation Presentation Updated presentation on 
generic personal 
spaceflight  
May 2009 City University – Update 
on PhD 
Update to course 
director on PhD status 
and way forward 
Presentation/meeting  
May 2009 University of Bath – 
External Supervisor review 
Review of strategy 
change to dissertation 
Meeting  
June 2009 Conference – RAeS Space 
Tourism, London 
Space Conference Exhibition stand for 
Worldview Spaceflight 
with Rocketplane 
material, model 
(partnership formed) 
Investor now on board 
and able to start 
effective marketing 
strategy to raise profile 
of personal spaceflight 
training – benefit to 
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Activity 
Date 
Spaceflight/Research 
Activity 
General Topic Specific Presentation/ 
Meeting 
Remarks 
research will be from 
training analysis and 
raw data and surveys 
Dec 2009 University of Bath – 
External Supervisor review 
Review of progress Meeting  
May 2010 Conference – 4th IAASS, 
Huntsville 
Space Safety conference Paper & Presentation on 
Safety Criteria for 
personal spaceflight. 
Also sat on suborbital 
space safety panel 
discussion. 
The panel discussion 
was a great opportunity 
to raise my profile and 
to get my points across 
in a wide forum 
Nov 2010 Conference – Inside 
Government: Space, 
London 
Space Conference Networking 
Information gathering 
Varying lectures from 
UK Space Agency; 
more specifically 
concerning satellites but 
did go into emerging 
space tourism 
Dec 2010 City University – Update 
on PhD 
Update to course 
director on PhD status 
and way forward 
Presentation/meeting  
Dec 2010 University of Bath – 
External Supervisor review 
Review of progress Meeting  
Feb 2011 EASA Meeting, Cologne, 
Germany 
Meeting to go through 
the Pre-Regulatory 
Impact Assessment that 
I contributed to and 
discuss the next steps for 
the full SoA Policy and 
AMC/GM 
Per previous column Excellent first meeting 
and detailed next steps 
and next meeting 
April 2011 City University – Update 
on PhD 
Update to course 
director on PhD status 
and way forward 
Presentation/meeting  
May-June 
2011 
Conference – 2nd IAA 
Access to Space  
2ND conference to 
update progress in the 
private space industry 
Attendance for 
information gathering 
and networking 
Good conference but 
showed that progress 
was slow in the private 
spaceflight domain 
(suborbital) 
August 
2011 
City University – Draft 
PhD Complete 
Update to course 
director on PhD status 
and way forward 
Presentation/meeting  
Oct 2011 Conference – 5th IAASS, 
Paris 
Space Safety conference Paper & Presentation on 
Safety Model for 
personal spaceflight. 
Also sat on suborbital 
space safety panel 
discussion. 
Also now Chair of 
Suborbital Technical 
Committee – also 
organised a suborbital 
workshop session 
The panel discussion is 
a great opportunity to 
raise my profile and to 
get the main points 
across in a wide forum 
Dec 2011 VIVA Present Thesis   
2012 Graduation    
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APPENDIX 3 – Case Study for ‘SATURN SAFETY MODEL’ (Air 
France Flight 447 Disaster) 
SYNOPSIS [91]: 
Date of accident 1st June 2009 at around 2 h 15 (UTC)  
Site of accident Near the TASIL point, in international waters, 
Atlantic Ocean 
 
Type of flight International public transport of passengers 
Scheduled flight AF447 
 
Aircraft Airbus A330-203 registered F-GZCP (Aircraft Destroyed) 
Owner Air France  
Operator Air France  
Persons on board 
 
Flight crew: 3 
Cabin crew: 9 
Passengers: 216 
(All on board killed) 
Summary  
On 31 May 2009, flight AF447 took off from Rio de Janeiro Galeão airport bound for Paris Charles 
de Gaulle. The airplane was in contact with the Brazilian ATLANTICO ATC centre on the INTOL – 
SALPU – ORARO route at FL350. There were no further communications with the crew after passing 
the INTOL point. At 2 h 10, a position message and some maintenance messages were transmitted by 
the ACARS automatic system.  
At around 2 h 02, the Captain left the cockpit. At around 2 h 08, the crew made a course change of 
about ten degrees to the left, probably to avoid echoes detected by the weather radar. 
At 2 h 10 min 05, likely following the obstruction of the Pitot probes in an ice crystal environment, 
the speed indications became erroneous and the automatic systems disconnected. The airplane’s flight 
path was not brought under control by the two co-pilots, who were re-joined shortly after by the 
Captain. The airplane went into a stall that lasted until the impact with the sea at 2 h 14 min 28. 
Bodies and airplane parts were found from 6 June 2009 onwards by the French and Brazilian navies. 
Notable Issues 
 The cases of inconsistencies in measured speeds are classified as major in the safety analysis that 
describes the associated failure conditions. 
Airbus presented 17 cases of temporary Pitot blocking that had occurred on the long-range fleet 
between 2003 and 2008, including 9 in 2008 without being able to explain this sudden increase. 
The first batch of C16195BA Pitot probes arrived at Air France on 26 May 2009, that is to say six 
days before the F-GZCP accident (existing probes were C16195AA type). 
SATURN SAFETY MODEL ANALYSIS: 
By using the SATURN SAFETY MODEL we can examine the sequential components and determine 
those that failed. In the figure below we can see that the following controls failed: 
 Redundant sensors – the 3 pitot tubes were the same and therefore were subject to 
common mode failures 
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 Key (Platform) Hazard procedural control failure – operating procedure to control 
the aircraft for ‘Unreliable Indicated Airspeed (IAS)’ (at 5 degrees nose up and 
85 per cent power  is the standard procedure);  
[Although having identified and called out the loss of the speed indications, 
neither of the two co-pilots called the procedure “Unreliable IAS”] [92]  Emergency recovery procedures (and training) – once passed the hazardous state 
of undetected speed error the pilot should have recovered the aircraft before the 
onset of stall i.e. the warnings of stall normally include ‘stick-shakers’ and 
warning horns; neither of the pilots formally identified the stall situation [92]. 
Had they done so (and had the appropriate training) they would have pushed the 
nose of the aircraft down to regain airspeed and hence lift over the wings. The 
author (previously a Flight [Air] Engineer) has practised stall procedures as part 
of flight crew drills both in normal training and in recurrent simulator training on 
the VC10 aircraft. Additionally crews were trained on ‘wind-shear’ approaches 
and this involved ‘riding’ the stall warning systems with full power. This sort of 
training was not conducted by the two co-pilots according to the BEA report [93].  No Limitations in place either to; 
o Avoid the altitude that the pitot-tubes could be subject to super-cooled water 
droplets and icing i.e. fly below Flight Level 310 (this would require more 
fuel to be carried to cross the Atlantic) 
o Avoid Flight in Icing conditions and flight in or near thunderstorms i.e. fly 
around (divert off track) any Cumulonimbus clouds (this would require more 
fuel to be carried if the forecast indicated clouds)  
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FINAL REPORT ON THE ACCIDENT: 
The BEA Interim Report No.3 states that Air France has introduced the operator control measures in 
terms of briefing, training (in simulators) and revised the Unreliable IAS procedures. Also the design 
measures required of the SB have been implemented and so the Safety Risk is now down to a 
Tolerable level of risk
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APPENDIX 4 – Case Study for ‘SATURN SAFETY MODEL’ (Space 
Shuttle Challenger & Columbia Disasters) 
SYNOPSIS: 
Date of accidents 28 Jan 1986 – Challenger  
01 Feb 2003 – Columbia  
 
Site of accidents Challenger – Launch  
Columbia – Re-entry  
 
Type of flights International Space Station standard NASA 
spaceflights 
 
Vehicles Challenger – Space Shuttle 
Columbia – Space Shuttle 
(Challenger Exploded) 
(Columbia broke up - 
structural failure)  
Owner/Operator NASA  
Persons on board 
 
Challenger Astronauts: 7 
Challenger Astronauts: 7 
(All on board killed) 
(All on board killed) 
SUMMARIES:  
Challenger – On 28 Jan 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger launched at 0500hrs (US time) after having 
been delayed from previous launches. Seconds after Launch Challenger’s Expendable Rocket 
Boosters exploded, destroying the Space Shuttle System; all on board were killed in the ‘mishap’. 
Columbia – On 01 Feb 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia was re-entering Earth’s atmosphere. On its 
Launch from Earth, a protective thermal foam tile was seen to be dislodged and then striking the 
leading edge of the main-plane.  Whilst in Space the area was examined but NASA considered that a 
repair could not be undertaken and so authorised the return. Columbia suffered structural failure of the 
main-plane during re-entry due to the excessive heat and broke up; all on board were killed in the 
‘mishap’. 
Notable Issues: 
NASA safety culture was cited as ‘lamentable’ by Diane Vaughan and this was further backed up by 
Rd. Richard Freeman despite the 17 year gap between the accidents. 
Challenger: The management played a large part in the Challenger disaster in that they authorised a 
Launch when the temperatures were extremely low and this was against the advice of the engineers 
who knew that the O-Ring seals had a history of blow-backs at low temperatures.  
Columbia: The management also played a large part in the Columbia disaster as the displacement of 
foam tiles was known to be an issue and the video evidence clearly showed a tile striking the leading 
edge of Columbia on Launch. Although the damage was assessed whilst docked the ISS the decision 
to return the Space Shuttle with full crew was flawed.  
SATURN SAFETY MODEL ANALYSIS: 
By using the SATURN SAFETY MODEL we can examine the sequential components and determine 
those that failed. In the figure below we can see that the following controls failed firstly for 
Challenger and then for Columbia: 
Challenger Sequence detailed below: 
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 Pressure sensors not providing sufficient data in time  Flight Termination System – not able to protect the astronauts in time  Crew Pod ejection – not able to protect the astronauts in time  Limitation ignored – the 53° F limitation for the O-Rings were ignored by the 
management against the engineer’s advice 
 
 
Columbia Sequence detailed below: 
 Cause Control failure – Lack of Quality Assurance to check the adhesive 
properties of the heat resistant foam tiles   Lack of Space Shuttle repair policy whilst docked at the ISS (leading to decision 
to return Columbia without repair)   Crew Pod ejection – low survivability; as the airframe started to break up the 
crew should have been able to eject the crew pod safely and float the Earth. This 
facility was not properly thought out  
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APPENDIX 5 - Suborbital Aircraft Policy – Goal Structuring Notation 
This task is not complete at the time of submission due to EASA suspending the task pending the European Commission’s decision to proceed from the information 
provided for the Preliminary Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). The following Safety Argument requires substantiation and further work when EASA have the 
approval to continue.  
 
 
 
Top Strategy
Argue that Sub-Orbital Aircraft
Operations are acceptably safe in the
defined operating environment by
demonstration that the European
Governance is robust in terms of 
Airworthiness, Operations, ATM-ANS,
Spaceports and Operator Safety Risk
Management
G1
EASA SoA Airworthiness
Requirements and
Guidelines are effective
G2
EASA SoA Flight Crew
Licensing/Operational
Requirements are effective
G3
EASA SoA ATM/ANS
Requirements are effective
G4
EASA SoA Spaceport
Requirements are
effective
G5
EASA SoA Operator Safety
Risk Management
Requirements & Guidelines
are effective
C_Top_3
Definition of 'defined operating
environments': Aircraft flying above
FL600 without reaching Orbit and used
for commercial operations (either air
transport or aerial work)
C_Top_1
Sub-Orbital Aircraft definition: Aircraft
(airborne with wings) able to climb
to the upper limits of the
atmosphere, which may be
considered the lower reaches of
outer space
Top Goal
EASA Sub-Orbital Aircraft
Policy is appropriate to
ensure acceptably safe
operations within the 
defined operating
environments
C_Top_2
Acceptably Safe Operations:
Airworthiness aircraft
operated and managed to
maintain (or better) the
safety target
        Appendix 5 
 
Page 249 of 300 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N9626734
EASA
SC
N8181356
EASA
SC
N7148097
FAA
Applicable
Requirements
N386409
FAA
Applicable
Requirements
N2985150
FAA
Applicable
Requirements
N9802928
EASA
SC
N3588358
EASA
SC
N8099332
FAA
Applicable
Requirements
N8297946
EASA
SC
N724260
FAA
Applicable
Requirements
N2980536
EASA
SC
N2843330
FAA
Applicable
Requirements
N1530399
EASA
SC
N8321518
FAA
Applicable
Requirements
N4989177
EASA
SC
N8986750
FAA
Applicable
Requirements
G1.2.1
ECLSS
guidelines are
effective for SoA
G1.2.2
Smoke
detection & Fire
Supression
G1.2.3
Human
Factors
G1.2.4
Emergency 
G1.2.5
Other Specific
Systems and
Operations
G1.2.6
Intra-Vehicular
Activities
G1.2.7
Specific
Equipment
(payload)
Requirements
G1.2.8
Non-Airbreathing
Propulsion
System
S1.2.1
Argue that specific
SoA Special
Conditions for
sys...
G1.2
Additional  Special
Conditions and
Requirements are identified
and are effective for SoA
operations
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N5438702
EASA
SC
N1312339
FAA
Applicable
Requirements
N1585258
EASA
SC
N4895375
FAA
Applicable
Requirements
N6126370
EASA
SC
N5089177
FAA
Applicable
Requirements
G1.2.9
Ground
Support
Equipment
G1.2.10
Environmental
Requirements
G1.2.11
Verification
Programme
N7392193
EASA SoA
Safety
Criteria
G1.2.12
SoA Safety
Objectives or
Targets are
effecive
S1.2.2
Argue that other SoA
specific
requirements have
been identified
G1.2
Additional  Special
Conditions and
Requirements are identified
and are effective for SoA
operations
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G2
EASA SoA Flight Crew
Licensing/Operational
Requirements are effective
S2
Argue that the SoA FCL &
Operational Requirements &
Guideliens are applicable and
effective for SoA operations
G2.2
Operational
Requirements &
Guidelines are identified
and specific to SoA
operations
E2.2.2
EASA Operating
Guidelines
E2.2.1
EASA Operating
Requirements
E2.1.2.1
EASA
Passenger
Requirements
E2.1.2.2
EASA
Passenger
Guidelines
E2.1.1.2.1
EASA FCL
Guidelines
E2.1.1.2.2
FAA
Complimentary
Guidelines
E2.1.1.1.3
Crew Training
and
Qualification
E2.1.1.1.2
Pilot Rating
E2.1.1.1.1
Baseline Pilots
Licence
G2.1.1.1
Baseline FCL
Requirements
identified for SoA Ops
G2.2.2
Operating Guidelines
are effectiive for SoA 
G2.2.1
Operating Requirements are
identified and effective for
SoA
G2.1.2.2
SFP Guidelines
are effective for
SoA operations
G2.1.2.1
Baseline Space
Flight Participant
Requirements are
identified for SoA
operations
S2.1.2
Argue that SFP
Requirements and
Guidelines are
identified and specific
to SoA Operations
G2.1.1.2
FCL Guidelines are
effective for SoA
operations
S2.1.1
Argue that FCL
Requirements and
Guidelines are
identified and specific
to SoA Operations
G2.1
FCL & Passenger
Requirements are
identified and specific to
SoA operations
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G3
EASA SoA ATM/ANS
Requirements are effective
S3
Argue that existign ATS/ANS
and additional identified
SoA requirements are
effective to ensure safe SoA
operations
E3.2.1
EASA ATM
Requirements
for SoA
G3.2
Additional ATM/ANS
Requirements are
identified and specific
to SoA operations
E3.2.2
FAA Applicable
Requirements
G3.1
Existing ATM/ANS
Requirements are
identified for SoA
operators to follow
E2.1
ATM/ATC
requirements
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G4
EASA SoA Spaceport
Requirements are
effective
S4
Argue that the Spaceport
Requirements &
Guidelines are effective
for SoA operations
E4.1.2
FAA Applicable
Requirements
G4.1
EASA Spaceport
Requirements  are
identified for specific SoA
operations
E4.1.1
EASA
Spaceport
Requirements
E4.2.2
FAA
Applicable
Guidelines
for
Spaceports
E4.2.1
EASA
Guidelines
for
Spaceports
G4.2
EASA Spaceport Guidelines
are identified for specific
SoA operations
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G5
EASA SoA Operator Safety
Risk Management
Requirements & Guidelines
are effective
S5
Argue that Operator Safety
Risk Management
Requirements &
Guidelines are effecrive for
SoA operations
E5.1
EASA
Requirements
for Operator
Safety
Management
G5.1
Operator Safety Risk
Management
Requirements are
identified and effective
for SoA Operators
E5.2.1
EASA
Guidelines
for Operator
Safety
Management
E5.2.2.1
Other
Operator
Safety
Management
Guidelines
G5.2
Operator Safety Risk
Management Guidelines
are effective for SoA
operaors to follow
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EASA Suborbital Aircraft Policy Task 
 
This task is not complete at the time of submission due to EASA suspending the task pending the European 
Commission’s decision to proceed from the information provided for the Preliminary Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(RIA). 
 
Task Outline: The task was to assist EASA in developing a Policy and Guidance Material for Suborbital Aircraft (SoA) 
operations. This was to be achieved partially by the Gap Analysis of the FAA-AST Regulations and Guidelines and to 
determine which existing EASA Regulations and Guidance would be applicable to SoA operations. 
 
Task Structure: The SoA Policy is in essence a set of requirements and guidance material that prospective designers and 
operators will follow in order to certify their vehicle within the existing EASA regulatory framework with Special 
Conditions levied as appropriate. Therefore this is a goal-based regulatory approach and the author has provided a safety 
argument structured to suit a goal-based approach. 
 
Task Status: The argument presented by the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) in the figures above represent the SoA 
Policy. The report generated from the GSN (using the ASCE Tool) is presented below. The status is that the arguments 
and evidence are not fully substantiated at the time of submission. This is made clear within the main body of the thesis 
and a recommendation made to continue with the task as further work when the EC approves the task for EASA to 
continue. 
 
Within the report below those aspects that are not complete are essentially those that have a simple statement or 
placeholder with no further argument or no further evidence provided i.e. ‘Smoke Detection & Fire Suppression’; here it 
is the intent that the EASA requirements will be stated (these may be existing standard Certification Specification 
Requirements) and also any relevant FAA-AST requirements will be stated (some of these are not relevant for 
certification considerations and are not included whereas others are relevant or indeed relevant but with caveats). 
 
EASA Suborbital Aircraft Policy  
Top Goal 
EASA Suborbital Aircraft Policy is appropriate to ensure safe operations within the defined operating environments 
Context 1 
Suborbital Aircraft definition: Aircraft (airborne with wings) able to climb to the upper limits of the atmosphere, which 
may be considered the lower reaches of outer space 
Context 3 
Definition of 'defined operating environments': Aircraft flying above FL600 without reaching Orbit and used for 
commercial operations (either air transport or aerial work) 
Context 2 
Acceptably Safe Operations: Airworthiness aircraft operated and managed to maintain (or better) the safety target 
Top Strategy 
Argue that Suborbital Aircraft Operations are acceptably safe in the defined operating environment by demonstration that 
the European Governance is robust in terms of Airworthiness, Operations, ATM-ANS, Spaceports and Operator Safety 
Risk Management 
Justification to Strategy 
The argument will be justified by the public workshop and invited comments to the NPA; therefore the final Policy will 
be ratified by EASA and the Industry 
Goal 1 - EASA SoA Airworthiness Requirements and Guidelines are effective 
Argument 1.1 
Argue that EASA Airworthiness Requirements and Guidelines are robust for SoA operations 
Goal 1.1 - Applicable Basic Requirements are effective for SoA operations 
Evidence 1.1.1 
EASA Regulations EC No. 216/2008 
E1.1.2 
Regulations (EC) No. 1702/2003 (Part 21) 
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E1.1.3 
EASA Certification Specifications (CS-23) 
Goal 1.2 - Additional Requirements are identified and are effective for SoA operations 
Argument 1.2 
Additional Requirements are identified and are effective for SoA operations 
Goal 1.2.1 
ECLSS guidelines are effective for SoA 
Goal 1.2.2 
Smoke detection & Fire Suppression 
Goal 1.2.3 
Human Factors 
G1.2.4 
Emergency 
G1.2.5 
Other Specific Systems and Operations 
G1.2.6 
Intra-Vehicular Activities 
G1.2.7 
Specific Equipment (payload) Requirements 
G1.2.8 
Non-Air breathing Propulsion System 
G1.2.9 
Ground Support Equipment 
Argue that other SoA specific requirements have been identified 
G1.2.10 
Environmental Requirements 
G1.2.11 
Verification Programme 
G2 - EASA SoA Flight Crew Licensing/Operational Requirements are effective 
Argument 2 
Argue that the SoA FCL & Operational Requirements & Guidelines are applicable and effective for SoA 
operations 
Goal 2.1 - FCL & Passenger Requirements and Guidelines are identified and specific to SoA operations 
Substantiated by Goals G2.1.1 & G2.1.2 
Strategy 2.1.1 - Argue that FCL Requirements and Guidelines are identified and specific to SoA 
Operations Baseline Flight Crew Qualification: 
EASA considers that Flight Crew Licensing (FCL) requirements are at (as a minimum) the equivalence 
of that commensurate with airline pilots i.e. that an Air Transport License (ATPL) or Commercial 
License should be held. 
 
Rating: 
Flight Test Pilot (or military fast jet pilot) in the absence of a specific SoA rating may be considered. 
 
Flight Crew Medical Standards: 
EASA considers that Flight Crew should hold a Class I aerospace medical certificate. 
 
Flight Crew Training: 
Flight Crew Training shall be performed using representative hardware and applying standards for 
Training Records and CQRM [FAA-AST 460.7] 
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G2.1.1.1 - Baseline FCL Requirements identified for SoA Ops 
 
Standard Pilot Requirements 
Current EASA standard Airline Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL) or Commercial Pilots Licence is 
the minimum requirement for Flight Crew to be considered to undertake SoA flights. 
 
Alternate Acceptable Requirements 
In the absence of an ATPL or CPL, a pilot can fly SoA if a Flight Test Pilot rating is held. This 
includes ex-military fast jet test pilots in particular as long as this is with currency. 
 
Additional Requirements 
1. Should a pilot only hold and ATPL or CPL, they must complete an Operators training 
program (including centrifuge training) 
2. Should a pilot not hold an ATPL or CPL, he must hold a test-pilot rating (fast jet) AND 
the operator must ensure that at least one pilot holds an ATPL or CPL in order to fly 
through the NAS. 
 
Medical Requirements 
EASA requirements are for the highest standards for flight crew due to the complex flight 
environment conditions. A Class I aerospace medical certificate is required. 
 
Training Standards 
FAA-AST standards for Flight Crew training are considered appropriate for EASA standards and 
detail the following [FAA-AST Human Spaceflight CFR 460]: 
The operator should develop a mission- and configuration-specific training 
program for flight crew and define standards in accordance with paragraph c for successful 
completion in order to (1) cover all phases of flight using i) a method of simulation, ii) an 
aircraft with similar characteristics iii) incremental expansion of the mission envelope, or iv) an 
equivalent method of training. AND (2) the operator should verify through test, analysis, 
inspection or demonstration that any flight crew training device realistically represents the 
vehicle's configuration and mission AND (3) nominal and non-nominal flight conditions AND (4) 
transition between multiple control and/or propulsion modes. 
Additionally, it is required that all SoA pilots undergo centrifuge training in both Gx and Gz axis 
in order to demonstrate compatibility and competence in dealing with high-g loads. 
G2.1.1.2 - FCL Guidelines are effective for SoA operations 
 
EASA Flight Crew Licensing Guidelines 
The FAA-AST guidelines [Human Spaceflight CFR 460] state that 'the pilot of an RLV that will 
operate in the National Airspace System (NAS) should possess an FAA pilot certificate, and 
should hold ratings to operate one or more aircraft with similar characteristics for as many 
phases of the mission as practicable'. 
EASA concurs with the general statement on FCL and have further split the requirements as 
detailed in section G2.1.1.1. The rationale is that it is anticipated that the initial pilots will stem 
from the military fast-jet test pilot (and non-test pilot) community and these will be well suited to 
fly in the high g-force environment. It is recognised that the SoA operations will take place in the 
NAS and therefore at least one pilot should hold an ATPL or CPL in addition to the test 
pilot/fast-jet pilot rating. 
 
Flight Crew Medical Guidelines 
EASA requirements stipulate a Class I Aerospace Medical certificate, as opposed to a Class II 
certificate. The rationale is that a Class II may be sufficient to obtain an ATPL which is generally 
flown in a benign environment (emergencies excepted) and therefore due to the high g-forces and 
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other complex environment aspects it is considered that higher medical standards are required for 
SoA operations. 
Additionally Flight Crew should be provided with passive radiation dosimeters so that their 
exposure can be monitored; it is proposed that an annual limit of 50mSv and a career limit of 
100mSv is enforced by operators (it is anticipated that a typical annual dosage may be in the 
order of 7-15 mSv). 
 
Flight Crew Training Standards 
EASA Flight Crew Training Standard principles agree with the FAA-AST approach, in that 
training should be performed using representative hardware and applying standards for Training 
Records and CQRM [FAA-AST 460.7]. In addition offer the following guidelines for operators:  Centrifuge Training: The centrifuge is not detailed within the FAA-AST guidelines 
however it is considered an essential component as part of a training strategy. The 
benefits of a centrifuge is that it can simulate both Gz profiles (eyeballs down) for the 
transition between horizontal and vertical flight and Gx profiles (chest to back) for the 
descent phase. Additionally it is assumed that the SoA pilots will be either test pilots 
and/or ex-military fast jet pilots who have undergone centrifuge training. However some 
operators may recruit per the minimum FAA-AST requirements. In either case it will be 
essential that pilots have centrifuge currency as part of the safety mitigation.  Simulator Training: The FAA-AST requirements concerning simulator aspects are 
generally sound and state that the flight crew training device (should) realistically 
represents the vehicle's configuration and mission. It is imperative that the simulator 
accurately represents the vehicle in terms of 'concurrency'; this is whereby the 
configuration is the same as the aircraft (instrumentation, switches, seats, doors, etc.). 
The rationale is that the other two attributes of a SoA simulator (fidelity and capability) 
will not accurately reflect the vehicle and therefore can affect the aim of the training. In 
terms of fidelity (concerning the visual and motion system and accuracy of the 
instrumentation) it will be extremely difficult to represent high g-forces in all axes. The 
simulator will not be able to accurately represent the vehicle's capabilities in terms of the 
'pull-up', ascent, space segment (with upside down and reaction control aspects) and the 
high-g descent. Nonetheless, the simulator is an essential component of flight crew 
training.  Altitude Chamber Training: Military fast jet pilots (and all other aircrew) are trained to 
recognize the signs and symptoms of decompression so that they can carry out 
emergency procedures, including donning an oxygen mask and switching to 100% 
oxygen under pressure breathing conditions. This is also considered essential for 
Suborbital flights because the flight crew must be able to respond to the earliest 
indications of pressurisation problems in order to maintain control of the vehicle. The 
altitude chamber provides simulated pressurisation failures by climbing the 'chamber' to 
25,000 feet (ft), 45,000ft (pressure breathing is required at this altitude). 
 
Strategy 2.1.2 - Argue that FCL Requirements and Guidelines are identified and specific to SoA 
Operations 
The flight crew and passengers are considered an integrated part of the safety of the system; therefore 
they must be trained and qualified accordingly. In particular to the passengers the following medical 
qualifications and training requirements apply: 
 
Passenger Medical Qualifications: 
It is considered that a minimum standard of fitness and health shall apply to passengers such that they do 
not become a contributor to a safety event or in the case of a safety event that they are able to undertake 
the necessary actions. 
The passenger medical qualification (PMQ) steps are as follows; 
1. Passenger to have medical examination by own General Practitioner (GP) in accordance with a 
prescriptive format that includes relevant criterion 
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2. Operator Aerospace Physician to determine suitability of passenger to fly by review of GP 
certificate of results 
3. Operator Aerospace Physician to undertake pre-training medical to determine that the passenger 
is fit to undertake training in centrifuge and other training as required which may include 
microgravity flights (Go) 
4. Operator Aerospace Physician to undertake pre-flight medical to determine that the passenger is 
still 'fit to fly' (Go) 
EASA are adopting a methodology whereby passengers are either fit to fly (Go), are not fit to fly (No-
Go) or have conditions that merit further investigation and risk assessment on an individual basis 
(Pending Further Checks). An EASA-approved list of contraindicating health issues has been developed 
as guidelines for operators [Ref TBD]. 
 
Passenger Training: 
As passengers are considered part of the safety of the system, then the following requirements apply to 
passenger training:  Awareness Training/Briefs  Emergency Training in Simulator (representative hardware); 
o Normal Ingress/Egress 
o Operation of seats and restraining system 
o Emergency Procedures  Pressurisation failure  Fire  Loss of control  Crash Landing  Emergency egress  Medical emergencies  Centrifuge Training 
 
G2.1.2.1 - Baseline Space Flight Participant Requirements are identified for SoA operations 
SFP Medical Requirements 
EASA concur with the general requirements for SFPs to undertake a General Practitioner medical 
with subsequent issue of a certificate. The Operator's aerospace physician (flight surgeon) then 
determines the suitability of the SFP to undertake the flight. EASA requires that the SFP 
undergoes a medical by the Operator's aerospace physician immediately prior to centrifuge 
training and the SoA flight to determine whether the SFP is still fit to fly/train. 
SFP Training Requirements 
EASA's approach to training is that as safety mitigation, the SFPs are required to undergo 
essential training that may enable them not to become a flight safety concern during the flight 
(that may affect the flight crew's ability to maintain control of the flight). Therefore the following 
are mandated training events:  Safety Briefings, including emergency briefings  Centrifuge Training  Simulator Training, including physical demonstration of normal and emergency 
situations  Parabolic Training - only if SFPs are to be allowed to experience microgravity 
conditions; if SFPs are to remain strapped in during the flight this component of training 
is not a requirements 
 
G2.1.2.2 - Space Flight Participant Guidelines are effective for SoA operations 
SFP Medical Guidelines 
EASA concur with the FAA-AST approach to medical requirements but also require that the 
Operator aerospace physician undertakes a medical on the SFP immediately prior to any 
centrifuge training or the actual SoA flight 
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SFP Training Guidelines  Briefings: 
·  Space Awareness briefing; this should consist of various videos on the history of human 
spaceflight, including space tourism, and also provide a tutorial on the space environment and 
explaining the rationale for some of the training that SFPs will encounter (detailed below) 
·  SoA briefing; this briefing should be explicitly related to the SoA that the SFPs will fly in. It 
should include the basic attributes of the vehicles both on the ground and in the air. This should 
include a video and possibly mock-ups in the classroom environment in order to familiarise the 
SFPs with the vehicle. 
·  Emergency briefing; this briefing, once again in the classroom environment, should concern the 
vehicles safety equipment (fire extinguishers, goggles, oxygen masks, protective clothing) and 
the actions that SFPs should take in an emergency. SFPs should then be given a 'safety 
information' booklet that they can study.  Centrifuge Training: As per flight crew, the centrifuge is not detailed within the FAA-
AST guidelines however it is considered an essential component as part of a training 
strategy. The benefits of a centrifuge is that it can simulate both Gz profiles (eyeballs 
down) for the transition between horizontal and vertical flight and Gx profiles (chest to 
back) for the descent phase. In terms of SFPs this is essential because, unlike the 
pilots/flight crew, they will not have experienced sustained g-forces. They will also not 
have received Anti-G Straining Manoeuvre (AGSM) training.  Simulator Training: The simulator is an excellent training tool for the flight crew but in 
the case of Suborbital flights it can also be an essential part of the SFP training strategy. 
Having received briefings about the vehicle, the SFPs can then be physically trained on 
the equipment in terms of the following; 
·  Normal Ingress/Egress; it is important that the SFPs are familiar with the basic 
configuration of the vehicle and are able to enter and exit 
·  Operation of Seats; the seats (and restraint system) may actually save their lives so a 
demonstration and practice in the use of the seat and restrain system is vital. This may be 
even more important if the seats are designed to recline with certain phases of flight to 
assist in countering the effects of g-forces. 
·  Operation/Procedure for returning to seat (after microgravity phase); should SFPs be 
allowed to 'float' in the short duration of microgravity then it will be essential that they 
return to their seat and are restrained for the descent phase. If this does not occur it is 
envisaged that they will naturally be forced to the floor under the g-forces; this may have 
dire consequences should another SFP also be forced on top of another SFP as this would 
result in experiencing twice the weight of the person on the chest resulting in injury or 
indeed death. 
·  Emergency Training 
o Pressurisation failure; depending on the vehicle and operating requirements in the 
event of a pressurisation failure during the rocket phase and microgravity phase then the 
vehicle occupants will be in grave danger. This failure condition should then provide a 
logical argument to provide the occupants with a pressure suit and person oxygen 
system. The SFPs will then be trained to either shut their helmet or select 100% oxygen 
(or indeed this may happen automatically). In this instance it is important that SFPs 
receive full training in the use of their 'spacesuit' and in particular what to do in the event 
of a pressurisation failure. The author has first-hand experience from the altitude 
chamber in pressure breathing and it is extremely difficult for 'first-timers' (pilots are 
used to this). 
o Fire; in the event of a fire whilst airborne there is little the flight crew will be able to do 
as they will be trying to land the vehicle as quickly and safely as they can. This therefore 
leads to the issue of fire-fighting. In the event that there is no 'cabin crew' (this would be 
a good argument to having cabin crew) then it would be up to an SFP to attempt to fight 
the fire. This leads on to training in the use of the fire-fighting equipment, which could 
be an issue with some SFPs not being physically or mentally able to do this. 
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o Loss of control; as occurred on the X-Prize flights, Space-Ship One had an instance of 
roll 'runaway'. This non-nominal situation could occur on flights and although pilots are 
trained and used to this sort of manoeuvre, SFPs are certainly not. During the rocket 
phase and descent phase SFPs should be restrained in their seats and this should not 
normally be an issue; though it is worth briefing SFPs on and demonstrating the use of a 
possible 'locked' position of the restraint system. 
o Crash Landing; this event could occur from a loss of control incident or other flight 
events and as per normal aviation a procedure should be implemented and then practiced 
in the simulator for the SFPs to 'adopt the position' (if appropriate). 
o Emergency Egress; in the event of the crashed landing then the SFPs may have to 
egress quickly. This may involve unstrapping normally or there may be a Quick-Release 
Button, followed by exiting the vehicle. Once again this can be practiced in the 
simulator. 
In terms of emergency training some operators may feel that demonstrating too many of 
these aspects may frighten SFPs and so may wish to selectively omit some training. It is 
considered that the characteristic type of the SFP is an 'adventure seeker' and in fact that 
they will demand to be involved as much as possible and to undertake as much training 
as is required. Operators should not reduce safety training as part of cost cutting.  Parabolic Flight Training: Although not essential for flight crew, should SFPs be allowed 
to leave their seats in the microgravity phase of the flight then it is considered essential 
that they have parabolic flight training. The XCOR Lynx vehicle for instance is a two-
seater cockpit (one pilot, one fee-paying SFP) and in this instance as the SFP will not be 
leaving the seat then there is no requirement for parabolic flight training.  Psychological Training: The physiological training elements detailed above will 
undoubtedly provide psychological benefits for the SFPs in overcoming any fears or 
concerns regarding the flight. Indeed much can be done to prepare the SFP for their 
once-in-a-lifetime experience including a countermeasures program. 
Another psychological benefit of the physiological training is that the SFPs will feel 
properly integrated with the flight crew and it will no doubt feel for of a team mission 
rather than a mere individual 'joy-ride'. 
 
Goal 2.2 - Operational Requirements & Guidelines are identified and specific to SoA operations 
 
Goal 3 - EASA SoA ATM/ANS Requirements are effective 
Argument 3 
Argue that existing ATS/ANS and additional identified SoA requirements are effective to ensure safe SoA 
operations 
Goal 3.1 
Existing ATM/ANS Requirements are identified for SoA operators to follow 
FAA Applicable Requirements 
CFR Part 437.57 - Operating Area Containment 
CFR Part 437.69 - Communications 
CFR Part 437.71 - Flight Rules 
CFR Part 420.31 - Agreements (a. Coastguard, b. ATC) 
CFR Part 420.57 - Notifications (NOTAM of flight corridor)  
Goal 3.2 
Additional ATM/ANS Requirements are identified and specific to SoA operations 
 
Goal 4 - EASA SoA Spaceport Requirements are effective 
Argument 4 
Argue that the Spaceport Requirements & Guidelines are effective for SoA operations 
Goal 4.1 
EASA Spaceport Requirements and Guidelines are identified for specific SoA operations 
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 FAA Applicable Requirements 
CFR Part 420 
 
Goal 5 - EASA SoA Operator Safety Risk Management Requirements & Guidelines are effective 
Argument 5 
Argue that Operator Safety Risk Management Requirements & Guidelines are effective for SoA operations 
Goal 5.1 
Operator Safety Risk Management Requirements are identified and effective for SoA Operators 
Goal 5.2 
Operator Safety Risk Management Guidelines are effective for SoA operators to follow 
 FAA Operator Safety Management Guidelines 
AC 120-92 
ARP 5150 
FAA Applicable Guidelines for Spaceports 
FAA-AST Environmental Guidelines: these also contain relevant aspects for safety including;  Airspace  Hazardous Materials and Hazard Waste Management  Health and Safety  Noise 
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APPENDIX 6 - Exemplar Suborbital Aircraft (Partial) Functional Hazard Analysis – Failure Condition Level 
 
    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Systems 
Display of attitude 
information to control roll 
& pitch Catastrophic 
Catastrophic, if 
includes both 
Primary Flight 
Displays. 
Major, if includes 
oŶe pilot͛s PFD Catastrophic     Applicable Applicable 
Systems Display of Heading 
Catastrophic 
Major, if Navigation 
systems operational Major 
Catastrophic; 
Major, if Navigation 
systems operational     Applicable Applicable 
Systems 
Display of altitude 
information Hazardous Minor Catastrophic     Applicable Applicable 
Systems 
Display of airspeed 
information 
Hazardous, during 
landing; otherwise 
Major Minor Hazardous     Applicable Applicable 
Systems Display of rate of turn Minor                                                          Minor     Applicable Applicable 
Systems Display of slip-skid Minor   Minor     Applicable Applicable 
Systems Display of time Minor   Minor     Applicable Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Systems 
Display of Navigation 
information 
Major; Total Loss of 
navigation and 
communication is 
Catastrophic Major 
Major; 
Catastrophic for 
Precision Approaches     Applicable Applicable 
Systems Communication Major  Minor 
Major, if data is primary 
link     Applicable Applicable 
Systems Visibility during landing Hazardous         Applicable Applicable 
Systems 
Misinterpretation of flying 
altitude Hazardous   Catastrophic   
Occur during landing 
& poor visibility 
Applicable - though 
SoA may not be 
certified to CAT I IFR 
as they may not 
have an engine and 
will therefore not be 
able to 'go-around' 
in poor visibility 
landings Applicable 
Systems Display of Radio Altitude Minor   Minor   Category I IFR 
Not Applicable - 
though a RAD ALT 
may be considered 
as procedural 
mitigation Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Systems Display of vertical speed Major   Major   Category I IFR 
Although IFR is not 
applicable, a VSI may 
be considered 
essential procedural 
mitigation Applicable 
Systems 
Display of flight guidance 
commands (Category I 
operation) Minor   Minor   
Category I ILS 
For Category II ILS, 
an autopilot or flight 
director is required 
N/A - SoA may not 
be certified to CAT I 
IFR as they may not 
have an engine and 
will therefore not be 
able to 'go-around' 
in poor visibility 
landings Applicable 
Systems Autopilot failure 
Hazardous on auto 
land   
Catastrophic if authority 
is unlimited   
Maximum inputs to 
aircraft primary 
control surfaces 
should not exceed 
aircraft structural 
limits N/A Applicable 
Systems 
Flight controls for pitch 
axis Catastrophic Major Catastrophic     Applicable Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Systems Flight controls for roll axis 
Hazardous, if yaw 
axis is still available Major Catastrophic     Applicable Applicable 
Systems Flight controls for yaw axis 
Minor to Major. 
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic if 
combined with 
engine failure or 
severe cross wind Minor Catastrophic     Applicable Applicable 
Systems Reaction Control System  Hazardous Hazardous Catastrophic   
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional identified 
for Suborbital ops 
RCS must be able to 
operate and not 
interfere with 
normal controls any 
stability 
augmentation 
system Not Applicable 
Systems All Hydraulics Catastrophic         Applicable Applicable 
Systems 
Manual control flight 
controls Catastrophic         Applicable Applicable 
Systems Artificial Feel Hazardous       
Variable severity - 
engineering 
judgment required Applicable Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Systems 
Take-off director and 
automatic landing system Catastrophic   
Catastrophic, if auto 
land malfunction below 
alert height.Hazardous, 
if take-off director 
provides only lateral 
guidance     N/A if appropriate 
Systems Stability Augmentation  Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic   
Variable severity - 
engineering 
judgment required if appropriate Applicable 
Systems Stick Pusher 
Hazardous , if stall 
regime encountered; 
otherwise Minor Minor 
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic near 
ground     if appropriate Applicable 
Systems Flaps for take-off/ landing 
Hazardous for 
landing   
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic if 
asymmetric   
Engineering 
judgment if appropriate Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Systems Stick shakers/stall warning Minor Minor Major   
Assumes that a 
warning system is in 
place to notify pilot 
of loss of system 
function if appropriate Applicable 
Systems Trim control Minor Minor 
Major, if manual trim. 
Catastrophic or 
hazardous for electrical     if appropriate Applicable 
Systems Display of trim indicators Minor Minor 
Major; engineering 
judgment   
Variable severity - 
engineering 
judgment required if appropriate Applicable 
Systems Landing Gear control Hazardous Minor Major to Hazardous     Applicable Applicable 
Systems 
Display of landing gear 
indications Major   Hazardous     Applicable Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Systems Brake control 
Catastrophic, if 
unannunciated loss 
of braking. 
Major if annunciated 
loss of braking Hazardous Hazardous   
Electronic anti-skid 
and brake systems 
can cause significant 
ground handling 
problems if they 
malfunction under 
adverse conditions 
due to asymmetrical 
loading Applicable Applicable 
Systems 
Visual warnings, cautions 
and alerts Major for worst case       
Failure conditions 
depend on the 
criticality of the 
systems being 
monitored and pilot 
action required Applicable Applicable 
Systems 
Display of outside air 
temperature Minor R Minor   R = Reserved if appropriate Applicable 
          Appendix 6 
 
Page 270 of 300 
 
    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Systems Display of toxic gas levels Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic   
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional identified 
for Suborbital ops 
closed loop system 
so need to ensure 
levels of CO2 are not 
high and 
incapacitate pilots N/A 
Systems Over speed warning Minor Minor Minor   
Airspeed may be 
used as a backup to 
the over speed 
warning for 
continued safe flight 
and landing 
May need to up the 
severity to Major? Applicable 
Systems Aural warnings         
Failure conditions 
depend on the 
criticality of the 
systems Applicable Applicable 
Systems Warning of fire in cabin Hazardous       
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional identified 
for Suborbital ops Applicable Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Systems 
Ventilation/internal fan 
blower system Hazardous       
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional identified 
for Suborbital ops Applicable N/A 
Systems Electrical system indication Minor  Minor Major   
Depends on crew 
reference and 
analysis Applicable Applicable 
Systems 
Vacuum/pressure 
indication Minor Minor Major   
Provides an 
indication that flight 
instruments are 
operating within 
power source limits if appropriate if appropriate 
Systems Electrical Power 
Catastrophic, if 
primary flight 
instruments require 
electrical power 
Hazardous for IFR. 
Depends on 
capability of 
secondary system Installation dependent   
Depends on 
electrical system 
loads (from analysis) 
and the criticality of 
the functions 
Catastrophic due to 
critical systems Applicable 
Power plant Uncontained disk failure       Catastrophic   N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant Engine/Pylon separations       Catastrophic   N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant 
Engine/rocket case 
rupture       Catastrophic   Applicable Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Power plant Uncontained blade failures       Hazardous 
Uncontained fan 
blade failures, or 
uncontained turbine 
blade failures or 
uncontained 
compressor blade 
failures N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant Core cowl separations       Catastrophic   N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant Inlet Cowl separations       Catastrophic   N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant Fan cowl separations       Hazardous   N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant Nozzle separations       Hazardous   Applicable Applicable 
Power plant 
Liberation of large 
nacelle/fairing parts       Hazardous   Applicable Applicable 
Power plant 
Liberation of small 
nacelle/fairing parts       Major   Applicable Applicable 
Power plant 
(Thermal) 
Fire damage outside 
designated fire zones       Catastrophic   Applicable Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Power plant (Thermal) 
Fire damage within 
designated fire zones       Hazardous   Applicable Applicable 
Power plant 
(Thermal) Magnesium fires       Hazardous 
Variable - 
engineering 
judgment required if appropriate if appropriate 
Power plant(Thermal) Electrical fires       
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic 
Variable - 
engineering 
judgment required Applicable Applicable 
Power plant 
(Thermal) 
Loss of power plant 
installation thermal 
insulation       
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic 
Variable - 
engineering 
judgment required Applicable Applicable 
Power plant 
(Thermal) 
Inadvertent release of 
engine (or APU) bleed air       
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic 
Variable - 
engineering 
judgment required N/A (see note 5)   
Power plant 
(Thermal) 
Inadvertent engine (or 
APU) exhaust gas 
impingement       
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic 
Variable - 
engineering 
judgment required N/A (see note 5)   
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Power plant 
(Excess Loads) 
Excessive engine/rocket 
(or APU) vibration       
Variable - 
engineering 
judgment 
required; 
Hazardous?   
Applicable -Exposure 
of 90 sec for 
calculation Applicable 
Power plant 
(Excess Loads) 
Explosive ignition of 
flammable vapours       Catastrophic   
Applicable -Exposure 
of 90 sec for 
calculation Applicable 
Power plant 
(Excess Loads) 
Rupture of pressurised 
components (oxidiser 
tank)       Hazardous   Catastrophic for SoA Applicable 
Power plant 
(Excess Loads) Inadvertent firing of rocket       Catastrophic 
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional identified 
for Suborbital ops Applicable  N/A 
Power plant 
(Excess Loads) 
Engine (or APU) seizure 
loads       Hazardous   N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Power plant(Excess Loads) Abnormal thrust vectors       
Variable - 
engineering 
judgment 
required; 
Hazardous? 
Causes by engine 
mount failures, 
inadvertent thrust 
reverser 
deployment, 
compressor surge, 
nozzle failures, etc. 
Nozzle blockage/ 
asymmetric ablation Applicable 
Power plant 
(Excess Loads) Fuel Imbalance       
Variable - 
engineering 
judgment 
required; 
Hazardous? 
Caused by 
asymmetric loading 
or use of fuel, or 
leaking or trapped 
fuel, or improper 
transfer N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant 
(thrust) 
Thrust Loss (detected) 
2 to 55% (twins)       
Minor to 
Hazardous (note 
2) 
Take off abort/ over-
run from take-off 
power set to V1 N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant 
(thrust) 
Thrust Loss (detected) 
2 to 55% (twins)       
Minor to Major 
(note 3) 
Air turn 
back/diversion after 
V1 N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant 
(thrust) 
Thrust Loss (undetected) 
2 to 55% (twins)       
Minor to 
Catastrophic 
(note 4) 
Unable to clear 
obstacle during any 
flight phase N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Power plant 
(thrust) 
Thrust Loss (detected) 
> 55% (twins)       
Minor to 
Hazardous (note 
2) 
Take off abort/ over-
run from take-off 
power set to V1 N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant 
(thrust) 
Thrust Loss (undetected) 
> 55% (twins)       Catastrophic  
Over-run/unable to 
clear obstacle from 
take-off power N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant 
(thrust) 
Thrust Loss  
> 55% (twins)       Catastrophic  
Unable to maintain 
altitude during take-
off between V1 and 
1500' AGL N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant(thrust) Thrust Loss > 55% (twins)       Catastrophic  
Unable to maintain 
altitude during en-
route N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant 
(thrust) Rocket Thrust Loss       
Major to 
Hazardous 
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional identified 
for Suborbital ops;  
In this instance, the 
SoA would abort the 
rocket phase and 
recover stability and 
then do a normal 
glide/approach N/A 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Power plant 
(thrust) 
Inadvertent in-flight thrust 
reversal       
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic   N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant 
(thrust) Loss of reverse thrust       
Minor to 
Catastrophic  
During landing or 
rejected take-off 
(severity dependent 
on runway 
condition) N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant 
(thrust) 
Loss of thrust control 
required to meet 
certification or operational 
control manoeuvrability, 
or crew workload 
requirements       
Major to 
Catastrophic   
Possibly due to loss 
of fluids through 
zero-g (so must have 
mitigation of fluid 
systems designed to 
cope with zero-g)  
Applicable only if  
carrier is to 
perform 
parabolic flights: 
Possibly due to 
loss of fluids 
through zero-g 
(so must have 
mitigation of 
fluid systems 
designed to cope 
with zero-g)  
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Power plant(thrust) 
Loss of system redundancy 
or functionality due to 
engine (or APU) failure        
Variable - 
engineering 
judgment 
required; 
Hazardous? 
Caused by loss of 
electrical power 
generation, or 
hydraulics pumps, or 
ECS bleed air, or 
anti-ice bleed air  N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant 
(display) 
Display of fuel level 
indication Minor Minor Major     
fluid systems must 
cope with zero-g 
phase 
Applicable only if  
carrier is to 
perform 
parabolic flights: 
fluid systems 
must cope with 
zero-g phase 
Power plant 
(display) 
Display of power plant oil 
temperature Minor Minor Minor     N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Power plant 
(display) 
Display of power plant oil 
pressure 
 
Minor  
 
Minor  
 
Minor      N/A (see note 5) 
Applicable only if  
carrier is to 
perform 
parabolic flights: 
fluid systems 
must cope with 
zero-g phase 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Power plant 
(display) 
Display of hydraulic 
pressure 
Hazardous for SS2, 
Minor for WK2 
Hazardous for SS2, 
Minor for WK2 
Hazardous for SS2, 
Minor for WK2   
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional identified 
for Suborbital ops 
fluid systems must 
cope with zero-g 
phase 
Applicable only if  
carrier is to 
perform 
parabolic flights: 
fluid systems 
must cope with 
zero-g phase 
Power plant 
(display) 
Display of power plant fuel 
pressure Minor Minor Major     Applicable  Applicable  
Power plant 
(display) 
Display of rocket fuel 
pressure ? ? ?   
Variable - 
engineering 
judgment required; 
Hazardous? Applicable  N/A 
Power plant(display) 
Display of power 
plant/rocket thrust Major  Minor Hazardous     Applicable  Applicable 
Power plant 
(display) 
Display of power 
plant/rocket fire warning Major Major Hazardous     Applicable  Applicable 
Power plant 
(display) 
Display of power plant 
thrust reverser position Major   Major     N/A (see note 5)   
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Propellant 
Fuel or propellant/ 
oxidiser feed/fuel supply       
 
Major to 
Hazardous 
(depending on 
phase) for SS2; 
Catastrophic FOR 
WK2   Applicable  
Applicable only if  
carrier is to 
perform 
parabolic flights: 
fluid systems 
must cope with 
zero-g phase 
Propellant Rocket abort        Catastrophic 
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional identified 
for Suborbital ops 
should a non-
nominal situation 
occur (LOC or 
excessive vibration) 
then the rocket 
phase must be able 
to be aborted to 
avoid a Catastrophic 
outcome N/A 
Propellant 
fuel/propellant/ oxidiser 
tank integrity       Catastrophic   Applicable  Applicable 
Propellant 
fuel/propellant/ oxidiser 
jettison       Hazardous   
could be 
Catastrophic 
could be 
Catastrophic 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Propellant 
Un-commanded 
fuel/propellant/ oxidiser 
jettison       
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic   Applicable  Applicable 
Ice Protection 
Inlet, engine or other 
power plant ice protection 
on multiple power plants 
when required       Hazardous   N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Ice Protection 
engine/power plant ice 
protection       Hazardous   N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Ice Protection 
Activation of engine inlet 
ice protection above limit 
temperatures       Hazardous   N/A (see note 5) Applicable 
Pressurisation Cabin Decompression       
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic   Applicable  Applicable 
Structure 
Control surfaces structural 
failure       
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic   Applicable  Applicable 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Structure 
Landing gear structural 
failure on hard landing or 
soft ground       Catastrophic   Applicable  Applicable 
Structure 
Loss of vent and 
pressurization 
(fuel/oxidizer system)       Catastrophic   Applicable  Applicable 
Fire Risks Fire risk due to oxygen        Catastrophic   
Fire suppression 
system needs to be 
considered for 
closed loop cabin Applicable  
Fire Risks 
Fire risk due to electrical 
faults in equipment       Catastrophic 
bonding, such that 
effects of lightning 
are minimized 
Fire suppression 
system needs to be 
considered for 
closed loop cabin Applicable  
Fire Risks 
Fire risk due to 
overheating brakes        Catastrophic   
Dependant on 
individual SoA 
design Applicable  
Other Risks Wheels up landing       Hazardous    Applicable  Applicable  
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
Other Risks 
Loss of cabin egress 
capability       
Hazardous to 
Catastrophic   Applicable  Applicable  
Other Risks 
Unintended Spaceship - 
Carrier separation       
Hazardous if 
sufficient height 
to obtain 
aerodynamic 
glide to land; 
otherwise 
Catastrophic   
Engineering 
judgment as new 
technology 
Hazardous or No 
effect? 
Other Risks 
Loss of (airframe) ice 
protection when required       Hazardous   N/A As required 
Other Risks 
Seat Restraint whilst under 
'g' force        Hazardous 
Engineering 
Judgment - 
additional identified 
for Suborbital ops 
Marginal to 
Hazardous to 
participants  
Applicable only if  
carrier is to 
perform 
parabolic flights: 
Marginal to 
Hazardous to 
participants  
                  
         
 
References: 
This FHA list has been compiled from example FHA in AC23.1309, ARP 5150 and the EASA paper (Marciacq et.al) and knowledge of existing functions for 
spaceflight operations with a Carrier/Spaceship configuration 
 
Notes: 
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    Classification of Failure Condition Comment 
Comments and 
Applicability to  
Suborbital Aircraft 
Comments and 
additional 
applicability to  
Carrier aircraft 
(for the SoA) 
Systems Function 
Total Loss of 
Function 
(with warning) 
Loss of Primary 
Means of Providing 
Function 
Misleading and/or 
Malfunction  
(without warning) 
General 
Functional Failure 
(Loss or Incorrect)     
 
Note 1: % is total aircraft/spaceship thrust. Threshold values are based on typical (aircraft only) margins. Thrust reductions caused strictly by pilot error are not considered a 'Thrust Loss 
Scenario' for the purpose of this table. The failure condition severities noted here are based solely on the effects of thrust loss and not on any other potential effects of causal failures (e.g. 
potential hazards associated with damage from an uncontained engine failure, loss of electrical or hydraulic systems are not reflected here). therefore these severities are generally dependent 
on the effects of the thrust loss scenario has on aircraft performance relative to certified field length or obstacle clearance limits (i.e. see 14 CFR Part 121 Subpart I and 14 CFR Part 25 Subpart 
B).  
 
Note 2: The worst case scenario is where the thrust is such that it occurs throughout the take-off roll but is only detected at or near V1 and the aircraft is too far down the runway to avoid a 
high speed over-run. 
 
Note 3: The severity of the effects from these performance losses will be dependent on the aircraft type design, the mission, and the scenario. 
 
Note 4:  The two scenarios here which produce the greatest risk of striking an obstacle, either during take-off or en-route, are; a) operating for an extended period of time with a small 
symmetric thrust loss (2 to 15%) followed by an engine failure; and b) operating for a short period (perhaps a flight or two) with a larger thrust loss. 
 
Note 5:  For Suborbital Aircraft (SoA) the engine-related failures have been noted as 'Not Applicable' (N/A/) as it is assumed that the SoA do not have engines for normal flight i.e. only a rocket. 
However it is appreciated that some designs may incorporate a rocket and an engine(s) - in this case, the engine-related functions and failures thereof are applicable. 
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APPENDIX 7 - Exemplar Suborbital Aircraft (Partial) Functional Hazard Analysis – Aircraft Level 
The following exemplar aircraft level FHA is provided to illustrate the functional failure conditions and the derived aircraft level Key (Platform) Hazard. Only the first few functions 
are shown to illustrate the technique (Block 1.1 to 2.2): 
Aircraft Function FBD 
Ref 
Specific Function Functional Failure Guide 
Word 
Functional Failure Effect Classification Resultant Failure 
Condition 
Resultant 
platform level 
Key (Platform) 
Hazard 
  
1.1 PROVIDE 
THRUST  
1.1.1 PROVIDE ENGINE 
MOTIVE SOURCE 
Omission No thrust provided when required As per normal aviation  Catastrophic Loss of Engine 
Thrust 
Undetected 
inappropriate 
Engine Thrust Commission Thrust provided when not required As per normal aviation  Hazardous Un-commanded 
Engine Thrust 
Incorrect Thrust incorrect As per normal aviation  Hazardous 
Incorrect 
(PARTIAL) Engine 
Thrust 
                
1.1.2 PROVIDE ROCKET 
MOTIVE SOURCE 
Omission No/Loss of  Rocket thrust when required Flight Aborted - glide to land or power up 
aero-engines 
Major-Hazardous Loss of Rocket 
Thrust 
Undetected 
inappropriate 
Rocket Thrust 
Commission Rocket Thrust provided when not required If connected to a carrier aircraft could be 
catastrophic - if not, then would be 
hazardous to catastrophic depending on 
flight phase 
Catastrophic - Hazardous Un-commanded 
Rocket Thrust 
Incorrect Asymmetric thrust vector Incorrect thrust vector resulting in Non-
nominal flight path 
Catastrophic Incorrect 
(PARTIAL) 
Rocket Motive 
Force  
  
1.2 PROVIDE 
CONTROL OF 
1.2.1 PROVIDE GROUND 
STABILITY 
Omission Loss of stability on the ground   Hazardous Loss of stability 
on the ground 
Undetected 
inappropriate 
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AIRCRAFT ON 
GROUND 
Commission Ground Stability provided when not 
required 
  Hazardous N/A Ground 
Stability 
Incorrect  Incorrect stability   Hazardous N/A 
                
1.2.2 PROVIDE BRAKING Omission No braking when required on ground   Hazardous Loss of braking Undetected 
inappropriate 
Braking Commission Braking when not required on ground   Hazardous Un-commanded 
braking 
Incorrect Incorrect braking    Hazardous Incorrect braking  
                
1.2.3 PROVIDE STEERING Omission Loss of steering when required   Hazardous Loss of steering Undetected 
inappropriate 
Steering 
Commission Steering input when not required   Hazardous N/A 
Incorrect Incorrect Steering   Hazardous Incorrect 
Steering 
  
1.3 PROVIDE 
CONTROL OF 
AIRCRAFT 
ATTITUDE 
1.3.1 PROVIDE CONTROL 
OF AIRCRAFT 
PITCH ATTITUDE 
Omission Loss of ability to control pitch attitude   Hazardous-Catastrophic Loss of pitch 
attitude control 
Undetected 
inappropriate 
Flight Control Commission Un-commanded change in pitch attitude   Hazardous-Catastrophic Un-commanded 
change in pitch 
attitude 
Incorrect Incorrect pitch attitude/incorrect speed 
control 
  Hazardous-Catastrophic Incorrect pitch 
control 
                
1.3.2 PROVIDE CONTROL 
OF AIRCRAFT ROLL 
ATTITUDE 
Omission Loss of ability to control aircraft roll attitude   Hazardous-Catastrophic Loss of roll 
attitude control  
Undetected 
inappropriate 
Flight Control Commission Un-commanded change in aircraft roll 
attitude 
  Hazardous-Catastrophic Un-commanded 
change in roll 
attitude 
Incorrect Incorrect roll attitude/incorrect heading   Hazardous-Catastrophic Incorrect roll 
control 
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1.3.3 PROVIDE CONTROL 
OF AIRCRAFT YAW 
ATTITUDE 
Omission Loss of ability to control aircraft yaw   Hazardous-Catastrophic Loss of yaw 
attitude control  
Undetected 
inappropriate 
Flight Control 
    Commission Un-commanded change in aircraft yaw   Hazardous-Catastrophic Un-commanded 
change in yaw 
attitude 
    Incorrect Incorrect yaw attitude   Hazardous-Catastrophic Incorrect Yaw 
attitude 
                
1.3.3 PROVIDE STABILITY 
AUGMENTATION 
(SPACE 
SEGEMENT) 
Omission Loss of ability to stabilize ac SoA may not be in optimum angle for 
descent and may lose control 
Hazardous-Catastrophic Loss of Reaction 
Control System 
Undetected 
inappropriate 
Stability 
Augmentation 
(or same as 
above i.e. 
undetected 
inappropriate 
flight control) 
  Commission Un-commanded stability augmentation May change flight path but should have 
little effect 
N/A N/A 
  Incorrect Incorrect stability augmentation N/A - Subset of above N/A N/A 
  
1.4 PROVIDE 
STRUCTURAL 
INTEGRITY 
1.4.1 PROVIDE PRIMARY 
STRUCTURAL 
INTEGRITY 
Omission Loss of aircraft primary structural integrity   Catastrophic Loss of aircraft 
primary 
structural 
integrity 
Undetected 
inappropriate 
Structural 
Failure 
Commission Provision of  primary structural integrity 
when not required 
N/A N/A N/A 
Incorrect Incorrect primary structural integrity N/A N/A N/A 
                
1.4.2 PROVIDE 
SECONDARY 
STRUCTURAL 
INTEGRITY 
Omission Loss of aircraft  secondary  structural 
integrity 
  Hazardous Detachment of 
secondary 
structure 
Undetected 
inappropriate 
Structural 
Failure Commission Provision of  secondary structural integrity 
when not required 
N/A N/A N/A 
Incorrect Incorrect secondary structural integrity N/A N/A N/A 
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1.4.3 PROVIDE DYNAMIC 
ELEMENTS 
INTEGRITY 
Omission Loss of aircraft  dynamic  integrity control surfaces structural failure may lead 
to loss of control/loss of structural integrity 
Hazardous-Catastrophic Loss of aircraft 
dynamic 
structural 
integrity 
Undetected 
inappropriate 
Structural 
Failure 
Commission Provision of  dynamic integrity when not 
required 
N/A N/A N/A 
Incorrect Incorrect dynamic integrity N/A N/A N/A 
                  
1.5 PROVIDE 
VISIBILITY 
1.5.1 PROVIDE VISIBILITY 
OF OUTSIDE 
WORLD 
Omission Loss of visibility of the outside world   Hazardous Loss of external 
visibility from 
the aircraft. 
Undetected 
inappropriate 
SoA Position 
Commission Visibility of the outside world when not 
required 
N/A N/A N/A 
Incorrect Incorrect external visibility N/A N/A N/A 
                
1.5.2 PROVIDE VISIBILITY 
OF AIRCRAFT 
INTERIOR 
Omission Loss of visibility of aircraft interior   Hazardous Loss of visibility 
of the aircraft 
interior 
Undetected 
inappropriate 
SoA Position 
Commission Visibility of the aircraft interior when not 
required 
N/A N/A N/A 
Incorrect Incorrect internal visibility N/A N/A N/A 
                  
2.1 PROVIDE 
OPERATIONAL 
AWARENESS OF 
AIRCRAFT STATE 
2.1.1 PROVIDE DISPLAY 
OF  ALTITUDE 
Omission Loss of ability to provide barometric display   Minor   Undetected 
inappropriate 
Altitude 
Commission Un-commanded barometric display N/A N/A N/A 
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Incorrect Incorrect barometric display   Hazardous   
                
2.1.2 PROVIDE DISPLAY 
OF ATTITUDE 
Omission Loss of ability to provide attitude display   Catastrophic   Undetected 
inappropriate 
Attitude Commission Un-commanded attitude display N/A N/A N/A 
Incorrect Incorrect attitude display   Catastrophic   
                
2.1.3 PROVIDE DISPLAY 
OF SPEED 
Omission Loss of ability to provide airspeed display   Major-Hazardous   Undetected 
inappropriate 
Speed Commission Un-commanded airspeed display N/A N/A N/A 
Incorrect Incorrect airspeed display   Hazardous   
                
2.1.6 PROVIDE DISPLAY 
OF HEADING 
Omission Loss of ability to display aircraft heading   Major-Hazardous   Undetected 
inappropriate 
Heading Commission Un-commanded change in aircraft  
displayed heading  
  N/A N/A 
Incorrect Incorrect display of aircraft heading   Hazardous   
                  
2.2 PROVIDE 
AIRCRAFT 
CURRENT 
POSITION AND 
NAVIGATION DATA 
2.2.1 PROVIDE CURRENT 
AIRCRAFT 
POSITION 
Omission Loss of current aircraft position   Major-Hazardous   Undetected 
inappropriate 
SoA Position Commission Position determined when not required   N/A N/A 
Incorrect Incorrect position determined   Hazardous Undetected 
incorrect aircraft 
position error.  
                
2.2.2 PROVIDE AIRCRAFT 
FLIGHT PATH 
GUIDANCE 
Omission Loss of ability to provide  aircraft flight path 
guidance 
  Hazardous N/A Undetected 
inappropriate 
Flight Path Commission Relative position of destination determined 
when not required 
N/A N/A N/A 
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Incorrect  Incorrect Flight Path   Catastrophic for Precision 
approaches - otherwise 
Hazardous 
Undetected 
incorrect aircraft 
flight path 
selection.  
         
  
Guide Words 
Omission 
Means failure to operate, lack of indication or warning, jammed or free operation 
  
Commission 
Means inadvertent or uncommanded operation, and false indication or warning 
  
Incorrect Means intermittent operation, partial or degraded operation, nuisance indications or warnings, false or delayed data input/output or display. Runaway (full or 
partial), changes in characteristics 
         
  
Key (Platform) 
Hazards 
Key (Platform) Hazards derived from the FHA are highlighted in the final column as detailed here: 
 
Denotes a Key 
(Platform) 
Hazard 
(platform level) 
  
Lower-Level 
System Hazards 
(Failure 
Conditions) 
Those Functional Failures derived from the FHA that are highlighted in the second to last column are considered relevant but are lower-level functional 
failures i.e. system-level failure conditions 
Denotes a lower 
system-level 
failure condition   
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APPENDIX 8 - PAPER 1 – Operators SMS; presented at IAC, 
Valencia, 2006 
 
SUBMISSION FOR 57th IAF Category E3.4 
 
SAFETY MANAGEMENT OF SPACE TOURISM 
 
Charles Andrew Quinn MSc AMRAeS – High Wycombe, UK 
 
ABSTRACT 
Travelling at 3 times the speed of sound during the ascent and experiencing 5 times Earth’s nominal 
gravitational forces during re-entry is not a normal flight profile. How does the general public, let 
alone highly trained flight crew, cope with these and other exacting environmental factors during a 
suborbital spaceflight?  To enable the innovative space tourism industry to achieve success, designers 
and operators must constantly view the challenge from a safety perspective. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has produced regulatory guidelines to cover the varying design proposals of 
prospective Re-Launch Vehicle (RLV) operators and these guidelines provide baseline measures. The 
challenge for the RLV operators is to employ criteria to meet and exceed the guidelines.  
This paper examines the challenges using a Safety Management System (SMS) approach. The author 
has undertaken the available training for the space participants to gather experiential research data, 
including radial G-Force experience (centrifuge and flight in an RAF Hawk), simulated zero-G forces 
(parabola flight), aircraft simulator training, disorientation training (disorientation motion simulator 
and 3-axis ‘spaceball’), and hyperbaric training (decompression chamber and pressure breathing). 
This practical data, together with the theoretical analysis of American and Russian operated space 
flight profiles, and the Scaled Composite’s SpaceShipOne profile,  enabled the author to identify key 
issues  that need to be addressed; G-Forces, Life Support Systems, Noise, Vibration, Radiation and 
Medical standards.  A high-level Safety Case methodology was reviewed, employing the Goal 
Structured Notation (GSN) model, whereby evidence was examined to support arguments that the 
overall goal is satisfied – ‘the flight crew and space participants are acceptably safe for spaceflight’.    
The findings verified the requirement for an SMS approach, including safety by design in the early 
stages being a critical factor. The practical research phase highlighted that psychological and 
physiological management of the flight crew, especially for the space participants, is vital to assure 
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the success of the industry.  The outcome of the research included recommendations for an SMS 
approach, including mitigating measures in order to satisfy and exceed FAA requirements.  It is 
concluded that exacting environments require high levels of safety management, both in design and 
operation; an RLV with in-built safety features still requires an effective safety culture embedded 
within an operator’s effective SMS to avoid a disastrous event. Space tourism can be successful, so 
long as safety management principles are proactively employed from the beginning and with 
commitment at all levels of the industry.          
Full paper at: 
www.saturnsms.com 
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APPENDIX 9 - PAPER 2 – Micro-Gravity; Presented To QinetiQ for 
UK CAA Consideration 
 
CERTIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR MICRO-GRAVITY FLIGHTS WITHIN UK 
C.A. Quinn – QinetiQ, Bristol, UK 
Abstract 
The emergence of the Commercial Spaceflight Industry has provided opportunities for companies in 
regards of design, manufacture, operations and training. Within the latter field, parabolic flights to 
facilitate ‘micro-gravity’ experiences are regarded as integral to a spaceflight Operator’s passenger 
training programme. Currently, there are no UK CAA regulations covering this activity. To enable 
micro-gravity flights to commence within the UK, regulations and guidance need to be produced in 
advance to permit the activity. 
This paper examines differing approaches to micro-gravity flight certification and the necessary 
methodology to ensure the safe management of the activity. The paper also presents the view that 
micro-gravity flights should be granted permission to fly, qualifying under the CAA’s Certificate of 
Airworthiness by demonstration of compliance within defined modification and verification 
standards. 
Full paper at: 
www.saturnsms.com 
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APPENDIX 10 - PAPER 3 – Centrifuge as Key Safety Mitigation; 
presented at IAASS, Rome, Italy, October 2008 
 
Submitted for: The IAA 1st Symposium on Private Manned Access to Space  
Commission III (Space Technology and System Development) 
CENTRIFUGE TRAINING AS KEY SAFETY MITIGATION IN THE COMMERCIAL 
SPACEFLIGHT INDUSTRY 
 
Authors 
Andy Quinn MSc AMRAeS IEng - Operations Director, Worldview Spaceflight 
Dr Henry Lupa    - Senior Physiologist, QinetiQ 
Alec Stevens    - Physiologist, QinetiQ 
 
Abstract 
Sub-orbital spaceflight profiles may nominally incur gravitational forces up to 4Gz and/or 4Gx during 
the ascent, depending on spacecraft design, and up to 7Gx during the descent, once again depending 
on spacecraft design and also procedures. Will the general public cope with these extreme stresses on 
the body, especially considering that the duress may exceed 90 seconds during ascent and then again 
during descent?  The emergence of the commercial spaceflight industry has provided opportunities for 
companies in regards of design, manufacture, operations and training. Within the latter field, 
centrifuge training to facilitate gravitational forces should be regarded as key to a spaceflight 
operator’s passenger training programme. Currently, there are no regulatory requirements for 
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passengers to undertake centrifuge training, with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) stating 
that passengers should have ‘emergency briefs’. 
This paper examines the role of centrifuge training as part of an effective safety management system 
(SMS), including a comprehensive training programme for passengers (and indeed flight crew) as part 
of risk mitigation. The justification for centrifuge training will be quantified by numerical evidence 
from centrifuge runs carried out on non-military and non-astronaut candidates in practical runs 
involving video footage and the measurement of vital statistics. The paper also presents the view that 
an effective aerospace medical pre-screening process should also be considered essential as part of the 
mitigation process. Effective safety management would mitigate extreme gravitational forces to as 
low as reasonably practical by introducing design features, warnings, training, processes and 
procedures.    
The findings of the paper verified the rationale for the centrifuge training, combined with an effective 
aerospace medical pre-screening process in assuring the safety of passengers for sub-orbital 
spaceflight. Assessment of each individual’s g-tolerance was considered essential and the subsequent 
training and techniques were found to be invaluable in the prevention of g-induced loss of 
consciousness (G-LOC). It is concluded that prospective spaceflight passengers should participate in 
centrifuge training in order to provide both physiological and psychological mitigation against the 
extreme environment. It is therefore recommended that Regulators of the emerging commercial 
spaceflight industry introduce centrifuge training as a pre-requisite element of Space Operator’s 
preparation of their passengers.    
Full paper at: 
www.saturnsms.com  
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APPENDIX 11 - PAPER 4 – Safety Criteria for the Personal 
Spaceflight Industry; presented at IAASS, Huntsville, USA, May 
2010 
Submitted for: The Fourth IAASS Conference – Making Safety Matter 
Session – ‘Private Spaceflight Safety’ 
 
SAFETY CRITERIA FOR THE PRIVATE SPACEFLIGHT INDUSTRY 
Authors 
Andy Quinn MSc AMRAeS IEng      - Saturn Safety Management Systems Ltd 
Professor Paul Maropoulos CEng FCIRP FIMechE - University of Bath, England  
 
Abstract 
The sub-orbital private spaceflight industry, whilst still in its developmental stages, remains one of the 
most the eagerly anticipated and closely watched new industries of the past few years. The Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) has set specific rules and generic guidelines to cover experimental 
and operational flights by industry forerunners such as Virgin Galactic and XCOR. One such 
guideline [Advisory Circular 437.55-1, dated April 20, 2007] contains ‘exemplar’ hazard analyses for 
spacecraft designers and operators to follow under an experimental permit; in particular stating that 
the guidelines are not mandatory and that they are for demonstrating compliance with certain 
requirements associated with the launch or re-entry of a reusable suborbital rocket.  However in 
terms of severity classifications, the hazard analysis guideline merely considers harm to the public and 
the public property. The guideline stops short of providing meaningful guidance on the safety criteria 
and on determining the loss of the spacecraft (cumulative probability of safety critical failures). The 
Advisory Circular does not attempt to address the potential differences in risk levels with the different 
launch design solutions, such as vertical launches, horizontal single stage launches and airborne 
launches. This issue is also considered in a report to the United States Congress entitled ‘Analysis of 
Human Space Flight Safety’ where the authors (members of The Aerospace Corporation, George 
Washington University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) cite that the industry is too 
immature and has insufficient data to be proscriptive and that ‘defining a minimum set of criteria for 
human spaceflight service providers is potentially problematic’ in order not to ‘stifle the emerging 
industry’. The authors of this paper contend that it is better practice to have a sound safety 
engineering approach that can be modified with time as opposed to redrawing unsound criteria when 
accidents occur. This paper aims to address the problematic issue of safety criteria for the emerging 
personal spaceflight industry. Our methodology is firstly to synthesise ‘best practice’ approaches from 
the aviation and space industries. These will in turn provide the basis for a set of proposals and 
guidelines which will provide more robust safety criteria than those currently defined in FAA 
guidelines. We also examine the current hazard analysis Advisory Circular 437.55-1 and argue that 
additional clarification is needed to assist and inform spacecraft designers, constructors and operators. 
These groups should have been/should be using these guidelines now to construct their own System 
Safety Program Plans to be able to 'demonstrate compliance with certain requirements’ for 
experimental permits; the authors acknowledge the immaturity of the industry yet contend that these 
groups should be assisted and not left to define their own criteria. The paper also argues for more 
clarity in definitions and intent for using the classification tables as criteria in the current guidelines.   
Full paper at: www.saturnsms.com 
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APPENDIX 12 - PAPER 5 – An Integrated Safety Model for 
Suborbital Spaceflight, presented at IAASS, Paris, France, Oct 2011 
 
Submitted for: The Fifth IAASS Conference – Making Safety Matter 
Session – ‘Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety’ 
NEW SAFETY MODEL FOR THE COMMERCIAL HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT INDUSTRY 
Authors 
Andy Quinn MSc MRAeS CEng    - Saturn Safety Management 
Systems Ltd 
Dr Steve Bond PhD MRAeS CEng    - City University, London, 
England 
Professor Paul Maropoulos     -  University of Bath, England 
 
Abstract 
The aviation and space domains have safety guidelines and recommended practices for Design 
Organisations (DOs) and Operators alike. In terms of Aerospace DOs there are certification criteria to 
meet and to demonstrate compliance there are Advisory Circulars or Acceptable Means of 
Compliance to follow. Additionally there are guidelines such as Aerospace Recommended Practices 
(ARP), Military Standards (MIL-STD 882 series) and System Safety Handbooks to follow in order to 
identify and manage failure conditions. In terms of Operators there are FAA guidelines and a useful 
ARP that details many tools and techniques in understanding Operator Safety Risks. However there is 
currently no methodology for linking the DO and Operator safety efforts. In the space domain NASA 
have provided safety standards and guidelines to follow and also within Europe there are European 
Co-operation of Space Standardization (ECSS) to follow. Within the emerging Commercial Human 
Spaceflight Industry, the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation has provided hazard 
analysis guidelines. However all of these space domain safety documents are based on the existing 
aerospace methodology and once again, there is no link between the DO and Operator’s safety effort.    
This paper addresses the problematic issue and presents a coherent methodology of joining up the 
System Safety effort of the DOs to the Operator Safety Risk Management such that a ‘Total System’ 
approach is adopted. Part of the rationale is that the correct mitigation (control) can be applied within 
the correct place in the accident sequence. Also this contiguous approach ensures that the Operator is 
fully aware of the safety risks (at the accident level) and therefore has an appreciation of the Total 
System Risk.  
The authors of this paper contend that it is better practice to have a fully integrated safety model as 
opposed to disparate requirements or guidelines. Our methodology is firstly to review ‘best practice’ 
approaches from the aviation and space industries, and then to integrate these approaches into a 
contiguous safety model for the commercial human spaceflight industry. 
Full paper at: 
www.saturnsms.com  
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APPENDIX 13 - Safety Suborbital Space Safety Technical 
Committee ‘Explanatory Note’ 
 
The Author proposed to have a new Technical Committee (TC) for Suborbital Space Safety (SSS) because of 
the uniqueness of the new field; the current Space Safety & Launch Safety Committees were mainly concerned 
with Orbital (Governmental) Safety and would not necessarily understand the need for a new approach for the 
(nominally) aircraft-based Suborbital vehicles. The ‘Explanatory Note’ contains the author’s views and ideas on 
how the new SSS TC could be formed and how the TC could influence safety in the suborbital domain. 
 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of this new Suborbital Space Safety Technical Committee (SSS TC) is to focus on the emerging 
technical issues as the industry develops towards regular suborbital operations. The timing for introducing this 
TC is pertinent with the leading companies entering their flight test phases; thus the media will be and the world 
will be watching to determine for themselves the viability and safeness of this exciting new venture. 
The SSS TC will address technical issues for suborbital operations only and will cover the following all modes 
of operation:  Horizontal take-off (with either powered or un-powered approach and landing) – 
typically a EADS (Atrium) model  Horizontal Rocket Launch (with either powered or un-powered approach and 
landing) – typically an XCOR model  Air Launch (with either powered or un-powered approach and landing) – 
typically a Virgin Galactic model  Vertical Rocket Launch and Recovery – typically a Blue Origin model  Plus any other emerging mode of operation in the suborbital domain 
The rationale for a separate TC is that some of the above modes of operation have aircraft-based designs and 
therefore may adhere to standard aviation recognised practices and certification approaches. Additionally as the 
suborbital flight profile has a more contained ‘footprint’ the emphasis for safety must primarily include the 
airworthiness/ space-worthiness of the vehicle in order to protect those on board as well as those in support of 
the take-off or launch and of course, the general public (3rd parties);the effect to 3rd parties should be minimised 
in the case of suborbital flights because the NOTAM area will be in a sparsely populated area (as opposed to an 
Orbital launch or re-entry whose trajectory will overly populated areas at some point). 
 
INTEGRATION WITH EXISTING TECHNICAL COMMITTEES 
Whilst the SSS TC will focus on the suborbital technical issues there may be an overlap of safety topics 
concerning other TCs.  Where a topic is clearly more suited to another TC, then that TC should either have 
already addressed the issue or the new issue should be raised by the SSS TC with the relevant TC to deal with. 
Once the issue has been discussed in the TC the outcome shall be reviewed and further discussed within the SSS 
TC to achieve consensus. 
The following issues of overlap are anticipated:  Suborbital Vertical Launches only; interaction required of the Launch Safety TC  Suborbital Human Factors and Performance issues; interaction required with the 
HFPS TC  Suborbital ‘Space’ segment of flight; interaction required with the Legal 
Regulatory Committee 
MEMBERS 
The members for  the SSS TC is composed of relevant Agency personnel and IAASS General Members; both of 
these categories of people have been chosen for their knowledge, interest and professional attributes such that a 
credible body can be constituted to provide informed judgement on suborbital space safety matters. 
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Committee Role Name and Organisation Contact Details 
Chair Andy Quinn (Saturn SMS) Andy.quinn@iaass.org 
Co-Chair Maite Trujillo (ESA) Maite.trujillo@iaass.org 
Agency Member Jean-Bruno Marciacq (EASA) Jean-Bruno.Marciacq@easa.europa.eu 
Agency Member Melchor Antunano (FAA) Melchor.J.Antunano@faa.gov 
Space Society 
Member 
Norul Ridzuan (Malaysian STS) ikam290200@hotmail.com 
Industry Member Christophe Chavagnac (EADS-Astrium) christophe.chavagnac@astrium.eads.net 
Industry Member Chuck Lauer – Rocketplane (Spacelinq) ChuckLauer@aol.com 
General Members Diane Howard (McGill University – Air & 
Space Law) 
ladydi814@me.com 
General Members Tanya Masson-Zwaan (Deputy Director 
International Institute of Air & Space 
Law) 
t.l.masson@law.leidenuniv.nl 
General Members Simon Adebola – previous IAASS paper 
on Emergency Medicine for Human 
Suborbital Spaceflight 
simonadebola@gmail.com 
General Members Amaya Atencia Yepez (GMV) – Systems 
RAMS expert and has also worked in the 
aerospace domain 
aatencia@gmv.com 
Other Specialists 
Invited 
Dr Eric Groen (TNO) – expert in 
aerospace medical and human factors 
specialist 
eric.groen@tno.nl 
Other Specialists 
Invited 
Manual Vals Toimil  (previous ESA head 
of integration crew missions) 
mvallstoimil@gmail.com 
Other Specialists 
Invited 
Arno Wilders – Space Horizon arno@spacehorizon.com 
Other Specialists 
Invited 
Misuzo Onuki mszmail@aol.com 
Other Specialists 
Invited 
Karin Nilsdotter karin@spaceportsweden.com 
 
Other Specialists 
Invited 
Rafael Harillo Gomez-Pastrana harillo@stardust-consulting.es 
 
SUBORBITAL TOPICAL ISSUES  
 
The SSS TC will address issues only relating to suborbital space safety  
(a) General – Papers/Workshops/Panels 
o Current Status and Development of Suborbital Industry – Paper (relevant for 
presentation to:   UNCOPUOS (June 2011)  5th IAASS Suborbital Space Safety Panel Discussion (Oct 2011)  2-day workshop to support IAASS Conference? (on technical issues below)  ISSF-IAASS workshop (on technical issues below)  Preside over Suborbital Space Safety Panel Discussion and Sessions at the 
IAASS Conferences  Technical Issues  Defining & Harmonization of Safety Criteria  Defining & Harmonization of Certification ‘v’ Launch Licensing  Provide Guidance on Design System Safety Analysis for Suborbital 
vehicles  ECLSS 
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 Rockets  Propellants  Other suborbital specific design issues   Provide Guidance on Suborbital Operations:  Operator Safety Risk Management for Suborbital vehicles  Pilot Considerations (qualifications and training)  Passenger Considerations (medical and training)  Spaceport Considerations  ATM Considerations  Promotion of Sector  Newsletter  Attending Relevant Conferences  Publications  Update to IAASS – ISSB Space Safety Standard Manual (Commercial Human-
Rated System)  Monitoring of Occurrences/Advice to Accident Investigations 
 
 
 
 
 
